24 November 2024

More Than Brute Force Is Needed To Upset Hezbollah’s Financial Network – Analysis

James Durso

Israel recently attacked banks in Lebanon it alleges are part of the financial network that supports Iran-backed terror group Hezbollah (a member of the Lebanese government). While Israel is great at the blowing-up aspect of fighting Hezbollah’s financial network, a bank is just a building, a mailing address — not “the network.”

The U.S. government has been working to disrupt Hezbollah’s financial network since it designated the group a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997, part of a broader strategy to weaken the group’s operational capabilities and reduce its influence.

Among the tools used by the U.S. are: 
  • Sanctions and financial alerts: The U.S. Department of the Treasury has imposed sanctions on individuals and entities involved in financial operations with Hezbollah ties. These sanctions are designed to restrict Hezbollah’s access to the global financial system. In addition, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has issued alerts to financial institutions to help them identify and report suspicious activities related to Hezbollah.
  • International cooperation and targeting financial networks: The U.S. has coordinated with other countries, such as Qatar, to impose sanctions on Hezbollah financiers. Also, the U.S. has targeted Hezbollah’s financial networks, including those involved in oil smuggling, money laundering, and illegal weapons procurement.

On Climate, Will Trump Have It All His Own Way? – Analysis

Dhesigen Naidoo

Donald Trump’s comments during his 2024 campaign trail, together with his actions during his first presidency, suggest doom and gloom for the global climate agenda – and a severe retardation of climate action during his upcoming second term.

But new factors determine the global landscape compared to 2016, offering a more nuanced set of possibilities for climate action.

Trump announced the United States’ (US) withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change in 2017. The official exit came in November 2020, just before the end of his first term. Although President Joe Biden’s administration soon reversed the departure, some damage was done. A second withdrawal could be devastating.

Trump also appointed climate change sceptics to key positions within the US administration and beyond. He picked Scott Pruitt as Environmental Protection Agency head and nominated David Malpass – famous for denying the scientific consensus on the link between fossil fuels and global warming – as president of the World Bank. The bank is a key body expected to support an international movement to a lower carbon economy.

Elon Musk’s $2 Trillion Fiscal Fantasy

JEFFREY FRANKEL

When the US presidential election was called for Donald Trump, the yield on ten-year US government bonds increased from 4.3% to 4.4%, and the 30-year-bond yield rose from 4.5% to 4.6%, with both remaining at those levels ten days later. As the bond market declined – higher yields mean lower prices – the stock market rose. Clearly, investors expect the next Trump administration to produce higher government budget deficits and more debt.

It is not difficult to see why. During Trump’s first term in office, he added $8 trillion to the national debt – all previous presidents combined had accumulated $20 trillion – despite having promised to run budget surpluses so large that they would eliminate the national debt within two terms.

In the campaign, he vowed to cut taxes for seemingly every group that caught his fancy. According to the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget’s central estimate, Trump’s tax proposals imply $10 trillion in foregone revenue over the next ten years. Add to that an extra $1 trillion in interest accrued on the national debt, and the losses far exceed the $3 trillion in added revenue that would come from the sky-high tariffs that Trump has pledged to introduce. This will require the federal government to sell a lot of bonds – a practice that will keep their price low and interest rates high.

Securing AI Labs in the U.S. is a National Imperative

Michael Groen

The United States is at a critical juncture with artificial intelligence as it scales to become capable across a wide range of applications. If current trends continue, advanced AI will transform both national security and economic competitiveness. And as U.S. tech companies and federal laboratories alike continue to push the frontiers of AI capabilities, they become prime targets of espionage, particularly from adversarial nations like China. Congressional leadership can increase protections against foreign espionage as they finalize the National Defense Authorization Act for 2025 to counter this strategic threat. Our adversaries are capitalizing on AI advancements. The time is now for us to act to close the gaps in our security.

The breakthroughs in machine intelligence have placed AI at the center of the global race for technological dominance, with nations competing fiercely not only for the economic advantages AI can unlock but also for its critical military and intelligence applications. The United States, home to world-renowned research institutions, and leading federal and private AI labs, holds the razor-thin edge in this race. However, this advantage is under threat from China, whose government heavily invests in its domestic AI industry and state-sponsored cyberattacks, espionage, and intellectual property theft against U.S. national and private labs are on the rise.

To address these threats, the U.S. government, academia, and the private sector need to take coordinated action. As AI technologies play an increasingly critical role in both civilian and military applications, we need close coordination with counterintelligence agencies to help AI labs identify security vulnerabilities, detect insider threats, and safeguard intellectual property, while also adhering to export control regulations that prevent the unauthorized transfer of AI technologies.

Americans Love a Tough Guy

Jeffrey A. Friedman and Andrew Payne

During the 2024 presidential campaign, the U.S. foreign policy establishment was virtually united in declaring Donald Trump unfit to serve as commander in chief. More than 100 Republican national security leaders joined with Democrats to endorse Kamala Harris, condemning Trump as an aspiring autocrat who would upend the U.S.-built global order. Even several of Trump’s own top officials—including two secretaries of defense, two national security advisers, and a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—warned that Trump posed a clear and present danger to the United States’ interests abroad and its democracy at home.

Yet Trump is now returning to the White House, and foreign policy appears to have helped him get there. Although international relations are not as important to voters as the economy, polling data indicates that global issues did play a role in the election’s outcome and that this factor worked to Trump’s advantage. This was partly because of Trump’s stance on immigration, which was the top international issue on voters’ minds by a wide margin. But it was also because Trump convinced voters that he is a strong leader—which is the attribute that the electorate values most in a commander in chief. Harris, meanwhile, struggled to explain how she would inject new life into U.S. foreign policy at a time when most Americans say they are dissatisfied with their country’s standing in the world.

Will Ukraine become Europe’s forever-problem?

Gabriel Elefteriu

As the war reached its 1000th day this week, any form of victory seems further away from Kyiv’s grasp than ever before. Militarily, Ukraine’s situation is dramatic; politically, after the US election, it is irrecoverable. Soon, the West – especially Europe – may have to face the final results of its Ukraine policy. We should not shy from discussing the worst case scenario, not least because the record of Western strategy over the past 30 years suggests that versions of the worst are rather likely. The full reality of where things could realistically end for Ukraine is almost too hideous to contemplate, but it is important to be clear on the risks so we avoid even greater policy mistakes as the endgame approaches.

Negative prospects

The greatest risk is that Ukraine becomes Europe’s insoluble, festering, forever-problem and a recurring source of conflict with a major military power; a war-torn land that never gets to recover, locked in a spiral of resentment, corruption and violence, drained of talent and living on the charity of its sponsors; and perhaps an inadvertent exporter of trouble, including vast refugee flows, among its neighbours. Some might find in this parallels with how Palestine is seen by many Arab states.

Sweden, Finland Urge Residents To Be Ready For War


Sweden on Monday began sending some five million pamphlets to residents urging them to prepare for the possibility of war, as neighbouring Finland launched a new preparedness website.

Both Sweden and Finland dropped decades of military non-alignment to join the US-led military alliance NATO in the wake of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Since the start of the war, Stockholm has repeatedly urged Swedes to prepare both mentally and logistically for the possibility of war, citing the serious security situation in its vicinity.

The booklet "If Crisis or War Comes", sent by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), contains information about how to prepare for emergencies such as war, natural disasters, or cyber attacks.

It is an updated version of a pamphlet that Sweden has issued five times since World War II.

Biden’s ATACMS Gambit on Ukraine Could Blow up in America’s Face

Daniel L. Davis

The U.S. embassy in Kyiv closed its doors on Wednesday, warning all its employees to “shelter in place” in the event of an air raid siren. The embassy shut down over fears a Russian attack against the American building could be imminent after Biden’s inexplicable escalation of the war by authorizing long-range American weapons to be used deep inside Russia.

It is unclear why, this late in the war and in the eleventh hour of his presidency, Biden chose to take action that carries a significant war escalation risk. That this decision represents a serious and unnecessary danger to the United States—while simultaneously raising the chances of a Ukrainian defeat—is very clear.

It is clear to those willing to see through the lens of reality. There are those in America that, on the surface, appear to have great credentials and have hailed Biden’s decision to allow the ATACMS missiles to be used by Ukraine to attack targets deep in Russia. Former generals Jack Keane, Barry McCaffrey, and Wesley Clark all came out in support of the president’s decision. Keane actually complained that there were still too many restrictions on the use of the missiles.

Decades Of Failure To End TB And Tobacco Use – OpEd

Shobha Shukla

Despite strong scientific and community-based evidence to support tobacco and TB control, 1.1 million people died of TB in 2023 and over 8 million died of tobacco use in the same year. “Tobacco is an entirely preventable epidemic,” rightly said Dr Tara Singh Bam who is a force for change when it comes to stronger actions to prevent avoidable diseases and save lives in low- and middle-income countries.

TB too is preventable, and no one needs to die of it. We have the tools to find all TB, treat all and prevent all TB but the ground reality is that TB is neither preventable, not treatable for millions of people every year. In 2023, over 10.8 million people got infected with TB worldwide (and 1.1 million died of TB), said Dr Tara Singh Bam citing the recently released WHO Global TB Report 2024.

Dr Bam serves as Board Director of Asia Pacific Cities Alliance for Health and Development (APCAT), Asia Pacific Director for Tobacco Control at Vital Strategies, and till very recently served as Asia Pacific Director of International Union Against TB and Lung Disease (The Union). The Indonesian Ministry of Health had awarded Dr Bam in recognition of his nearly two decades of contribution to public health earlier this year.

Measuring The Implications Of AI On The Economy – Speech

Kristalina Georgieva

Opening Remarks at the 12th IMF Statistical Forum

Good morning, and welcome. Let me start by thanking Bert and the Statistics Department for organizing the 12th IMF Statistical Forum on ‘Measuring the Implications of AI on the Economy.’ You always choose a topic that is timely and important—and also fascinating!

It has been just two years since generative AI emerged from the lab and became a tool that anyone with internet access can use. We still feel the excitement of something new and world changing. At the same time, we are all concerned about potential harms.

AI has huge potential to boost growth and efficiency—call centers, for example, have reported productivity gains of 34 percent among new and lower-skilled workers. But AI could also disrupt labor and financial markets. And it could deepen inequality within and among countries, destabilizing societies at a time when many are already very polarized.

To make AI a force for good that boosts inclusive economic growth, we need concerted, coordinated actions by governments, the private sector, and civil society.

Going Out With A Bang? Biden Plays Nuclear Chicken With Russia – OpEd

Dave Lindorff

There is no justifiable explanation for lame duck President Joe Biden’s sudden turnabout decision to okay Ukraine’s use of longer-range US ATACMS ballistic missiles which can hit targets as much as 200 miles inside Russia.

Biden and his ironically-dubbed national security “brain trust” of Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan have for most of this year been nixing Kiev’s request for such missiles as well as permission for Ukraine use Britain’s Storm Shadow stand-off air-launched long-range cruise missiles to hit Russian targets. They did this arguing that such attacks on the Russian heartland could lead to a spiraling escalation of that war — an escalation that could quickly go nuclear.

Now those two out-of-their-depth but supremely over-confident advisors and the doddering outgoing president they serve are claiming the US “has to respond” to Russia’s supposed escalation of the war. They are referring to Vladimir Putin’s acceptance of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s offer of over 10.000 North Korean troops to assist Russia in driving invading Ukrainian forces out of its Kursk region north of Ukraine.

This Is Serious: Why North Korea Is Fighting and Dying in Ukraine For Russia

Anna Matveeva

Big news: North Korea is not a black hole. It is a country that is now sending its military to the other side of Eurasia.

Historically, Pyongyang’s problem has been its military’s lack of combat experience against a determined enemy. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has not fought in a significant conflict since the Korean War armistice in 1953. Yet, Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region provided a unique chance to master the art of war.

In October, after brief training in the Far East, up to 12,000 North Korean troops out of the 1.3 million-strong army were deployed to the battlefields in Russia.

DPRK provides its military assistance under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement, which came into effect last week. The treaty commits the parties to mutual defense against external attack. This provision legitimizes the involvement of North Korean troops as long as they fight on Russia’s internationally recognized territory.

North Korea’s three brigades are conducting combat operations in Kursk and defending the neighboring Belgorod region, allowing Moscow to free up troops for an offensive in Ukraine. The North Korean military will likely learn to operate drone technology and use Russian weapons.

Explaining SpaceX’s Success

Rainer Zitelmann

Yesterday marked the sixth test launch of SpaceX’s “Starship” shuttle, following a fifth successful test in October. If you want to know how this was possible, you should read this book. There are plenty of books about the aerospace company SpaceX, and I have read most of them. However, the recent book by astronomer and space expert Eric Berger, Reentry: SpaceX, Elon Musk and the Reusable Rockets that Launched a Second Space Age, stands out as the best. In particular, it portrays the checkered relationship between NASA and SpaceX.

Initially, the CEO, Elon Musk, faced significant opposition from both political figures and NASA officials. Charles Bolden, who would serve as NASA administrator during President Obama’s tenure in the White House, was a skeptic of Musk and SpaceX. The powerful U.S. senator who held NASA’s purse strings, Richard Shelby (R-AL), declared that efforts to rely on private companies like SpaceX represented a “death march” for NASA.

These were strong words, especially after NASA’s shuttle program had fallen far short of every one of its stated objectives, with each shuttle launch costing approximately $1.5 billion including “development costs, maintenance, renewal, and other expenses.”

They were also strong words when you consider that launch costs more or less stagnated between 1970 and 2010 and that several attempts by NASA to develop reusable rockets (the X-33 and X-34) were abandoned.

Can Technology End Corruption?

AZALINA OTHMAN SAID

At the end of October, the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA) held its annual meeting in Vienna. Representatives from 81 member states assessed progress on the organization’s mission to fight corruption through education, capacity-building programs, and research.

Leaving X Makes It Worse – OpEd

Jacob Wulff Wold

Isolating X from mainstream content is more likely to enhance than dampen conspiracy theories and polarisation.

Elon Musk and social media platform X are accused of being an epicentre of misinformation, with competitor Bluesky gaining millions of users after the US election.

The Guardian left X, calling it a “toxic” media platform with disturbing content “including far-right conspiracy theories and racism.”

Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia followed suit, saying X has become an “echo chamber” for disinformation and conspiracy theories.

The reasoning is curious. Indeed, X does not become any less of an “echo chamber” if opposing viewpoints vanish, nor X does not become any less “toxic” if moderate content is removed.

Targeting X’s finances could prove difficult, as the world’s richest man previously said “we’re going to support free speech rather than agree to be censored for money.”

Bridging the Marine Corps’s Digital Chasm

Scott Humr

The Marine Corps’s approach to providing commanders decision-making tools at the tactical level requires a fundamental reconceptualization if it is to support effective decision-making on the twenty-first-century battlefield. The current proliferation of both commercial and government-developed sensor technologies combined with authoritative data sources across the joint force opens up the opportunity to develop critical decision-making applications at the point of need. To achieve this, the Marine Corps must develop a trained data workforce and behave as a software- and data-centric organization. A trained digital workforce can create a tectonic shift that negates ponderous bridge building across the digital chasm between the enterprise and tactical levels. However, this will require the Marine Corps to break its cycle of outdated information technology (IT) practices, create a trained cadre of digital professionals, and develop an ecosystem that can appropriately scale across the enterprise.


Review of Conflict Realism

Bill Murray

At a time when the conversation around military strategy is increasingly dominated by technological innovation and the prospect of an almost bloodless, surgical form of warfare, Fox’s Conflict Realism offers a vital corrective. If you’re looking for a book that will tell you some emerging technology is poised to replace sound strategy, or that conventional wars and battles are becoming obsolete, Conflict Realism is not for you. Instead, Fox urges readers to return to the fundamentals of military theory and to recognize the enduring nature of war and warfare—where state and non-state actors alike operate in a coherent, self-interested, and value-seeking manner. As he aptly puts it, “Thinking about the future of war must see beyond situational fads, fake novelty, and military myths.” In this review, we will explore the depth and nuance of Dr. Fox’s arguments, discuss the themes that run through each chapter, and reflect on why this book is an essential read for military professionals and scholars alike.

In Chapter 1, he identifies four schools of thought that dominate modern military discussions: the institutionalist, the futurist, the traditionalist, and the realist. By categorizing these perspectives, Fox gives readers a useful framework for understanding how different schools shape military strategy and decision-making. The institutionalists often rely on rigid structures and established norms, while futurists focus on emerging technologies and the idea that future warfare will look radically different from past conflicts. Traditionalists, on the other hand, are more grounded in history but sometimes fail to account for present and future developments. Fox is quick to advocate for the superiority of the practical realist approach. Realism, he argues, recognizes the messy, unpredictable nature of conflict and the need for military strategies that are flexible and adaptable. Rather than being swayed by the allure of technology or institutional dogma, the realist emphasizes practical solutions and hard truths—something often missing in the more idealistic or overly optimistic perspectives of other schools.

23 November 2024

Managing the Canada-India Diplomatic Conflict

Andrew Latham

The ongoing diplomatic dispute between Canada and India has escalated into a serious national security concern for both nations. What began as a political row, sparked by Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s allegations of Indian involvement in the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, has evolved into a wider conflict that threatens to disrupt security dynamics in both countries. With accusations ranging from interference in domestic affairs to targeted political actions, both Canada and India find themselves in a standoff with far-reaching security implications. This piece argues that while a full resolution may be elusive, both nations must take immediate steps to manage the conflict to prevent further harm to their national security interests.

The Diplomatic Fallout: More Than Just Political Posturing

The Canada-India diplomatic rift gained significant momentum after Trudeau publicly accused India of being involved in the murder of Nijjar, a Canadian citizen and Sikh separatist leader, on Canadian soil. This serious allegation, which India categorically denies, has led to reciprocal expulsions of diplomats and a freezing of relations. But this incident is not just a political spat—it is a matter of national security for both countries, highlighting vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hostile actors if not managed carefully.

Sri Lanka’s Efforts from the Viewpoint of New Approach for Counterinsurgency (COIN)

Yoshimasa Adachi

Introduction

Counterinsurgency (COIN) is defined by comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency while addressing its root causes. During the Fourth Eelam War (July 2006 – May 2009) under President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s administration (November 19, 2005 – January 9, 2015), the Sri Lankan government achieved a decisive military victory over the LTTE, quelling the rebellion. The Rajapaksa administration’s efforts to eliminate the LTTE drew attention as a successful example of crushing a rebel force through decisive military action in counterinsurgency (COIN). Because the LTTE was ultimately crushed with many civilian casualties, the thorough use of force tends to be emphasized. However, this view does not capture the full picture of the Rajapaksa administration’s COIN.

Traditionally, COIN strategies are categorized into two primary approaches: the population-centric approach and the enemy-centric approach. These approaches have influenced COIN in various countries, yet both come with inherent challenges. The population-centric approach emphasizes focusing COIN efforts on the civilian population rather than the insurgents. By safeguarding the population, providing essential services, and securing their support, this approach aims to isolate the insurgents from the populace, ultimately leading to the suppression of the rebellion. However, this approach is often based on idealistic theories and untested assumptions, making it difficult to apply effectively in real-world conflict scenarios. Conversely, the enemy-centric approach prioritizes targeting insurgents directly, often employing fear and coercive force to suppress rebellions, including exerting pressure on the population. This method tends to overlook the protection of civilians, which can fuel further rebellion and lacks a nuanced political perspective.

The Promise of Trump’s Realist China Grand Strategy

Dr. Ionut Popescu

President-elect Donald Trump’s decisive election victory gives him a once-in-a-generation mandate to finally implement an America First grand strategy and thus replace the outdated globalist post-World War II framework. Trump’s vision is a hard-nosed realist strategy very well suited to the current era of intense strategic competition and geopolitical peril. The new grand strategy includes securing the border and economic nationalism, core elements of Trump’s agenda, but its most important component is prioritizing the containment of China as the driving principle of U.S. foreign policy in the new Cold War against the Chinese Communist Party.

After three decades of being the only unquestioned regional hegemon and global superpower, and hence benefiting from the geopolitical and financial advantages conferred by this privileged status, a peer rival is now on the horizon. And while conflicts in the Middle East or Russia’s war in Ukraine dominate the daily headlines, there should be no higher priority for America’s grand strategy in coming years other than containing China’s quest for regional hegemony and global superpower status.

Taking Xi at His Word: War in 2027

Harrison Schramm

Leaders of both China and the United States[i] have opined about the possibility of a Cross (Taiwan) Strait invasion in early 2027. While there are historical examples of countries having deadlines internally (famously, Hitler’s four year plan for Germany[ii]), having both sides of a potential conflict agree – at least in rhetoric – when the war should start is novel.

In this piece, we explore what happens when we take both President Xi and his prospective opponents at their word; that a cross-straits invasion of Taiwan will begin approximately 750 days from press time; Friday, 1 January 2027. Specifically, we would like to explore two issues:
  1. If we really believe this war is upon us on this timescale, what should we do, and what are the risks of being wrong?
  2. If China really believes that, what would they do that we could observe to know they are serious? What would be the risks to believing them?
But first, a short primer in:

How militaries spend money

Note: If you are a longtime “Pentagon Warrior” you might feel this section is a review; you should read it anyway. Defense budgets are both huge and notoriously opaque. Perhaps surprisingly and counter to popular sentiment, it is straightforward to understand how the United States spends its’ defense budget. You can get an exhaustive briefing here[iii]; and the items not covered in the budget are notable by their rarity. Conversely, it is nigh on impossible to figure out how China spends their defense budget (we’ve tried)[iv]

China military now a ‘significant threat’ capable of winning in a conflict with U.S., says repor

Bill Gertz

China’s military power poses an acute threat to the United States and Beijing’s forces could now potentially defeat the U.S. military in a future regional conflict, according to a congressional commission report made public Tuesday.

The report, based on both classified and unclassified information and hearings, also warned that Beijing is escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific region against Japan, in addition to continued military pressure targeting Taiwan and the Philippines further south.

Two decades of large-scale military expansion by China focused on building large numbers of missiles, ships, aircraft and other systems for a future Indo-Pacific conflict, said the 793-page report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

“As a result, U.S. forces and bases in the region would face a significant threat from the [People’s Liberation Army] in any regional contingency involving treaty allies and/or security partners, and the outcome of any such conflict is far from certain,” the report states.

China’s communist leaders view the U.S. military bases and activities in the region as “hostile” and “threatening,” and have been preparing for a future U.S. intervention should China take military action against Taiwan or in the South China Sea.


Denial Without Disaster—Keeping a U.S.-China Conflict over Taiwan Under the Nuclear Threshold

Dahlia Anne Goldfeld, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Shawn Cochran, Alexis Dale-Huang, David R. Frelinger, Edward Geist, Jeff Hagen, Elliot Ji, William Kim & Nina Miller

Introduction, Research Themes, and Methodology

U.S. President Joseph Biden and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping have twice publicly pledged that “nuclear war should never be fought and can never be won.”1 As nice as this may sound, if a war between the two countries ever comes to pass, this pledge will be put to the test. Passing that test could be harder than anticipated, and the United States should plan today to avoid disaster tomorrow. How to pass the test would vary across differing war scenarios, so, to focus our work, we consider what the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) describes as its “pacing scenario”: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.2 For this scenario, we assume that the Chinese government’s decision to invade Taiwan would come after some unambiguous strategic warning, allowing the United States to prepare and mobilize forces.3 The United States has a long-standing policy to maintain “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait”—including “oppos[ing] any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side”—and specifically promises to “uphold . . . commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-defense and to maintain . . . capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan.”4 Thus, for this scenario, we assume that the United States will militarily intervene to seek to stop the invasion and end the conflict.


Historical Lessons of the Short War Temptation for Putin and Xi

Julian Spencer-Churchill

It is now a truism that political leaders don’t initiate wars with the expectation that they will be protracted contests of attrition. It is an interesting counter-factual conjecture whether Russian President Vladimir Putin, if he had a crystal ball two or three years into the war in Ukraine, would have still started his war, even without evidence of his defeat. John Mearsheimer, in his 1984 Conventional Deterrence, has a slew of case studies where failed blitzkrieg offensives transformed themselves into intractable slogs. U.S. journalist William L. Shirer reported that Hitler knew of his short war-long war gamble, as he had warned his military staffers that if the ensuing war became protracted, Germany could only hold out for a few years. The same consideration applies to Chinese Communist General Secretary Xi Jinping’s conception of the time horizon to complete an invasion of Taiwan. Short wars are of course rational, as a fait accompli would pre-empt any response by a slow-mobilizing U.S. alliance. However, if the lightning attack fails, then Putin and Xi would risk becoming victims of regime change by the extent of the re-organization they would need to impose on their citizens and industry in order to strengthen their respective countries.


How allied are Iran and Russia really?

Emil Avdaliani

Iran and Russia will likely sign a strategic partnership treaty in Moscow later this year, upgrading a partnership the sometimes allies, sometimes foes established in the early 2000s.

Though the two sides have extended the original agreement several times, both have recognized the need to renew it so that it better reflects contemporary global realities.

The war in Ukraine, the related deterioration of ties between Russia and the collective West and exacerbating tensions between the US and China have all impacted what were already complicated relations between Moscow and Tehran.

If Russia was historically always cautious not to provide sensitive technologies to the Islamic Republic, largely because of potential negative reactions from the West, the war in Ukraine has apparently shifted Russia’s perspective.

Moscow has pivoted in earnest to Asia and Iran has become a pivotal state in its geopolitical recalibration. As a likewise heavily sanctioned state and critical for Russia’s reach to the Indian Ocean and East Africa, Moscow increasingly sees Iran as a major partner.

The makings of a grand Trump deal in the Middle East

Jamie Dettmer

“Iran is a de facto threshold nuclear power,” said former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. It could be just days or weeks away from being able to assemble a nuclear warhead; nine months to a year from weaponizing it.

And if this is the course of action Tehran chooses, no surgical airstrikes — by either Israel or the United States — would be able to significantly delay it.

Delivered during an exclusive interview with POLITICO, Barak’s somber warning prompts an interesting question: Could the circumstances be shaping up for a deal between Iran and the U.S. if — as seems likely — President-elect Donald Trump retains his interest in stopping wars?

Trump’s recent administrative picks suggest such a deal would be unlikely. Marco Rubio, his pick for secretary of state, has been an unrelenting hawk when it comes to Iran. After the country fired nearly 200 missiles at Israel last month, Rubio noted that: “Only threatening the survival of the regime through maximum pressure and direct and disproportionate measures has a chance to influence and alter their criminal activities.”

North Korea Is the Only Winner in the Russia-Ukraine War

Justin Hastings

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, North Korea has moved from vocal support of Russia and the invasion to shipping missiles and artillery shells to Russia to sending North Korean soldiers into combat with heavy artillery. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a gift dropped in North Korea’s lap, but it has run with it. The opportunity to test North Korean weapons, and give North Korean troops some actual combat experience is no doubt welcomed by Kim Jong-un, But their presence in Russia and potentially Ukraine has several implications that show that North Korea is in a better strategic position now than at any time since the Cold War.

Enforcement of United Nations sanctions against North Korea is well and truly over. Essentially everything North Korea is doing with Russia; weapons exports, any payment or aid from Russia for North Korea’s nuclear, missile, submarine, or drone programs, and deployment of North Korean soldiers to Russia, is a violation of United Nations sanctions. While the sanctions continue to exist on paper, they cannot change North Korea’s behavior or encourage it down more productive paths.

Chinese and Russian sanctions enforcement has been flagging since North Korea’s diplomatic offensive in 2018. Even as North Korea has become more sophisticated in its efforts, the strategies North Korea uses to evade sanctions have become less convoluted: North Korean ships now forthrightly spend months being repaired and disguised in Chinese shipyards, ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned goods take place frequently within China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and ships sail directly from North Korea to Russian ports.

Why Ukraine is Establishing Unmanned Forces Across Its Defense Sector and What the United States Can Learn from It

Kateryna Bondar

The war in Ukraine has shown that unmanned systems are now indispensable to modern war tactics. These systems—both platforms and software—are evolving at an extremely rapid pace, as new updates and technological advancements emerge sometimes within one or two days. Yet, the technology itself is only part of the story. Achieving success on the battlefield requires more than just advanced unmanned systems, it also demands their effective integration into military operations, proper deployment, personnel training, and support throughout their use.

This urgent need has pushed the Ukrainian military to institutionalize these support functions by creating a new branch of the Armed Forces of Ukraine—the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF). In addition, specialized teams started to form within frontline forces as bottom-up initiatives. These teams work to integrate unmanned systems into operations, providing support to warfighters by delivering the latest technological developments to the battlefield and training how to operate them. According to a report from CSIS, these changes significantly alter the institutional landscape within the Ukrainian military, enabling it to adapt to rapid innovations development and making it more resilient to the technological advancements of the enemy.

This article analyzes the Ukrainian experience by examining three examples of these newly formed structural units. Identifying commonalities across these three cases will draw lessons that should be learned and potentially implemented when expanding the arsenal of unmanned systems in the U.S. Army.

Navy needs industry all in on 3D printing parts for subs, or else

Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

Leading Navy admirals and officials now see additive manufacturing as a potential savior of the overstretched submarine force and its “exceptionally fragile” industrial base. But they need industry to get on board, ASAP.

3D printers are already churning out an ever-larger array of ever-larger parts, from simple plastic safety covers, to high-end specialty valves, to robust metal structures weighing a ton and a half. And while many companies are embracing the new approach, the service’s program executive officer for attack submarines (PEO-SSN) had stern words for the laggards.

“If you are a supplier, and your lead time is too long, and you refuse to work with us to give us your tech and help us figure out how to reverse-engineer it and how to manufacture it — not that we’re trying to take it from you — [but] we’re going to figure it out,” said Rear Adm. Jonathan Rucker, the PEO-SSN. “[That’s] not a threat — [it’s] a fact of life.

“We’re going to figure out how to get these parts quicker,” he told a ballroom full of contractors at last week’s Naval Submarine League conference. “We need your help. We don’t have a choice. Time is not on our side.”

Germany at a Crossroads: Coalition Breakdown Portends Sweeping Change in 2025

Melanie Banerjee

On November 6, shortly after the results of the 2024 US elections became clear, Germany was plunged into political uncertainty when Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a confidence vote for January 2025. Given the flagging popularity of the coalition government, the confidence vote is likely to result in snap elections in February, well ahead of the expected date of September 2025.

The catalyst for these events traces back to a leaked policy position paper from Finance Minister Christian Lindner of the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP), which proposed policies in stark contrast to the FDP’s coalition partners, the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens. The paper, titled Economic Transition for Germany: Economic Concepts for Growth and Intergenerational Fairness, contradicts and negates key aspects of coalition policy, including climate action, social security, taxation, and Germany’s Sonderweg thesis (the ‘unique path’). The disclosure effectively fractured the coalition, with Chancellor Scholz dismissing FDP Finance Minister Christian Lindner, leaving the SPD and Greens to rule in as a minority government.

Now evidently heading into early elections, the question arises: How will Germany’s economic transformation be impacted if these ideas are given central political consideration? Let’s examine.

Moscow raises nuke tensions, adjusts policy - Is it worth it?

Nick Sorrentino

In our previous post we argued that the Biden administration’s authorization of long range strikes from the Ukraine into Russia, with “western-made” missiles was not only a mistake, but an act of shortsighted ego driven policy. (At least that’s what it looks like to us.) In the wake of Trump’s win, and with it the assumption that Ukraine and Russia would soon be forced to the negotiation table to settle things, the Biden administration purposely upped the heat in Ukraine, causing as much chaos as possible before power is handed over in Washington. There are many people in the American foreign policy community who are all-in on Ukraine. That Putin would emerge from the conflict intact is just too much for them.

The argument we often hear (and from people for whom we have great respect) is that if Putin is not stopped in Ukraine using our money but Ukraine’s blood it will soon be NATO’s (and American) blood on the line as Putin rolls his way through The Continent. These people argue that total European dominance is Putin’s master plan.

We have little doubt that if it was possible Putin might just fancy such an idea. But at this point, barring some monumental development not yet on the geopolitical horizon, it’s not possible. Putin can’t at this point project power beyond the small slice of Ukraine that is the Donbas. The idea that the Russian army is going to roll into Warsaw, never mind Berlin or Paris appears to us to be ludicrous. Logistically it would be pretty much guaranteed suicide for Moscow. This, before even considering NATO’s wrath.

Deterring the Nuclear Dictators

Madelyn Creedon and Franklin Miller

For more than three decades after the end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies faced no serious nuclear threats. Unfortunately, that is no longer the case. Russian President Vladimir Putin has been rattling his nuclear saber in a manner reminiscent of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Chinese President Xi Jinping has directed a dramatic buildup of China’s nuclear arsenal, a project whose size and scope the recently retired commander of U.S. Strategic Command has described as “breathtaking.” The Russian and Chinese leaders have also signed a treaty of “friendship without limits.” North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is supplying weapons and troops to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, and North Korea is improving its ability to strike both its neighbors and the U.S. homeland with nuclear weapons, as it demonstrated with an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test launch on October 31.

These developments pose far-reaching challenges to U.S. national security. The United States no longer has the luxury of ignoring nuclear dangers and concentrating on deterring a single adversary. To address this new reality, the Biden administration has modified U.S. nuclear targeting guidance in order to be able to deter China and Russia simultaneously. It is also developing new nuclear delivery systems, platforms, and warheads. But Washington’s efforts to modernize the aging U.S. nuclear deterrent have been hampered by inadequate industrial base capacity, materials and labor shortages, and funding gaps. What needs to be done is clear: the next administration should dispense with undertaking an extensive review of either the nuclear deterrence policy or the modernization plans. There is a huge need to just get on with the work of modernization and fix the problems.

The Rise of Fragmentation. A New Economic Security Era?


Multiple crises have shaken the foundations of the global economy, and the resulting instability has yet to recover. Instead, it has led to increasing fragmentation along political and ideological lines. The current geoeconomic order is increasingly defined by the use of advanced trade defense and economic security tools, such as tariffs, trade barriers, sanctions, and export restrictions, which have become more sophisticated. Major economies are adapting to this new reality by shaping their own definitions of economic security, particularly to safeguard critical and high-tech sectors. The EU, the US, and China are each calibrating their economic security strategies, seeking a balance between openness and protection that maximizes their respective advantages. However, in this shifting international landscape, new actors are emerging with the potential to influence the global balance of power.

What type of "new globalization" is emerging? Could economic security tools become the new normal in the global economy? What are the key economic security strategies adopted by the world's leading economies?

Language barriers and inexperience may hamper North Korean troops on Russia’s battlefield

Stella Kim and Mithil Aggarwal

North Korea’s entry into Russia’s war against Ukraine is a major escalation in the grinding conflict, but Moscow may find it’s more trouble than it’s worth.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has sent thousands of soldiers to Russia, the U.S. and others say, stepping up his assistance against Ukraine as he and Russian President Vladimir Putin strengthen security ties.

With victory still elusive as the war nears the end of its third year, Putin welcomes more help from North Korea, which has already been providing weapons, experts say. But the inexperience of the North Korean soldiers as well as the language barrier between them and their Russian counterparts are likely to minimize their impact on the battlefield, military analysts told NBC News.

“The average Russian soldier is going to say, what are they doing here? I’m having to hold their hand. I’m tripping over their bodies,” said Sydney Seiler, the U.S. national intelligence officer for North Korea from 2020 to 2023.

My List of Weapons Europe Can Give Ukraine Now—Before It's Too Late

Michael Bohnert

With Donald Trump returning to the U.S. presidency on Jan. 20, Europeans are asking what they can do to keep Ukraine armed if U.S. military aid were to be cut back.

At first glance, it might seem like not much; Europe has abdicated to the United States much of its security and industrial base since the end of the Cold War.

When I took a deeper look, however, I discovered that Europe can provide significant useful, albeit nontraditional, military aid even in this short time frame. But Ukraine cannot wait; Europe must act now.

Last May, I wrote about how much military materiel Ukraine needed and how much it would cost, reality-testing an analysis put out by the Estonian Ministry of Defense calling for member states to annually contribute 0.25 percent of GDP for four or more years.

My analysis calculated that without U.S. participation, an annual contribution of approximately 0.5 percent GDP by European NATO members would sufficiently support Ukraine's annual munitions needs for a defensive stalemate. Double that or more would be needed to support military restoration of Ukrainian territory.