20 November 2026

Fragile India–Pakistan ties

International Institute for Strategic Studies | Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Yusra Khan

India and Pakistan maintain a fragile, downgraded diplomatic baseline eighteen months after their four-day military conflict in May 2025. Tensions intensified following mutually declared coercive operational doctrines and a September 2026 naval collision in the Arabian Sea involving Indian and Pakistani warships. The confrontation originated from an April 2025 terror attack in Pahalgam, triggering Indian cross-border retaliatory strikes in Punjab.

Bilateral ties worsened further as New Delhi placed the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, rejecting an August 2026 Hague Court of Arbitration ruling that deemed the treaty active. To enforce hydrological leverage, India is expediting several hydroelectric projects, including the 330-megawatt Kishanganga dam and the Ratle power plant scheduled for completion by 2028. Reciprocal diplomatic presence remains capped at 30 staff members. Both states continue basic confidence-building measures, such as exchanging nuclear facility rosters and pre-notifying missile tests. New Delhi plans high-level participation at the August 2027 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Islamabad.

China Wants India’s Market. Does It Want India’s Industrial Rise?

The Diplomat | Staff Writer

China announced export controls on October 19 restricting heavy construction and engineering machinery, imposing stricter licensing rules for destinations in territorial disputes with Beijing. Effective November 18, the restrictions target critical equipment, including tunnel-boring machines and walking excavators. Delivery delays have already impacted specialized machines manufactured in China by a German company for Indian infrastructure projects.

These export controls create immediate implications for India's high-speed rail and metro networks. Beijing holds direct leverage. The new export restrictions threaten to complicate economic rapprochement between both countries while giving Beijing another tool to influence neighboring industrial ambitions. Infrastructure developments relying on foreign-manufactured machinery face immediate delivery disruptions. This regulatory framework weaponizes critical equipment supply chains against regional rivals during active disputes. China leverages its domestic manufacturing sector to exert systemic economic pressure, directly targeting key civilian engineering capabilities.

Taliban is building a web of partners, and Pakistan must adapt

Asia Times | Mansoor Qaisar

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk led trade talks in Kabul on November 12, 2026, revealing bilateral trade surged to US$349 million in the first eight months of 2026. Russia remains the only country to formally recognize the Taliban regime, having done so in July 2025. This diplomatic momentum reflects Kabul building transactional partnerships to bypass international isolation following the Western withdrawal.

India upgraded its Kabul technical mission to an embassy status in October 2025, while China pursues mineral and infrastructure dialogues. Concurrently, security friction between Kabul and Islamabad has intensified over Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan cross-border operations, triggering Pakistani airstrikes in October 2026. The rift caused the October 5 Moscow Format talks to collapse without a joint statement. Border closures at Torkham and Chaman since October 2025 forced regional trade rerouting. Transit paths shifted. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the United Arab Emirates signed a Trans-Afghan railway agreement on September 30.

Russia Increases Engagement with Taliban-Led Afghanistan

The Jamestown Foundation | Dinoj K. Upadhyay, Rupal Mishra

Russia is expanding economic and diplomatic ties with Taliban-led Afghanistan through high-level visits, private-sector agreements, and a surge in bilateral trade. Bilateral trade more than doubled during the first eight months of this year, while Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk signed new MoUs worth more than $103 million in Kabul.

Moscow became the sole government to formally recognize the Taliban administration in July 2025, attempting to balance security cooperation with economic integration despite regional frictions. Russian intelligence chief Sergey Naryshkin met with Afghan intelligence director Abdul Haq Wasiq to address persistent terrorist threats, including Islamic State-Khorasan Province activity and cross-border militant recruitment. Moscow faces diplomatic friction with Pakistan over the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, leading to the collapse of the eighth Moscow Format Consultations in October without a joint declaration. Russian firms are concurrently securing energy and infrastructure contracts, including oil extraction rights for Inteco Group and 4G network installation by Protey. Future engagement depends on containing transnational militancy and synthetic drug trafficking.

Pakistan’s Garrison State Began With Empire and Found New Patrons

FrameTheGlobeNews | A Poet's Voice, Jinnah's Writer

Pakistan established its post-independence state apparatus by preserving colonial governance structures under the 1935 Government of India Act, according to an Australian National University study on Soviet regional analysis. Early Soviet critics like Anatoly Dyakov argued London designed Partition to retain imperial influence across the subcontinent. As documented in a Partition Council decisions record, Islamabad inherited 17.5 percent of uncovered debt and a one-third share of military stores.

Foreign security patronage soon sustained this central command. Joining SEATO in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact in 1955 secured Western military assistance while exposing domestic airbases, including Peshawar's U-2 surveillance hub, to Soviet retaliation. Internal political suppression followed. When the Awami League won 160 of 162 East Pakistan seats during the December 1970 election, military leaders launched a campaign culminating in state fragmentation. Following the December 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, foreign aid further entrenched military dominance over civilian institutions.

A New Anti-Taliban Group Emerges With a Bang: The Afghanistan United Front

The Diplomat

The Afghanistan United Front, led by former Afghan Special Forces commander Sami Sadat, launched a major military campaign titled Operation Muharib against the Taliban in August 2026. Founded in the United States in 2023, the political movement turned combat organization claimed 126 attacks across 22 Afghan provinces between August 1 and November 13, 2026.

This operational expansion directly targets the Taliban's southern power centers in Kandahar and Helmand, which accounted for 37 and 27 attacks respectively. The group killed 135 Taliban personnel and wounded 60 others through ambushes, assassinations, and raids on military outposts. Sadat's forces killed 74 Taliban fighters in August alone. A dedicated military court operated by the organization also ordered the execution of six individuals accused of espionage. Unlike the National Resistance Front or Afghan Freedom Front, Sadat's movement explicitly focuses on southern strongholds while publicizing tactical engagements to mobilize domestic anti-Taliban resistance.

A Former Pakistani Army Captain Now Commands the BLA

The Diplomat | Rizwan Naseer

Rahman Gul took command of the Baloch Liberation Army on November 14, replacing Bashir Zeb following the high-casualty failure of Operation Herof 2 in early 2026. The former Pakistan Army captain previously commanded the insurgent group's Majeed Brigade suicide unit after completing eight years of service in Waziristan and on the Line of Control.

Zeb was ousted after the six-day January-February offensive produced heavy insurgent losses against state forces. Gul is shifting tactics toward small mobile cells. This dispersal aims to evade detection while sustaining long-term operations across Balochistan, where quarterly violence deaths surged to 829 in late 2026. Targeting remains concentrated against Chinese personnel and infrastructure, building on 14 attacks that killed 20 Chinese nationals between 2021 and 2024. Islamabad is leveraging foreign mining investments, including a 1.3 billion dollar American venture at Reko Diq and Chinese operations at Saindak, to secure dual counterterrorism assistance.

The Model Middle Power

Foreign Affairs | Andrew Yeo

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung leads an adaptive middle-power strategy that combines a deep security alliance with the United States and expanded global partnerships. Seoul maintains 28,500 American troops on the peninsula for deterrence against North Korean aggression while simultaneously building a formidable military and pursuing industrial self-reliance.

This economic and military capacity has allowed South Korea to become a major global arms supplier to European NATO members like Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Norway, Poland, and Romania, ranking as the second-largest weapons supplier to European NATO members in 2025. Despite facing internal challenges such as severe political polarization, deep economic exposure to external pressure, and the world's lowest birthrate, Seoul manages frictions with Washington through significant reciprocal investments, including a $350 billion pledge to advance American economic and national security interests. Through sustained domestic capacity building and strategic diversification, South Korea demonstrates how middle powers can exercise meaningful autonomy without constructing an entirely new multilateral bloc.

Can the US, China, and Russia Keep AI from Triggering Nuclear War?

The National Interest | Jianli Yang

Presidents Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin face growing pressures to address artificial intelligence risks to nuclear deterrence during a trilateral summit alongside the APEC leaders’ meeting in Shenzhen, China. Integrating AI into strategic command structures risks triggering accidental nuclear escalation through automated warning errors, rapid cyber intrusions, or unverified autonomous weapon engagements.

The strategic triangle lacks mutually accepted rules and foundational values to maintain nuclear stability. United States technological dominance and Chinese manufacturing scale drive a bipolar AI competition, while Russia relies on energy assets and electronic warfare expertise. Strategic stability requires human oversight. Warning systems could mistake routine cyber activity or false sensor data for incoming first strikes. These structural vulnerabilities shorten decision windows for political leadership during conventional crises. Without trilateral operational safeguards, automated threat assessments could accelerate nuclear escalation before sovereign authorities comprehend battlefield reality.

China and Nuclear Arms Control: Why a Trump-Xi Breakthrough at APEC Is Unlikely

Council on Foreign Relations | Eleanor Atkins, Gerald C. Brown

U.S. President Donald Trump has proposed trilateral denuclearization discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen, China. Beijing remains resistant to formal nuclear limits, pointing to its stockpile of approximately 600 warheads compared to 3,700 U.S. and 4,400 Russian weapons.

Structural historical grievances drive China's refusal to accept nuclear constraints. Premier Zhou Enlai denounced the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty as a swindle, establishing an enduring institutional view that arms control locks in foreign advantages. Quantitative ambiguity remains essential to the survivability of Beijing's deterrent posture. Dissent costs within Xi's governance model further prevent internal posture shifts. Foreign Ministry arms control director Sun Xiaobo broke off dialogue in 2024 following U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Washington rejects Chinese preconditions regarding no-first-use pledges and missile defense systems like Golden Dome. Misperception risks grow daily. Launch notifications and tactical posture discussions offer modest operational options to reduce immediate crisis escalation risks.

A new phase in China’s cross-strait integration strategy

International Institute for Strategic Studies | Olivia Parker

China's local governments expanded cross-strait integration activities by 84 percent between 2023 and 2024 to attract Taiwanese businesses and residents. This sub-national initiative escalated through September 2026, reaching all 31 administrative divisions across the mainland. Following Beijing's September 2023 directive designating Fujian province as a primary demonstration zone, regional officials increasingly targeted artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, and advanced manufacturing sectors.

The expansion aligns with policy signals from the annual Taiwan Work Affairs Conference and guidelines in the 15th Five-Year Plan covering 2026 to 2030. Local cadres leverage these commercial and cultural exchanges to secure central development funding and political recognition. Sub-national economic inducement remains central. These non-military campaigns operate alongside the accelerated modernization of the People's Liberation Army and expanding grey-zone maritime operations surrounding Taiwan. CCP leadership maintains this dual-track strategy to compel eventual unification without resorting to large-scale amphibious combat operations.

The Jensen Huang scandal has revealed just how much national security thinking has conflated itself with corporate bottom lines.

National Interest | Paul R. Pillar

Former Central Intelligence Agency Deputy Director David Cohen proposed in Foreign Affairs that the United States conduct economic espionage and share classified intelligence directly with American corporations. Former Nvidia Chief Executive Officer Jensen Huang subsequently faced severe security scrutiny involving an affair with a Chinese intelligence asset alongside a $25 million donation to President Donald Trump's ballroom project.

Selective intelligence distribution to commercial firms introduces systemic security vulnerabilities while forcing federal agencies into selecting commercial winners and losers. Private profit motives directly conflict with national security priorities. Nvidia designed microchips specifically for Chinese clients and lobbied Washington to weaken semiconductor export restrictions despite official policy prioritizing artificial intelligence leadership. Corporate globalization and executive financial interests blur the boundaries between sovereign defense and private balance sheets. Channeling state intelligence to private firms compromises intelligence sources while distorting economic policy across critical technology sectors.

The upcoming Donald Trump-Xi Jinping-Vladimir Putin summit will test whether great-power diplomacy can build a safer international order.

National Interest | Jianli Yang

Presidents Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin face growing risks as artificial intelligence threatens nuclear strategic stability ahead of a proposed trilateral summit in Shenzhen. Automated early warning systems and cyber intrusions into nuclear command infrastructure could accelerate accidental escalation. The expiration of the New START treaty in February 2026 and China's expanding nuclear arsenal compound these strategic dangers.

To mitigate miscalculation, the three powers require a dedicated dialogue on artificial intelligence and nuclear stability. This mechanism would focus on protecting command networks, maintaining crisis communications, and enforcing human authorization for nuclear launch decisions. While Washington leads in frontier research and Beijing expands manufacturing capacity, Moscow maintains distinct capabilities in energy and electronic warfare. Comprehensive arms reduction remains unlikely due to asymmetrical arsenals and mutual suspicion. Deterrence failure risks remain high. Establishing technical confidence-building measures and reporting protocols for autonomous systems represents a necessary initial step toward stabilizing the strategic triangle.

The Clash of Time Between the U.S. and China

Manual Input | Efraín Vázquez-Vera

United States strategists suffer from a distorted geographic map and an out-of-sync clock that compromises their hegemonic contest against Beijing. Washington leaders measure success through election cycles and quarterly earnings while ignoring Latin America and the Caribbean. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party executes multi-generational plans by treating regional provocations in the Taiwan Strait as tactical diversions.

This long-term patience shields an extractive outward push designed to compensate for domestic demographic decline and an exhausted economic model. Beijing devours resources across the Global South to stave off internal collapse and cement a civilizational worldview. Sustaining this cycle requires decades of uninterrupted focus that only a civilization-state mindset can manage.

Trump, Xi, and Putin at APEC Summit: Arms Control Long Shot, Ukraine Longer Shot

19FortyFive | Robert E. Kelly

United States President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in Shenzhen during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit to discuss nuclear weapons and Iran while excluding Ukraine from the formal agenda. The expiration of the New START treaty without a successor leaves a dangerous bilateral arms control vacuum as Beijing expands its nuclear inventory toward an estimated 620 warheads.

Negotiating a trilateral framework faces steep structural hurdles because Moscow treats its massive arsenal as a core pillar of great power status while demanding the inclusion of British and French warheads. Beijing similarly rejects participation in disarmament talks that would freeze its strategic forces into permanent inferiority relative to Washington and Moscow. Abu Dhabi talks on the ongoing war in Ukraine recently deadlocked over territorial demands, leaving a diplomatic settlement unlikely.

Is What’s Good for Nvidia Good for the United States?

The National Interest | Paul R. Pillar

Former CIA deputy director David Cohen proposed in Foreign Affairs that the United States conduct economic espionage and share collected intelligence directly with domestic corporations. This proposal coincides with a counterintelligence scandal involving former Nvidia chief executive officer Jensen Huang and an alleged Chinese intelligence asset. Foreign state intelligence services, particularly those operating from China, aggressively target American commercial technology and proprietary intellectual property.

Transferring classified intelligence to private companies introduces severe operational security vulnerabilities and risks compromising sensitive collection sources and methods. Corporate environments lack rigorous federal security clearance structures and internal need-to-know protocols. Intelligence leaks remain a persistent threat. Selecting specific corporate recipients effectively forces the federal government into executing industrial policy by picking economic winners and losers. Furthermore, American commercial entities already utilize inexpensive Chinese artificial intelligence models without government intelligence assistance, demonstrating how private market incentives routinely override state-sponsored technological interventions.

Trump keeps weighing his Iran options. He should do them all | Opinion

USA Today | Ilan Berman

President Donald Trump faces severe domestic political fallout following Republican mid-term losses linked to the Iran conflict. Washington evaluates three distinct paths: tightening sanctions through Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's Operation Economic Outcast, negotiating a settlement over the Strait of Hormuz, or executing limited military action. Economic pressure has caused the Iranian rial to drop nearly 25 percent since August, pushing inflation to 90 percent in September and halting oil tanker loadings since late August.

Public opinion remains deeply opposed to protracted campaigns, with a 65 percent disapproval rating in an October Pew Research Center survey and nearly three-quarters opposing ground troops in a July Quinnipiac poll. Secretary of State Marco Rubio dismissed Iranian demands for asset releases and non-aggression pledges as ridiculous. Ilan Berman argues for an integrated strategy combining sustained economic blockade, kinetic deterrence against regional proxies such as Yemen's Houthi rebels, and conditional diplomatic off-ramps.

One chair, seven leaders

Brussels Signal | Renata Shipkova

European Council President António Costa proposed the E5+EU2 format on November 13 in Dublin, designating five national leaders and two institutional presidents to represent the continent in potential Ukraine peace talks. The arrangement includes Germany, France, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom, alongside the European Commission and Council, though its authority remains contested by the remaining member states.

Lithuanian foreign minister Kęstutis Budrys noted the difficulty of coordinating twenty-seven national positions, while foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on November 16 questioned the mandate and composition of the negotiating team. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas invoked her institutional treaties to challenge her exclusion from the envoy role, exposing persistent internal frictions. National governments remain reluctant to delegate real political authority or concede national control to a single representative, reflecting foundational tensions within the EU foreign policy architecture.

Uncertain Precedents for Redrawing Russian–Ukrainian Border in Post-Soviet Space

The Jamestown Foundation | Paul Goble

Russian and Ukrainian forces continue fighting the largest war in Europe since 1945 without either side achieving its maximalist territorial goals. To end the protracted conflict, mediators are floating border compromises that echo administrative realignments common during the Soviet era. From 1921 to 1980, central authorities recorded 90 major inter-republican territorial transfers alongside numerous internal administrative boundary shifts.

Central Asian states have since demonstrated that negotiated border adjustments can foster regional cooperation and stability. However, replicating those peaceful outcomes along the Russian-Ukrainian front faces severe domestic resistance, hardening regional identities, and deep distrust regarding external security guarantees like the Budapest Memorandum. Territorial revisions imposed without genuine Ukrainian participation risk igniting veteran backlash and perpetuating armed conflict indefinitely.

The Tamed Liberal West Doesn’t Understand the Threat of Islam

Manual Input | Daniel McCarthy

Twenty-five years after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, Western efforts to export liberal democracy across the Middle East have faltered while Islam expands rapidly across Europe, North America, and sub-Saharan Africa. Demographic shifts and enduring religious conviction continue to challenge the core Western assumption that secular governance represents humanity's inevitable trajectory.

This divergence stems from contrasting historical frameworks established during the 16th and 17th centuries, when European polities tamed internal religious conflict through state supremacy. Hobbesian and Lockean political philosophies redefined civic identity. Published in 1651, Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan subordinated religious dogma to supreme territorial state authority, a model later softened by John Locke's utilitarian premises in his 1689 Second Treatise of Government. Because Islamic civilization underwent no equivalent institutional taming, Western defence analysts consistently misread strategic realities by misinterpreting fundamental civilisational frictions as transient struggles between freedom and tyranny.

American Refineries Are Sitting Ducks – OpEd

Eurasia Review | Ronald Stein, Mike Ariza

Ukrainian drone strikes have targeted Russian oil facilities over 300 times since February 2022, cutting refining capacity and triggering severe regional fuel shortages. This operational attrition demonstrates the systemic vulnerability of petroleum infrastructure supporting active military forces. In the United States, total refining capacity has fallen to 130 facilities following key closures in Texas and California, including Valero’s Benicia plant on January 31, 2026.

Domestic plants currently operate at maximum capacity while postponing essential scheduled maintenance turnarounds. Catastrophic equipment failure remains an immediate risk. To mitigate domestic vulnerability, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth unveiled the FORTRESS initiative on September 30, 2026, mandating 90 days of operational self-reliance across 500 military installations. Critical bases like Travis Air Force Base depend on single commercial suppliers, including Chevron’s Richmond refinery, for jet fuel. Without targeted physical defenses and grid reinforcement, localized refinery damage will paralyze forward defense logistics.

The Tamed Liberal West Doesn’t Understand the Threat of Islam

Chronicles | Daniel McCarthy

George W. Bush launched the invasion of Iraq in 2003 with the bipartisan conviction that deposing Saddam Hussein would establish liberal democracy across the Middle East. Twenty-five years after the 9/11 attacks, Western elites confront demographic decline at home alongside the rapid global expansion of Islam, a faith whose growth in sub-Saharan Africa mirrors its historical spread in North Africa 1,300 years ago.

Modern Westerners view religion as voluntary and subordinate to individual rights, misinterpreting their own Lockean framework as a universal human condition. European states broke from religious conflict only after the 17th-century wars that prompted Thomas Hobbes to write Leviathan in 1651, establishing earthly territorial authority to restrain human vainglory. Muslims did not experience an equivalent historical transition, leaving Islam untamed by Hobbesian or Lockean social-contract philosophy. Consequently, modern liberals routinely direct more hostility toward domestic postliberals than toward unassimilated religious expansion, misjudging the enduring spiritual appeal of an unsecularized faith.

Defending Japan’s Southwestern Islands

IISS | Robert Ward, Jumpei Ishimaru

Japan prepares to revise its 2022 strategic documents—the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program—by the end of 2026 to reinforce the defense of its Southwestern Islands. Tokyo faces critical operational gaps in joint command structures, inter-service logistics, and bilateral integration with United States forces in the Nansei island chain.

Strategic discussions recorded on 6 November 2026 between host Robert Ward, Dr Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, and Dr Lotje Boswinkel highlighted persistent vulnerabilities in Japan’s defense-industrial capacity and operational readiness. Alliance division of labor remains uneven. The planned revisions aim to accelerate posture adjustments across the southwestern maritime domain to counter regional security threats. Defending these remote island chains requires seamless theater-level coordination and rapid force projection capabilities across all domain operations. The outcome of the 2026 document revision will redefine Tokyo's regional defense posture for the coming decade.

What’s Your WAR? Moneyballing Professional Military Education

Small Wars Journal | Col. Patrick McCarthy

Col. Patrick McCarthy examines the current state of professional military education through an analytical lens inspired by baseball sabermetrics. Professional military education relies heavily on administrative outputs like credit hours and graduation rates rather than measuring true value added to an officer's capability. A 2020 Government Accountability Office review found that while programs meet civilian accreditation standards, the Office of the Secretary of Defense remains poorly positioned to assess their actual effectiveness.

Organizations must adopt outcome-based metrics that evaluate real professional growth rather than assuming career advancement equates to educational impact. Future assessments should track educational value added through diagnostic baselines and monitor repetition to ensure programs actually develop enduring strategic judgment.

Houthis retake Bab al Mandeb and move toward Aden

Long War Journal | Bridget Toomey

The Southern Armed Forces repositioned from Dhubab Airport and the Bab al Mandeb area on November 15, enabling Houthi fighters to reoccupy the strategic Red Sea chokepoint. This pullback allowed Houthi units to advance east along the Gulf of Aden coast to within 50 miles of the strait and 40 miles from the interim capital of Aden.

Anti-Houthi forces, including the Southern Giants Brigade and National Shield Forces, had previously reached Dhubab Airport on October 5 during a counteroffensive to retake west coast territory. The Houthis seized key coastal positions. Simultaneously, Houthi forces encircled Taiz, creating critical supply shortages while displacing over 340,000 civilians across the governorate since August. Yemeni Armed Forces spokesperson Colonel Majid Abdullah al Nuzaili reported hundreds of daily operational engagements across Marib and Al Jawf. Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree claimed 88 Saudi airstrikes in six governorates, pushing total Saudi air attacks to 5,183 since July.

19 November 2026

Another international alliance withering under Trump: The Quad

Politico | Phelim Kine

President Donald Trump will meet the leaders of Japan, India, and Australia on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in the Philippines amid diplomatic friction over tariffs and alliance commitments. This marks the administration's first Quad leaders' summit following years of diplomatic neglect and trade friction. While Secretary of State Marco Rubio convened five foreign minister meetings to advance energy supply chains and surveillance integration, high-level engagement has faltered.

Washington imposed 18 percent tariffs on India and 12.5 percent on Australia. Tokyo pledged 550 billion dollars in American investments. Indo-Pacific members are building security ties without Washington. September joint military exercises featured the first deployment of Japanese fighter jets to India since World War II. Japan also secured an August deal to test hypersonic missiles in Australia and initiated a defense trilateral with Indonesia. Beijing sees the diminished American focus as an opportunity to deepen Indo-Pacific leverage.

India’s Use of Buddhism: Soft Power, Soft Balancing

E-International Relations | David Scott

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has integrated Buddhist diplomacy into foreign policy to counter Chinese influence along the disputed Himalayan frontier. Border confrontations at Doklam in 2017, Galwan in 2020, and Yangtse in December 2022 accelerated this strategy. The initiative links ancient civilizational heritage with contemporary territorial friction over Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.

India organized the International Conference on Shared Buddhist Heritage in March 2023 for Shanghai Cooperation Organization delegates to deepen Eurasian ties. In April 2023, the Indian Himalayan Council of Nalanda Buddhist Tradition convened a conference at Zemithang in Arunachal Pradesh's Tawang district with 600 delegates. This site marks where the 14th Dalai Lama entered India after fleeing Tibet in 1959. Unagreed border lines persist along the Line of Control. By organizing international summits and engaging Himalayan monastic networks, New Delhi utilizes geocultural links to counter Beijing's official state-controlled Buddhist outreach across Asia.

Why India escaped the global Microsoft 365 disruption and how to develop lasting cyber resilience

ETGovernment | Lt. Gen. M. U. Nair

A global Microsoft 365 outage on 12 November 2026 disrupted government email and critical workflows across 74 countries, including Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States. India avoided systemic public sector disruption through its Government of India Email Policy, which mandated National Informatics Centre oversight and decoupled official state communications from dominant commercial cloud platforms.

This architectural separation prevented service propagation failures across central government offices. Following a 2023 tender, the ministry migrated 16.68 lakh official accounts to a cloud platform integrated by Zoho Corporation under state data ownership. India's core banking network similarly remained insulated due to Reserve Bank of India architectural guidelines separating productivity tools from financial platforms. CERT-In handled 2,944,248 cybersecurity incidents in 2025 as domestic security product revenue grew from 1.05 billion dollars in 2020 to 4.46 billion dollars in 2025. Resilience required architectural redundancy.

ASEAN and APEC: Trump’s Real Lame-Duck Test Is in Asia

The Diplomat | Staff Writer

U.S. President Donald Trump faces heightened foreign policy uncertainty following the November 3 congressional elections, where Democrats swept control of both the Senate and the House. This electoral defeat leaves Trump operating as a lame-duck president two years before completing his term, altering strategic decision-making in Washington. Writing in Foreign Affairs, analysts Daniel Drezner and Elizabeth Saunders warned that limited domestic authority often drives unilateral executive action, increasing escalation risks in secondary security theaters such as Iran or Cuba.

However, Asian partner nations attending ASEAN and APEC multilateral summits face a different operational calculation. Foreign governments and leaders must decide whether negotiating diplomatic agreements with a politically constrained president remains viable. Trump retains direct executive authority. Yet foreign capitals increasingly anticipate legislative gridlock, domestic constraints, and potential executive policy reversals. Consequently, regional posture across Asia encounters diplomatic friction as allied states recalibrate their long-term strategic commitments.

Why Is Beijing So Determined to Pursue Reunification With Taiwan?

The Diplomat | Staff Writer

Beijing under Xi Jinping pursues cross-strait reunification with Taiwan primarily to safeguard Chinese Communist Party regime legitimacy rather than to control advanced semiconductor manufacturing or project People's Liberation Army power beyond the First Island Chain. U.S. and Asia-Pacific analysts frequently frame the flashpoint around maritime perimeter expansion and chip supply chain security following Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Regime survival remains the paramount objective. Statements from Deng Xiaoping during a September 2, 1986 interview and Jiang Zemin in 2001 demonstrated that material and military control were secondary to national sentiment and overcoming historic humiliation. As Chinese economic growth slows, the ruling leadership relies increasingly on nationalist mobilization to sustain authority. Beijing promotes a defensive one-country, two-systems framework to shield its communist governance while exploiting unification messaging, as seen during Xi's November 12, 2026 speech honoring Sun Yat-sen.

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