9 February 2026

The Trump-Modi Trade Deal Won’t Magically Restore U.S.-India Trust

Evan A. Feigenbaum

On Monday, after six months of rancor and wrangling, the United States and India at last announced an initial agreement on a trade deal. The agreement came just one week after India and the European Union sealed a formal free trade agreement that had been under negotiation for well over a decade.

The contrast is important in two respects. First, the EU’s deal is a genuine trade agreement, while Washington’s, in keeping with the pattern of negotiations under President Donald Trump, is a trade “deal”—with all the flexibility and potential for reversal that the latter implies. Bluntly put, the United States hasn’t done true bilateral or plurilateral agreements since what feels like the Jurassic period, so we should temper our enthusiasm by recognizing that one of these things is not like the other.


The Other India-EU Deal: The trade pact may be getting all the attention, but the pair also inked a landmark defense agreement.

Sumit Ganguly

On Jan. 27, after two decades of intense negotiations, India concluded a major free trade pact with the European Union that will end tariffs on nearly all traded goods. Much media commentary, understandably, has focused on the economic significance of this accord.

However, another deal signed the same day has been almost completely eclipsed in the process: the Security and Defence Partnership. Under this agreement, the EU and India will enhance cooperation in the areas of maritime security, counterterrorism, and cyberdefense.

After the “Golden Era”: Getting Bangladesh-India Ties Back on Track


What’s new? The demise of Sheikh Hasina’s government in Bangladesh has led to a deterioration in relations between Dhaka and New Delhi. There have been disputes over the border, tit-for-tat trade restrictions and a rise in inflammatory rhetoric. Bangladesh’s forthcoming elections offer an opportunity for a reset.

Why does it matter? New Delhi’s support for Sheikh Hasina fanned longstanding anti-India feeling in Bangladesh, contributing to her ouster. Poorer relations could spell violence, further destabilisation of the border and hindered economic development. Violent protests surged in Bangladesh in mid-December after the killing of a young activist critical of India, underscoring the risks.

What should be done? Bangladeshi political parties should refrain from stoking anti-India sentiment, while New Delhi should avoid further inflaming tensions and undermining potential partners in Bangladesh. After the elections, New Delhi should extend good-will gestures to the new government in Dhaka, which in turn will need to respect Indian security concerns.

Xi, Trump and why their talks are stoking unease in Taiwan

Lawrence Chung

Talks between the US and Chinese presidents on Taiwan and arms sales have fanned fears on the island that it is slipping down the ladder of Washington’s strategic priorities in an era of great-power bargaining. The concern compounded unease raised by the release last month of the US’ National Defence Strategy, which made no mention of Taiwan.

In a phone call on Wednesday, Chinese President Xi Jinping told his American counterpart Donald Trump that Taiwan was the “most important” question in China-US relations. He stressed that Taiwan was Chinese territory and that Beijing would never allow it to be separated.

Modernizing a giant: assessing the impact of military-civil fusion on innovation in China’s defence-technological industry

Alexandre Dupont-Sinhsattanak

China’s third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, has carried out several sea trials since May 2024. Arguably, its technological level is higher than the two previous ones. It uses electromagnetic aircraft launch systems, similar to the US Navy Ford-class carriers (Suciu Citation2024). This development reflects China’s ambitious efforts to modernize its military capabilities, with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aiming to achieve complete military modernization and seeking to be a world-class military by 2049 (Bitzinger and Raska Citation2022). While the Fujian demonstrates China’s progress in indigenous innovation, it also highlights ongoing challenges. China’s historical reliance on foreign technologies underscoresthe crucial need for sustained indigenous innovation to meet these ambitious goals. The transition from imitation to pioneering technological breakthroughs remains a significant challenge, as shown by Fujian’s lack of truly disruptive innovations.

Not only is the issue of indigenous innovation important for China’s military modernization, but it is also a central question for the expansion of its arms exports. As the technological value of its products remains limited, international customers find themselves forced to find other sellers for advanced weapon systems. If China is not able to generate an efficient innovation system, it risks lacking behind the military capabilities of the West and losing market opportunities in the international market.

High Politics in China: Assessing Politburo Meetings and Study Sessions in 2025

Manoj Kewalramani, Kumari Krishna

The Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is a decisive centre of power, and its meetings and study sessions form a critical component of intra-party deliberation. Based on publicly available information, a standard Politburo meeting, generally held monthly, discusses policy proposals, new initiatives, and progress toward previously set milestones. The periodic collective study sessions of the Politburo engage experts on specific policy issues. Their aim is to obtain inputs, refine thinking and align the party’s posture on cutting-edge topics.

A careful study of these meetings is essential, as they clarify the authoritative policy and party line on priority issues, which is then transmitted downward through policy framing and implementation. This Issue Brief summarises key themes and ideas emerging from ten such meetings in 2025.

How China’s Crypto Seizures Are Quietly Powering Its Digital Asset Reserves

Hugh Harsono

China’s increasing growth of its strategic digital asset reserves via law enforcement seizures is enabling it to yield more direct influence over the global digital asset ecosystem beyond just mining and holding cryptocurrencies. Despite an existing ban on cryptocurrency activities, China maintains its status as the world’s largest crypto miner, while in parallel, Chinese citizens comprise a significant portion of global crypto users.

In many cases, these seized digital assets originate from illicit activities, whether this be from criminal networks or from unlicensed financial platforms. While the concept of keeping seized assets to build a country’s own reserve is not unprecedented, the continued custody of digital assets to establish a sovereign digital asset treasury is a relatively new notion, with countries like the U.S. typically preferring to sell off seized cryptocurrencies. Therefore, countries like Kazakhstan and the United States are newer in their crypto stockpile efforts, in contrast to China’s relatively quieter and earlier accumulation of assets. With this in mind, China has a clear head start in growing its influence in shaping the global digital asset economy.

Tracking China’s Increased Military Activities in the Indo-Pacific in 2025

Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Leon Li, Truly Tinsley

China is rapidly modernizing and building up its military and paramilitary forces, providing Beijing with greater capacity to challenge and intimidate its neighbors. This report leverages open-source data to analyze observable trends in People’s Liberation Army (PLA) activities in 2025 with a focus on key developments in the Indo-Pacific region.

In 2025, four key trends emerged in the PLA’s activities around Taiwan. First, there was more activity across the board in the air and maritime domains. Second, the PLA maintained a higher baseline of activity than before. Third, there was a slight year-over-year decrease in PLA activity in the latter part of the year from May to December 2025. Finally, the PLA continued the precedents set in recent years by conducting two large, named military exercises around Taiwan.

Pivoting in plain sight: China’s stealthier geoeconomics

Vladimir Shopov

When Chinese leader Xi Jinping tabled his proposal for a “dual circulation” policy in 2020, many saw this economic strategy as export-led isolationism. The policy bore fruit: by 2025 China had a $1.2trn trade surplus and included visible, loan‑fuelled megaprojects such as the Belt and Road Initiative. However, Beijing’s approach is now subtly changing. It is moving towards a more diffuse, company‑centred strategy that quietly embeds Chinese firms and value chains across sectors in other countries. That can create new long‑term leverage for China that the EU is currently ill‑equipped to handle.
Old model meets resistance

Up until now, China has focused on acquiring stakes in foreign companies and handing out easy loans, with very few obvious conditions attached, to gain footholds overseas. The plan was successful but it began to cause concern, especially in Europe. For example, when the Chinese company Midea bought the German robotics firm Kuka in 2016, it raised alarm in Berlin and subsequent German governments tightened the rules for foreign investment. The expansion of Chinese loan programmes also attracted attention. One high-profile example was Sri Lanka, which was forced to lease a key seaport to Beijing because it could not service its debts. These kinds of cases fuelled fears that China was using “debt‑trap diplomacy”—offering attractive loans that later leave countries so indebted they have to give up strategic assets or political leverage. As a result, many countries scaled back or reconsidered Chinese loans and commitments.

Trump Told Iranian Protesters Help Was on the Way. What Happened?

Eli Lake

It’s been five weeks since President Donald Trump first drew his redline on the Iranian uprising. On January 2, he posted on Truth Social that if Iran shot the protesters flooding the streets of its cities and towns, “we are locked and loaded and ready to go.”

The warning did not prevent a bloodbath. A week later, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s goons massacred protesters in the most violent crackdown since the regime took power. Today human rights groups who have monitored the state-backed carnage estimate the dead could number more than 30,000. But no U.S. strike followed. Now, the president’s top envoys will meet their Iranian interlocutors in Oman on Friday. The talks are not about the terms of Khamenei’s surrender or the fate of Iranian demonstrators. Rather, the negotiations are about the regime’s nuclear program and support for terror in the Middle East.

Venezuela: A Loud Cheer, an Amber Light and a Soft Jeer

Ramesh Thakur

This has been a sobering start to the new year. ‘Out with the old, in with the new’ embraced not just the change in the year but also the government in Venezuela and a full-frontal challenge to the Westphalian world. On the night of 3 January, the United States acted audaciously, decisively and to stunning effect to seize President Nicolรกs Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores from the presidential palace in Caracas and spirit them away to New York. A great power used its armed forces with extreme speed and violence to kidnap the president of a sovereign state and put him on trial under its own criminal justice system. It does not appear that allies were given advance notice of the operation.

Public and official reactions around the world fall into three categories. Those who are reflexively anti-American or detest President Donald Trump have criticised the strikes and the kidnapping of a head of state. Their counterparts who habitually back the US or Trump have applauded and celebrated a corrupt dictator’s defenestration. Both groups are immune to evidence and reason. The critical third group of people, who are prepared to support or condemn actions depending on the nature of the act and not the identity of the actor, seem to be in a small and reducing minority. This does rather beg the question: what is the point of an analysis dissecting an event in light of the evidence, laws, principles and moral frameworks?

Bond Markets Are Now Battlefields

Geoffrey Fain Williams, Charles Dainoff, and Robert Farley

As the Greenland crisis came to a head in the days before Davos, Europeans sought tools that could be reforged as weapons against the Trump administration. On Jan. 18, Deutsche Bank’s global head of foreign exchange research, George Saravelos, warned clients in a note that “Europe owns Greenland, it also owns a lot of [U.S.] treasuries,” and that the EU might escalate the conflict with a “weaponization of capital” by reducing private and public holdings of U.S. debt instruments.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent reported later that week that Deutsche Bank no longer stood behind the analyst’s report, but Saravelos was far from the only financial analyst to discuss the idea. Within days, a few European pension funds eliminated or greatly reduced their holdings of U.S. Treasurys and—perhaps as a result—U.S. language about European strength became considerably less aggressive.


Musk Shuts Down Russian Army Starlink Terminals in Ukraine, Kremlin Forces Lose Internet

Stefan Korshak

A recent Elon Musk decision to shut down Russian military-operated Starlink terminals in Ukraine has hammered Kremlin forces with internet access denial across a 1,000-kilometer (620-mile) fighting front that has left commanders without means of communication and combat units unable to attack, Ukrainian mainstream news reports and milbloggers reported on Thursday.

Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov, a high-profile Ukrainian electronic warfare expert, in Wednesday evening comments published on his personal Telegram channel, said practically all frontline Russian combat units dependent on the US-developed Starlink satellite system for digital communications no longer are able to transfer data via secure internet, while Russian sources said some formations had had to revert to paper maps and couriers carrying memory sticks between units.

Europe’s Next Hegemon: The Perils of German Power

Liana Fix

“Igive you my solemn warning that under the present trend, the next world war is inevitable,” declared the French military leader Ferdinand Foch. It was 1921, and Foch, the commander in chief of the Allied armies during World War I, was raising alarms in a speech from New York City. His concern was simple. After defeating Germany, the Allied powers had forced it to disarm with the Treaty of Versailles. But just a couple of years later, they had stopped enforcing the terms of their victory. Berlin, Foch warned, thus could and would rebuild its military. “If the Allies continue their present indifference . . . Germany will surely rise in arms again.”

Foch’s comments proved prescient. By the late 1930s, Germany had indeed rebuilt its military. It seized Austria, then Czechoslovakia, and then Poland, sparking World War II. When it was again defeated, the Allies were more attentive in their management of the country. They occupied and divided it, disbanded its armed forces, and largely abolished its defense industry. When the United States and the Soviet Union allowed West Germany and East Germany, respectively, to reestablish their militaries, it was only under strict oversight. When they allowed the halves to merge, Germany had to limit the size of its armed forces. Even so, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher opposed reunification, fearing it would produce a dangerously powerful country. A bigger Germany, she warned in 1989, “would undermine the stability of the whole international situation and could endanger our security.”

The useful illusion of a ‘rules-based order’ is ending

Brahma Chellaney

The “rules-based international order” was never a set of neutral rules. It was a story the U.S. told — about itself, its power and its right to bend norms when convenient. In January, that story finally collapsed when Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney called that order what many governments have long known it to be: a useful “fiction,” sustained less by universal law than by American power and selective enforcement.

For decades, when U.S. officials invoked a “rules-based international order,” they were not describing universal principles, but defending a flexible set of rules largely devised in Washington and adjusted whenever American interests required it. Now, as President Trump openly revives territorial expansion and economic coercion as tools of U.S. statecraft, that phrase no longer commands belief, even among America’s closest allies.

Russia’s FSB Exploits ISKP Threats to Pressure Central Asia

Uran Botobekov

Since launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has aimed to widen the geopolitical rift between the so-called Global South and the West. The Kremlin seeks to circumvent oil-related sanctions, while weaponizing threats posed by Uzbek and Tajik militants of the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) to portray Kyiv and its Western partners as complicit with global jihadi networks. This was exemplified on October 13, 2025, when Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) announced it foiled an assassination plot targeting a senior military officer, alleging that the plot was orchestrated by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) in coordination with the Islamic State (IS) (Federal Security Service of Russia, October 13, 2025).

Propaganda about the Assassination Plot. Four suspects were detained in the assassination plot—three Russian nationals and one Central Asian—for allegedly planning a suicide attack in central Moscow. The operation was reportedly directed by IS member Saidakbar Gulomov from bases in Ukraine and Western Europe. The FSB also claimed Gulomov was involved in the December 2024 assassination of Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, who headed Russia’s Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Troops (Gazeta.ru, December 17, 2024). Wanted by both Uzbekistan and Russia, Gulomov is believed to be of Uzbek origin, but no verified links to Ukraine, IS, or ISKP have been established. Russia’s accusations against Gulomov blur the line between war propaganda and legitimate counterterrorism analysis.

Central Asia Building New Cities

John C. K. Daly

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have taken numerous steps over the past several months to advance the construction of new modern cities (Forbes.kz, December 2, 2025; Economist.kg, January 15; Gazeta.uz, January 16). These four Central Asian countries have been building these metropolises designed for hundreds of thousands of residents for several years. Kyrgyzstan is building Asman, Kazakhstan—Alatau, Uzbekistan—New Tashkent, and Turkmenistan—ArkadaฤŸ. All are major projects, designed for initial populations of approximately 250,000. All four states are attempting to replace outdated Soviet-era infrastructure and increase international investment by providing state-of-the-art facilities and services for foreign companies. Central Asia will also need more urban facilities to accommodate a growing population, which the United Nations predicts will grow from about 84 million today to over 114 million by 2050 (ASIA-Plus, May 2, 2025; UNICEF, November 7, 2025).

The new urban centers are meant to facilitate and project Central Asia’s modernization. In 2023, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov laid the groundwork for Asman’s construction, saying that foreign direct investment (FDI) would cover the entire cost (24.kg; Tsentr Aziia, June 30, 2023). In 2021, the Kyrgyz government started discussing the construction of Asman (Kyrgyz for “sky”). Bishkek planned to build Asman on the northwestern shore of Lake Issyk-Kul for up to 700,000 inhabitants at an estimated cost of $20 billion, in a design that resembles a Kyrgyz musical instrument, the komuz (Izvestiia, January 9). Japarov claimed that it was cheaper and easier to create a new city than to update any of the existing ones. Bishkek suspended the project in 2023 after international partners proposed changes aimed at creating a “green city,” requiring additional time to revise the concept (24 KG, November 3, 2025).

Future-proofing Civilian CSDP in a Challenging Strategic Environment: Seven Questions for Debate

Aino Esser

Despite repeated efforts, much-needed improvements to increase the strategic impact of the European Union’s (EU) Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (civilian CSDP) have failed to materialize. Simultaneously, the formulation of strategic guidance in Brussels has stalled. This state of affairs risks civilian CSDP’s credibility and legitimacy in addressing the EU’s foreign policy priorities and security challenges. Against this backdrop, this research policy paper provides decision makers with seven questions for discussion. These questions touch upon civilian CSDP’s future as a crisis management tool, its functional and geographical prioritization, the breadth of mission mandates, host country relations and other aspects that have remained largely unresolved following two civilian CSDP compacts. To maintain civilian CSDP’s strategic relevance and prepare the instrument for the future, member states need to agree on answers to these questions.

To effectively tackle the proposed agenda, future debate needs to take place at a politico-strategic level and avoid becoming fragmented across different policy forums. In addition, discussions surrounding the instrument’s development should expand beyond technicalities and consider it as one of many foreign policy tools available to the EU in its deteriorated security environment and under the current geopolitical circumstances.

Chinese-Russian military industrial cooperation in the 2020s : towards true joint capabilities or merely transactional great power politics

Heinonen, Lauri 

This study addresses the history, current state, and prospects of military industrial and military technological cooperation between Russia and China, mostly based on original academic research in Russian and in Chinese. The study first lays out the historical background and development of Russian and Chinese military industrial cooperation from 1949 until the present day. This part of the study also addresses how the Soviet Union, later Russia, and China have also competed on international arms and military technology markets, showing the relative strengths and weaknesses of both countries.

The study next addresses relevant government policies on military industrial cooperation in Russia and in China. After this, the focus is on the most relevant military technologies being developed by Russia and China, their most important military industrial firms and organizations, and the most relevant civilian and dual-use technologies. The next part of the study addresses Western, Russian, and Chinese views on the military technological cooperation between Russia and China, showing that Western literature considers Russo-Chinese cooperation to be more advanced than do Russian and Chinese sources, with Russian sources being largely reserved on cooperation with China and Chinese sources wanting to intensify and extend cooperation with Russia while worrying that Russia does not show enough interest in cooperation.

Documenting the Israel–Gaza war: reflections and the future

Ross Burley

Since the October 7th attacks, CIR has been conducting sustained open source investigations into the war in Israel, Gaza and the wider region. Much of this work has unfolded away from public view. Some of that was by design: to protect investigators and sources; some because the scale, intensity and sensitivity of the conflict demanded a degree of caution before drawing conclusions or releasing data into an already volatile information environment. This article is not intended as a comprehensive catalogue of everything CIR has produced on the conflict. Nor is it an advocacy piece. It is, instead, a reflective account of why we undertook this work, how we approached it, and what we believe our investigations have contributed to public understanding, accountability and the historical record.

Why we engaged. Within hours of the attacks of 7 October 2023, CIR analysts began collating and verifying digital evidence emerging from Israel. Like many organisations working in conflict documentation, we were confronted immediately with an overwhelming volume of violent imagery, contradictory claims, and emotionally charged narratives. What became clear very quickly was that this would be a conflict defined not only by the scale of physical violence, but by an information environment that was unusually hostile, polarised and prone to distortion. Verified data was scarce. Unverified claims travelled fast. Misinformation and deliberate manipulation flourished in the absence of access for most international media.

US healthcare needs fixing, but there's no agreement on how to do it

Madeline Halpert

Jeff King was recovering from an unexpected procedure to fix his irregular heart rhythm when he received shocking news. The hospital had given him a $160,000 (£119,000) bill for the treatment. King, a former pastor, did not have standard health insurance from his employer, only a cost-sharing alternative plan that said it would not cover the procedure.

"It was pretty traumatic," said the 66-year-old from Lawrence, Kansas. "Who knew that less than a one-day procedure in and out of the hospital could destroy us financially?"

What Are the Pros and Cons of Data Centers?

Aminu Abdullahi

When ChatGPT launched in late 2022, I watched something remarkable happen. Within two months, it hit 100 million users, a growth rate that sent shockwaves through Silicon Valley. Today, it has over 800 million weekly active users. That launch sparked an explosion in AI development that has fundamentally changed how we build and operate the infrastructure powering our digital world.

That all happens in data centers… and lots of them. Data centers are economic engines and technical marvels, but they also come with real costs that communities are only beginning to feel. Let me walk you through the three major pros and cons of today’s data center boom and what they mean for our future.

Dehumanisation, powered by AI

Nishtha Sood,JAGPREET SINGH

There were reports in January 2026 that IIT Bombay, in association with the Maharashtra government, is working on an AI-based tool that could detect and identify so-called “illegal” Bangladeshi nationals and Rohingya refugees. The tool, according to Maharashtra Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis, is reportedly 60 per cent accurate. In other words, out of every 10 individuals who are tested with this tool, four could be falsely identified. Even if we were to assume that this tool is 100 per cent accurate—a highly unlikely scenario—the very purpose of this tool is highly problematic and dehumanising. It is intended not only to classify speech but also to deny some of the most persecuted populations of the world their sense of belonging and legal existence.

The application of artificial intelligence in state surveillance is often presented as value-free, objective, and efficient. However, as history has repeatedly shown us, technologies are not applied in a vacuum. Rather, they are shaped by the politics, prejudices, and power structures of the societies that apply them.

Five Questions for a General: Admiral Harry Harris

Charles Faint

Welcome back to Five Questions for a General, a production of the Modern War Institute at West Point. This series features specially selected cadet hosts who are given an incredible professional development opportunity—to sit down with senior military officers and ask carefully crafted questions about everything from leadership to their unique experiences while serving, to their expectations about the future of war.

In this episode, Cadet Nathan Unks sits down with retired Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., former commander of US Pacific Command and former US ambassador to South Korea, for a conversation focused on national security, leadership, and perseverance. Admiral Harris reflects on his personal journey—from growing up in the American South as the son of a Navy chief petty officer and a Japanese war survivor to finding opportunity through Navy JROTC and the Naval Academy—and shares candid lessons on resilience, failure, risk management, and teamwork.

Who Consolidates Gains? The Enduring Requirement for Manpower in Army Formations

Amos Fox

The late Colin Gray offers prophetic advice to those thinking about innovation, technology, and the future of war. In Gray’s Strategy for Chaos, his research “Shows clearly the limited value of advanced technology as a source of strategic effectiveness…Military advantages and disadvantages will tend to even out over a period, and leave the contest to be decided by the issue of quantity rather than quality.”

When developing war-fighting concepts and military doctrine, Robert Citino also provides prudent counsel. Citino posits that, “There is something incomplete about a way of war that relies on the shock value of small, highly mobile forces and airpower, that stresses rapid victory over all, and that then has a difficult time putting the country it has conquered back together again.” Considering both Gray and Citino’s caution, it is important to examine the U.S. Army’s move to transform most of its Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) into Mobile Brigade Combat Teams, or MBCTs.


8 February 2026

On track: India’s rail-based Agni-Prime

Karl Dewey

On 24 September 2025, India launched a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) designated Agni-Prime (Agni-P) from the Integrated Test Range missile-testing facility on Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha State. Though the choice of a rail-based mobile launcher may seem anachronistic compared to more modern road-mobile systems, rail is well suited to India’s mountainous terrain and the variable quality of the country’s road network. In turn, this increased mobility aids dispersal, ambiguity and, ultimately, survivability at relatively low costs. Given these apparent benefits, rail-based concepts have at times also attracted attention in China, North Korea and Russia over the last decade, each for their own set of convergent reasons.

Already in service, the road-mobile variant of Agni-P is set to replace the decades-old short-ranged Agni-I. In its rail-mobile configuration, Agni-P will also likely replace the medium-ranged Agni-II, which, like the intermediate-ranged Agni-III, is rail-based. The September launch was the first known test of Agni-P in its rail-mobile configuration, and the first time Indian authorities have publicly revealed its rail launcher, which is designed to look like a regular commercial freight wagon. Satellite imagery of the Abdul Kalam Island test site from 20 September shows this approximately 17 metre-long launcher in the same position before the test. With India’s rail network fast approaching full electrification, a short stretch of simulated overhead cable had been fitted to this section of track. The released imagery indicates the launcher had a device fitted to move these cables aside for launch.

What the US-India trade deal really means

Saroj Kumar Rath

Although United States-India cooperation remains a fundamentally positive-sum enterprise, advancing both economic and strategic interests, the manner of the new bilateral trade deal’s announcement was as striking as its substance. President Donald Trump framed the deal as a decisive reset of a year-long tariff standoff, unveiling it through social media posts following a direct call with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who reciprocated with his own public message.

While the precise contours of the agreement remain indistinct and its legal architecture has yet to be formally articulated, the exchange nonetheless carried an unmistakable assertion of sovereignty: two elected leaders of major powers publicly affirming a shared decision in full global view. In this sense, the announcement functioned less as a concluded treaty than as a performative act of statecraft, in which political authority preceded bureaucratic finality and symbolism momentarily eclipsed procedure without diminishing the strategic significance of the moment.

India’s Strategic Recalibration: Managing US Volatility and China’s Opportunism

Anna Maria Treifeldt

However, Trump’s tariffs, lack of progress in Quad (India, Australia, Japan, and the US) initiatives, and ambiguous signals on Pakistan have made the existing approach untenable. In response, India has lowered its immediate exposure by reopening limited diplomatic channels with China, highlighting that New Delhi prefers strategic hedging. These actions undermine assumptions in both Europe and the US about India’s reliability as a consistent counterweight to China.

The Trump Shock. The 2025 US National Security Strategy specifically called for bolstering commercial and security ties with India, and for “continued quadrilateral cooperation” to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific. Yet Washington’s trade threats and transactional framing of partnership under Trump have translated into early actions that have altered key elements of India’s strategic environment.[1]

From Dependence To Diversification: Afghanistan’s Ban On Pakistani Medicines And Its Regional Impact – OpEd

Zahid Khalili

On November 12, 2025, the Taliban government in Afghanistan (the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) announced a ban on the import of medicines from Pakistan. During a meeting with Afghan traders, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar Akhund described Pakistani medicines as low-quality and gave Afghan pharmaceutical importers a three-month deadline to settle their financial accounts in Pakistan. After the expiration of this period, Afghan traders would no longer be allowed to import Pakistani medicines into the country.

Recently, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Finance reiterated this decision and emphasized that, based on the directive of the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, no Pakistani medicines would be cleared at customs after February 9. The ministry once again urged Afghan pharmaceutical companies to finalize their accounts in Pakistan.

Five years on: Myanmar under military rule


On 1 February 2021, the country descended into a world of conflict following the military’s overthrow of the democratically elected government. Since then, civilians have continued to face daily threats of violence, with their safety at risk. This reality has been documented across many of Myanmar Witness’s investigations. Military tactics have evolved, with the number of airstrikes rising, and the use of paramotors, landmines and other aerial operations hitting areas meant to provide safety in times of violence, such as schools and religious sites.

To mark this sombre milestone and the intensified human rights crisis, Myanmar Witness has produced a video showing the lasting impacts of military rule. The video offers a glimpse into the challenges faced by communities that continue to navigate fear, displacement, and limited access to essential services. For 1,800 days, Myanmar Witness has been collecting, analysing and verifying data on unprecedented human rights abuses and violence across the country. Now in its fifth year, the project continues to provide verified information to media, advocacy organisations, and civil society, whilst also supporting justice and accountability mechanisms aimed at holding perpetrators to account.

Xi Jinping’s Military Purges Leave Him Increasingly Powerful but Isolated

Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil
Source Link


Key Takeaway: Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping has expanded his military purges to include two of the seniormost officers in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Xi may have purged them because he saw them as undermining his leadership and military objectives. The continued purges have reduced the Central Military Commission (CMC) since 2023 from seven members to two members, including Xi, transforming the body into an extension of Xi’s will rather than a major military decision-making forum. The CMC purges consolidate Xi’s control over the military but risk isolating him or surrounding him with sycophants, which in turn risks military miscalculations.

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping has expanded his military purges to include two of the most senior officers in the PLA. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) National Defense Ministry announced investigations into Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli on January 25, stating that they were “suspected of serious violations of discipline and law.”[1] Zhang and Liu were members of the CMC—the seniormost PRC military decision-making body—at the time of the announcement. Zhang had been a CMC vice chairman since October 2017, serving directly under Xi, who is the CMC chairman in addition to CCP general secretary.[2] Xi promoted Zhang to CMC senior vice chairman in October 2022 and exempted him from the required PLA retirement age, demonstrating Xi’s trust in him.[3] Liu had been the CMC Joint Staff Department chief of staff since September 2022, making him one of the top commanders overseeing PLA operations. Zhang and Liu were among the few senior PLA officers with combat experience, which they gained from conflicts with Vietnam in 1979 and the 1980s.[4] The publicly announced investigations strongly suggest that the CCP will expel Zheng and Liu and possibly impose legal consequences.

Missile barrages and cyber operations: Iran outlines multi-front war plan against US

SHIR PERETS

The concept echoes recent years of proxy warfare across Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and the Red Sea, where Houthi maritime attacks disrupted shipping and drew international responses. Iran has published a detailed concept for war with the United States, describing missile barrages, proxy escalation, cyber operations, and threats to global oil flows, according to the IRGC-linked Tasnim news agency.

The war scenario published by Tasnim begins with US strikes on nuclear and military sites in densely populated areas, followed by a rapid Iranian counter-barrage aimed at US regional bases. The document touts hardened underground infrastructure and redundant command networks designed to survive an initial blow and enable sustained retaliation.

Bombs And Backlash: How U.S. Strikes Could Strengthen Iran’s Regime – Analysis

Shaunak Nath

Reports that the United States is repositioning military units for a potential strike on Iran have coincided with a sharp escalation at sea. A U.S. fighter recently shot down an Iranian drone that approached an American aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea, marking one of the most direct military encounters between the two sides in years. At the same time, officials on both sides have signalled openness to indirect talks, reportedly through regional intermediaries. 

This combination of military pressure and diplomatic signalling has revived a familiar but unresolved question: could US strikes weaken or even topple the Iranian regime, especially at a moment of visible domestic unrest? Or would military action instead consolidate power in Tehran and undermine the political movements challenging the system from within?

America in the Crosshairs: The Emergence of Destabilization as Global Strategy

The Ren Way

In early 2026, as new Jeffrey Epstein related documents began surfacing in courts and in newsrooms on both sides of the Atlantic, the familiar outlines of a scandal suddenly looked stranger. The headlines were predictable enough: more transcripts, more names, more sickening detail about trafficking, abuse, and impunity. But buried alongside the salacious material were clues that pointed somewhere else.

There were repeated references to Russia. There were discussions of visas and meetings in Moscow. There were notes implying that Epstein had offered analysis and “insight” on US politics to officials connected to the Kremlin. At the same time, older threads about Epstein’s proximity to Israeli political and intelligence figures resurfaced. His investments in surveillance technology firms with roots in Israeli military intelligence. His longstanding friendship with a former Israeli prime minister who once ran the country’s military intelligence branch. The shadow of Ghislaine Maxwell’s father, Robert Maxwell, long suspected of juggling relationships with multiple intelligence services.

Russian general shot several times in Moscow

Paul Kirby

A high-profile general in Russia's military has been shot several times and wounded in Moscow. Lt Gen Vladimir Alexeyev, 64, was taken to hospital after the attack in a residential block of flats in the north-western outskirts of the capital, and is believed to be in a serious condition. The attacker fled the scene. Alexeyev is number two in the main directorate of Russia's GRU military intelligence and the latest high-ranking military figure to have been targeted in or near Moscow since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

No-one has so far claimed the attack, but senior Russian officials immediately blamed Ukraine, saying it was trying to derail negotiations to end the war. "The victim has been taken to one of the city's hospitals," said Svetlana Petrenko of Russia's Investigations Committee (SK), which said it opened a criminal case for attempted murder.