10 May 2026

TTP and the Escalating Islamabad-Kabul Security Crisis

Rahim Nasar

The Afghan Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 has led to the resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which presents a growing threat as a strong militant force along Pakistan’s western border.

Pakistan has launched aerial strikes against alleged TTP sanctuaries in Afghanistan—a shift from its traditional counterinsurgency practices—in response to the group’s more frequent cross-border attacks. The Afghan Taliban’s persistent denial of TTP’s presence and refusal to take counter-measures has exposed a deeper ideological alignment between the Afghan Taliban and TTP. Current tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan are no longer limited to militancy but are evolving into a structured inter-state conflict.

Mali Is the Linchpin of West Africa—Now It’s Under Jihadist Siege

Ebenezer Obadare

Thousands of armed fighters belonging to the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and ethnic Tuareg separatists under the umbrella of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) launched coordinated attacks on multiple cities in Mali on Saturday, April 25. They targeted Bamako, the capital, as well as Gao, Kidal, Mopti, and Sevare—all sites of major military bases in the northern and central regions of the beleaguered country. If the military government of Assimi Goïta has gotten used to sporadic attacks by JNIM militants—who have effectively imposed a fuel blockade on Bamako for the better part of a year—it seems to have been caught off guard by the alliance between JNIM and FLA, and by their rare decision to target several cities simultaneously.

From the standpoint of the emergency allies, the attacks were a success, as they managed to kill Malian Defense Minister Sadio Camara at his residence in Kati, a garrison town eleven miles from Bamako.

China Bulletin


Weak consumption: China has repeatedly pledged to rebalance its economy toward consumer spending but has not followed through. Retail sales growth bottomed out in December 2025 (0.9 percent year-on-year), then rose slightly to 2.8 percent in early 2026 before slowing again in March to 1.7 percent.1 A 9.1 percent drop in auto sales for Q1 dragged down retail spending for the quarter.2 

In an effort to stabilize prices, Beijing had subsidized trade-ins of cheaper models in favor of higher-end models.3 Beijing’s “anti-involution” action led to an excess supply of lower-priced cars, fueling exports—China’s passenger car exports rose 60.6 percent year-on-year in Q1. declining 2.2 percent in all of 2025.7 The sharp increase was driven partly by NBS adding power investment into the figure, which had previously been tracked separately by the National Energy Administration.8

State-Driven Nuclear Expansion is Winning Energy Race

Christopher Nye

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) now commands the world’s largest overall nuclear construction pipeline, placing Beijing on a credible path to surpass the United States in operable nuclear capacity before 2030. Policy continuity—including the 2024 Energy Law, the 2025 Atomic Energy Law, the 14th and 15th five-year plans, and State Council approval—has allowed the PRC to mitigate the “cost escalation curse” that has haunted Western nuclear projects.

A lower cost of capital for state-owned developers, combining record-low sovereign bond yields, staged value-added tax rebates, a centralized “spent fuel” fund, and long-term power purchase agreements, has also helped support the sector’s growth.

China unveils new naval defence systems as drones change nature of war at sea

Liu Zhen

The Chinese navy has unveiled a new anti-drone air defence system, according to state broadcaster CCTV. Drones have fundamentally transformed naval warfare in recent years and emerged as a significant threat to modern warships in conflicts such as Russia’s war against Ukraine and the US-Israeli attacks on Iran.

The CCTV report on Monday said a “finalisation test” – which certifies that a weapon system’s design meets all operational requirements – had been successfully carried out in the Bohai Sea. In effect, this means that it has been given the official green light for mass production and deployment. During the test, the system intercepted multiple drones conducting “high-difficulty” ultra-low-altitude and stealth attacks in a “realistic” combat simulation, the report said.

Can China Curb Trump’s Gambit In Hormuz? – OpEd

M.K. Bhadrakumar

China’s shock warning to the US President Donald Trump that his road to Beijing goes through the Strait of Hormuz has been an audacious move directly linking his planned visit to China on May 14-15 with the situation around Iran.

It is more than coincidental that China’s whiplash in the form of a special press conference to mark the commencement of China’s presidency of the Security Council on May 1 at the UN by its special representative Ambassador Fu Cong came hot on the heels of Russian President Vladimir Putin telephoning Trump on April 28 to warn him that “if the United States and Israel resume military action, this would inevitably lead to extremely adverse consequences not only for Iran and its neighbours, but for the entire international community… a ground operation on Iranian territory would be particularly unacceptable and dangerous.”

U.S. Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF): America’s New Counter To China And Russia’s A2/AD Threats – Analysis

Andrew Feickert and Ebrima M’Bai

Congress has expressed concern about the threat to U.S. national security posed by Russia and China. The Army believes to address this threat, it must be able to operate in a multi-domain (air, land, water, space, cyber, information) environment, requiring new operational concepts, technologies, weapons, and units. The Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) is the Army’s self-described “organization centerpiece” of this effort.
What Is a Multi-Domain Task Force?

The Army’s Chief of Staff Paper #1: Army Multi-Domain Transformation Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict dated March 16, 2021, describes the MDTF as “theater-level maneuver elements designed to synchronize precision effects and precision fires in all domains against adversary anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) networks in all domains, enabling joint forces to execute their operational plan (OPLAN)-directed roles.”

The Caspian Sea’s Role in the Iran War

Arjun Singh

Since the outbreak of the Iran War, most international attention has focused on the Persian Gulf, specifically the Strait of Hormuz, through which, in normal times, nearly 25 percent of the world’s oil and 20 percent of the world’s natural gas flow. The double Iranian and US naval blockade has choked maritime traffic and precipitated a global energy crisis.

Yet, the gulf and its strait are not the only bodies of water that war has placed in jeopardy. On its northern edge, Iran borders the Caspian Sea, the world’s largest inland body of water. At 143,000 square miles, it’s as large as the Black Sea in Europe, and along its coast, it hosts the regional powers of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. Maritime trade and oil pipelines have, for years, crossed the Caspian between Europe and Asia, making it a prime venue for commerce.

Innovation and the Energy Crisis

David M. Hart

The energy landscape is being radically reshaped by war in the Middle East. Spiking prices are prompting emergency measures in much of the world. They should also reinvigorate energy innovation policy. Accelerated innovation is vital to softening or averting future crises, but countries are not all prioritizing innovation to the same degree or in the same way. That is why CFR’s Climate Realism Initiative has launched a new, interactive Global Energy Innovation Index.

The largest energy supply shock in history is still unfolding. Petroleum and liquefied natural gas (LNG) prices have risen significantly since February 28, and many analysts expect them to continue to climb. Fuel shortages in some countries have led to rationing, shutting schools and workplaces.

MBZ Bought a Missile Shield


Sixty-seven days into a regional war that has kept the Strait of Hormuz functionally closed and placed Israeli troops on Arab soil for the first time in history, Iran has not struck Saudi Arabia in 

Two Wars Later, Iran’s Nuclear Question Is Still on the Table

Jane Darby Menton and Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar

The Middle East Program in Washington combines in-depth regional knowledge with incisive comparative analysis to provide deeply informed recommendations. With expertise in the Gulf, North Africa, Iran, and Israel/Palestine, we examine crosscutting themes of political, economic, and social change in both English and Arabic.

The Nuclear Policy Program aims to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Our experts diagnose acute risks stemming from technical and geopolitical developments, generate pragmatic solutions, and use our global network to advance risk-reduction policies. Our work covers deterrence, disarmament, arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear energy


Bowen: Strait of Hormuz standoff raises risk of sliding back into all-out war

Jeremy Bowen

The ceasefire in the Gulf is four weeks old and showing its age. The US and Iran's determination to keep the pressure on each other has put it in serious jeopardy. This is a dangerous moment.

The ceasefire opened up a chance for diplomacy that looked for a short time as if it might make progress. Americans and Iranians faced each other across a conference table in Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, but came away empty-handed.

The Pakistanis are trying to revive the process, without much success so far. Both America and Iran want to have a deal. But they have different deals in mind and are sticking to their red lines. Until one or the other, or preferably both, decide to offer concessions, renewed full-scale hostilities remain an incident away.

The Iran–U.S./Israel Conflict One Month After Its Outbreak: The Logic Of Controlled Escalation And Systemic Risk – Analysis

General (Rtd) Corneliu

The conflict between Iran, on the one hand, and the U.S.–Israel axis, on the other, has roots that go far deeper than the current military confrontation. In U.S.–Iran relations, the structural rupture begins with the historical resentment linked to the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mosaddegh, continues with the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and deepens through a combination of sanctions, regional competition, and the nuclear file.

In parallel, Iran–Israel relations have evolved from indirect rivalry to open strategic hostility, particularly through the expansion of Iran’s “axis of resistance”—Hezbollah, Shiite militias, and the Houthis—and through Israel’s perception that a near-nuclear Iran would represent an existential threat. The 2015 nuclear agreement temporarily halted the escalation spiral, but the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and the killing of Qassem Soleimani in 2020 pushed the conflict back toward a logic of force.

Where Are U.S. Military Forces Deployed in Europe?

Molly Carlough

Where are U.S. bases and troops situated in Europe?

U.S. forces have been stationed in Europe since the end of World War II. Troop numbers have fluctuated over the decades, reaching a high of roughly 475,000 active-duty personnel in the late 1950s, when the U.S. military served as a bulwark against Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces at the height of the Cold War. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, those numbers dropped to the tens of thousands.

As of April 2025, the United States had roughly eighty thousand [PDF] U.S. service members stationed in Europe, according to the United States European Command (EUCOM). The total amount varies due to planned exercises and regular rotations of troops in and out of the continent. For example, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, some twenty thousand additional U.S. soldiers were deployed to states neighboring Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. Over the course of the war, the total number of troops has ranged between approximately 75,000 and 105,000 military personnel, primarily from the Air Force, Army, and Navy.

Europeans Are Quiet Quitting the United States

Rym Momtaz

Strategic Europe offers insightful analysis, fresh commentary, and concrete policy recommendations from some of Europe’s keenest international affairs observers. Behind the scenes of the genuflection and obsequiousness that has dominated European interactions with U.S. President Donald Trump since January 2025, an increasing number of leaders have been quietly making long-term shifts.

In tech, space, and defense in particular—arguably the most strategic fields—Europeans are increasingly weighing their historic reflex to buy American against the cost associated with the tempestuousness of the United States.

The Tragic Decline of the American Navy

Robert D. Kaplan

Alfred Thayer Mahan, a 19th-century naval officer and pre-eminent military strategist, believed his young country was destined to be great because of its Navy. Toward the end of his service, Mahan, then a U.S. Navy captain, wrote a landmark book about the age of sailing ships. Read avidly by kings, prime ministers and presidents — including Theodore Roosevelt, Kaiser Wilhelm II and the young Winston Churchill — the book posited the idea of a free world anchored by American sea power.

Mahan believed America needed a large number of ships to fight decisive battles and to keep sea lanes open and international commerce flowing. This vision, which was both humanitarian and self-serving, soon came to pass, starting with the Spanish-American War of 1898, which Mahan avidly supported. After World War II, the U.S. Navy possessed some 7,000 vessels that went on to dominate the oceans for the next half century. The United States, with its blessed geography fronting two oceans, had embarked upon its imperial destiny, with the naval power to back up its values.

Defining Cognitive Warfare: A NDAA Mandate Response

Bonnie Rushing,  Dr. Shouhuai Xu,  Dr. William "Ox" Hersch

The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act directs the Department of War to define cognitive warfare and distinguish it from existing information-related activities. This article responds directly to that mandate, proposing a decision-centric definition of cognitive warfare, delineating it from information operations, psychological operations, and influence activities across seven dimensions. The definition is illustrated through a notional case study and validated against observed Russian and Chinese cognitive warfare operations in the Baltic states and Taiwan.

Disclaimer: “The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force, Department of War, or the US Government.”

The Return of Japanese Hard Power

Matthew Finkel

Japan’s long-dormant defense industry is finally waking up. Constrained by a constitution imposed by the Allied military occupation after World War II, Japan has for decades adhered to a pacifist security policy. It technically maintains no military (although its Self-Defense Forces are more formidable than many foreign militaries), and until last month, the government had forbidden the export of lethal weaponry. Cultural attitudes have reinforced Japan’s pacifism: Japanese citizens have historically derided hawkish politicians and defense firms as “merchants of death.”

These constraints on defense production have taken their toll. 

Trump Is Pulling Troops From Germany. The Missiles Are a Bigger Problem.

Liana Fix

President Donald Trump’s recent announcement that the United States would withdraw five thousand troops from Germany—with the threat of “cutting” more from U.S. bases across Europe—has taken U.S. allies by surprise. The decision seems to be driven less by strategic calculations about burden-shifting within NATO and more by a desire to punish Europeans for their criticism of and limited support for the Iran war.

While this move does not appear to threaten the minimum number of seventy-six thousand troops that Congress has mandated to be stationed in Europe, it does add to a list of issues that have lasting consequences for European security. This includes depleted U.S. stockpiles due to the Iran war and delayed arms deliveries to Europe, but the possible cancellation of Tomahawk cruise missiles that were planned to be stationed in Germany in 2027 is of particular concern.

An All-American Retort To Israel’s Bombing Of Lebanon – OpEd

James Bovard

Israel’s bombing of Lebanon has reportedly killed more than a thousand civilians this year. Israel also drove out more than a half million civilians from southern Lebanon as part of an effort to confiscate or ravage that territory. The New York Times reports that Israel is “applying the Gaza model in Lebanon,” destroying entire towns and villages and leaving the rubble uninhabitable. Israel’s bombing has been so indiscriminate that even President Trump pretended to object. On Truth Social, Trump announced: “Israel will not be bombing Lebanon any longer. They are PROHIBITED from doing so by the U.S.A. Enough is enough!!!”

Trump’s assertion had as much effect as his boasts about how he already won the war against Iran. The Israeli military continues assailing Lebanon and Trump’s attention long since wandered back to his ballroom. The latest attacks are reminiscent of Israel’s 2006 invasion of Lebanon, which also killed roughly a thousand civilians, as well as a few hundred Hezbollah fighters. With the Bush White House cheerleading all the way, Israel assailed Lebanon in response to Hezbollah’s seizure of two Israeli soldiers.

Germany’s military power is on the rise. This time it must be firmly embedded in Europe

Timothy Garton Ash

As we mark the 81st anniversary of the end of the second world war in Europe this Friday, 8 May, it’s clear that Germany will again be the leading European military power.

Already next year its defence spending will be as much as that of France and Britain combined – and it is projected to be significantly larger by 2030. The German government’s declared goal is to have the strongest conventional army in Europe. True, France and Britain have nuclear weapons, but that means less money to spend on the rest of defence. So the question is not, will this happen? Barring unforeseen developments, it will. The question, particularly on this solemn anniversary, is: how can we ensure that this time the growth of German military power is a positive development for all of Europe?

When drones dominate the battlefield, distance no longer matters - opinion

BRIG.-GEN.(RET.) ZVIKA HAIMOVITCH

The modern battlefield is transforming. New operational concepts are emerging, additional domains such as the digital and cyber spheres are expanding in scope and intensity, and advanced technologies are reshaping capabilities and achievements. Among all these shifts, the air domain is experiencing the most profound evolution. Its rapid technological and conceptual changes are creating far‑reaching implications for the modern battlefield.

The evolving air domain is also reshaping the very geometry of conflict. Long‑range strike capabilities have dramatically reduced the traditional importance of geography; a threat originating 2,000 kilometers away (such as in Iran) can now be as immediate and actionable as one positioned just beyond the border.

How to Lose an Information War in 10 Days

Benjamin Jensen, Nico Vacca, and Jose M. Macias III

We live in a surreal world in which battlefield success does not necessarily translate into an information advantage. Belief is suspended from reality largely because most of us spend hours of our waking lives bombarded by images, memes, and ephemeral social media content that is both tailored and increasingly augmented by AI. For every official press conference, no matter how masterful or awkward, viral pop culture pastiches blitz the senses. Homo economicus succumbs to giggles, fear, dopamine, and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).

Look no further than the war with Iran. The United States and Israel achieved unparalleled success on the battlefield, sinking large portions of Iranian naval capability and setting back its ballistic missile and nuclear program by years, if not decades. Yet, Iran counterattacked as much online as it did with salvos of ballistic missiles and drones. While U.S. leaders struggled to make a compelling case for the war, Iranian-linked accounts flooded social media with deepfakes, false claims of battlefield success, and narratives painting the conflict as a costly war driven by corrupt elite interests at the expense of ordinary Americans.

Yes, Reality Demands More Guns, Larger Guns, Everywhere

CDR Salamander

After the invention of gunpowder, every time a navy faces conflict after a long time at peace, one of the first things they realize they have to do is to get more guns, and larger caliber guns, on their ships as soon as possible. This reality today also applies to a side-branch, missiles, as well, but today let’s focus on the gun proof.

In peace, the accountants and those who are willing to shift their personal career risk onto combat risk worn by other people will happily divest platforms of money and people hungry weapons to buy cheaper, smaller, none—or if they are feeling a little guilty, will “fit for but not with”.

9 May 2026

Could India Revisit The 1959 Chinese Proposal To Settle The Border Dispute? – Analysis

P. K. Balachandran

Gen. M.M.Naravane, who served as India’s army chief from 2019 to 2022, has suggested that India and China consider the 1959 Chinese proposal to barter the disputed territories of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh to end the 75-year-long boundary dispute between the two countries.

Because of the boundary dispute, India and China have not been able to have normal relations. Hence the need to find ways to bring the curtains down on the dispute, the General argues in his recent video interview to the New Delhi-based website The Print.

But India had rejected the Chinese proposal to barter Aksai Chin for Arunachal Pradesh in 1960 for good reasons argues historian Srinath Raghavan, Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, in his paper entitled, “A Missed Opportunity? The Nehru-Zhou Enlai Summit of 1960,” published by the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in 2015.

Analysis: ISKP’s Exploitation of the Af-Pak Border War

Uma Miskinyar 

Much of the current discussion treats the Iran–Israel–U.S war and the Pakistan–Afghanistan conflict as separate crises, but along the Iran–Afghanistan–Pakistan corridor they are unfolding in the same strategic space. This article analyzes how that overlap is reshaping militant dynamics in Balochistan, focusing on the growing confrontation between ISKP and Baloch nationalist groups. It also assesses the implications for U.S. counterterrorism policy, particularly in tracking cross-border networks, digital recruitment, and declining intelligence visibility.

On the early morning of February 27, 2026, Pakistan’s defense minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, declared what he termed “open war” between Pakistan and the Taliban authorities in Afghanistan. The announcement formalized a week of cross-border strikes and escalating retaliation along the Durand Line, a boundary whose instability has long been sustained by overlapping insurgencies and unresolved sovereignty disputes. This escalation differs from previous cycles of Af-Pak tension; it is unfolding simultaneously with intensifying conflict involving Iran, producing a regional security environment defined not by a single crisis, but by concurrent shocks.

Strategic Implications of the Iran War

Paul J. Saunders, and Nikolas K. Gvosdev

Over two months into the US-Israeli war with Iran, the conflict shows no signs of imminent resolution, with both sides convinced that time is on their side. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has driven up the prices of oil and natural gas, but neither Washington nor Tehran appears ready to back down or make concessions, raising the possibility of a prolonged stalemate of “no war, no peace.” At the same time, the war’s immediate effects on the energy markets and US military posture will have repercussions for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s plans for Taiwan, as well as President Donald Trump’s summit in Beijing later this month.

How long can each side endure this state of affairs, and what would it take to force a settlement and reopen the Strait of Hormuz? How does the war intersect with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine? And what lessons is China drawing as it watches another great power struggle to bring a middle power to heel?

Oil Tanker Hijacking Stokes Fears of New Disruption in Gulf Region

Pranav Baskar and Matthew Mpoke Bigg

Pirates from Somalia hijacked an oil tanker off the coast of Yemen on Saturday and have diverted it to Somalia’s waters, the authorities in Somalia said Sunday, the third such incident in recent weeks. The hijacking is an embarrassment for the government in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, and suggests a resurgence of piracy at a time when the Red Sea, which borders western Yemen, has become an even more critical route for global shipping, given the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz by the war in Iran.

Yemen’s Coast Guard said that unidentified people had boarded the ship, the Togo-flagged Eureka, on Saturday and directed it through the Yemeni part of the Gulf of Aden toward Somalia’s coast. Efforts to monitor and recover the vessel were underway, it added.

Avoiding the Knife Fight: Defeating Iran’s Strait Strategy

David Levy

Iran has long prepared to close the Strait of Hormuz in the event of a major conflict with the United States, hoping to trigger an energy shock, draw US naval forces into a confined battlespace, and impose enough cost to weaken Washington’s will. The US has been fully cognizant of Tehran’s intent for decades and planned accordingly. In the recent conflict, rather than accept a direct fight inside the Strait on Iranian terms, Washington and Jerusalem widened the campaign, degraded Iran’s command structure, air defenses, naval forces, missile infrastructure, and supporting systems, and only then turned more directly to the Strait itself. Even so, reopening the waterway has proved difficult. 

The IRGC’s naval capacity, though significantly diminished, is still sufficient to threaten shipping through mines, small craft, and shore-based systems. As a result, the United States has shifted to a broader indirect approach that combines limited military operations in and around the Strait with strikes and threats of further strikes on vital targets, economic coercion, blockade measures, and a diplomatic alternative. Thus far, that approach appears to be working. Iran’s Strait strategy has not forced the United States into the kind of fight Tehran had spent decades anticipating.

The U.S. Military Was Losing Its Edge. After Iran, Everyone Knows It.

Tierney L. Cross

On paper, the war in Iran should not be much of a contest. The United States spends around $1 trillion a year on its military, more than 100 times as much as Iran. That money buys a vastly larger Air Force and Navy, as well as advanced weapons technologies that Iranian generals can only dream about.

In the war’s early days, the mismatch played out as one might expect. American forces destroyed much of the Iranian military. Now, however, the contest looks less one-sided. Iran has taken control of the Strait of Hormuz, and its missiles and drones still threaten America’s allies in the region. While President Trump seems eager for a negotiated truce, Iran’s leaders do not. Somehow, the weaker nation is in the stronger negotiating position.

IRGC Announces New Maritime Control Zone In Strait Of Hormuz


The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) on Monday announced a new maritime control zone in the Strait of Hormuz, reports Iranian media.

In an official statement, the IRGC said it has declared a new maritime control area in the strategic Strait of Hormuz, reports the Tasnim News Agency, which is closely aligned with the IRGC.

According to the statement, the new zone of “smart control” by the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Strait of Hormuz is defined as follows: “In the south: the line between Mount Mobarak in Iran and south of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates; In the west: the line between the end of Qeshm Island in Iran and Umm Al Quwain in the United Arab Emirates.”

The Real Center of Gravity in Tehran

Stephen D. Cook

On April 22nd in these pages, I warned that ships and planes are tools of denial, not governance. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the theocratic regime it protects can absorb the loss of tankers, missiles, and oil revenue so long as they retain their most valuable resource: armed loyalists on the ground who control the Iranian people. That piece drew on twenty-five years in the U.S. Army, including combat tours as a Green Beret where I watched the same pattern play out in Iraq and Afghanistan. The speed with which the situation in the Gulf continues to evolve compels a follow-up.

We are still fighting the wrong war.

The United States continues to treat Iran as a conventional nation-state whose center of gravity can be found in the familiar pillars of national power: military, economic, information, and political. We impose a naval blockade on the Strait of Hormuz believing the leadership values its economy. We prepare new precision strikes believing the regime values identified targets—missile sites, air defenses, nuclear facilities—the same way a Western government would. Both assumptions are flawed.

Tapping into America’s Distaste for Forever Wars: The Spread of Iranian Narratives on Bluesky

Jose M. Macias III and Nico Vacca

The United States and Israel have made battlefield gains in their conflict against Iran, but the United States is struggling to counter Iranian propaganda. Operational successes have removed Iran’s authoritarian supreme leader, dismantled its defense leadership apparatus, and degraded its missile capabilities. However, the opportunity cost of military success for the United States is the loss of ground in the information war for the hearts and minds of American audiences and Western audiences more broadly. While Iran is losing on the battlefield, it is competing effectively in the information space through an aggressive, multiplatform disinformation campaign.

Analysis by the Futures Lab of more than 9,000 Bluesky Social posts finds that messages seemingly designed to exacerbate public divisions, which compose 23 percent of posts in the dataset, are the highest performing, averaging 150 reposts, 470 likes, and 28 replies per post. These same posts have been viewed by an estimated 293,666 users and are statistically significantly associated with a higher sharing volume, with an estimated 41 percent increase compared to other posts.

Have any lessons been learned from US failures in the Iran war?

Stephen Bryen

While the US military has had many achievements in the Iran conflict, it’s been far from cost free. Iran conducted extensive retaliatory strikes targeting high-value US bases. According to international reports and satellite data, the damage to aircraft, radar, and communication systems throughout February and March was more significant than initially reported.

In all, 16 US military sites in eight countries across the Middle East were hit, and some of them sustained enough damage to be unusable.

Did the US learn any lessons as much from the failures as from the successes?

The US clearly made some major blunders, despite far superior air defenses and sophisticated command and control systems. Most spectacularly, the US lost two AWACS aircraft, one totally destroyed and the other possibly unrepairable, and three F-15 fighter jets, downed by “friendly” fire. The US also “missed” an Iranian jet that did substantial damage to Camp Buehring in Kuwait.

Trump’s Project Freedom Isn’t Going to Open the Strait of Hormuz

Max Boot

President Donald Trump announced Sunday that the United States would launch an operation to help tankers and cargo ships trapped in the Persian Gulf transit the waterway. Two U.S. destroyers entered the Persian Gulf on Monday, and two U.S.-flagged commercial ships exited it. Iran hit back by attacking commercial ships and targeting the United Arab Emirates with missiles and drones for the first time since the ceasefire began on April 8. Iranian forces also fired on U.S. warships, and U.S. forces responded by destroying six Iranian small boats.

Trying to open the Strait of Hormuz by force could reignite the wider conflict and expose U.S. warships to Iranian attacks in a narrow waterway with little time to react. All of this could quickly render “Project Freedom”—with its vague pledges of military help but no announcement of actual convoy operations—another improvised half-measure in a conflict that has lurched from misstep to misstep. As long as Iran remains capable of attacking commercial vessels, few shipping lines will risk running the gauntlet.