Indian Strategic Studies

15 April 2026

Rare Earth Leverage and Pressure Points on U.S. Technological Power

Sergey E. Ivashchenko

In 2025–2026 the world faced a series of decisions by China that at first glance looked like another step in its technological confrontation with the West. Beijing introduced export licenses for gallium, germanium, and several other rare‑earth metals, citing the need to protect national security. The United States and the EU responded by increasing strategic reserves, attempting to accelerate domestic production, and launching diplomatic efforts to diversify supply. The markets experienced a short‑term panic, but most observers viewed the situation as a temporary episode that would not change the overall dynamics of global trade. A deeper and more strategically significant process lies behind this episode. Restrictions on rare‑earth exports became the starting point of a chain of interconnected consequences that disrupted U.S. defense supply chains, altered the balance of influence in Africa, and accelerated the formation of new technological blocs.

The analysis uses the Yankee angle — a framework I introduced to describe how the United States interprets and responds to strategic disruptions. It combines a defined analytical viewpoint, a deliberate angle of approach, and the American habit of turning positioning and timing into advantage. Applied to the current situation, this perspective shows that the rare‑earth crisis is not an isolated market fluctuation but a direct challenge to U.S. technological and defense resilience.

India-China Border Incidents Database Project

Y Nithiyanandam & Ayush Hegde

25 August 1959 | Longju, Subansiri Frontier Division, NEFA

The first serious armed clash between Indian and Chinese forces occurred at Longju, Subansiri Frontier Division, erstwhile North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), presently Arunachal Pradesh, when PLA (People’s Liberation Army) troops attacked personnel of the Assam Rifles.

21 October 1959 | Kongka La, Aksai Chin

A joint party of the Intelligence Bureau and the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) was ambushed by heavily armed and entrenched Chinese PLA soldiers near Kongka Pass.

Most Comprehensive Unclassified Order of Battle for China’s Sea Services! Latest “Modern Chinese Maritime Forces” Covers Growing Nuke Sub Force!

Andrew Erickson

Follow the latest developments in China’s growing nuclear-powered submarine force (pp. 20–22) and beyond with this new edition of “Modern Chinese Maritime Forces,” the most comprehensive open source PRC sea services inventory! As we gallop through the Year of the Fire Horse (火马年), China under Xi is steaming full speed ahead, particularly at sea. Navigate troubled Indo-Pacific waters by consulting the latest version of Modern Chinese Maritime Forces!

China’s Navy is simultaneously sustaining high-rate production, beginning a new generation of surface combatants, and continuing comprehensive force expansion across the waterfront. China’s Coast Guard and Maritime Militia are achieving similarly rapid advances.

Pakistan shouldn’t put all of its guns in China’s basket

Suffian Zafar and Najeeb Ullah

As great powers like the United States pursue frameworks that impose growing security, political, and economic burdens on smaller states, middle and small powers face mounting pressure to reassess their interests. Countries like Pakistan must draw on historical experience to navigate this turbulent moment and chart a more autonomous course.

Three priorities stand out. First, Pakistan must reduce its defense dependency on China through a calculated alternative strategy. Second, making a middle-power military-industrial complex — such as Turkey’s — into a major defense partner is crucial to hedging great-power competition and promoting defense multilateralism. Third, building indigenous naval capacity and maritime security through joint ventures in underwater drones, frigates, naval exercises and navigation technology would strengthen strategic autonomy.

The Myth of the PRC’s Overseas Energy Vulnerability

Daniel Fu

Experts in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) argue that the country’s energy system is resilient enough to withstand major external disruptions, including conflict in the Persian Gulf, repudiating Western claims of PRC vulnerability to strategic chokepoints.

Through supply route diversification via Russia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, potential blockades of the straits of Hormuz or Malacca now inflict less economic damage to the PRC’s energy supply. Global economic interdependence and the PRC’s growing domestic energy capacity further limit risk of disruption. Strategic petroleum reserves, diversified imports, domestic production (especially coal), and rapid expansion of renewable energy have helped reduce the PRC’s reliance on seaborne oil and enhanced its long-term energy security.

China Has a Battle Plan to Defeat the U.S. Army

Michael David Peck

U.S. Army M1A2 tank during exercise at National Training Center in 2019. Photo by Spc. Nathan Franco, DVIDS The last time that China and America fought a major ground battle was in the Korean War, almost 75 years ago.

But that Chinese army of poorly equipped peasants – who still came perilously close to ejecting U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula – are long gone. If U.S. troops were to fight the People’s Liberation Army of today, they would encounter a foe that is far more technologically and tactically sophisticated than in 1950. The PLA’s evolution can be seen in a scenario recently tested by U.S. Army experts: what would happen if a Chinese Heavy Combined Arms Brigade (HCAB) fought a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT)? These are roughly equivalent units of about 5,000 soldiers each.

The Fragile U.S.-Iran Ceasefire: Issues to Watch

Daniel Byman

For now, the United States, Israel, and Iran have agreed to a ceasefire and only a ceasefire. Numerous contentious issues remain unresolved, ranging from Iran’s nuclear and missile programs to Tehran’s support for proxies and repression of protesters at home. Tehran, for its part, seeks an end to U.S. sanctions, the right to enrich uranium, an end to Israel’s attacks on Lebanon, and other demands, as well as guarantees that attacks on Iran will not resume. The war itself has also generated new demands: Iran seeks compensation for the devastation caused by U.S. and Israeli bombing and is claiming that it will demand payment for tankers seeking to transit the Strait of Hormuz. The two sides are far apart, and both seek to convince audiences at home that they have won—something that will further complicate negotiations.

It is possible that the ceasefire itself will be the settlement: The United States, Israel, and Iran will not come to a final deal, but the ceasefire will continue indefinitely, with the risk of a flare-up hovering over the region.

Tehran Takes the Strait — and the Premium

Natalia Katona

March has turned into a month of hard power tests for Iran – and so far, it has been quietly exceeding expectations. By effectively blocking the Strait of Hormuz to all but its own cargoes (or the ones that have received their approval), Tehran has demonstrated that the trajectory of the conflict is far from being dictated by its counterparts. Faced with the risk of acute shortages in medium-sour crude, the US administration has been forced into a partial sanctions retreat, allowing Iranian barrels already at sea to re-enter the market. The result is a striking reversal — Iranian crude, once deeply discounted, is now trading at a $1/bbl premium to ICE Brent, while the pool of willing buyers is slowly but steadily widening.

Iran entered the escalation phase with export momentum already building, loading crude at 2.2 million b/d in February – the highest level since 2018. In March, when all other Tehran’s neighbours had their barrels trapped inside the Gulf, Iranian crude exports only eased slightly to 1.9 million b/d. But what mattered more than volumes was pricing power. Iranian Light into China has flipped from a steep $12/bbl discount to a $1/bbl premium to ICE Brent, an extraordinary reversal for a heavily sanctioned grade.

Bowen: Ceasefire means respite for civilians, but it might not last long

Jeremy Bowen

In a day, Donald Trump went from threatening that Iran's civilisation "will die tonight" to declaring that Iran's ten-point plan was a "workable" basis for negotiation in Pakistan. The ceasefire, first and foremost, is a respite for all those civilians across the Middle East who have been under fire since the United States and Israel went to war against Iran on 28 February.

They do not include the people of Lebanon. After insisting that the ceasefire did not apply to Lebanon, Israel launched a huge and deadly wave of air strikes. The respite elsewhere might not last long. Both Iran and the US have strong reasons to end the war. But their publicly declared positions are way apart. Two weeks lie ahead to attempt to make a deal between two sides that do not trust each other.

How Pakistan Helped Secure a Cease-Fire in Iran

Michael Kugelman

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.

The highlights this week: Pakistan plays a leading role in brokering a U.S.-Iran cease-fire, South Asia remains very vulnerable to the ongoing energy crisis, and China hosts talks between Pakistan and the Taliban.

What’s Next for Oil Markets After the Ceasefire Agreement?

Clayton Seigle

The ceasefire announced by President Trump on April 7 implicitly acknowledges Iran’s newfound control over Gulf energy flows—a strategic challenge for oil market stability and the interests of Gulf Arab exporting countries. The United States has halted the military campaign it started six weeks ago with Tehran poised to call the shots on oil and gas exports. As was the case prior to the ceasefire, tanker vessels will require Iran’s approval to exit the Gulf, which may be conditioned on a new tolling fee arrangement.

Following Trump’s announcement, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated: “For a period of two weeks, safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz will be possible via coordination with Iran’s Armed Forces and with due consideration of technical limitations.”

The Fragile U.S.-Iran Ceasefire: Issues to Watch

Daniel Byman

After over a month of fighting, the United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire. The ceasefire is fragile, and many of the key factors that will determine its durability are unclear. Below are six issues to watch as negotiations play out.

Ceasefire or a Settlement?

For now, the United States, Israel, and Iran have agreed to a ceasefire and only a ceasefire. Numerous contentious issues remain unresolved, ranging from Iran’s nuclear and missile programs to Tehran’s support for proxies and repression of protesters at home. Tehran, for its part, seeks an end to U.S. sanctions, the right to enrich uranium, an end to Israel’s attacks on Lebanon, and other demands, as well as guarantees that attacks on Iran will not resume. The war itself has also generated new demands: Iran seeks compensation for the devastation caused by U.S. and Israeli bombing and is claiming that it will demand payment for tankers seeking to transit the Strait of Hormuz. The two sides are far apart, and both seek to convince audiences at home that they have won—something that will further complicate negotiations.

What’s Next for Oil Markets After the Ceasefire Agreement?

Clayton Seigle

The ceasefire announced by President Trump on April 7 implicitly acknowledges Iran’s newfound control over Gulf energy flows—a strategic challenge for oil market stability and the interests of Gulf Arab exporting countries. The United States has halted the military campaign it started six weeks ago with Tehran poised to call the shots on oil and gas exports. As was the case prior to the ceasefire, tanker vessels will require Iran’s approval to exit the Gulf, which may be conditioned on a new tolling fee arrangement.

Following Trump’s announcement, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated: “For a period of two weeks, safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz will be possible via coordination with Iran’s Armed Forces and with due consideration of technical limitations.”

Three Things To Watch As The US-Iran Cease-Fire Takes Hold – Analysis

Kian Sharifi

The United States and Iran have agreed to a two-week cease-fire, brokered by Pakistan, premised on Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz. The announcement came less than two hours before US President Donald Trump’s self-imposed deadline was set to expire at 8 pm ET on April 7.

Global markets rallied. Oil prices fell. Leaders around the world expressed relief.

But the cease-fire is already proving to be fragile, with Iranian strikes reported across Arab states in the Persian Gulf just hours after the pause in fighting went into effect. Meanwhile, Israel has continued its attacks in Lebanon on Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy that has been designated a terror organization by Washington.

Empty ships and shut wells: Why the Iran war oil crisis is not over yet

Mohamed A. Hussein and Amr Alkazaz

After 40 days of fighting, the United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire on Wednesday morning, with negotiations expected to begin on Friday in Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad. One of the key points in Iran’s 10‑point proposal is allowing shipping to resume through the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas is shipped during peacetime, but which has been in effect closed almost since the start of the war, causing global oil and gas prices to soar.

Over the past six weeks, more than 100 countries have raised prices at petrol pumps. Several governments, mostly in Asia, have declared national energy emergencies and introduced strict measures to limit consumption, including work-from-home policies, shorter working weeks, fuel rationing and curfews.

‘Our geography is our oil’: Why Djibouti hosts many foreign military bases

Faisal Ali

It also hosts the densest cluster of foreign military bases in the world, with bases from the United States, China, France, Japan and Italy operating within miles of each other along its coastline.

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These countries, seeking bases for both commercial and security purposes, have been warmly welcomed by President Ismail Omar Guelleh, who has ruled for at least two decades and leveraged the country’s strategic location to advance his own aims. As Djiboutians go to the polls on Friday with Guelleh safely expected to win his sixth term, it is a strategy that has never looked more consequential.

The 'Moral Imperative' Behind the Rescues in Iran

Forrest Marion

The writer gratefully acknowledges this powerful, clarifying phrase—moral imperative—as the title employed by noted air power historian, and a mentor and friend, Col. Darrel D. Whitcomb (USAF, retired); see his Moral Imperative: 1972, Combat Rescue, and the End of America’s War in Vietnam.

The day after The Rescue on 5 April, Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu congratulated President Trump and the Americans who pulled off this daring, high-risk mission. Netanyahu said, in part:

All Israelis rejoice in the incredible rescue of a brave American pilot, by America’s dauntless warriors.[i] This proves that when free societies muster their courage, and their resolve, they can confront seemingly insurmountable odds, and overcome the forces of darkness and terror. This rescue operation reinforces a sacred principle: no one is left behind. This is a shared value demonstrated time and time again in the history of both our countries.

Opinion – The 47-Year War of Attrition in the Middle East and North Africa

Patricia Sohn

In announcing that the U.S. war objectives in Iran have been nearly completed, U.S. President Donald Trump also reminded listeners that this war in the Middle East and North Africa has been going on for 47 years, or since the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979. A watershed year, 1979 marked the end of the Iranian Revolution, the beginning of the Iranian hostage crisis, and (in Afghanistan) the beginning of an attempt to create a Soviet foothold in both the Middle East and South Asia. The next year saw the start of the Iran-Iraq war, and by that time the Lebanese Civil War was already five years underway.

While the Iranian Revolution ended in 1979, the remaining of these conflicts and crises ended around 1988-1990. However, these major wars in the Middle East and North Africa were followed by internecine conflict that involved international jihadist movements, the U.S., and Europe; wars of attrition on several key borders; an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; localized non-state actors fighting their own regimes or a neighboring regime; localized revolutions in Libya and elsewhere; the wars in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan; and, of course, the Arab Spring and the Syrian Revolution.

Information Lethality Revisited: Strategic Influence and the Future of War

Bill Rivera

In February 2019, the author, with Arnel David, argued in these pages that the United States military’s understanding of lethality was dangerously incomplete. The concept had become a defining priority of the Department of Defense (DoD)—appearing across modernization strategies, acquisition frameworks, and doctrinal literature—yet it was treated almost exclusively as a physical phenomenon: the ability to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces. We argued then that this was insufficient. To view lethality only through a physical lens limits its full potential. Lethality at the strategic level, we contended, must also include the capacity to break an adversary’s will to fight. And that capacity is increasingly exercised not through firepower, but through influence. We have used influence to support kinetic action. This paper argues that this order of events is inverted: kinetic action should operate within the framework of strategic influence, not the other way around.

The strategic competition between the United States and its rivals has intensified. The cost of kinetic warfare—in blood, treasure, and strategic credibility—has grown exponentially. Meanwhile, peer and near-peer competitors have continued to invest heavily in influence-based strategies, reshaping political environments, undermining alliances, and projecting power without firing a shot. The gap between what the United States understands as lethality and what its adversaries practice as strategy has not closed. If anything, it has widened.

Inside the US Army’s Nuclear Disablement Teams: Surgical Strike Forces Against Nuclear Weapons

Guy D. McCardle

The US Army’s Nuclear Disablement Teams stand as silent sentinels, expertly safeguarding against nuclear threats.More in Army More by Guy D. McCardle

Operators clear the way, then the specialists move in, US Army Nuclear Disablement Teams handle the devices no one else can touch. Image Source: DVIDs In the shadows of the world’s most perilous threats, the US Army’s Nuclear Disablement Teams (NDTs) stand vigilant, a silent shield against the specter of nuclear devastation.

On the testing grounds of Aberdeen, Maryland, these unsung heroes have been sharpening their skills, ensuring they’re ready to counter the dark tide of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that looms on the horizon.

Training for the Unthinkable

Iran Truce Or Dare? – Analysis

Björn Stritzel

After five weeks of bombardment, a ceasefire is now supposed to take hold. Yet the central elements of this truce remain entirely unclear: when or whether the Strait of Hormuz will reopen to shipping; whether Iran will relinquish its highly enriched uranium or continue enrichment; whether its ballistic missile program will be dismantled and whether Tehran will persist in pursuing its imperial ambitions through proxies.

The Israeli and American air campaign was at first conspicuously successful, with much of Iran’s navy destroyed and dozens of the most senior political and military leaders eliminated.

Yet, the Iranian regime proved more resilient than many anticipated. Its command structures remained intact despite decapitation strikes, and the hunt by Israeli and American air forces for Iranian missile launchers failed to prevent continued ballistic missile launches, even if they succeeded in curtailing them.

Why US Regime Pretends Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Don’t Exist – OpEd

Ryan McMaken

It’s difficult to find much of anything we might call “good” coming out of the current US-Israel war against Iran. Yet, one positive development has been the fact that Israel’s deceitful practice of pretending it has no nuclear weapons program is now untenable. The renewal of the discussion around Israel’s nuclear arms program was prompted in part by Iranian missile strikes in the area of Dimona, a city in southern Israel known to house Israel’s nuclear research facilities.

In a March 22 report on the strikes by the Jerusalem Post, the ongoing denials by the Israeli state are noted: “In the 1960s, then prime minister Levi Eshkol vowed that “Israel will not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons into the region.” The sentiment has been repeated by Israeli officials since.”

How is the field of Cognitive Warfare actually being built?—and who is shaping it? Mapping the cognitive warfare literature: A strategic analysis

Sara Russo

What this research does

The study uses a PRISMA-aligned bibliometric and network analysis to examine the research landscape on cognitive warfare and related concepts from 1981 to 2025. It begins from a broader corpus, narrows it through successive screening phases, and then isolates a refined core of publications most conceptually aligned with cognitive warfare. More precisely, the workflow moved from 2,740 screened records, to 1,915 publications for bibliometric analysis, and then to a final core corpus of 289 publications for refined conceptual analysis.

AI and Critical Thinking

This year, I will be inviting a range of experts on military affairs and strategy to write for Futura Doctrina. The subjects will encompass war, strategic competition, national strategy, technology, human capacity and other issues germane to learning from modern war and preparing for future conflict. The first guest contributor is Dr Frank Hoffman, who writes about the importance of aligning critical thinking skills and the employment of AI in military organisations.

With all the hype and hyperbole about Artificial Intelligence (AI) it is hard to determine what these rapidly evolving technologies can and cannot deliver. The opinions range from posing an existential threat or being less than useless machines. Many military institutions are now carefully exploring where AI might have payoffs. Conservative by nature, the armed services have more concerns and less consensus about AI applications due to the nonlinear character of warfare.

PRC Supply Chain Ecosystem Behind Iran's Drone Campaign

Christopher Nye & Charles Sun

In March 2026, Iran’s drone campaign consumed thousands of expendable unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The critical technologies, manufacturing equipment, and components underpinning these platforms trace to the civilian manufacturing ecosystem of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), channeled through private capital acquisition, reverse engineering, and the systematic exploitation of dual-use trade ambiguities.

The PRC’s drone supply chain operates as a “manufacturing plain”—a flat landscape of interchangeable micro-enterprises, as distinct from the “mountain peak” defense contractors that sanctions are designed to neutralize. Individually targetable but collectively inexhaustible, with minimal staffing and nominal business scopes unrelated to aviation, these firms channel drone-applicable materiel to sanctioned end-users at scale.

14 April 2026

Silk Cage-II Webinar Report on “Corridor, Client, or Catalyst? CPEC and Beijing’s Strategic Leverage from Pakistan to the Indian Ocean”

Sevil Khikmatova, Anne Weiler and Jagannath Panda

This report is the outcome of the second webinar in the Silk Cage series, held on February 19, 2026. This webinar addressed debates surrounding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) with a central question: is CPEC primarily an economic development initiative, or does it function as a strategic instrument through which Beijing reshapes security alignments from South Asia to the Indian Ocean? While framed as a growth corridor vital to Pakistan’s development, CPEC is increasingly viewed as a mechanism that embeds long-term strategic leverage, linking continental access to maritime reach. This tension between development and security anchored the discussion. A recording of the webinar is available on YouTube. Read the full report here.

The Evolution of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): Ideology, Strategy, and Aspirations

Mohammad Waqas Sajjad, Ahmed Jawad

The re-emergence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Pakistan has caught the state off guard. This research note details the evolution of the threat posed by TTP given the shift in the terrorist organisation’s ideology, strategy, and modus operandi, and highlights the differences between the present and previous waves of terrorism in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. In doing so, it also brings to fore the much less explored role women often play in financing, facilitating, and – at times – carrying out terrorist activities. The new TTP leadership under Noor Wali Mehsud, as well as a different political context with the Afghan Taliban in power in Afghanistan since August 2021, once more make it imperative to focus on the twin subjects of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. In its new iteration, the revitalised TTP needs to be reviewed in a different light. In this research note, these shifts are explored in detail, including its connection with the Afghan Taliban, a new leadership and the subsequent changes

in ideology, tactical evolution, willingness to form new alliances, involvement of women, and an enhanced administrative structure make the current wave of TTP extremely dangerous.

Afghanistan-Pakistan: The Overlooked War at the Margins of the Middle East Conflict

SAINT-MEZARD

Pakistan has historically maintained the closest ties to the Taliban movement and initially viewed its return to power in Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 with considerable optimism. The bilateral relationship has since deteriorated, and the two neighbors have been caught in a cycle of escalation since last fall. In October 2025, Pakistan launched its first airstrikes on Kabul. For three weeks in February–March 2026, Afghanistan intensified ground assaults on the Pakistani side of the border as well as drone attacks on Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Pakistan, for its part, has intensified airstrikes on Afghan border areas, as well as on Kabul and Kandahar. Given the dynamics at play at the bilateral and regional levels, the prospects for a sustained return to stability appear limited.

The intensification of terrorist attacks by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)-a movement opposed to the federal government-on Pakistani territory is the primary driver of the escalating tensions between Islamabad and the Taliban regime. The TTP is a terrorist group composed of Pakistani Pashtuns from the tribal areas who have historically been close to the Afghan Taliban. In addition to ethnic ties, their proximity to the Afghan Taliban is ideological and is reflected in their strict interpretation of Islam (Deobandi school), though they are more susceptible to international jihadism as embodied by Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The TTP’s objective is to establish an Islamic emirate in Pakistan modeled on the Afghan Taliban regime.

China-Iran Fact Sheet: A Short Primer on the Relationship

year the Commission identified the relationship between China and Iran as part of an informal “Axis of Autocracy.” China helps Iran evade U.S. sanctions and maintain its destabilizing activities in the Middle East. Iran supplies China with relatively low-cost oil and is a partner in China’s efforts to undermine the U.S.-led global order, including through alternative multilateral organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Although Tehran has sought deeper strategic alignment, China has avoided formal defense commitments to Iran and is not likely to take significant action to support Iran beyond providing diplomatic support and dual-use supplies. China and Iran bilateral defense engagements have been limited in recent years, while both participate in joint exercises in trilateral (with Russia) and multilateral settings (including the SCO). Reports indicate that after U.S. strikes began, China allowed two state-owned Iranian vessels in a Chinese port to be loaded with sodium perchlorate, which is used in solid rocket fuel for missiles.

Why does the US have Iran's Kharg Island in its sights?

Robert Greenall,

US President Donald Trump has warned of possible further American action against a small island off the coast of Iran - home to a major oil terminal that is considered the country's economic lifeline. In an interview with the Financial Times on Sunday, Trump said he wants to "take" Iran's oil and was considering seizing Kharg Island. But he added an operation "would mean we had to be there for a while".

The US has already targeted the island earlier in the war. On 13 March, the US launched airstrikes on Kharg, with Trump saying US forces had "totally obliterated" every military target there. But it held off targeting the island's oil infrastructure.

Iran ceasefire deal gives Trump a way out of war - but at a high cost

Anthony Zurcher

At 18:32 Washington time, President Donald Trump posted on his social media website that the US and Iran were "very far along" with a "definitive" peace agreement and that he had agreed to a two-week ceasefire to allow negotiations to proceed. It wasn't exactly the last minute, but with Trump's looming 20:00 EDT (01:00 BST on Wednesday) deadline to reach a deal or the US would launch massive strikes against Iranian energy and transportation infrastructure, it came pretty close.

All of this is contingent on Iran also suspending hostilities and fully opening the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping traffic, which the regime says it will do, while insisting it still exerts "dominion" over the waterway. The deal allowed Trump to extricate himself from what was shaping up to be a treacherous choice – either escalating with his promise that a "whole civilisation will die tonight" or backing down and undermining his credibility. The US president may have only bought himself a temporary reprieve, however.

Iran’s Escalation Strategy Won’t Work

Raphael S. Cohen

The Iranian regime’s military strategy has always involved an underlying bet that it could control escalation. For the better part of half a century, this gamble mostly paid off. Whether it was taking hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, bombing U.S. Marines barracks in Beirut and Air Force housing in Saudi Arabia, or funding proxies from Afghanistan to Gaza to Iraq, Iran’s actions have, until very recently, never triggered serious blowback.

This month, Iran placed its biggest bet yet on its ability to control escalation. But this time, it appears headed toward calamity.

Europe Cannot Sit Out the Iran War

Sophia Besch

The United States has gone to war with Iran without consulting Europe. Yet President Donald Trump and his administration have sought to deflect blame for a faltering campaign by lashing out at NATO and accusing European leaders of shirking their alliance responsibilities by refusing to offer support. The charge does not hold. NATO imposes no obligation to back a war of choice, and Europe lacks any realistic means of reopening the Strait of Hormuz by force while hostilities continue.

At the same time, Europe cannot afford to stand aside. The war is already reshaping its security and economic outlook. Within days of the U.S.-Israeli strikes, an Iranian drone hit a UK Royal Air Force base in Cyprus, prompting coordinated European deployments; NATO intercepted missiles over Turkey, while European officials warned of rising terrorism risks and renewed refugee pressures. Disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz have raised the prospect of fuel shortages and rising costs across sectors from agriculture to aviation. Inflation has climbed to 2.5 percent, growth forecasts are being revised downward across Europe, and interest rates might be driven up. Slower growth, higher prices, and mounting migration pressures together risk fueling political instability across the continent.

Military Options for Reopening the Strait of Hormuz: Limitations and Imperatives

Michael Eisenstadt, Assaf Orion

After attacking more than twenty ships in or near the Strait of Hormuz since the war began, Iran has established a selective passage regime through the Persian Gulf chokepoint, exporting its own oil and natural gas while permitting safe passage to countries that “pay a toll” and denying transit to all others. Tehran’s terms to end the war include a “new legal regime for the Strait of Hormuz,” which is a clear challenge to U.S., global, and regional interests. On March 21, President Trump issued an ultimatum that Iran’s power plants would be obliterated unless it fully opens the strait. The Iranian military countered by threatening to target all U.S. and Israeli-related energy, information technology, and water desalination infrastructure in the region. Earlier today, the president postponed any strikes against power plants for five days to allow ongoing discussions with Iran.

Given the resultant jeopardy to the global economy, Trump has stated that the U.S. Navy will reopen the strait and has called on other countries to help. On March 19, the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement expressing “readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage” through Hormuz. Twenty-two nations have now signed the statement. Meanwhile, U.S. forces have destroyed over 130 Iranian naval vessels and 44 minelayers and attacked dozens of military targets along Iran’s coast and inside the Gulf, including storage sites for mines and missiles. The United States has also dispatched the 31st and 11th Marine Expeditionary Units and the USS Tripoli and Boxer Amphibious Ready Groups to the Middle East to provide additional options.

How Trump Took the U.S. to War With Iran

Jonathan Swan and Maggie Haberman

The black S.U.V. carrying Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arrived at the White House just before 11 a.m. on Feb. 11. The Israeli leader, who had been pressing for months for the United States to agree to a major assault on Iran, was whisked inside with little ceremony, out of view of reporters, primed for one of the most high-stakes moments in his long career.

U.S. and Israeli officials gathered first in the Cabinet Room, adjacent to the Oval Office. Then Mr. Netanyahu headed downstairs for the main event: a highly classified presentation on Iran for President Trump and his team in the White House Situation Room, which was rarely used for in-person meetings with foreign leaders.

Mr. Trump sat down, but not in his usual position at the head of the room’s mahogany conference table. Instead, the president took a seat on one side, facing the large screens mounted along the wall. Mr. Netanyahu sat on the other side, directly opposite the president.

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