25 May 2026

On ATF, don’t miss the plane truth

Times of India  |  Anupam Manur
Indian aviation faces severe structural fragility, with Aviation Turbine Fuel (ATF) costs now comprising nearly 60% of airline operating expenses, leading to warnings of insurmountable losses and flight cancellations from the Federation of Indian Airlines (FIA). This crisis is exacerbated by government policies including a 100% monopoly of state-owned Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) in ATF supply, an irrational import-parity pricing model for domestically produced ATF, an 11% ad valorem excise duty, and ATF's exclusion from GST, resulting in fragmented state VAT rates up to 29%. These factors cause Indian airlines to pay approximately 65% more for ATF than foreign counterparts. Additionally, Indian carriers engage in minimal financial hedging due to restrictive RBI regulations, increasing vulnerability to price spikes. The government's perception of air travel as a luxury good drives this extractive tax structure. Strategic policy reforms are urgently needed to liberalize OMCs, introduce competition, scrap import-parity pricing, implement flat and low ATF taxes, and integrate ATF into GST to foster a more accessible and competitive aviation sector in India.

What Happened in India’s West Bengal?

Foreign Policy  |  Sumit Ganguly, Shibashis Chatterjee
India's Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) achieved a significant victory in the West Bengal state elections, decisively ousting the All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) party after 15 years of rule. Capturing nearly 46 percent of the vote and 207 legislative seats, the BJP breached a key regional bastion, further consolidating its national power, as it already controls 22 other states and union territories. This electoral upset also unseated longtime West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. The article highlights that this stunning victory, particularly in a state proud of its subnational ethos, has been accompanied by allegations of foul play, specifically citing last-minute changes to voter rolls. The strategic implications include the BJP's expanded political footprint and the potential for increased national-level influence over regional governance, alongside concerns about electoral integrity.

Did Trump Just Blunt The Strategic Ambiguity On Taiwan?

Eurasia Review  |  Vivek Mishra
US President Donald Trump's recent trip to China saw Xi Jinping draw a clear red line on Taiwan, threatening conflict if the US mishandled the issue. Trump's lack of a commensurate response, possibly to secure an economic deal, could be dangerously consequential for Taiwan. While the first Trump administration adopted a robust, confrontational posture, increasing arms sales to US$18.3 billion and passing the Taiwan Travel Act, his second term's sweeping tariff policies, applied even to Taiwan, have complicated America's standing. Trump has framed Taiwan as responsible for "stealing the US’s advantage in the semiconductor sector," suggesting it should pay for its defense. This has heightened strategic ambiguity, giving China room to maneuver, especially as its military preparedness grows. Taiwan's global importance as a semiconductor and chip hub makes a potential mainland invasion a global concern. A protracted Iran conflict has diverted Trump's focus, allowing China to engage with Taiwan's Kuomintang, pressuring President Lai Ching-te. The 2025 National Security Strategy still prioritizes defending Taiwan, viewing it as a tech hub and strategic geography for the Second Island Chain, seeking allied cooperation.

Tracking China’s Fourth Aircraft Carrier

Center for Strategic and International Studies  |  Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, Aidan Powers-Riggs, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
China's fourth aircraft carrier, the Type 004, is under rapid construction at the Dalian Shipyard, with prefabricated hull components assembled since early 2025. CSIS assesses with near certainty it is an aircraft carrier, measuring approximately 286 meters long and 46 meters wide as of May 2026. It is likely nuclear-powered, indicated by two 15-meter by 15-meter compartments resembling shielded reactor containment systems, a critical technical leap for longer operations and greater energy for electromagnetic catapults. The Type 004 is very likely larger than the _Fujian_, with a 46-meter beam versus _Fujian_'s 40 meters, and its full length will likely exceed _Fujian_'s 303 meters, potentially approaching the U.S. _Gerald R. Ford_-class supercarriers (337 meters). It will feature electromagnetic catapults, with plausible evidence suggesting four catapults and a third aircraft elevator, enhancing launch tempo. This carrier marks a significant People’s Liberation Army Navy modernization milestone, aligning with the 2025 U.S. Department of Defense assessment that China aims to field nine carriers by 2035, requiring simultaneous construction and escort vessel production.

Iran Never Tried to Close The Strait of Hormuz: It Has a Much More Powerful Playbook Ready

National Security Journal  |  Andrew Latham
Iran has not aimed to close the Strait of Hormuz, but rather to create permanent uncertainty through mines, shore-based anti-ship missiles, fast attack craft, and cheap drones, making every transit a calculation. Global oil inventories dropped 250 million barrels across March and April, with the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve at 384 million barrels in early May, and the IEA projecting Q2 drawdowns averaging 8.5 million barrels daily. This strategy, which Washington lacks a military answer for, has already led shipping companies to reprice Gulf routes and energy ministries in Tokyo and Seoul to revise procurement assumptions. China, which takes 90% of Iran’s exported crude and routes 45% of its own crude imports through Hormuz, benefits from this unsettled environment, gaining leverage without naval deployments. Beijing's 2021 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and its role in the 2023 Saudi-Iran normalization underscore its economic influence, which is crucial for Iran's survival. Reversing this de facto Iranian influence requires directly addressing IRGC posture, considering China's economic footprint in sanctions relief, and explicitly stating American red lines. Western governments are quietly adjusting to this new reality, which does not require formal acceptance.

Iran’s Crisis Awakens The Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan Corridor Amid Eurasian Transit Risks

Eurasia Review  |  He Yan
Following the U.S. military's naval blockade on Iran in April 2026, China-Iran railway trade surged, with freight trains from Xi’an to Tehran increasing to one every 3-4 days and monthly cargo volume soaring to 400,000–500,000 tons, including Iranian crude oil. This exposed the critical vulnerability of China's trans-Eurasian transport system, constrained by limited rail capacity, drastically escalated shipping costs (up 40%, $7,000/40-foot container), and unidirectional trade flows. Existing northern (Russia) and southern (Iran, Turkey) corridors face geopolitical risks, while maritime routes are vulnerable to chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. The Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan (TUT) corridor emerges as a strategic third path, bypassing Russia and southern Iran. It offers geopolitical stability, shorter transit distances, and interfaces with routes like the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, enhancing China's leverage in the Middle East and providing Central Asian countries with external connectivity independent of Russia. Challenges include coordinating diverse transit countries, requiring institutional innovation.

Same but different: how Xi and China welcomed Trump and Putin

The Guardian | Pjotr Sauer, Amy Hawkins
China orchestrated deliberately mirrored welcomes for Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, yet subtly signaled Moscow as a more trusted partner in an emerging non-western world order. While Trump was met by China's vice-president, Putin was welcomed by a politburo member. The Kremlin dismissed comparisons, but Russian state media portrayed Putin as an "ally" and Trump as a "rival." Both summits yielded modest results; Trump-Xi talks saw little progress on Nvidia chip exports and tariffs. Russia's economic struggles and limited battlefield progress in Ukraine have deepened its reliance on China, transforming their relationship into an asymmetric one. The US-Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz offered Russia an opportunity to present itself as a reliable long-term energy supplier to Beijing, though no specific announcement on the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline emerged. Xi Jinping benefited by projecting China as a global statesman capable of balancing rival powers and as a lifeline for an increasingly dependent Russia. No breakthroughs on the Ukraine or US-Iran conflicts were achieved, with China reiterating language mirroring the Kremlin's narrative on Ukraine.

Saudi Arabia and UAE say drone attacks were launched from Iraq

Long War Journal  |  Seth J. Frantzman
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates reported that recent drone attacks against their countries originated from Iraq, with the UAE stating six drones were launched from Iraq in 48 hours, including one that caused a fire at a nuclear power plant. Saudi Arabia intercepted three drones from Iraqi airspace, reserving the right to respond. Iraq denied detecting drones from its territory and condemned the attack on the UAE, calling for intelligence cooperation. These incidents occur amidst ongoing regional tensions with Iran, with Iran-linked drones and missiles targeting the region, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, even after an early April US-Iran ceasefire. Reports indicate the majority of attacks on Saudi Arabia since February 28 originated from Iraq, carried out by Iran-backed Shiite militias, prompting retaliatory strikes by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in Iraq. Iraq's new Prime Minister Ali al Zaidi faces pressure to control these Iran-backed militias, part of the Popular Mobilization Forces, while the US has arrested an Iraqi national accused of ties to Kataib Hezbollah and offered rewards for militia leaders.

As U.S. war redraws Middle East, Turkey braces for rivalry with Israel

The Washington Post  |  Ellen Francis, Burhan Yรผksekkaศ™
Amid the Trump administration's search for a victorious path out of its war against Iran, Turkey is actively preparing for a shifting balance of power in the Middle East. Ankara anticipates a growing rivalry with Israel and is pursuing new security partnerships, advocating for “regional ownership” in the unpredictable landscape of U.S. Middle East policies. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has positioned Turkey as a crucial mediator capable of engaging with diverse actors, including Russia and Ukraine, as well as the U.S. and Iran, reflecting a broader strategy to assert influence. This proactive stance aims to navigate and shape the regional dynamics being redrawn by the ongoing U.S. conflict, securing Turkey's interests and enhancing its geopolitical standing amidst evolving power structures and potential new alliances. The call for “regional ownership” underscores Turkey's desire for greater autonomy and influence in a post-conflict Middle East, challenging traditional power brokers.

Iran war pulls some Gulf states toward Israel, while pushing others away

The Jerusalem Post  |  Herb Keinon
The Iran war is driving a significant divergence in strategic alignments among Gulf states, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) deepening its strategic partnership with Israel while Saudi Arabia seeks alternative security alliances. The UAE's relationship with Israel has evolved beyond the 2020 Abraham Accords into extensive security coordination, intelligence sharing, and air defense cooperation, including the deployment of an Iron Dome battery and personnel during the recent conflict. This partnership is fueled by shared threat perceptions of Iran and a perceived lack of Arab solidarity, with Israel's counter-drone lasers and Iron Dome system intercepting over 95% of Iranian projectiles targeting the UAE. Conversely, Saudi Arabia, while welcoming a weakened Iran, is wary of Israel emerging as the dominant Middle East power. Riyadh is strengthening ties with Pakistan and Turkey, evidenced by a trilateral defense agreement in January and Pakistan's deployment of 8,000 troops, fighter jets, drone units, and a Chinese-operated air defense system to Saudi Arabia. This divergence exposes a new strategic fault line in the postwar Middle East, with the UAE prioritizing direct security cooperation with Israel and Saudi Arabia hedging to maintain a regional balance without empowering Jerusalem.

Trump ramps up Cuba pressure as Nimitz carrier enters Caribbean Sea

USA TODAY  |  Kim Hjelmgaard, Zachary Anderson
The USS Nimitz aircraft carrier and three escort warships entered the Caribbean Sea, coinciding with the Justice Department's announcement of murder charges against Cuba's 94-year-old former president Raúl Castro. This deployment and indictment reflect escalating pressure from the Trump administration, reminiscent of January's commando raid that captured Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and Cilia Flores on narco-terrorism charges. The Nimitz, previously engaged in preplanned training and joint exercises with the Brazilian navy along the South American coast, arrived as the U.S. developed military operations options against Cuba. Charges against Castro and five others stem from the 1996 downing of two civilian planes, killing four, including three Americans. Cuba condemned the "despicable accusation" as a pretext for military action. Despite President Donald Trump's statements about not anticipating escalation and wanting to help Cuba "on a humanitarian basis," his administration has maintained an oil blockade and sanctions, with CIA Director John Ratcliffe recently meeting Cuban leaders amid fuel shortages and fears of U.S. military intervention.

Report to Congress on U.S. Aircraft Combat Losses in Operation Epic Fury

The United States, in coordination with Israel, initiated Operation Epic Fury (OEF) against Iran on February 28, 2026, involving air, maritime, and missile combat across the Middle East. Following a ceasefire in April, some strikes resumed, maintaining fluid conditions. A Congressional Research Service report details 42 fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft, including uncrewed aircraft, reportedly lost or damaged in OEF, based on news reports and statements from the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Acting Pentagon Comptroller Jules W. Hurst III testified on May 12, 2026, that the DOD’s cost estimate for military operations in Iran has increased to $29 billion, primarily due to refined estimates for equipment repair or replacement. The DOD, operating under a secondary "Department of War designation" per Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, has not published a comprehensive assessment, and the number of damaged or destroyed aircraft remains subject to revision due to classification, ongoing combat, and attribution challenges. Download the document here.

For Russia, AI and “Traditional Values” are Part of the Same Security Logic

Small Wars Journal | Anna Varfolomeeva
Russia’s March 2026 proposal to restrict foreign AI systems like ChatGPT, Gemini, and Claude, ostensibly to protect “traditional Russian spiritual and moral values,” is a manifestation of a long-standing military doctrine. This doctrine, evolving since the 2011-2012 Bolotnaya protests, views values formation and collective identity as a primary security battlefield, not merely cultural terrain. Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine formally identified information activity undermining “historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions” as a military threat. Drawing on *Voennaya Misl’*, the Russian Defense Ministry’s journal, the “mental sphere” is mapped as a battlefield where common values enable societal mobilization. This coherent, two-directional architecture hardens domestic cognitive space against external penetration through measures like sovereign internet and patriotic education, while simultaneously eroding the common identity substrate of adversary societies. For instance, Russia restricts foreign AI domestically but uses systems like ChatGPT for external influence operations targeting audiences in Africa and beyond, mirroring its Telegram strategy. The strategic endpoint is to undermine trust in social processes and state institutions, making collective political action impossible and rendering populations difficult to govern.

The U.S.-Israel Aid Era Is Ending. Drift Is the Greatest Risk.

RealClearWorld  |  Gregg Roman
Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced a 350 billion shekel ($120 billion) investment in its domestic defense industry over the next decade, confirming plans to phase out U.S. military aid. Washington and Jerusalem are preparing formal talks for a successor framework to zero out Foreign Military Financing (FMF) by 2038, led by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Israeli Defense Ministry Director General Amir Baram. The 2016 Memorandum of Understanding already initiated a phaseout, with Off-Shore Procurement ending in FY2028. Israel's defense exports hit a record $14.79 billion in 2024, indicating its robust defense capabilities. To manage this transition and prevent "drift," the article outlines four critical steps: signing the successor framework by FY2027, doubling U.S. missile defense allocation to $1 billion annually, reforming International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) for tier-one allies, and Israel building institutional infrastructure like a Defense Industrial Transition Authority and a Defense Export Credit Agency. This structured approach aims to strengthen the U.S.-Israel relationship through joint capability investment rather than grant subsidy.

Hamas replaces military wing leader, IDF reports 19 Gaza ceasefire violations May 6–20

Long War Journal  |  Aaron Goren
Hamas has reportedly selected Mohammed Odeh, a longstanding member and former intelligence headquarters chief, to lead its Al Qassam Brigades after Israel eliminated the previous chief, Izz al Din al Haddad, in a May 15 targeted strike in Gaza City. Odeh, involved in the October 7, 2023, attacks and a survivor of multiple Israeli assassination attempts, is one of the last senior Hamas members alive. An IDF document, reported by Israel’s Channel 13, assessed Hamas is producing hundreds of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and anti-tank rockets monthly, smuggling weapons and dual-use products into Gaza, conducting training exercises, and collecting up to 30 percent taxes from humanitarian aid merchants. Between May 6 and May 20, Palestinian terrorists violated the Gaza ceasefire 19 times, according to IDF reports. These violations included multiple Israeli operations eliminating Hamas commanders like Hamza Sharbatsi, striking armed terrorists planning attacks, and destroying weapons storage and explosives production facilities in northern and central Gaza, often near the Yellow Line, which demarcates Israeli-held territory.

The tide is turning in Russia-Ukraine war

GZERO Media  |  Ian Bremmer
On May 17, over 500 Ukrainian drones penetrated Moscow’s air defenses, striking oil infrastructure, military-industrial plants, and apartment buildings, killing four and wounding a dozen. This attack, following a deadly Russian barrage on Kyiv, signals a turning tide in the Russia-Ukraine war, driven by Ukraine's evolving long-range drone capabilities. Ukraine now wages small frontline battles without soldiers, using AI-enhanced drones and robotic vehicles, causing debilitating psychological effects and surging Russian desertions. Russia's inability to match Ukraine's drone edge is partly due to Elon Musk's Starlink cutoff, setting Russia back a year in unmanned capabilities. Russia has lost over 350,000 soldiers, with total casualties exceeding one million, and its killed-to-wounded ratio has inverted due to drone warfare. Ukrainian deep strikes have damaged over 20 Russian oil refineries, knocking 500,000 barrels/day capacity offline, hindering Russia's ability to capitalize on higher oil prices. Putin's theory of victory is weakening as Ukraine approaches military self-sufficiency, supported by a €90bn EU loan. A cornered Putin might escalate with hybrid operations in Europe, though direct NATO confrontation is unlikely. Ukraine is becoming a formidable military-technological power, a strategic asset for Europe and democracy.

Ukraine increasingly able to strike inside Russia thanks to new drones

France 24  |  Solange Mougin
Ukraine is increasingly employing mid and long-range drones to successfully strike targets within Russia. Over the recent weekend, hundreds of these drones were deployed, targeting multiple Russian regions. Ukraine asserts that these sustained drone operations are effectively impeding Russia's operational capabilities.

The Crumbling Pillars of Global Peace

Foreign Affairs  |  Thant Myint-U
The long peace of the past eight decades has been underpinned by two revolutionary convictions: the intolerability of wars of aggression and the imperative to end empires. These principles, forged from the devastation of two world wars that killed a hundred million people and centuries of colonial subjugation and the fight across Asia, Africa, and Latin America for self-determination, were formally embodied in the United Nations Charter, signed in San Francisco in June 1945. Since its establishment, the world has successfully averted a cataclysmic great-power conflict, and global European empires were systematically dismantled. However, the article posits that these foundational pillars of global peace are now crumbling, with the forgotten power of the United Nations failing to adequately uphold these critical tenets. This erosion threatens the international stability achieved over the last 80 years, risking a resurgence of war and imperialistic ambitions.

The rise of the sub-national power: Why mayors and regional bosses will rule the world

Brussels Signal | Gabriel Elefteriu
Sub-national powers, including mayors and regional leaders, are increasingly becoming the primary route to supreme political authority, as central administrations face growing failures. This trend is exemplified by figures like Andy Burnham (Greater Manchester), Boris Johnson (London), and Jacques Chirac (Paris) who ascended to national leadership. Several factors drive this shift: sub-national governments now account for approximately 40 per cent of total public expenditure and 55 per cent of public investment across OECD countries, a steadily rising share. California's state spending, for instance, grew from $51.4 billion in fiscal year 1990-91 to over $300 billion by 2025-26. Urbanization and economic concentration create powerful city-states, while deliberate decentralization, adopted by two-thirds of countries since the 1980s, empowers regional authorities. Central governments also struggle with governance overload, finding complex, hyper-local problems better addressed by sub-national leaders. This devolution, evident even in non-democratic states like China's Guangdong province, suggests future political battles will be won at local and regional levels.

The Iran War Is Exposing BRICS’s Internal Fault Lines

Geopolitical Monitor | Raghu Gururaj
The Iran war served as the first geopolitical stress test for an expanded BRICS, revealing significant internal fault lines. The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New Delhi failed to produce a joint communiquรฉ due to tensions between new entrants Iran and United Arab Emirates, with Tehran accusing the UAE of facilitating US-Israeli military operations and the UAE accusing Iran of violating its sovereignty. Despite this, India secured agreement on institutional and economic issues, multi-polarity, and Global South concerns, reflected in the “New Delhi Chair’s Statement”. The statement notably avoided anti-West discourse, military alignment language, explicit condemnation of Israel or the US, or endorsement of Iran’s military position, reflecting India’s priorities to maintain unity and focus on development. The expansion to include Iran, UAE, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Indonesia has made the grouping more heterogeneous, hindering consensus on geopolitical questions. BRICS was not designed as a NATO-style alliance but as a flexible coalition for selective cooperation on finance, trade, and institutional reform. The absence of a strong unified statement demonstrates the inherent limits of a diverse grouping, suggesting BRICS may evolve into a looser coordination forum rather than a unified bloc on security crises.

Distributed Combat Power: How Ukraine is Redefining Fires, Electronic Warfare, and Air Defense at the Tactical Level

Small Wars Journal | Daine van de Wall
The war in Ukraine reveals a fundamental shift in tactical combat power generation, driven by the proliferation of cheap, rapidly adaptable systems like drones. Ukrainian forces have profoundly decentralized leadership and responsibilities across fires, electronic warfare (EW), and air defense to battalion, platoon, and squad levels. This contrasts with the U.S. Army's comparatively centralized model, which may be ill-prepared for persistently contested environments. Ukrainian units treat drones as organic maneuver components, conducting their own intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike operations, contributing to 60-70% of Russian equipment losses. The Hedgehog 2025 exercise demonstrated this lethality, with Ukrainian drone operators rendering two NATO battalions combat ineffective. Control of the electromagnetic spectrum is a critical, distributed battlefield in Ukraine, actively managed by lower echelons for both offensive and defensive operations. U.S. formations, despite multi-domain operations (MDO) concepts, implicitly assume higher echelons will shape the battlefield, a reliance Ukrainian units cannot afford.

The Jazz Band of Mars: What if the Army’s Shift to Division-Centric Warfighting is Wrong?

Modern War Institute | ROBERT G. ROSE, MATTHEW REVELS 
The US Army's "Army 2030" shift towards division-centric warfighting, which centralizes intelligence, fires, and decision-making, risks repeating the failures of France's interwar _la bataille conduit_ doctrine. This approach misinterprets General Patton's "jazz band" analogy, favoring a synchronized orchestra over decentralized initiative. The Army's current doctrine, optimized for a Chinese joint island landing campaign, requires flexible forces to counter strategic surprise, but Army 2030's centralization impedes brigades' ability to rapidly integrate fires, conduct reconnaissance, and employ engineering assets, sacrificing cohesion and responsiveness. Historical examples, including World War I and II US Army experiences and the French Army's systemic breakdown against German _Schwerpunkt_ tactics, demonstrate the pitfalls of over-centralization. Critically, Ukrainian forces effectively blunted Russian aggression by fighting primarily at the brigade level, assigning artillery batteries in direct support of infantry battalions for rapid fires within three minutes, exemplified by the _Kropyva_ system. This decentralized model, where brigades retain significant organic capabilities and shape their battlespace, contrasts sharply with Army 2030's artificial separation of deep and close fights.

Mosaic Defense and Dispersed Command: Iran Strikes Back

Small Wars Journal | Andre Carvalho, Joao Rego
The 12-Day War in June 2025 exposed critical vulnerabilities in Iran’s command and control (C2) structure following Israeli decapitation strikes, where Iranian retaliatory missile and drone salvos became less coordinated and effective over time. However, in a subsequent conflict against the U.S. and Israel, Iran successfully implemented its two-decade-old Mosaic Defense (DMD) doctrine, enabling sustained operations across multiple fronts despite significant losses, including critical assets and leadership. This doctrine, introduced by General Mohammad Jafari in 2005, replaces centralized command with a dispersed, redundant structure, allowing semi-autonomous regional units to operate independently. Iran demonstrated operational resilience, targeting U.S. military bases, Gulf energy production infrastructure, and Israeli territory, generating substantial effects, particularly on energy. Tehran leverages its strategic depth, underground "missile cities," and asymmetric warfare capabilities, exploiting adversary sensitivities to casualties and dependence on advanced technologies. Western powers risk underestimating DMD's capacity to impose substantial political, economic, and military costs.

Resiliency Starts Within the Force

Real Clear Defense  |  Mark W. Castillon
The U.S. military system, designed for episodic trauma, struggles with the sustained, cumulative stress experienced by modern service members, leading to 471 suicides in calendar year 2024 and billions in downstream costs. Current mental health care is centralized and external, creating barriers to access and utilization, as stress accumulates (allostatic load) rather than presenting episodically. The Department of War (DoW) proposes integrating mental health as a core warfighting capability by establishing standardized mental health sections at every battalion-equivalent unit. These organic units, comprising dedicated leadership, clinical providers, and enlisted specialists, would offer continuous, embedded support, enabling early identification and routine engagement. This structural shift, estimated at $1.2-$1.7 billion annually, aims to normalize mental health as a readiness function, authorize commander-recommended consults without automatic adverse action, and ensure clinical independence, ultimately improving readiness and reducing risk across the Active, Guard, and Reserve components.

NATO commander: Europe has no alternative to Palantir’s warfare tech

Politico Europe | ANTOANETA ROUSSI
NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Adm. Pierre Vandier, stated that Europe currently lacks a viable alternative to Palantir's battlefield AI technology, urging faster European development to reduce dependence on U.S. defense tech. The alliance acquired Palantir's Maven Smart System in March 2025, a rapid six-month procurement, to enhance intelligence, targeting, battlespace awareness, and decision-making through AI. This purchase has intensified European concerns over reliance on U.S. technology, especially given past U.S. administration threats questioning NATO commitments. While NATO aims to avoid vendor lock-in, switching from Palantir can be costly. Vandier emphasized that European companies must quickly deliver equivalent solutions, defining digital sovereignty not as full autonomy but as control over processed data and intellectual property. NATO is working towards open digital systems to allow multiple vendors and reduce single-supplier dependence, addressing Europe's long-term underinvestment in critical technologies like chips and cloud infrastructure.

24 May 2026

U.S. Set to Drop Charges Against Indian Billionaire Accused of Fraud

The New York Times  |  Nicole Hong, Ben Protess, William K. Rashbaum, Devlin Barrett
The U.S. Justice Department is planning to drop fraud charges against Indian billionaire Gautam Adani, reversing an indictment from the final weeks of the Biden administration. This decision follows Adani's engagement of a new legal team, including Robert J. Giuffra Jr., a personal lawyer for President Trump. During a previously unreported meeting at the Justice Department, Giuffra presented arguments challenging the prosecution's evidence and jurisdiction. Crucially, Adani's team also made an unusual offer: a $10 billion investment in the American economy and the creation of 15,000 jobs if the charges were dropped, echoing a prior pledge made after Trump's election. This development also includes the resolution of a parallel civil case with the Securities and Exchange Commission and an impending deal with the Treasury Department, highlighting the significant influence of political connections and economic leverage in high-profile international legal matters.

Delimitation After Defeat: India’s Unfinished Debate Over Representation

Carnegie Endowment  |  Louise Tillin, Milan Vaishnav, Andy Robaina
India's government recently attempted to address the country's significant malapportionment of parliamentary seats through a trio of delimitation bills, which were defeated in a mid-April special session. This legislative setback has intensified the debate over reallocating Lok Sabha seats, a process frozen since 1971 despite a nearly 1 billion population surge. A new delimitation based on population would likely shift political power from slower-growing, richer southern states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala (which would lose 15-21 seats) to faster-growing, poorer northern states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (which would gain 19-26 seats). This shift would benefit the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its alliance partners, who are strong in underrepresented northern states, while upsetting the long-standing informal federal equilibrium where southern states contribute disproportionately to economic output. The proposed bills also sought to operationalize the 2023 Women’s Reservation Bill by expanding the Lok Sabha to 850 seats, with new seats reserved for women, but without codifying the prime minister's guarantee to preserve existing state-wise proportional seat shares. The unresolved debate underscores a fundamental contest over India's federal balance and political representation.

Opinion – The Institutional Afterlife of Populist Rule

E-International Relations  |  Nicholas Morieson
Viktor Orbรกn’s defeat in Hungary, while initially framed as a democratic victory, does not signify an immediate end to the populist era or a swift return to liberal democracy. The article argues that populist rule leaves an institutional "afterlife" by fundamentally reshaping state bodies. Orbรกn’s 16-year tenure saw his Fidesz government rewrite Hungary’s constitution, politicize appointments, and weaken institutional independence, transforming the bureaucracy, courts, and public broadcasters into extensions of the party’s populist-nationalist ideology. This institutional capture, also evident in India under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) through incremental legal changes, pressure on accountability institutions, and partisan appointments, demonstrates that populists aim not to dismantle the state but to make it loyal to their political will. Reversing these changes is complex, as elections remove governments faster than they repair politicized institutions. This global challenge prompts efforts in countries like France to secure state institutions against future populist takeovers, risking exacerbated populist sentiment.

How Trump trampled on Modi’s dream of an Indian superpower

The Telegraph  |  Hans van Leeuwen
India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi's ambition for "Viksit Bharat" (developed India by 2047) and superpower status has been significantly hampered by the ongoing war in Iran, initiated by Donald Trump's "excursion." This conflict, past the 80-day mark, has caused foreign investors to flee India, the currency to fall, and petrol prices to rise, forcing Modi to impose tariffs and import restrictions on gold. India, importing 87% of its crude oil and gas with about half typically passing through the Strait of Hormuz, faces severe economic fallout, including a Moody's downgrade of its 2026 growth forecast to 6%. Geopolitically, Trump's closer ties with India's rivals, China and Pakistan, have eroded the 20-year effort to cultivate a strong US-India relationship. India's "Made in India" campaign struggles with stalled manufacturing GDP share and insufficient investment, indicating it is far from challenging China. Modi's government faces strained public finances from fuel tax cuts (₹70bn fortnightly) and fertiliser subsidies (₹500bn), potentially leading to cuts in growth-driving capital expenditure.

Arms Without Strings: What Buying Chinese Military Technology Really Means

Small Wars Journal | Tahir Azad
The May 2025 India–Pakistan crisis and the February 2026 United States–Israel–Iran war have significantly elevated the global perception of Chinese military technology, transforming it from a marginal alternative into a parallel defense-industrial ecosystem. Chinese arms exports offer competitive pricing, flexible financing, joint-production options, near-immediate access to dual-use technologies, and an alternative satellite-navigation backbone via BeiDou, all without the political conditions imposed by Western suppliers. For instance, Pakistani J-10CE fighters reportedly achieved combat kills against Indian Rafales in May 2025, and Iran transitioned its military and civilian applications to BeiDou in June 2025, enhancing missile precision during the current war. This contrasts sharply with the bureaucratic friction of Western programs like the F-35, which faces delays and downgrades for clients due to qualitative military edge considerations and concerns about Chinese telecommunications. Despite its appeal, the Chinese model faces weaknesses including thin after-sales support, exposure to secondary United States sanctions, and a modest 5.6 percent share of global arms exports, with 61 percent going to Pakistan.

The Price of Collusion: Why Sri Lanka Needs a New Approach to Debt Governance

The Diplomat  |  Mushtaq Khan, Pallavi Roy, Ulrich Volz
Sri Lanka's 2022 default stemmed from a crisis of governance, not merely a fiscal accident, highlighting the inadequacy of standard "good governance" reforms like those prescribed by the International Monetary Fund. These reforms, relying on transparency and formal oversight, are easily circumvented in developing economies where powerful networks of politicians, bureaucrats, and businesses collude to inflate project costs. Following Mahinda Rajapaksa's 2008 electoral victory, Sri Lanka embarked on an infrastructure boom financed by China, India, and international bond markets, including projects like the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, Hambantota Port, highways, and the Mannar Wind Power Project. Approximately 65 percent of foreign debt accumulated in the decade preceding the crisis was tied to transport, energy, water, and port/airport infrastructure. Many of these mega projects, such as the Mannar wind power project where the agreed price was around 2.7 U.S. cents per kWh higher than the actual market price, failed to yield expected economic returns, significantly contributing to the nation's eventual default. Preventing future unsustainable borrowing requires empowering local actors and fostering genuine competition.

The Trump-Xi Summit: What It Means for Southeast Asia and South Asia

Council on Foreign Relations | Joshua Kurlantzick
The recent Trump-Xi summit in Beijing, despite producing modest substance, signaled that the U.S.-China bilateral relationship had not completely derailed, a critical point for Southeast Asian states. However, regional states were largely disappointed, particularly regarding the Iran war and Strait of Hormuz. China did not commit to keeping the Strait open, and Iran continues collecting fees, exacerbating Asia's energy crisis, which is pushing regional states into recession and causing widespread anger. This situation also prompts Southeast Asian states to reconsider tolling the Strait of Malacca, risking instability. Furthermore, Trump's amenable approach to China and the “constructive strategic stability” framing worry regional states like Indonesia and Japan, fearing they will be cut out of discussions on issues like the South China Sea and Taiwan. The lack of progress on AI and rare earth export controls also leaves regional companies in uncertainty, compounding economic woes already worsened by the Iran conflict, with the UN Development Program projecting $299 billion in economic losses for the Asia-Pacific.

How Trade Reduces the Risk of War

Center for Strategic and International Studies  |  Philip Luck, Christopher M. Meissner
Increased bilateral trade significantly reduces the probability of militarized conflict and dampens perceptions of enmity between countries, according to new research. Estimates indicate that a doubling of bilateral trade, driven by reduced shipping costs from advancements like aviation, decreases the likelihood of conflict by approximately 30 percent and lowers conflict intensity. This effect was most pronounced in East and Southeast Asia, where rapid integration into global manufacturing networks coincided with regional stabilization, with China, South Korea, Thailand, Myanmar, and the Philippines experiencing the largest reductions in conflict risk. While acknowledging that trade can create coercive leverage, as seen with Europe's reliance on Russian gas before February 2022 or China's tightening of rare earth export licenses since 2023, the authors argue that broad "de-risking" or "decoupling" efforts to limit economic integration will, on average, increase conflict likelihood. This quantifiable security cost, often overlooked in policy debates, must be integrated into cost-benefit analyses of fragmentation policies to design a more stable future international order.

A Summit of Equals

The recently concluded U.S.-China summit, despite President Trump's declaration of success, yielded unclear outcomes due to the absence of a joint statement and divergent comments. On trade, anticipated progress on the "three B’s" (beans, beef, and Boeing) remains unconfirmed; Trump cited significant agriculture purchases without details, China renewed lapsed U.S. beef export licenses, and a 200-plane Boeing deal is unconfirmed by Beijing and less than expected. Discussions on a Board of Trade, Board of Investment, and AI safety protocols began but produced no agreements. Notably, traditional U.S. complaints like overcapacity, subsidies, and intellectual property theft were not discussed, signaling a U.S. shift towards transactional goals and China's success in avoiding these issues. More significant discussions focused on Taiwan and Iran. On Taiwan, no immediate policy change occurred, but China pressed harder, warning of conflict, while Trump acknowledged discussing U.S. arms sales without a decision. Regarding Iran, Xi Jinping reiterated previous stances on nuclear weapons and the Strait of Hormuz, with China's willingness to act privately unclear. The summit's slogan, "constructive strategic stability," reflects both nations' need to buy time amid challenges, with China viewing its rise as inexorable and the U.S. implicitly acknowledging limited leverage.

The Coming AI Backlash

Council on Foreign Relations | Chris McGuire
Artificial intelligence (AI) policy will be the most important issue in the 2028 U.S. presidential election, driven by exponentially advancing capabilities, doubling every four months since 2024, leading to models 250 times more powerful by 2028. These advancements will cause significant job losses, as warned by OpenAI CEO Sam Altman and JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon, and create potential for dangerous misuse, including advanced hacking and biological engineering. AI also enables comprehensive government surveillance without warrants. The U.S. military is already using AI in Iran operations, compressing target identification to seconds, and future conflicts will see fully autonomous combat drones, making U.S. AI leadership critical against China. Public sentiment is largely negative, with only 26 percent of voters having positive feelings. This necessitates a proactive federal policy addressing safe development, equitable economic gains through workforce programs and income support, and maintaining U.S. global AI leadership over China via robust technology protection measures. Deferring serious policymaking risks a reactive, crisis-driven response detrimental to both public safety and U.S. competitiveness.