6 December 2025

If a young officer is not part of his troops in every way, they are unlikely to follow him into dange

Kuldip Singh

The Supreme Court on November 25 upheld the Delhi High Court’s May 2025 order affirming Lieutenant Samuel Kamalesan’s termination from service for refusing to enter the sanctum of his regiment’s temple and gurdwara. His unit, the 3rd Cavalry, has a distinguished and valiant history, largely comprising troops from the Sikh, Jat, and Rajput communities.

Kamalesan, a Protestant Christian officer commissioned in 2017 into the Indian Army, maintained that he never disrespected any faith, but believed that physically entering another religion’s sanctum violated the first of the Ten Commandments (viz, “You shall have no other gods before me”). The apex court observed: “Leaders have to lead by example … When a pastor, a leader of your faith, counselled you that it was alright, you should have left it at that … you cannot have your private understanding of what your religion permits … in uniform.” The Court thus held that Kamalesan’s refusal encroached upon the Army’s model of secularism, which requires all officers to participate equally in the rituals of the diverse faiths of their troops, and that his conduct constituted a breach of discipline and collective ethos.

The judgment has sparked predictable controversy. Some argue that, while discipline is indispensable to the armed forces, the dismissal violates personally held religious convictions, reduces Indian secularism to ritual uniformity, overlooks its deeper constitutional soul, and narrows the accommodative space in which all belief systems can coexist without coercion. A few have even juxtaposed this with emphatic assertions about Pakistan’s armed forces being Islamised and radicalised. The issue, however, is far more complex.

Satellite Imagery Shows Tehran’s Accelerating Water Crisis

David Michel, Will Todman, and Jennifer Jun

Tehran is experiencing an unprecedented water crisis. Satellite imagery analysis shows that key reservoirs that feed the capital are far below their typical seasonal variation. The Iranian president has warned that Iran has “no choice” but to move the location of the capital due to the water crisis. In the short term, water rationing has been imposed on some neighborhoods, and authorities may have to evacuate residents from Tehran. This crisis is driven by mounting demand for water, a historic drought, and persistent mismanagement. The Iranian government faces no easy way out, as necessary reforms would undercut the regime’s political economy and could risk triggering broad social unrest.
Drivers of the Crisis

Tehran’s worsening water crisis represents the chronicle of a dearth foretold. Relentlessly mounting demands, rising environmental pressures, and persistent policy deficiencies have long converged to impose unsustainable strains on the city’s water resources. However, as the capital navigates the current crisis, these underlying drivers of continuing water insecurity will remain.

Hunting bin Laden on 'the roof of the world'

Jack Murphy and Sean D. Naylor

The village of Drosh with the Hindu Kush mountains in the background. (Credit: Zahijee, via Wikimedia Commons)

In September 2005, in a remote valley in Pakistan, a CIA contractor locked eyes with a man he was sure was Osama bin Laden and caught the moment on camera.

The images of that encounter (see below) caused the small Joint Special Operations Command task force in Afghanistan to prepare for a possible cross-border mission, according to the contractor, before Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, which the CIA’s Islamabad station chief had controversially informed about the sighting, persuaded the agency that it was a case of mistaken identity.

The episode, almost six years before a JSOC raid killed bin Laden in Pakistan, underscored the divide in the CIA over how much their Pakistani counterparts could be trusted and the febrile nature of the hunt for bin Laden after the trail of the al-Qaida leader had gone cold following the December 2001 battle of Tora Bora.

In early July 2005, according to an account written by the former contractor and obtained by The High Side, the U.S. consul general in Peshawar, a bustling city in what was then Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (since renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), was invited to meet with the head of the Kalash people, a community of about 3,000 centered in a few remote valleys in Chitral, the most northwesterly region of Pakistan.

How trade war with poor Afghanistan is bleeding Pakistan

Sushim Mukul

Pakistan's DG ISPR, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry's statement warning Afghanistan—"blood and business cannot go together"—now seems to have backfired and is hurting Islamabad itself. With bilateral relations between the two neighbours sinking to their lowest point, following the brief border clash and the mass expulsion of Afghan nationals during harsh winter months, the trade war between Pakistan and Afghanistan has erupted, and its effects are falling disproportionately on Pakistan.

Since the closure of border trade points on October 11, Afghanistan has quickly adapted by redirecting commerce through Iran, India, and the Central Asian republics. Pakistan, however, has taken a severe hit. The halt in cross-border trade is dealing a heavy blow to Pakistan's already fragile economy. It is undermining its trade, manufacturing, and export sectors, according to several reports, including one in Dawn, the Karachi-based English daily.

China's Demographic Dilemma

Henrietta Levin

In this episode of Pekingology, CSIS Senior Fellow Henrietta Levin is joined by Philip O’Keefe, Professor of Practice at the University of New South Wales Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research and one of the world's leading experts on demographic trends in China and across Asia. They unpack the rapid aging of Chinese society, exploring the impact of a shrinking population on China's politics, economy, and innovation ecosystem, as well as its trade imbalances and Beijing's global ambitions.

The rot eating at China’s war machine

Gabriel Honrada

China’s drive to build a modern, high-tech military is increasingly undermined by a widening corruption crisis that is raising doubts about its true strength.

This month, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released a report mentioning that China’s major state-owned defense firms suffered the steepest downturn among the world’s top arms producers in 2024, as corruption scandals rippled through the sector and disrupted procurement.

According to the report, arms revenues of the eight Chinese companies on the list fell 10% to USD 88.3 billion, the sharpest decline of any country, dragging down overall regional performance. SIPRI researchers said six firms saw revenue losses after high-profile graft probes triggered postponements, cancellations and reviews of major military contracts.

China is bearing down on Taiwan – enabled by Trump’s weakness and vacillation

Simon Tisdall

Sheer ignorance, fed by malign intent, historical prejudice and mutual misunderstanding, is often the crucial spark that ignites simmering international conflicts. If Adolf Hitler, remarkably ignorant of the US, had grasped the true extent of American industrial might, would he still have fatefully declared war on Washington in 1941?

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, it evidently had no idea what it was getting into. Humiliating defeat contributed greatly to its subsequent disintegration. In 1990, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait, convinced he had a green light from the White House. In all these cases, stupidity produced disastrous misjudgments that proved fatal.

China’s fractious relations with the western democracies suffer from similarly hazardous blindspots. The recent publication in state media of “explainer” articles apparently intended to provide reassurance about Taiwan’s future under Chinese rule exemplified this lack of mutual knowledge, to almost comical effect

What Taiwan can and can't learn from Ukraine

Sean Durns

In some ways, the war in Ukraine resembles World War I. The latter was infamous for its static front lines, trench warfare, and the use of new battlefield weapons, from airplanes to mustard gas to advancements in artillery and small arms. It took time for many of the powers to adapt their 19th-century tactics to the new, and more monstrous, terrain of the 20th.

At war’s end, both winners and losers sought to imbibe its lessons. Some, notably France with its Maginot Line fortifications, learned all of the wrong ones. Many expected the next war to also be primarily static. Others recognized that new technologies would allow for wars of maneuver and offense. Militarily, World War II bore scant resemblance to its predecessor. Those who clung to old tactics and outdated technologies paid a heavy price.

The war in Ukraine has been marked by constant evolution. In a recent report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mick Ryan, a retired major general in the Australian army, offered some takeaways from the conflict. One inescapable conclusion: Warfare by drone and other unmanned aerial vehicles is here, and it is here to stay. Both sides have attempted to adapt, with varying levels of success. Yet, as Ryan observes, “Ukraine is not a drone war, it is a war where drones have gained prominence. … Drones do not replace human capacity — they extend it.” Drones are not replacing soldiers on the ground, nor are they a substitute for war’s other basic commodities: artillery, tanks, logisticians, infantry, and engineers.

To China's war planners, AI is just another thing to deceive

TYE GRAHAM and PETER W. SINGER

A mask of darkness had fallen over the Gobi Desert training grounds at Zhurihe when the Blue Force unleashed a withering strike intended to wipe Red Force artillery off the map. Plumes rose from “destroyed” batteries as the seemingly successful fire plan took out its targets in waves. But it had all been a trap.

When Blue began to shift positions to avoid counter-battery fire, exercise control called a halt—and revealed that, far from defeating the enemy, more than half of Blue’s fire units had already been destroyed. After the exercise, the Red commander explained the ruse: he had salted the range with decoy guns and what he called “professional stand-ins,” the signatures of units and troops, which not only tricked Blue’s sensors and AI-assisted targeting into shooting at phantoms, but also revealed their own firing points.

President Xi Jinping Speaks with U.S. President Donald J. Trump on the Phone


President Xi noted that we had a successful meeting in Busan last month, and reached many important common understandings. We recalibrated the course of the giant ship of China-U.S. relations and provided more momentum for it to sail forward steadily, thus sending a positive message to the world. Since then, the China-U.S. relationship has generally maintained a steady and positive trajectory, and this is welcomed by the two countries and the broader international community. What has happened demonstrates yet again that the description of China-U.S. cooperation benefiting both sides and confrontation hurting both sides reflects a common sense that has been repeatedly proven by experience, and the vision of China and the U.S. helping each other succeed and prospering together is a tangible prospect within reach. The two sides should keep up the momentum, keep moving forward in the right direction on the basis of equality, respect and mutual benefit, lengthen the list of cooperation and shorten the list of problems, so as to make more positive progress, create new space for China-U.S. cooperation and bring more benefits to the people of both countries and the world.

President Xi outlined China’s principled position on the Taiwan question. He underscored that Taiwan’s return to China is an integral part of the post-war international order. China and the U.S. fought shoulder to shoulder against fascism and militarism. Given what is going on, it is even more important for us to jointly safeguard the victory of WWII.

Leadership Turmoil Impacts Eastern Theater Command Readiness

Zi Yang

Tensions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan have risen dramatically after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks on how Japan might react to an attack on Taiwan. Responding to a question at a budget committee meeting on November 7, Takaichi said that a Taiwan contingency involving the use of force could constitute an “existential risk” for Japan (Nikkei, November 7). [1][1]In the original Japanese, Takaichi said, ” This comment was met with threats from online PRC commentators. Most notably, the PRC’s consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian , inflamed the situation by posting on the social media platform X to say that “the dirty neck that sticks itself in must be cut off” (UDN, November 10). [2][2]In the original Japanese, Xue Jian wrote,

The PRC government subsequently discouraged its citizens from visiting Japan and deployed People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ships to waters south of Japan’s Kyushu Island (South China Morning Post [SCMP], November 14). The PLA’s theater commands have also mobilized, producing bellicose videos with the goal of intimidation (Sina, November 19).

The PRC’s aggressive rhetoric raises questions about the readiness of the PLA Eastern Theater Command (TC), given its strategic focus on both Japan and Taiwan. Recent purges have impacted its leadership, however, to the detriment of command stability. This suggests military escalation is unlikely in the near future.

Data Is the Battlefield. US Cyber Command Brings the Artillery

Galen Fries 

Bottom Line up Front: U.S. Cyber Command is the Pentagon’s tip of the spear in the digital gunfight. From Fort Meade, it pulls cyber talent from every service, aims it at America’s adversaries, and keeps DoD networks alive and lethal.

If you think war is only tanks and trigger pullers, USCYBERCOM is here to mess up your day. As a unified combatant command, it plans and runs offensive and defensive ops in cyberspace, and it synchronizes how the services do that work under one roof. Its four main service components are Army Cyber Command, Navy Fleet Cyber Command, Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command, and Air Forces Cyber, aligned under the 16th Air Force.

The Impact of U.S. Sanctions and Tariffs on India’s Russian Oil Imports

Vrinda Sahai

After a steady rise for nearly three years, India’s imports of Russian crude oil declined significantly in November 2025. This followed sanctions by the United States on Russian energy companies and the imposition of substantial reciprocal tariffs on India, including duties on Russian oil purchases. In response to these economic pressures, Indian oil companies are reassessing their trade relationships with Russian counterparts.

This piece examines India’s response to U.S. sanctions and tariffs, specifically assessing the immediate market consequences, such as alterations in import costs, and the broader strategic implications for India’s energy security and foreign policy orientation.

The Scale of India’s Dependence

India is the world’s third-largest consumer of crude oil after the United States and China. In 2025, consumption rose to 265.7 million metric tonnes (MMT), growing at a rate of 3.7 percent annually. Limited domestic production capability forces India to import around 89 percent of its needs.

Why Qatar Should Have No Role in Gaza

Khaled Abu Toameh

Delegations from Qatar, Egypt and Turkey met in Cairo on November 25 to discuss implementation of the second phase of US President Donald J. Trump's plan for ending the war in the Gaza Strip, which erupted with the October 7, 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel.

According to media reports, the meeting included the heads of the Egyptian and Turkish intelligence agencies, along with the prime minister of Qatar. They discussed "ways to intensify joint effort to ensure the successful implementation of the second phase of the plan," which includes the disarmament of Hamas, the establishment of a transitional Palestinian governance committee, and the deployment of an International Stabilization Force in the Gaza Strip.

Are Palestinians Ready to Shed Hamas?

Mohamed Elgohari

The fragile cease-fire between Israel and Hamas has offered the first real opening to end the two-year war in Gaza. The outlines of a peace process have broad buy-in, with the UN Security Council approving U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposed plan on November 17, but many political questions remain unresolved. And the thorniest among them—who will govern Gaza, whether and how Hamas will be disarmed and involved in politics thereafter, and what to do about Israel’s ongoing occupation—cannot be answered by international decree. In no small part, the outcome of any peace process will be shaped by what Palestinians themselves think.

Immediately after the October 7, 2023, attacks, Palestinians rallied behind Hamas and broadly supported its armed resistance as a means to end Israeli occupation. Since then, tens of thousands of Palestinians have been killed and more than 90 percent of residential buildings in Gaza have been destroyed. Through the shock and attrition of Israel’s invasion, Palestinians’ opinions have shifted. Attitudes toward Hamas, and armed struggle in general, began to sour, although many Palestinians remained ambivalent about the alternatives. In the war’s later stages, however, the share of Palestinians who favored a negotiated settlement with Israel grew larger. Increasingly, Palestinians have seemed more open to governance by some sort of non-Hamas, Palestinian-led body to run Gaza after the war.

War Without End: Russia’s Shadow Warfare

Sam Greene, Andrei Soldatov, and Irina Borogan

Severed cables. Disrupted aviation. Arson. Sabotage. Assassination. Infiltration. Attacks designed to distract, to confuse, and to dismay an adversary – but not to provoke a response. Such is shadow warfare, causing damage and costing lives but operating below the traditional threshold of war.
Shadow War as System, Not Strategy

Even as Ukraine continues to suffer under wave after wave of bombardment and an ever deepening occupation of its eastern and southern territory, Europe as a whole is under a sustained assault of a different kind. Earlier this year, the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) launched a major new project—Defend, Deny, Deter: Countering Russia’s Shadow Warfare—to help lay the groundwork for a new transatlantic approach to deterrence.

In the first phase of this project, CEPA Senior Non-Resident Fellows Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan explore the who, what, why and how of Russian shadow warfare, uncovering the nature of the forces Russia brings to bear, their governance structures and, critically, the implicit doctrine that shapes strategic and tactical decision-making. Their analysis shows that shadow warfare is not merely an opportunistic tool, but an expression of a deep, self-reinforcing system of governance. Later in the year, CEPA will publish further studies, examining Europe’s vulnerabilities and testing strategies of retaliation and deterrence.

What Do Security Guarantees for Ukraine Mean?

Andreas Umland

Since spring 2025, the term “security guarantee” has become a buzzword in international debates about future Western support for Ukraine. Following the conclusion of a ceasefire, ensuring Ukraine’s security is to be a central component of international engagement with the embattled country. However, the term is currently often used in a way that leaves important political and strategic challenges to the implementation of these guarantees unaddressed.

In general, the term “security guarantees” can be misleading: a complete security guarantee is an unattainable illusion, not only for Ukraine but also for every other nation. Expert discussions distinguish between guarantees and (weaker) security commitments, as well as between positive and negative guarantees. As a rule, a positive security guarantee—the type of promise Ukraine is seeking—implies strong commitments on the part of the guarantor to protect the beneficiary.

The different definitions and interpretations of security guarantees, as well as the ambiguities and contradictions implicit in their planning and implementation, pose a problem. Open questions must be clearly identified at the outset. Transparency can help move from purely discursive progress on Kyiv’s future defense needs to a real improvement in Ukraine’s security situation.

Big Europe Has Lost the War Over Ukraine

Mick Hume

The strategy is obvious: to propagandize the public into accepting, if not celebrating, our “new normal” in which elderly couples are put down like household pets.

Much remains uncertain about the final outcome of the war in Ukraine. On the diplomatic battlefield, competing peace plans (28 points? 19 points? Crimea in? Crimea out?) have been flying backwards and forwards between capitals. Meanwhile in the real warzone, the Russian military continues to rain down military drones and missiles on Ukrainian cities, and the bodies continue to pile up on both sides in fierce street fighting, with no end in sight.

One indirect result of this bloody conflict, however, should already be clear enough. The leaders of the European Union and their UK allies—which we might collectively call Big Europe—have lost the political war over Ukraine. The EU’s claim to be a major global power player in the modern world have been thoroughly exposed as the fantasies of an ageing pretender.

Not for the first time, President Donald has been the breaker of Europe’s globalist dreams. The U.S. president sprang his proposed peace deal with Russia on his European allies, almost without warning. When a U.S. delegation met with Ukrainians in Geneva, European officials were left in the background of the photo-ops, if not outside in the corridor.

The War in Ukraine: Lots of Questions and a Few Answers

Victor Davis Hanson

Why did the war in Ukraine start in 2021?

As in 2008 and 2012, but unlike 2017 to 2021, Vladimir Putin sensed an American president would not or could not deter him, so he invaded a former Soviet republic. Under past presidents, Putin saw no downside to grabbing Ossetia, the Donbas, and Crimea.

Putin was also led to believe the West or Joe Biden would not challenge him following the recent humiliating U.S. withdrawal from Kabul. Biden’s unfortunate remark that a “minor” Russian invasion might not invoke a U.S. response did not help.

Based on past experience, Putin saw no real obstacle to a quick victory.

Why didn’t NATO deter Russia?

NATO members have only recently agreed to the earlier Trump demand to meet their 2% of GDP defense spending promises. Most were still poorly armed in 2022 and had mocked Trump’s effort to berate them into meeting their promised defense expenditures.

Ukraine's Long-Distance Drones Take Toll On Russia's Oil Business -- And War Chest

Will Tizard

Ukraine's deep-strike drone campaign targeting Russia's oil and gas production facilities has already cost its enemy 10 percent of its refining capacity, according to industry experts -- and Kyiv is committed to stepping things up.

"Ten percent, it's not an astonishing number," says Tatiana Mitrova of Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy. "But it is still something that starts to be felt with the Russian domestic fuel crisis, with reduced oil refined products exports, and general tension inside the Russian oil sector."

Ukraine has invested heavily in new long-distance drone technology, putting out weapons such as the Lyutiy drone, which is capable of delivering explosives up to 2,000 kilometers from its secret launch site.

But Ukrainian drone units have also gained expertise at swarming targets with dozens of cheaper first-person-view (FPV) drones.

The technology advances are currently allowing Kyiv to hit key Russian oil and gas resources on an almost daily basis.

It has also committed to hitting the same refineries repeatedly, an essential strategy, says Mitrova, as Russia scrambles to rebuild and repair damage.

Maria Ressa at UNGA 80th anniv: 'Information integrity is the mother of all battles

Bea Cupin 

MANILA, Philippines – In a hall full of top officials and diplomats from all around the world, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Rappler co-founder Maria Ressa called on the United Nations to win the battle for information integrity.

“Information integrity is the mother of all battles. Win this, and we can win the rest. Lose this, and we lose everything,” said Ressa.

“Please choose courage over comfort, facts over fiction, hope over fear. A lot has changed since the UN was created 80 years ago, but its values – peace, human rights, justice, rule of law – are more essential today than ever. It’s time to create again: to build better,” she added.

The United Nations celebrates the 80th year of its existence at a tumultuous time.

“The biggest battle we face today is impunity – and it leads to our dehumanization: in both the physical world, where wars rage from Ukraine to Gaza; and in the virtual world, where our minds and emotions are manipulated by surveillance capitalism for profit. To fight that, we need information integrity,” said Ressa.

Ressa is one of five speakers — alongside Secretary-General Antรณnio Guterres, President of General Assembly Annalena Baerbock, former Liberia president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and former World Health Organization (WHO) director-general of the Gro H. Brundtland — to have addressed the commemoration of the multilateral body’s anniversary.

Japan’s Hybrid Approach to AI Governance: Balancing Soft Law and Hard Law

Kyoko Yoshinaga

Japan has been a leader in international discussions on responsible artificial intelligence (AI) from the outset, helping shape the G-7, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and G-20 principles. Most notably, as the G-7 host in 2023, Japan launched the Hiroshima AI Process, which established eleven guiding principles for a code of conduct for organizations developing advanced AI systems as shared global values for safe and trustworthy AI, while respecting national differences in regulatory approaches.

Domestically, Japan adopts a “soft law” approach to AI governance through guidelines that are not legally binding, complemented by the newly enacted AI Promotion Act, which also avoids direct penalties. This flexible framework has sometimes been misunderstood as “hands-off” regulation, raising questions about enforcement. However, there are unique reasons why it functions effectively in Japan, where cooperation between government and industry and social accountability play significant roles.

American Greatness and Decline

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR.

CAMBRIDGE – With most Americans believing that the United States is in decline, Donald Trump claims he can “Make America Great Again.” But Trump’s premise is simply wrong, and it is his proposed remedies that pose the biggest threat to America.

Americans have a long history of worrying about decline. Shortly after the founding of the Massachusetts Bay colony in the seventeenth century, some Puritans lamented the loss of an earlier virtue. In the eighteenth century, the founding fathers studied Roman history when considering how to sustain a new American republic. In the nineteenth century, Charles Dickens observed that if Americans are to be believed, their country “always is depressed, and always is stagnated, and always is at an alarming crisis, and never was otherwise.” On a 1979 magazine cover about national decline, the Statue of Liberty has a tear rolling down her cheek.

But while Americans have long been drawn to what I call the “golden glow of the past,” the US has never had the power many imagine it did. Even with preponderant resources, America has often failed to get what it wants. Those who think that today’s world is more complex and tumultuous than in the past should remember a year like 1956, when the US was unable to prevent Soviet repression of a revolt in Hungary; and when our allies Britain, France, and Israel invaded the Suez. To paraphrase the comedian Will Rogers, “hegemony ain’t what it used to be and never was.” Periods of “declinism” tell us more about popular psychology than about geopolitics.

Cyber warfare in space: attacks on space systems rose during Gaza conflict, report finds

Anna Desmarais

Space satellites and communications systems are under threat from cyber warfare, a new report warns, which said there were 237 cyber operations that targeted the space sector between January 2023 and July 2025 during the conflict in Gaza.

The analysis, published by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zรผrich, compiles information, including social media posts, news articles and information from cybercrime forums about cyberattacks on the Israeli space sector and international agencies.

The most dramatic increase in space cyberattacks occurred during the Israel-Iran in June 2025, when 72 operations were recorded in a single month. This represents nearly one-third of all incidents identified during the study period, the author of the report, Clรฉmence Poirier, said.

“Cyber operations against the space sector are now part of a general trend during armed conflicts," the report read, comparing the pattern to similar activity seen during Russia’s most recent invasion of Ukraine.

Big Tech Is a Big Problem

KENNETH ROGOFF

The prosperity of the US has always depended on its ability to harness economic growth to technology-driven innovation. But right now Big Tech is as much a part of the problem as it is a part of the solution.

CAMBRIDGE – Have the tech giants – Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft – grown too big, rich, and powerful for regulators and politicians ever to take them on? The international investment community seems to think so, at least if sky-high tech valuations are any indication. But while that might be good news for the tech oligarchs, whether it is good for the economy is far from clear.

5 December 2025

Can Chinese Authoritarianism Stay Smart?

Jennifer Lind

The man at the podium wore a dark suit and a red tie. Behind him sat rows of dignitaries in front of a vast wall, draped in gold, from which protruded a yellow hammer and sickle, framed on either side by 100-foot scarlet flags. In front of him, in the cavernous, red-carpeted hall, sat more than 2,000 delegates to the 20th People’s Party Congress in 2022. They listened attentively and took notes like their lives depended on it, which they may well have. The man, Xi Jinping, spoke for over two hours, during which his rapt audience occasionally erupted in ecstatic applause. The moment was both bland in its authoritarian predictability and a sea change in Chinese politics.

Xi was formally taking office for the third time, after altering the Chinese Constitution to make it possible. The move was a striking rejection of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) norms that had been designed to protect China from the personalism associated with Mao Zedong’s rule. The political and economic reforms of the post-Mao era supported China’s stunning economic rise from poverty to the world’s second-largest economy and

A Five-Year Plan for Managed Confrontation

Matthew Johnson

A Five-Year Plan for Managed Confrontation

Executive Summary: Economic planning for systemic rivalry: The Fourth Plenum ratified the culmination of a decade-long project to fuse national planning, security strategy, and technological control under Xi Jinping’s direct command. The 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) formalizes this system as a doctrine of strategic endurance—a framework for sustaining confrontation with the United States through centralized control of capital, industry, and information.

Dual circulation reinterpreted: What appeared in 2020 as a rebalancing toward domestic demand was in fact the source code for managed confrontation, building an economy that can circulate internally under pressure while tightening global dependence on the People’s Republic of China (PRC). “Self-reliance” thus also meant redundancy, coercive leverage, and supply-chain weaponization.

Systemic hardening, 2020–2025: Over the following half-decade, Beijing implemented this blueprint, tightening Party command over finance and platforms, deploying “reverse constrainment” through trade sanctions, and rolling out export controls on rare earths, batteries, and chipmaking equipment. These measures tested the conversion of economic scale into strategic deterrence.

China's Demographic Dilemma

Henrietta Levin

In this episode of Pekingology, CSIS Senior Fellow Henrietta Levin is joined by Philip O’Keefe, Professor of Practice at the University of New South Wales Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research and one of the world's leading experts on demographic trends in China and across Asia. They unpack the rapid aging of Chinese society, exploring the impact of a shrinking population on China's politics, economy, and innovation ecosystem, as well as its trade imbalances and Beijing's global ambitions.

Former White House Middle East Envoy: What We Keep Getting Wrong About the UAE and Sudan

Jason D. Greenblatt

The war in Sudan is one of the great humanitarian catastrophes of our time, yet it rarely receives the accuracy it deserves. For many, the conflict feels abstract, if they know anything about it at all. Sudan has endured repeated cycles of political collapse and violence since the 1950s, including two civil wars, multiple internal conflicts and an ongoing war between rival military factions. This crisis did not appear out of nowhere, nor was it triggered by a single outside actor. It is the result of decades of fractured institutions, violent armed groups and a state that has consistently struggled to build lasting national cohesion.

The scale of human suffering is staggering: families with nowhere safe to go, cities emptied and generations robbed of stability. When discussing external involvement, including the role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), we owe it to the Sudanese to be precise, not performative. We owe them accuracy, not convenient narratives.

Afghan terror and Somalia fraud shows why Trump is right on migrants

Douglas Murray

You have to be careful with a country. Even a nation as vast in size and huge in population as the United States cannot be endlessly experimented upon. You cannot just leave borders open, or allow in large numbers of people with totally different value systems from your own.

That is the mistake many European countries have committed in recent years. They have opened their homes up to people from almost every part of the world where there is civil strife, war or just a lower standard of living.

The results can be seen everywhere. It is the reason why a country like Sweden — that used to be such a placid, decent place — has become one of the most violent countries in the world not actually at war. Grenade attacks, gang-warfare: these things were recently alien to Sweden. Not anymore.

It is the same here in the United States — though here the effects are more dispersed, so the problem can be covered up for longer.

Moscow’s Offshore Menace

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

At the October meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, an annual forum for Russian policy talks that has in recent years become a platform for Kremlin ideology, Russian President Vladimir Putin was asked an unusual question. “Mr. President, why are you sending so many drones to Denmark?” Putin initially dismissed it, joking that he would not send drones to “France, Denmark, or Copenhagen.” But the Russian leader did not stop there. He went on to say that “many eccentric characters,” especially young people, were capable of launching those drones over Europe—an enigmatic assertion that recalled his veiled comments about

America’s Toothless Sanctions on Russian Oil

Erica Downs and Richard Nephew

Last month, the Trump administration imposed fresh sanctions on Russia’s two largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, signaling a renewed desire to drive Moscow to the negotiating table in its war against Ukraine. But although these measures have the potential to harm the Russian economy, just how much damage they inflict will depend largely on one actor: Beijing. China bought almost half the oil Russia exported in 2024, evading Washington’s existing restrictions in the process. And new sanctions alone will do little to push China into significantly reducing its purchases.

The New Cold War is here

David Roche

The New Cold War is not a forecast. It’s here and now. Where the conflict takes us does need forecasting, however. For our destination I shall set out some scenarios for you to choose from. But first a bit of history.

We had a few misconceptions in 1989, when we welcomed the ‘end of history’, meaning the end of systemic confrontation between hegemonic great powers, after the Berlin Wall fell. And also in 2001, when we invited China to participate in the free world economy by joining the WTO. The idea was that the richer China got, the more Chinese society would become like us, espousing our democratic niceties. China actually became more dictatorial the more it succeeded in becoming a poverty-free, middle-income economy. A few bouts of liberalisation and social eruptions came to nothing. Since President Xi Jinping came to office in 2013, societal control and conformity have become increasingly systemic and ubiquitous. Anecdotally, a decade ago, China had a security camera for every ten citizens. Now there is one for every two.

Why Russia has come to the table

Peter Caddick-Adams

Russia’s economy is imploding. Largely due to sanctions caused by the Ukraine War, this year the Economics Ministry posted a record mid-year budget deficit of 3.7 trillion roubles ($45.8 billion) and the Central Bank expects the full-year deficit to reach $55 billion, or 2 per cent of GDP. This is almost certainly the reason peace proposals with Ukraine have surfaced again.

Firstly, its coal industry has been pushed to the brink of collapse. Russia exported 22.6 per cent of its coal by rail to the EU in 2021, but lost that market due to trade embargoes after the Ukraine invasion, and was forced to redirect shipments to Asia by sea, with higher freight charges. Buyers have leveraged the disruption to negotiate lower rates, and prices have dropped further to $70 per tonne, which no longer covers production and shipping costs. Russia’s overseas customers have ramped up their own production, particularly in China, India and Indonesia, but tracking the development of alternative energy forms, world coal consumption has slowed, which sent international prices plunging from $400 per tonne in late 2022 to around $100 per tonne by May 2025.

What Is “Anti-Access/Area Denial” Technology, and Why Does It Matter?

Harrison Kass

The network’s purpose is simple, yet carries profound implications for the global order: it is designed to make US military operations near China’s borders dangerous, expensive, and ineffective. The network does not rely on a single system, but on a multi-layered web of systems, across domains, which integrates long-range missiles, radars, aircraft, submarines, satellites, cyber tools, and electronic warfare platforms into one of the most capable defensive shields on earth.

At the core of the A2/AD network are long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, which give China striking ability. Systems like the DF-21D “carrier killer” and DF-26 “Guam killer” are designed to threaten large US warships—notably including aircraft carriers—at ranges previously thought unreachable. The effect is to push back US forces, making power projection into the Indo-Pacific more difficult and shifting the regional power balance towards China’s favor. Complementing the long-range missiles are mid-range cruise missiles including the YJ-12 and YJ-18, capable of high-speed terminal maneuvers and saturation attacks. Finally, China’s land-attack cruise missile, the CJ-10, extends its denial zone even further.

The missile systems rely upon data from a network of over-the-horizon (OTH) radars that can accurately monitor maritime activity thousands of kilometers away. Paired with China’s growing constellation of ISR satellites—including electro-optical, synthetic aperture radar, and electronic intelligence platforms—these systems provide wide-area detection, tracking, and fire-control-quality information. This web of satellites and radars is essential to making China’s long-range missiles effective.