One Year After Busan: Has China Kept Its Rare Earth Promises?

Center for Strategic and International Studies | Gracelin Baskaran, Max Martin

Chinese rare earth exports to the United States dropped by almost 75 percent in the 11 months following the October 30, 2025 Busan Agreement between President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping. Prior to Beijing's April 2025 export restrictions, monthly American imports averaged 76.8 metric tons, but fell to an average of 19.3 metric tons despite diplomatic commitments reached in Geneva and Busan.

Persistent licensing delays selectively choked supply chains supporting American defense, automotive, aerospace, and semiconductor manufacturing. Yttrium imports collapsed from 333 tons to 17 tons over comparable eight-month windows. Production stalled across major industrial sectors. While total Chinese shipments to non-aligned markets rose 146 percent, combined exports to the United States and Japan dropped 58 percent between November 2025 and August 2026. This targeted squeeze exposes the structural vulnerability of Allied defense industrial bases to single-source mineral controls ahead of the extended January 10, 2027 trade truce deadline.

China's Epic Campaign to Steal America's Secrets

RealClearDefense | Staff Writer

Chinese intelligence services have systematically targeted American defense contractors, research institutions, and government databases to siphon sensitive military technologies and proprietary industrial research. This vast intelligence gathering campaign aims to erode the technological superiority of the United States armed forces while accelerating Beijing's domestic defense modernization efforts. Beijing relies on state-backed actors.

Key targeted sectors include aerospace, semiconductor manufacturing, quantum computing, and maritime engineering technologies essential for next-generation military hardware. By bypassing decades of research and development costs, Chinese defense firms rapidly field advanced capabilities that mirror Western platforms. The widespread theft of dual-use technical data also weakens critical supply chain security across the Western defense industrial base. Western counterintelligence agencies face severe operational friction when detecting non-traditional collection methods, including academic exchanges, insider threat exploitation, and cyber intrusions. Consequently, persistent intellectual property extraction weakens long-term strategic deterrence, requiring enhanced defense industrial cyber defenses and stricter export controls across allied networks.

Three Questions About China's Hidden Foreign Exchange Assets

Council on Foreign Relations | Brad W. Setser

China's People's Bank of China faces an unexplained $1 trillion cumulative gap between market foreign exchange settlement and reported balance sheet reserves. Between late 2025 and late 2026, state settlement purchases reached $500 to $600 billion, yet reported central bank reserves expanded by only $50 billion. This structural divergence stems from off-balance-sheet mechanisms, including state bank foreign currency absorption and entrusted loans directed through the State Administration of Foreign Exchange to institutions like the China Development Bank.

The central bank also transferred $158 billion in accumulated interest income to the Ministry of Finance without adjusting its $3.5 trillion reserve baseline. Meanwhile, domestic commercial banks boosted dollar deposit interest rates to encourage exporters to hold foreign currency offshore rather than converting proceeds into renminbi. Unrecorded currency intervention remains substantial. These hidden assets systematically depress the renminbi exchange rate, directly sustaining a record current account surplus exceeding $825 billion while shielding Beijing's monetary policy from international trade scrutiny.

Resilience and Reform: U.S.-China Relations and the Global Economic Order

Center for Strategic and International Studies | Scott Kennedy, Ryan Featherston, Yves Tiberghien, Mary E. Lovely, Xu Qiyuan, Ye Yu, Su Qingyi

The Center for Strategic and International Studies track-two dialogue conducted expert surveys across Washington, Shanghai, and Geneva between May 2025 and July 2026 to evaluate bilateral economic friction. The October 2025 trade rapprochement between Washington and Beijing temporarily stabilized commercial relations following the severe April 2025 Liberation Day tariffs.

Disagreements persist over structural trade imbalances and governance. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently restricted executive authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Consequently, the White House pivoted toward Section 122 and Section 301 investigations. Trade disruptions forced redirected Chinese industrial exports into European markets, escalating multilateral trade tensions. Survey data revealed sharp structural divergences over remedies, with 84.6 percent of Chinese experts demanding expanded access for outbound investment, whereas 58.8 percent of international respondents prioritized Chinese domestic economic rebalancing. Both cohorts acknowledged deep operational friction within the World Trade Organization.

Policy Is Not A Substitute For Market Mechanisms – Analysis

Eurasia Review | He Yan

China's National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund divested over RMB 10 billion in semiconductor equities between January and May 2026 as market valuations detached from economic fundamentals. The CSI Semiconductor Industry Index surged 26.57% in June 2026, pushing its price-to-earnings ratio to 161.68 before dropping 27.25% in July.

Frequent state regulatory shifts disrupted long-term capital planning across the technology sector. Speculative capital rapidly migrated to artificial intelligence hardware before new regulatory management measures took effect on July 15, 2026. Total market trading value reached RMB 317.53 trillion in the first half of 2026. These speculative cycles eroded institutional confidence. Share disposals by controlling shareholders accelerated alongside cross-border capital outflows. Similar policy shifts previously altered private tutoring regulation in 2021 and Zhejiang's Common Prosperity target pacing in 2026. Abrupt regulatory interventions push short-term speculative trading while deterring institutional commitment to long-term research and domestic capacity expansion.

Munition Inventories: An Update Amid Renewed War Risk

CSIS | Mark F. Cancian, Chris H. Park

United States military forces consumed between one-third and two-thirds of key munition inventories during the 39-day Operation Epic Fury against Iran, creating severe strategic vulnerabilities for potential conflicts with China. While existing stockpiles can sustain short-term operations against Iranian forces, critical air defense interceptors face multiyear depletion. High operational expenditure rates drained over 1,500 Patriot interceptors and more than 1,100 Tomahawk cruise missiles from global stockpiles.

Industrial capacity constraints delay full inventory recovery, extending Tomahawk replenishment timelines into early 2031. Deep magazine depletion forces immediate operational trade-offs across maritime and ground forces. Supply lines remain strained. The Department of Defense reached a munition transition point on day five, forcing a tactical shift from exquisite long-range missiles to shorter-range weapons such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions. Surface ship interceptors saw lower utilization than ground systems because naval reload procedures required specialized port infrastructure outside the Persian Gulf, introducing severe sustainment bottlenecks.

As Iran-US Talks Falter, Gulf Countries Need To Step Up To Save The Day – OpEd

Eurasia Review | Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg

United States and Iran diplomatic negotiations have reached an impasse as Tehran demands prior concessions while internal power struggles and political shifts in Washington and Jerusalem stall talks. Iran has launched more than 8,000 attacks targeting civilian infrastructure and the Strait of Hormuz. The blockade disrupts global energy and fertilizer supplies.

In response, Gulf Cooperation Council states drafted United Nations Security Council Resolution 2817 in March to protect freedom of navigation. Regionally, the GCC established the Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance in July under Saudi leadership to secure the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, Red Sea, and Gulf of Aden. Integrated deterrence efforts include a new forward command in Kuwait under the GCC Unified Military Command, complementing the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkiye. Freedom of navigation remains precarious. Consequently, GCC members are enacting a strategy blending diplomacy, defense, deterrence, and economic resilience to prevent direct military escalation across the regional energy corridor.

UN Security Council Unanimously Agrees Moves To Halt Houthi Drone And Missile Production

Eurasia Review | Ephrem Kossaify

The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution renewing targeted sanctions against Yemen's Houthi militia until 14 November 2027. The measure targets dual-use components and precursor chemicals to disrupt the group's localized drone and missile manufacturing capabilities following recent military offensives across Yemen and strikes against Saudi Arabia.

UN monitors confirmed that Houthi forces maintain their strike arsenal by smuggling commercial parts, gradually reducing reliance on direct foreign supply lines. Arms embargo provisions under Resolution 2216 remain open-ended. Recent combat operations saw Houthi units seize the strategic Red Sea port of Mokha and launch missile attacks against Yanbu oil installations. Diplomats removed proposed references to Al-Shabaab linkages and omitted terrorist designations following objections from Russia and China during draft negotiations. The Security Council scheduled an 11 January deadline to specify restricted dual-use materials while expert panels track Houthi economic revenues to limit military diversion.

From Undercover Employment To Corporate Data Breaches: The ‘Combating Foreign Threats To Main Street Act’ – Analysis

Eurasia Review | Staff Writer

The United States House of Representatives passed the Combating Foreign Threats to Main Street Act of 2026 to defend small businesses against state-sponsored espionage and cyber risks from China, Russia, and North Korea. Introduced by Representatives Roger Williams and Derek Tran, the bipartisan bill mandates that the Small Business Administration compile and distribute defensive guidance using existing budgetary resources.

Small enterprises frequently lack dedicated counter-intelligence teams, making them primary targets for supply chain intrusions and intellectual property theft. The measure specifically addresses covert schemes where North Korean IT operatives infiltrate remote workforces to exfiltrate proprietary source code and extort corporate targets. Beyond cyber intrusions, the framework addresses forced-labor imports, counterfeit trade, and predatory foreign investments. The FBI previously documented cases of North Korean contractors leveraging administrative access to demand ransom payments from U.S. firms. Legislative momentum now shifts to the Senate. With no companion bill introduced and the congressional session ending in January, final passage remains uncertain.

The Warrior Is Not the War: How America Is Unlearning the Meaning of Victory

Manual Input | Isaiah Wilson III

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced thirty-three directives at the Naval War College on 9 November to refashion professional military education around tactical lethality and winning. The directives mandate placing recent combat operators in classrooms, expanding rigorous wargames, restricting civilian faculty tenure, and substituting capstone theses with AI-assisted decision exercises.

This systemic policy shift prioritises immediate operational combat readiness over long-term strategic comprehension. Retired US Army Colonel Isaiah Wilson III contends that narrowing military officer education risks dangerously confusing tactical force with strategic power. While American military forces retain extraordinary tactical capabilities, persistent institutional shortfalls hinder translating initial battlefield achievements into enduring political peace. Modern warfare has grown increasingly compound, politically entangled, and technologically accelerated. Combat lethality alone is insufficient. Depriving officer development of academic rigour leaves prospective commanders unprepared to distinguish routine tactical training from high-level strategic education during complex multi-domain operational conflicts.

AI Investment And The U.S. Economy – Analysis

Eurasia Review | Lida R. Weinstock, Marc Labonte

Artificial intelligence infrastructure spending fueled U.S. gross domestic product growth throughout 2025 and early 2026 through massive debt-financed data center and semiconductor expansion. Federal Reserve estimates indicate global trade in AI hardware grew 65 percent in the first half of 2025, offsetting raw domestic output gains through increased import volumes.

This rapid capital allocation puts upward pressure on long-term interest rates while widening the U.S. current account deficit. Goldman Sachs projects chip and electricity demand will increase peak inflation by 0.5 percentage points. Debt risks are compounding. In response, the 119th Congress considered the Ratepayer Protection Act, H.R. 9340, to insulate consumers from utility price spikes. A Bank for International Settlements study estimates current capital allocation exceeds efficient levels by 1.5 times. Rapid capital depreciation and circular financing heighten systemic financial risks. Still, Goldman Sachs forecasts AI investment will expand to 2.8 percent of GDP by 2028.

How the Legacy of Torture Has Vexed the Quest for 9/11 Justice

The New York Times | Carol Rosenberg

Military judges at Guantánamo Bay have thrown out key confessions from four Sept. 11 conspiracy defendants after Central Intelligence Agency interrogators subjected suspects including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to waterboarding and solitary confinement. A trial date is set for June 5, 2028. Bush administration officials initially sought fresh evidence in 2007 by deploying federal clean teams to conduct voluntary interrogations without legal counsel present.

Subsequent military courts deemed these statements derived from prior black-site torture. In 2024, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III revoked negotiated plea agreements offering life sentences for the 2,976 deaths. The evidence remains legally compromised. Meanwhile, trial proceedings for the October 12, 2000 attack on the USS Cole involving Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri take precedence, examining whether past interrogation tactics rendered the accused unfit for trial. Two decades of procedural litigation now push final military commission proceedings to 2028.

Brussels Accepts Petition To Suspend Israel Trade Agreement

Eurasia Review | Magnus Lund Nielsen

The European Citizens Initiative to suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement gathered over 1.1 million signatures, triggering a mandatory review process by the European Commission. Registered in November 2025, the petition reached the required one-million threshold within three months of formal signature collection in April. The European Commission must respond within six months and host a public hearing in the European Parliament.

The petition reached national thresholds across 12 member states, backed by a quarter-million euros from the European Left Alliance. France generated nearly 340,000 signatures alone. The EU remains Israel's largest trading partner. This action coincides with an unapproved July Commission proposal to restrict imports from Israeli settlements following scrutiny over operations in Gaza and West Bank violence. While the Commission will meet organizers within one month, member states retain ultimate political authority over bilateral trade suspensions under the agreement.

Ukraine War: Drone And Missile Warfare Dominating Combat Operations – Analysis

Eurasia Review | Can Kasapoğlu

Ukrainian drone forces struck nearly 18,000 Russian targets during the first week of November 2026, including the Rostec-operated Morozov Plant producing explosives and ballistic missile propellants near St. Petersburg. The strike targeted production for the Iskander-M system, illustrating Kyiv's strategy to disrupt Moscow's deep-strike inventory at the industrial source.

Concurrently, Ukrainian long-range strikes against nine of Russia's 35 major refineries cut crude processing by 200,000 metric tons per day. Tactical operations featured FirePoint FP-2 strike drones targeting launch hubs at Donetsk Airport. Moscow responded with heavy aerial salvos. Ground engagements remained locked at 180 to 200 daily battles around Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka. In October, Russia launched up to 8,500 Shahed-type drones, though Ukrainian defenses maintained an 84 percent interception rate. Deployments of jet-powered variants like the Geran-5 K5-K signal an operational shift toward higher-velocity loitering munitions to compress defense reaction times across Ukrainian airspace.

How Netanyahu Lost His Bet on Trump

Foreign Policy | Azriel Bermant

U.S. President Donald Trump announced on Fox News during the November 2026 midterm elections that Washington will end military assistance to Israel by the end of the year. The decision followed statements claiming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to terminate the aid package. Israeli opposition leaders Ehud Barak and Gadi Eisenkot immediately condemned Netanyahu for endangering national security without consulting defense officials.

U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance attributed Republican midterm losses directly to public opposition over the war with Iran. American voters blamed the conflict for inflation. Netanyahu's rhetoric regarding Iranian nuclear threats previously triggered friction with Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir. Netanyahu now operates as a caretaker leader following inconclusive October elections while Eisenkot attempts coalition building. Loyalists like Shin Bet chief David Zini targeted Arab lawmakers with investigations. Netanyahu remains politically exposed across the American legislative spectrum.

The Next Global Industrial Hubs May Not Be Where Investors Expect – Analysis

Eurasia Review | Simba Ruwodo

African industrialization faces severe structural imbalances as the continent generates under 2 percent of global manufacturing output despite holding vast critical mineral wealth and energy potential. Targeted regional developments in Morocco, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zimbabwe are attempting to convert these raw natural assets into domestic refining and manufacturing hubs.

According to African Development Bank and UN Trade and Development assessments, global investment capital remains concentrated in traditional production centers with established supplier networks and dependable power grids. Resource endowments alone do not guarantee industrial capacity. International Energy Agency reporting indicates that capturing clean energy technology supply chains requires refined chemicals, transport corridors, and skilled workforces. While Morocco successfully integrated its automotive sector into European export markets, cross-border mineral corridors in Central and Southern Africa must bridge persistent logistics gaps, energy constraints, and regulatory fragmentations to secure long-term commercial sustainability and global market access.

Why Sudan’s Civil War Is Becoming A U.S. National Security Threat – Analysis

Eurasia Review | James Durso

Sudan’s civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces poses a strategic challenge to American security interests along the Red Sea. The conflict threatens a maritime corridor handling 12–15% of international maritime trade and nearly 30% of global container traffic. Iran restored diplomatic relations with Khartoum in 2024 to supply battle-tested drones to the Sudanese military.

External arms flows and state collapse risk transforming the territory into a haven for extremist networks near regional American partners. The situation demands direct engagement. Sudan possesses natural resources including gold, uranium, and chromium alongside agricultural potential. Proposed U.S. legislation, such as the Sudan IMPACT Act, aims to tie assistance for mining development to measurable improvements in civilian protection and resource governance. Establishing a legitimate, civilian-led political transition remains vital to secure national borders, mitigate regional destabilization, reject a military solution, and maintain freedom of navigation near the Suez Canal.

The Coming Era of Undersea Anarchy

Foreign Policy | Elisabeth Braw

Turkey has challenged the construction of the Great Sea Interconnector, an European Union-funded undersea electricity cable designed to link the power grids of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. Ankara demands that survey vessels submit written notifications before conducting operations in contested Eastern Mediterranean waters. Greece warned that any attempt by Turkey to obstruct the cable project would trigger an operational response.

The dispute reflects Ankara's persistent rejection of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, reinforced by its bilateral maritime boundary agreement with Libya. Cable laying requires legal certainty. Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar proposed a gas pipeline via northern Cyprus to supply power to the entire island instead. Coastal states increasingly assert unilateral jurisdiction over maritime transit routes and seabed assets. China demands cable installation permits within its South China Sea claims, while United States policy permits unilateral offshore mining in international waters.

The UN secretary-general selection process and its implications for the future of multilateralism

International Institute for Strategic Studies | Fernanda Rios Herrera

United Nations Security Council straw polls for the tenth secretary-general position remain deadlocked as permanent members exercise veto leverage over prospective candidates ahead of the 1 January 2027 deadline. Costa Rica's Rebeca Grynspan secured 12 encourage votes on 5 November 2026, but two permanent members cast negative ballots during secret voting on 16 October.

Structural veto power dictates candidate viability. This institutional leverage forces contenders to suppress Security Council reform proposals to prevent vetoes from Beijing, Moscow, or Washington. Donald Trump's administration has rejected the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, narrowing the diplomatic space for candidates seeking unanimous support from the 193 member states. P5 divisions over conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine mirror this institutional gridlock. The UN faces severe liquidity constraints. If the Security Council fails to recommend a nominee by December 2026, the organisation risks acute administrative paralysis and further erosion of its multilateral governance mandates.

Hacked fridges and other dangers lurking in the ‘internet of shit’

The Guardian | Staff Writer

French supermarket fridges faced a series of cyber-attacks in October 2026, exposing systemic vulnerabilities across millions of internet-connected domestic and industrial controllers. Unsecured hardware including home security cameras, commercial refrigerators, and blast furnaces is routinely weaponized into distributed botnets. Following these breaches, individual users like Alex Pearce began disconnecting appliances from local wireless networks.

Engineers refer to this unmaintained device ecosystem as the internet of shit. Security features on these controllers function as a mere fig leaf, while installed firmware is rarely upgraded. Artificial intelligence accelerates this vulnerability by drastically reducing exploit discovery time. Most connected devices run offline. Security specialists advise equipment operators to upgrade firmware if confident or disconnect systems entirely. Denying Wi-Fi passwords to household ovens and commercial coolers prevents botnet recruitment while preserving primary equipment operational capacity. Unplugging non-essential controllers remains the most reliable defense against automated botnet recruitment campaigns.

How AI visionary Jensen Huang was undone by his own bad decisions

BBC News | Zoe Kleinman

Nvidia co-founder Jensen Huang has been forced out by the company's board following allegations of personal misconduct and extra-marital affairs with colleagues. The decision follows an ongoing investigation into his ties with a woman accused of spying for China. Chief Financial Officer Colette Kress has assumed interim leadership of the semiconductor firm.

Kress faces immediate pressure to reassure institutional investors that hardware development schedules and key technical personnel will remain intact without Huang. Author Tae Kim noted in his book, The Nvidia Way, that Huang maintained over 200 direct reports. Nvidia acts as a sector central bank. Beyond designing the advanced chips that power frontier artificial intelligence models, the firm provides financial loans to corporate partners across the tech industry. Rivals have already signalled interest in hiring Huang, with Elon Musk offering him a role at SpaceX. Meanwhile, Huang's sudden removal exposes operational risks across the global AI ecosystem.

The World Is Building Two AI Rulebooks, They Need To Meet At Deployment – Analysis

Eurasia Review | Burak Oktenli

Colorado state regulators held a public hearing on 26 October 2026 regarding revised automated decision-making rules taking effect on 1 January 2027, illustrating an expanding global division between upstream model regulation and downstream deployment accountability. Upstream legal frameworks such as the European Union AI Act and California's Transparency in Frontier Artificial Intelligence Act establish compute thresholds at 10^25 and 10^26 floating-point operations respectively to mitigate systemic risks.

Parallel downstream regimes in South Korea, Singapore, and India instead target specific real-world operational decisions. Accountability fractures across jurisdictional boundaries. Model developers manage training data and general capability risks, yet institutional deployers retain authority over final outputs. To bridge this structural regulatory gap, a proposed consequential-use statement mandates that model suppliers, system integrators, and deploying institutions explicitly document decision parameters, operational limitations, and redress mechanisms. This framework provides verifiable compliance handoffs without demanding a single binding international statute.

AI Is Changing Cybercrime: How To Protect Yourself – Analysis

Eurasia Review | Dr. Majid Rafizadeh

Artificial intelligence tools enable cybercriminals to generate realistic voice clones, deepfake videos, and natural language text to execute large-scale financial fraud and identity theft. Scammers capture public audio and video samples from social media to impersonate relatives and corporate executives during real-time calls. Synthetic media removes traditional warning indicators.

Consequently, victims face urgent demands for immediate wire transfers, confidential corporate actions, or compromised login credentials. Long-term schemes leverage fabricated celebrity endorsements and artificial online profiles to sustain fraudulent investment and romance scams. Countering these tactics depends on non-technical verification habits rather than complex software solutions. Establishing private family code words provides an immediate check against voice synthesis. Individuals must verify unexpected financial requests through secondary communication channels while limiting public media uploads. Utilizing multifactor authentication via dedicated authenticator apps or security keys further mitigates unauthorized account access.

Central Asia’s Financial Reliance on the PRC Grows

Jamestown Foundation | Vali Kaleji

Kazakhstan plans to borrow up to $2 billion from foreign markets in 2027 while focusing on China, according to Finance Minister Madi Takiyev. This projected borrowing highlights an expanding regional reliance on Beijing, evidenced by Kazakhstan's debt to the People's Republic of China reaching approximately $12.87 billion by the end of 2025.

Smaller economies in Central Asia face acute financial exposure due to heavy infrastructure borrowing and limited repayment capacity. Uzbekistan's public debt to PRC state financial institutions climbed to about $3.9 billion by the end of 2025, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan carry substantial sovereign and external liabilities. Kyrgyzstan incurred significant long-term obligations through a $2.35 billion PRC loan for the $4.7 billion China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway. Tajikistan owes between $821 million and $1.7 billion to PRC creditors, registering high debt-distress risks with the International Monetary Fund. Repayment difficulties across these states could compel asset transfers or concessions regarding natural resources and infrastructure rights to Chinese entities.

America Can Do Good—and Do Well

Foreign Affairs | Andrew Natsios

United States Agency for International Development programs prevented over 90 million deaths between 2001 and 2021 before the 2025 dismantling of the agency triggered more than 700,000 excess deaths within a single year. Research published in Science linked this termination to immediate surges in armed clashes, civil riots, and localized economic contraction.

The subsequent shift of foreign aid management to the State Department transferred $3.8 billion to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and $15.9 billion directly to foreign government treasuries. Over 90 percent of beneficiary governments face systemic corruption. Annual U.S. foreign aid disbursements fell by $26 billion between fiscal years 2023–24 and 2024–25, leaving $2.5 billion in allocated funds unspent by late 2026. This domestic structural vacuum expands operational opportunities for rival state actors. China is rapidly accelerating alternative development financing across the Global South while Russia expands security partnerships.

How Nvidia scandal, US midterm losses could affect Trump’s hand with Xi - and what it means for Beijing

Channel News Asia | Bong Xin Ying

United States President Donald Trump prepares to meet Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen on Nov 18 and 19 amid domestic political setbacks. A fragile trade truce between the two economies runs until Jan 10, while disputes over tariffs, agricultural purchases, and technology remain unresolved.

Democrats have recently wrested control of both chambers of Congress, ending the president's ability to run China policy unilaterally. Meanwhile, allegations that Nvidia chief executive Jensen Huang had an affair with a suspected Chinese spy have triggered congressional investigations and threats to his corporate position. Dexter Tiff Roberts of the Atlantic Council notes that Beijing likely views the American leader as a weaker partner who cannot make deals as before. Conversely, Drew Thompson of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies argues that congressional investigations will not constrain presidential foreign negotiation powers. Lim Tai Wei of Soka University suggests incoming Democratic majorities will focus instead on domestic bread-and-butter issues ahead of the 2028 presidential election. Xu Qinduo of the Pangoal Institution states that Beijing views the corporate controversy as an American domestic matter. The ongoing convergence of domestic political pressure and corporate investigations complicates the strategic landscape ahead of the upcoming summit.

To Revive American Manufacturing, America Should Learn From China

National Interest | Staff Writer

The United States must combine defensive trade barriers with an affirmative industrial strategy to reverse its manufacturing decline. Industrial capacity underpins national power, yet high tariffs have cost thousands of jobs without spurring a domestic production renaissance. American leadership should adapt Beijing's historical playbook by inviting qualified enterprises to establish joint ventures on American soil.

Such partnerships must ensure American majority ownership, workforce training, and domestic supply chain development. Washington can leverage China's current industrial overcapacity to acquire proven technologies while strictly guarding critical national security systems. Rigorous cybersecurity audits, ownership vetting, and legal punishments for espionage can separate economic cooperation from strategic vulnerability. Ultimately, leveraging domestic market access under strict security controls offers a faster path to national industrial revival.

A Recipe for Disaster in Taiwan

Foreign Affairs | Rebecca Lissner, Mira Rapp-Hooper

United States President Donald Trump described Taiwan as a negotiating chip in dealings with Beijing, signaling a shift in American willingness to loosen commitments to the island. Beijing is actively developing strategies to coerce Taiwan without direct warfare, relying on diplomatic channels and military pressure tactics such as blockades and quarantine simulations.

Washington cannot afford to distance itself from Taipei because Taiwan produces 97 percent of the global supply of high-end logic chips essential for artificial intelligence and advanced technology industries. A Chinese blockade would imperil more than $250 billion in bilateral trade, threaten trillions in global economic losses, and induce a severe contraction across major U.S. technology firms. Public opinion polls show declining American support for deploying troops if an invasion occurs, while bipartisan political backing for long-standing defense ties shows strain. Washington must urgently update its strategic posture to deter escalation before Chinese leadership miscalculates the permanence of the U.S. commitment.

In China’s Spy Operations, Romance Can Be a Long Game

The New York Times | Lily Kuo

Jensen Huang resigned as chief executive of Nvidia following revelations of an intimate relationship with Alice Huang, a Singapore-based businesswoman accused by American officials of gathering intelligence for China's Ministry of State Security. Her company operated data infrastructure in Southeast Asia using high-performance Nvidia hardware to rent advanced computing capacity to commercial firms inside mainland China.

China's intelligence apparatus has systematically deployed strategic romantic entanglements despite pledges delivered in April 1960 by Central Investigation Department leader Kong Yuan ruling out seduction tactics. Beijing denied the espionage claims. Former senior American intelligence officer Nicholas Eftimiades noted that Chinese operational doctrine relies on multi-year cultivation timelines rather than the rapid seduction methods used by East German Stasi agents or Soviet blackmail networks. President Trump stated that Huang disclaimed knowledge of the espionage links, while Washington has provided no public evidence verifying the agency's operational recruitment.

Central Asia’s Financial Reliance on the PRC Grows

Jamestown Foundation | Vali Kaleji

Kazakh Finance Minister Madi Takiyev stated in October that Kazakhstan plans to borrow up to $2 billion from foreign markets in 2027 while focusing on China. Total Kazakh debt to the People's Republic of China reached approximately $12.87 billion by the end of 2025, supported by instruments such as $1.5 billion in Panda bonds issued at a 1.82 percent rate.

This borrowing reflects broader regional integration patterns where Uzbekistan's debt to Chinese state financial institutions hit approximately $3.9 billion by the end of 2025. Smaller economies such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan face elevated debt-distress risks while pursuing large-scale initiatives including the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway. Underperforming infrastructure projects or declining export revenues threaten to overwhelm repayment capacities across these borrowing nations. Such financial strains create structural conditions for strategic asset transfers or collateral swaps under long-term loan agreements. Beijing continues expanding its financial leverage throughout Central Asia through diversified lending mechanisms involving institutions like China Exim Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.