4 May 2026

CNA Explains: Why the UAE is quitting OPEC – and what it means for oil markets

Firdaus Hamzah

SINGAPORE: The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) will have one fewer member from Friday (May 1) after the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced its decision to leave the oil cartel.

The 65-year-old organisation produces about 40 per cent of the world’s crude oil and has long wielded significant influence over global energy prices. The UAE said it plans to continue pursuing its goal of gradually increasing crude production, in line with demand and market conditions.

The Oil Supply Shock Will Scar the World for Years

Tsvetana Paraskova

The Middle East’s oil production and the global economy will take months and even years to recover from the worst crude supply shock in history.

Two months after the U.S. and Israel bombed Iran on February 28, the Strait of Hormuz remains closed for most tanker traffic, forcing more than 10 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude output shut-ins across the Middle Eastern oil producers. The disrupted energy flows triggered a global race for alternative supply, and sent energy prices soaring with the prospect of slowing global economic growth and even leading to a global recession if the world’s most critical oil chokepoint stays mostly inaccessible for another three months.

The two-month-long closure of the Strait of Hormuz is longer than analysts had expected at the start of the war. Most assumed back then that the Strait would open by April and producers could restart shut-in wells in May.

Iran Already Scrambling For Oil Storage After Two Weeks Of US Blockade

Tyler Durden

Trump's blockade is having a predictable effect on Iran's economy and oil industry, with reports that the regime is scrambling to repurpose old and rusty tankers as floating storage. Kharg Island is hitting capacity and the results could lead to disaster for Iran's oil wells.

The regime is reportedly moving to expand crude storage at the island, where around 90% of their energy exports are processed, by reactivating a 30-year-old crude carrier called M/T Nasha. It's a bad sign for Iran, indicating that the country’s main oil hub is nearing its onshore storage limit. Maritime analysts say the vessel, which had been anchored empty for years, is being repositioned as floating storage to absorb crude that still has to move out of the system.

Keeping talks with US sputtering along, Iran may be looking for time, not a deal

Stav Levaton

The latest stutter steps to plague US-Iran talks — marked by cancellations and missed meetings in Pakistan — have sharpened a central question hanging over the high-stakes negotiation: Is this a temporary breakdown, or evidence that the two sides are not negotiating at the same table at all?

Plans for the sides to gather in Islamabad over the weekend fell apart on Saturday, with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi leaving Pakistan and US President Donald Trump telling his negotiators to turn back at the last second and describing the trip and the talks as a waste of time. This came after Tehran earlier rejected attending a planned second round of direct talks.

Trump’s $1.5 Trillion Defense Budget Request: Unhinged, Unaffordable, and Unnecessary

Steven Kosiak

The Trump administration’s 2027 budget request, submitted on April 3, calls for funding defense at $1.5 trillion. It is difficult to overstate just how massive an increase in defense spending this would represent — or how unhinged it seems to be from reality and sober policymaking.

The 2026 defense budget already included a $150 billion increase from 2025. The latest request would involve a further increase of some $450 billion, marking an increase in “real” terms (i.e., inflation-adjusted) of 40 percent from 2026, and a 58 percent increase from 2025. Moreover, it would establish a defense budget that is some 90 percent higher — again, in real terms — than both the peak of the Cold War and the average base defense budget of the past 25 years (see Figure 1). It is also important to understand that the administration’s request — like all base budget requests — is intended only to cover the Pentagon’s peacetime manning, operating, and modernization costs. It is in addition that the administration plans to request a further $200 billion to cover Iran war costs.

A New Era of U.S.-China Interaction: From Competing to Racing

Evan S. Medeiros

This essay examines the U.S.-China trade war in 2025 as a possible turning point in the U.S.-China competition, arguing that the trade war created new power dynamics around a supply chain race that centers on leveraging chokepoints in critical minerals and advanced technologies.

Note: The author would like to thank the following colleagues for their superior research assistance: Jessica Shao, Davis Di, and Henry Wessel. This is the final essay in a series of four essays in 2025–26 on trade policy made possible by the generous support of the Hinrich Foundation.

King gets ovation for Congress speech warning of volatile world

Sean Coughlan

King Charles stressed the value and importance of the "indispensable" UK and US partnership in a well-received speech to Congress in Washington DC. Speaking in the US Capitol, the King warned the two nations had to stand together in a "more volatile, more dangerous" era - and he delivered some hard truths about the need to back Nato.

"We meet in times of great uncertainty, in times of conflict from Europe to the Middle East which pose immense challenges," he told the chamber, filled with US lawmakers. It was the biggest diplomatic moment of his reign, against a backdrop of deepening political tensions between the US and the UK - and in the end, he got a standing ovation before he'd spoken.

BREAKING: Air Force Academy Female Insubordination Threatens Secretary Of War During Global Conflict - Former Superintendent Lt Gen Michelle Johnson Reportedly Leads Charge Against 'Old White Men' Recently Elected To USAFA AOG

L Todd Wood

CORRECTION: We initially wrote that Charlie Kirk was on the USAFA AOG Board of Directors. That was an oversight. It should have read the USAFA Board of Visitors and has been corrected.

In a flagrant display of insubordinate Marxist ideology, the U.S. Air Force Academy terrazzo was overun last Friday with hundreds of females from a USAFA affinity group for women that literally threatened the Secretary of War during the ongoing conflict in Iran.

2026 Global Counterspace Capabilities Report

Victoria Samson and Kathleen Brett

Space security has become an increasingly salient policy issue. Over the last several years, there has been growing concern from multiple governments over the reliance on vulnerable space capabilities for national security, and the corresponding proliferation of offensive counterspace capabilities that could be used to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy space systems. This in turn has led to increased rhetoric from some countries about the need to prepare for future conflicts on Earth to extend into space, and calls from some corners to increase the development of offensive counterspace capabilities and put in place more aggressive policies and postures.

We feel strongly that a more open and public debate on these issues is urgently needed. Space is not the sole domain of militaries and intelligence services. Our global society and economy is increasingly dependent on space capabilities, and a future conflict in space could have massive, long-term negative repercussions that are felt here on Earth. Even testing of these capabilities could have long-lasting negative repercussions for the space environment, and all who operate there. The public should be as aware of the developing threats and risks of different policy options as would be the case for other national security issues in the air, land, and sea domains.

America’s Counterterrorism Wars

Peter Bergen, David Sterman, Melissa Salyk-Virk

​Editor’s note: This report was originally published on ​J​une 17, 2021, building on prior presentations of this data. The data and figures within are updated on an ongoing basis. The surrounding analysis and text have not been updated since the original publication. Readers should refer to the figures for the most current information.

This project tracks America’s counterterrorism wars​, including the drone war in Pakistan, air and ground operations in Yemen and Somalia, as well as the internationalized air war in Libya. It draws on news reports, official government statements, and available reporting from NGOs and other organizations. See the full methodology and also find detailed source information within each figure.

ASEAN’s Unwanted Conflict: Thailand-Cambodia Border Hostilities in 2025

Gregory V. Raymond 

As strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region intensifies, some region-watchers are attracted to the idea of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) playing a more central role in reducing tensions, preventing escalation, and resolving disputes peacefully. When two ASEAN member states are unable to resolve border tensions without resorting to the use of force, however, the credibility of that proposition falls into doubt. 

Regrettably, over the course of 2025, Thailand and Cambodia saw an old border dispute reignite with little warning and escalate rapidly to the use of heavy weaponry and airpower across their shared 800-kilometer border, inflicting civilian casualties and displacing hundreds of thousands. While the days of active military fighting were relatively few—and the level of casualties well beneath the toll of 1,000 fatalities that many scholars use to define war1 —the militarized dispute was unexpected and unwelcome.

Are we heading for ‘super El Niรฑo’ – and what could we expect?

Gabrielle Canon

There is a high likelihood that the phenomenon known as “El Niรฑo” will emerge this summer – and it could be exceptionally strong. A so-called “super El Niรฑo” could supercharge extreme weather events and push global temperatures to record heights next year if it develops, according to experts.

Meteorologists are keeping a close eye on the climate patterns developing in the Pacific Ocean that will enable stronger predictions about what’s to come in the year ahead. A strong El Niรฑo would put 2027 in the running to break global heat records, and could produce a series of devastating effects, ranging from supercharged rainstorms to drought depending on the region of the world.

Building the Knowledge and Skills the U.S. Air Force Needs for Strategic Competition with China

Miriam Matthews, Cristina L. Garafola

Despite clear strategic guidance identifying China as the primary pacing threat, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) lacks a coordinated, scalable, and sustained approach for developing and utilizing China-relevant expertise—such as language skills, cultural understanding, and regional knowledge—across its workforce. This gap raises concerns about the USAF’s ability to effectively anticipate and compete with China in a complex, evolving strategic environment.

In this report, the authors assess how the USAF develops, recognizes, and applies China-relevant expertise, drawing on interviews with airmen and educators, policy and document analysis, and historical case studies. The findings reveal that China-focused expertise remains limited in scale, unevenly recognized, and inconsistently applied, despite sustained strategic emphasis on competition with China.

Mobilisation and Training for War: Preparing to Break Glass

Nick Reynolds and Paul O’Neill CBE

This paper examines the critical need for the UK to prepare its armed forces for rapid mobilisation and training in response to escalating security threats in Europe. ​It highlights the challenges of increasing the number of people, equipping them and expanding the capacity and effectiveness of the training systems while offering actionable recommendations to enhance readiness and ensure effective force expansion. ​

The armed forces need to:Develop detailed mobilisation plans, defining roles for Volunteer and Strategic Reserves. ​Increase training capacity through distributed centres and civilian infrastructure. Accelerate training pipelines by using civilian skills and individualised learning approaches. ​

Navy Awards $282.9M FF(X) Frigate Contract to HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding

Mallory Shelbourne

The Navy issued HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding a $282.9 million contract award Tuesday to do lead yard work for the new frigate based on the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter. A Pentagon announcement noted that the Navy did not compete the contract and said the work should wrap up in April 2028.

The award comes after former Navy Secretary John Phelan cancelled the Constellation-class frigate program last year and opted to pursue a new frigate based on the NSC Legend-class hull built at Ingalls.

The Navy’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget submission, formally unveiled last week, projected the service purchasing one FF(X) in FY 2027, another in FY 2029 and two in FY 2031. The service wants the lead ship in the water by 2028, which is why it pursued the sole-source strategy, according to the FY 2027 shipbuilding justification documents. The soonest the ship would deliver to the Navy is in June of 2030.

Donald Trump’s Lose-Lose Negotiations with Iran

Isaac Chotiner

On Saturday, President Donald Trump called off a trip to Islamabad that two of his chief negotiators—Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff—were planning to make in the hopes of ending the war in Iran. That conflict, including Israel’s campaign in Lebanon, has cost thousands of lives and caused untold worldwide economic damage, and shows no signs of ending, despite the fact that Trump has extended a ceasefire that he declared earlier this month. Iran is still keeping the Strait of Hormuz largely closed; the United States is still blockading Iran’s ports; and Iran and the U.S. do not appear any closer to an agreement on Iran’s nuclear materials.

I recently spoke by phone with Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed what’s really keeping the two sides from reaching a deal, how the leadership of the Iranian regime has changed since the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and why this war is likely to continue being a lose-lose situation for both sides.

Sovereign AI and ROK-U.S. Cooperation

Hackyoung Bae

The Lee Jae-myung administration’s pursuit of sovereign AI reflects an effort to secure national control over critical technologies—semiconductors, data infrastructure, foundation models, and defense AI. But unlike China’s indigenous innovation strategy that pursues autonomy through isolation, South Korea seeks technological resilience through trusted interdependence. By evaluating South Korea’s development and strategies in AI and related technologies through an own-cooperate-access framework, we can see that Seoul’s approach represents a distinct form of “cooperative sovereignty” that can be compatible with its U.S. alliance partner. South Korea excels in memory semiconductors and foundry capacity but lags in AI accelerators, cloud infrastructure, and defense AI. Cooperation on R&D, supply chains, and the establishment of shared governance norms through mechanisms within the U.S.-led alliance architecture can reinforce democratic values and regional stability.

AI Implications for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Policy and Programs

Rebecca K.C. Hersman, Lauren Blackwelder, John V. Parachini

The U.S. Department of War’s rapid integration of artificial intelligence (AI) must account for how AI is reshaping the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) risk landscape to strengthen decision advantage, enhance CBRN defense, and deter AI-enabled threats. AI’s integration introduces both opportunities and risks: It can enhance detection, decisionmaking, and crisis response yet also enable more-sophisticated or destabilizing CBRN capabilities for state and non-state actors.

These dual-use dynamics complicate traditional understandings of offense-defense balance, arms races, and strategic stability. In response, this paper presents a strategic analytic research agenda derived from five workshops convened with experts in AI safety and CBRN deterrence. The research agenda identifies key research priorities to advance understanding of AIxCBRN interactions, strengthen policy and strategic frameworks, and improve mechanisms for risk assessment, crisis management, and deterrence. It also emphasizes the need for cross-sector collaboration to ensure responsible innovation and resilience in the face of accelerating technological and geopolitical competition, particularly between the United States and China.

3 May 2026

Gurudwara Violence In The West – Analysis

Nijeesh N

In a shocking incident marking a disturbing escalation in violence linked to sections of the Sikh diaspora in the West, two Indian men – Rajinder Singh and Gurmit Singh – were shot dead by an unidentified assailant shortly after exiting a warehouse functioning as a gurudwara – Gurudwara Mata Sahib Kaur Ji – following a Vaisakhi gathering at Covo in the Bergamo province of Italy, on the night of April 17, 2026. According to reports, the assailants approached the victims, fired multiple shots, and fled the scene by car, along with three accomplices. A third individual was also grazed by gunfire.

Authorities have released limited information, maintaining strict confidentiality; however, investigators are reportedly examining the possibility of a targeted, “coldly planned execution.” Sources indicate that three Indian nationals from the Sikh community are under investigation. Citing an eyewitness, local reports suggest that the shooter may have been “an Indian from Antegnate” and a frequent visitor to Gurudwara Mata Sahib Kaur Ji. One of the victims, Rajinder Singh, had previously served as president of a Sikh cultural association and was involved in the gurudwara’s management.

The Army Needs an Asymmetric Warfare Group Again — More Than Ever


For several years, I have been wrestling with a problem the Army never fully resolved after it deactivated the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) and after the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) evolved into JIDO and was absorbed into the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s broader mission set. JIDO’s transition under DTRA preserved some warfighter-support functions, but it also placed the counter-improvised-threat mission inside a much larger institutional structure.

Those of us who worked with AWG, or alongside its offshoots in the counter-IED fight, have long believed its role was not a wartime luxury. It was an indispensable function: a field-connected organization built to observe change, understand it quickly, and help the institution adapt before the next formation paid the price.

Chips, Code And Command: India’s New Architecture Of Power – OpEd

Advocate Sanhita Pandey

India’s technological journey in defence has entered a decisive new phase where it is defined not by dependence, but by design, development and dominance. The country’s entry into the elite league of nations capable of indigenously developing Gallium Nitride (GaN) semiconductor technology marks more than just a scientific milestone as it signals a structural shift in how India approaches national security and technological growth.

GaN-based chips, which are far superior to traditional silicon in speed, efficiency and thermal performance are the backbone of next-generation radar, electronic warfare systems and communication platforms. By mastering this capability, India is no longer just participating in global defence innovation but it is actively shaping it.

Central Asia’s Next Growth Story Runs on Water It Does Not Have

Vlad Paddack and Sobir Kurbanov

MINEX Kazakhstan 2026, held in Astana on April 15-16, brought together roughly 1,000 participants from the mining industry, government ministries, diplomatic missions, financial institutions and media for the largest extractive-sector gathering in Central Asia. The forum’s theme, “Kazakhstan’s Mineral Resources: Reforming for Value in a Multi-Vector Reality,” framed two days of discussion around how the country positions its critical minerals endowment against a tightening global competition for supply.

Much of the debate focused on the investment climate, royalty reformm and processing incentives. Less of it focused on the constraint that is becoming a first-order concern for the sector: water. The analysis below draws on a presentation delivered at the forum on April 16 by Nightingale Int. Fellows Vlad Paddack and Sobir Kurbanov on water security risks facing Central Asia’s mining sector and the broader industrial strategy built around it.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Bangladesh, 10 Years Later

Md. Himel Rahman

On October 14, 2016, during the historic visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Bangladesh, Dhaka and Beijing formally upgraded their relationship to a Strategic Partnership of Cooperation, and Bangladesh became a participant in the Chinese-financed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since then, several Chinese-sponsored major infrastructure projects have been completed in Bangladesh, and several more are underway.

On July 11, 2024, Dhaka and Beijing further elevated their partnership to the level of Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership. Even the subsequent political upheavals in Bangladesh – including the July Uprising that removed the Hasina government less than a month later, the formation of the interim government, and the victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in 2026 general elections – have not hindered Bangladesh’s continued participation in the BRI.

How Pakistan Became the Iran War’s Unlikely Peace Negotiator

Joshua Kurlantzick

As the United States and Iran inch toward a peace deal, Pakistan has emerged as an unlikely but indispensable mediator in the negotiations. It has hosted high-level talks in Islamabad and shuttled proposals between the two sides as they work toward a lasting ceasefire.

It’s a remarkable role change for Pakistan. For years, the country has been viewed as a pariah state. Just saying its name brought to mind political instability, military rule and harsh crackdowns on freedoms [PDF], support for terrorist groups, domestic insurgencies in Balochistan province, and the constant threat of war with neighboring India. The country had few real partners other than China, to whom it owed nearly $70 billion, and it has had a massive list of International Monetary Fund debt bailouts dating back decades.

The Limits of Pakistan’s New Counterterrorism Doctrine Against the TTP

Bantirani Patro

That cross-border air strikes have become an integral part of Pakistan’s counter-insurgency playbook is clear from the number of such attacks that have taken place in recent years. The most recent was in late February 2026, in which multiple Afghan cities, including Kabul and Kandahar, were attacked, resulting in intense border skirmishes between the Taliban and Pakistani forces that continued into the month of March. As both sides battled each other, the Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif declared an “open war” on Afghanistan.

Yet the Pakistan Army’s approach to countering the group within its own territory has garnered comparatively less attention. This is equally important, if not as sensational, due to the lack of an overt regional aspect. Alongside air strikes designed to penalize the Afghan Taliban for their continued support of the Pakistani Taliban, Pakistan has concurrently pursued security operations at home to contain the group’s activities. This piece clinically examines these small-scale operations and argues that they have laid bare Pakistan’s interprovincial tensions – which will encumber concrete action against the TTP – and that they are, by themselves, insufficient to counter militancy.

A Farewell to Arms? Challenges and Preconditions for Hezbollah’s Demilitarisation

Inna Rudolf

This briefing note considers whether Hezbollah can be sustainably demilitarised amid the current US-Israel-Iran escalation and its spillover into Lebanon, and what minimum preconditions would be required for demobilisation to hold.

Based on recent interviews with Hezbollah members, southern residents and Lebanese officials, it moves beyond binary debates about the decommissioning of weapons to highlight the environment (bi’a) of structural grievances, state absence, and perceived threats to dignity and security, which have sustained armed mobilisation.

Could Russia Mediate the Conflict Between Pakistan and Afghanistan?

Muhammad Murad

After Qatar, Turkiye, and Saudi Arabia failed to bring peace between the two neighboring countries, China ramped up its mediating efforts and brought both parties to the negotiating table earlier this month in Urumqi. Although Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi called the results of the Urumqi talks positive, the situation between Kabul and Islamabad has remained tense, casting doubt on Beijing’s influence in both countries. There have only been temporary ceasefires and no clear end to the conflict.

Russia is latest country to offer, however cautiously and conditionally, to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Given that previous efforts have not been able to deliver, Russia seems to be treading carefully. In mid-April, Russian Special Representative to Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov said that Moscow is ready to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan if asked by both countries. In a recent interview, Kabulov described the situation as “regrettable.”

Minerals Diplomacy Meets Market Reality: The Case of Pakistan

Meredith Schwartz and Gracelin Baskaran

The world is facing a new foreign policy landscape—one in which critical minerals are becoming ever more central to economic statecraft. Washington is increasingly shaping partnerships not only around traditional geopolitical alignment but also around the scale, quality, and accessibility of countries’ resource endowments. Within this evolving framework, Pakistan has emerged as an unexpected beneficiary. Despite long-standing challenges in Pakistan’s investment climate and security posture, its untapped geological potential has drawn renewed attention as the United States seeks to diversify supply chains and reduce reliance on dominant producers.

The United States is at a critical juncture in its relationship with India and Pakistan, and deepening ties with one may risk alienating the other. India offers long-term strategic, economic, and geopolitical value. It is increasingly central to the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy as a democratic counterweight to China and could respond to closer U.S.-Pakistan cooperation by deepening its strategic autonomy, expanding defense and energy ties with Russia, and slowing cooperation in critical domains such as supply chains, technology, and defense industrial integration.

Is China Winning the 2nd Space Race?


It’s 2041 and at the Artemis Base Camp on the rim of the Shackleton Crater, an American space mining engineer and his Japanese colleague are sipping coffee, scowling at the latest headline: Elsewhere in the Aitken Basin, the Chinese have found yet another rich deposit of Helium-3, not far from their International Lunar Research Station, the one they constructed with the Russians in 2036.

This hasn’t happened yet, but it’s not science fiction. It’s the genuine ambition of the United States and China — among others — to establish a permanent presence on the moon with the explicit mission of mining – and exploiting – lunar resources.

The Risks of Chinese-Produced Cellular Modules

Jack Burnham

When a doorbell, refrigerator, or thermostat in the United States is connected to the internet, it may already be sending data to the Chinese government. These “smart” devices rely on a component known as a cellular module to connect to the internet over cellular networks. Two Chinese firms, Quectel and Fibocom, already control nearly half the global market for cellular modules. Congressional investigations and independent reporting suggest their units may pose a national security threat.

Not just America’s homes, but also its power grids, ports, hospitals, transportation networks, and ship-to-shore cranes increasingly rely on cellular modules. In theory, these modules can shut down their host devices in addition to collecting massive amounts of data. This is possible because manufacturers of cellular modules maintain remote access to the devices to provide software and firmware updates “over the air.”2 If Beijing consolidated control of U.S.-based modules, it could disrupt an American military mobilization in response to Chinese efforts to coerce Taiwan. Or, amid a crisis, Beijing could hold Washington hostage by threatening to cause massive economic disruption.

China, Iran, and the Limits of Strategic Partnership Amid War

Nadeem Ahmed Moonakal

The Iran war has exposed the fragility of the Middle East security environment and its direct implications for Asian powers, particularly China. While Beijing has long benefited from a U.S.-led security order, the current escalation highlights the challenges China faces, especially as it continues to refrain from offering any security commitments to Iran. China’s ties with Iran remain significant but limited, while its deeper and more diversified partnerships with Gulf states reflect clearer long-term priorities. 

The war has raised questions about the nature of relations between China and Iran while amplifying concerns over the vulnerability of Chinese investments and energy security. Although China continues to rely on restraint and backchannel diplomacy, growing instability, particularly risks to Gulf infrastructure, threatens China’s interests in the region. In this context, Iran’s ties with China remain complicated, especially as Iran continues to prefer a hostile approach.

It’s Not Just War That’s Making the U.A.E. Leave OPEC

Vivian Nereim and Ismaeel Naar

As Saudi Arabia prepared to host a summit of Gulf Arab leaders on Tuesday, political commentators in the neighboring United Arab Emirates began furiously dropping hints online that major news was coming.

For weeks, Emirati officials had been openly expressing frustration with their Arab neighbors, complaining about their weak stance toward Iran, which had fired thousands of missiles and drones at Gulf countries in response to U.S. and Israeli bombing. Analysts wondered if the Emirates would demonstrate that displeasure at the summit.

Then, just as the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, commenced the meeting, the Emirati government dropped a bombshell from hundreds of miles away: It announced that it was leaving OPEC, a cartel of oil-producing countries that wields sway over global energy prices.

Missiles, Guns, Lasers . . . and Nets: The Case for Passive Drone Defenses

William Mayne

Of all of the modern war lessons that have emerged from more than four years of war in Ukraine, the rapid rise of weaponized drone technology and the necessary race to develop systems to counter them has arguably received the most attention—and the most resourcing by militaries around the world seeking to address it. Notable examples like fiber-optic drones, which are impervious to electronic warfare countermeasures, and Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb, which used hidden drones to attack Russian strategic airfields, have exposed vulnerabilities to military forces operating from static, easy to identify locations.

For US forces, the lessons learned vicariously through the war in Ukraine are being reinforced by the combat operations in the Middle East they are now engaged in. The threat of weaponized drones is quickly shifting from academic to existential for units deployed within range of Iranian and Iranian-aligned militia groups’ one-way attack and first-person-view drones in the Middle East. Despite a major push by the US armed services into counterdrone improvement, a simple, low-tech solution is being overlooked: the antidrone net.

Global Economy in the Shadow of War


After withstanding higher trade barriers and elevated uncertainty last year, global activity now faces a major test from the outbreak of war in the Middle East. Assuming that the conflict remains limited in duration and scope, global growth is projected to slow to 3.1 percent in 2026 and 3.2 percent in 2027. Global headline inflation is projected to rise modestly in 2026 before resuming its decline in 2027. Slowdown in growth and increase in inflation are expected to be particularly pronounced in emerging market and developing economies.

Downside risks dominate the outlook. A longer or broader conflict, worsening geopolitical fragmentation, a reassessment of expectations surrounding artificial‑intelligence‑driven productivity, or renewed trade tensions could significantly weaken growth and destabilize financial markets. Elevated public debt and eroding institutional credibility further heighten vulnerabilities. At the same time, activity could be lifted if productivity gains from AI materialize more rapidly or trade tensions ease on a sustained basis.

I Played Putin in a War Game. The Most Dangerous Period May Be Coming.

Alexander Gabuev

It was a bitter victory. After occupying a chunk of NATO territory in the Baltics, my team successfully converted the land grab into a diplomatic coup, winning major concessions from the United States that would refashion Europe’s security architecture in Russia’s favor. I was President Vladimir Putin, and I had just secured a big win for my project of Russian aggrandizement.

Thankfully, this was not reality. It was a war game organized by the German newspaper Die Welt and the German armed forces, designed to test Berlin’s readiness for a security crisis brought about by Russian aggression and American indifference. I’d been invited to represent my home country of Russia; there was a certain piquancy in playing the man whose invasion of Ukraine pushed me, as well as many of my friends and colleagues, into exile.