Indian Strategic Studies: 04/29/25

29 April 2025

The Once and Future China

Rana Mitter

If you dropped in to China at any point in its modern history and tried to project 20 years into the future, you would almost certainly end up getting it wrong. In 1900, no one serving in the late Qing dynasty expected that in 20 years the country would be a republic feuded over by warlords. In 1940, as a fractious China staggered in the face of a massive Japanese invasion, few would have imagined that by 1960, it would be a giant communist state about to split with the Soviet Union. In 2000, the United States helped China over the finish line in joining the World Trade Organization, ushering the country into the liberal capitalist trading system with much fanfare. By 2020, China and the United States were at loggerheads and in the midst of a trade war.

Twenty years from now, Chinese leader Xi Jinping might still be in power in some fashion even into his 90s; Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader from 1978 to 1989, retained considerable influence until his death at 92, in 1997. Since taking the reins in 2012, Xi has pushed China in directions that have increasingly placed it at odds with its neighbors, regional powers, and the United States. At home, authorities are widening and deepening systems of surveillance and control, clamping down on ethnic minorities and narrowing the space for dissent. On its maritime borders, China engages in ever more confrontational acts that risk sparking conflicts not just with Taiwan but also with Japan and Southeast Asian countries. Farther afield, Beijing has tacitly supported Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and is widely believed to be responsible for major cyber-interference in Western infrastructure. This trend is hardly promising, and things could get even worse were China to take the bold step of starting a war over Taiwan, an operation for which the Chinese military has long been preparing.

DEEPSEEK UNMASKED: EXPOSING THE CCP'S LATEST TOOL FOR SPYING, STEALING, AND SUBVERTING U.S. EXPORT CONTROL RESTRICTIONS

John Moolenaar (R-MI) and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL)

DEEPSEEK’S OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE

DeepSeek operates within a sophisticated ownership structure where founder Liang Wenfeng maintains effective control despite formal separation.1 While officially owned 99% by Ningbo Cheng’en Enterprise Management Consulting Partnership (LP) (Ningbo Cheng’en), Deepseek is controlled by Liang through his majority stake in Ningbo Chen’en and other affiliated companies.2 DeepSeek’s close ties to High-Flyer Quant, also founded by Liang, are evidenced by substantial initial funding ($420 million) and shared access to the powerful Firefly supercomputing infrastructure with 10,000 A100 GPUs.3 These ties are shown in Appendix A.

Beyond this corporate arrangement, DeepSeek’s connections to PRC state interests are significant. The company operates within the state-subsidized “Hangzhou Chengxi Science and Technology Innovation Corridor,” a government initiative explicitly guided by “Xi Jinping Thought,” the guiding ideology of the CCP, that aims to create China’s answer to Silicon Valley.4 Liang studied under Xiang Zhiyu, whose research includes military applications like drone swarms and battlefield systems.5

Through legally distinct entities, DeepSeek and High-Flyer Quant function as an integrated ecosystem under Liang’s control, with ties to state-linked hardware distributors and the strategic Zhejiang Lab—described by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology as the “core soul” of building “national strategic scientific and technological capabilities.”6 These connections, along with evidence of data transmission to Chinese servers and censorship of politically sensitive topics, have prompted multiple countries to impose restrictions on the app over security concerns.7

What are the key drivers of Xi’s economic policy in 2025?

Jonathan A. Czin

Xi, China’s economy, and the three “Ds”

For much of President Xi Jinping’s third term, he and his coterie of advisors have struggled to cope with the three “Ds” afflicting China’s economy: debt, deflation, and demography. The prevailing diagnosis of China’s economic malaise tends toward the same prescription—namely, an expansive fiscal stimulus designed to enhance consumption as a driver of GDP growth and alleviate the pain caused by the collapse of China’s real estate sector.

Yet, Xi’s policies thus far have been criticized for being too austere and doing too little—and sometimes too late—to stimulate China’s sagging economic numbers. It is worth asking why Xi has been reluctant to change course. This month’s National People’s Congress (NPC) marks the halfway point in Xi’s third five-year term as general secretary, which began in October 2022, and is, therefore, a natural point at which to answer this question, particularly as the second trade war with the United States intensifies.

Prologue to the problem

Throughout Xi’s third term, many analysts of China’s economy seem to have gone through a boom-and-bust cycle of inflated and then disappointed expectations. The story starts with China’s abrupt exit from its “zero-COVID” policy in late 2022—just after Xi started his third term as general secretary. Following that dramatic policy shift, many observers—especially in the business community—wrongly assessed that China’s economic trajectory would follow a roughly V-shaped trajectory similar to the United States and other Western economies as they recovered from the pandemic. These analysts believed that the initial rollback of the pandemic control measures would lead to a short-term spike in disease and death, but that then China’s economy would come roaring back—perhaps abetted by government stimulus.

PLA INFORMATION SUPPORT TO THE BATTLEFIELD: UAV EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS AND CHALLENGES

Caroline Y. Tirk and Eli B. Tirk

ASSESSMENTS OF UAVS IN PLA DOCTRINAL EDUCATION TEXTS

PLA authoritative academic texts have long emphasized the importance of unmanned systems and their contributions to ISR and other information support missions on the future battlefield. Published in 2003, Integrated Aerospace Information Warfare (空天一体信息作战) outlines UAVs’ ability to surveil an enemy’s rear area and guide munitions onto targets as an important use case of these systems. 10 The 2006 Science of Campaigns discusses UAVs in the limited role of supporting suppression of enemy air defense operations using electronic jammers and kinetic strike, tactics inspired by Israel’s UAV employment against Syrian air defenses in 1982.11 By 2009, the textbook Precision Operations Command remarks that UAVs had already become the primary means of battlefield reconnaissance, target designation, and damage assessment. 12 The 2013 edition of the PLA Academy of Military Science’s Science of Military Strategy (SMS) reflects an expanded interest in UAVs, emphasizing that unmanned systems have played an increasingly prominent role in an increasingly multi-dimensional battlefield, and in concert with other technologies would eventually cause revolutionary changes in operational theory, operational patterns, and ultimately the structure of nation’s militaries.13 The 2020 edition of SMS, published by the National Defense University, identifies the supporting role of intelligent unmanned systems as indispensable for modern military operations.14 The 2020 edition of SMS highlights that UAVs carried by surface ships can enable reconnaissance of larger areas and better early warning at sea.15 Over time, these publications have expanded their descriptions of UAVs roles and importance to overall military modernization.

ISR, TARGETING, AND BDA MISSIONS

PLA-affiliated authors contend that UAVs increasingly contribute to ISR operations. Overall, UAVs have expanded the “three-dimensional” nature of the battlefield by operating from high altitudes to extremely low altitudes and being able to effectively conduct close-range reconnaissance. 16 This section summarizes how PLA-affiliated authors describe UAV ISRTargeting (ISR-T) missions across domains

What Air Defenses Do The Houthis In Yemen Actually Have?

Joseph Trevithick

Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen have proven to have an air defense arsenal that presents real threats, as evidenced by a still-growing number of shootdowns of U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones. Still, many details about the scale and scope of Houthis’ air defense capabilities continue to be obscure and ambiguous. The U.S. military’s use of an increasing variety of air-launched stand-off munitions against targets in Yemen, as well as the employment of B-2 stealth bombers, also point to the danger posed to aircraft being even higher than is widely appreciated. So what actually are the Houthis’ air defense capabilities? That’s a clear question with at best a murky answer, but here is what we know.

The Houthi Surface-To-Air Missile Arsenal And MQ-9 Losses

Questions about the full extent of Houthi air defense capabilities have been growing for months now as the Yemeni militants have been able to down an alarming number of U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones.

A U.S. defense official told TWZ yesterday that Yemeni militants have or are suspected to have brought down six MQ-9s since March 15. Fox News reported today that U.S. officials have acknowledged the loss of another Reaper, the seventh one since the beginning of last month. Back in March, an unnamed U.S. defense official told Stars and Stripes that the Houthis had downed 12 Reapers since October 2023.

The Houthis themselves have claimed the destruction of at least 22 Reapers since October 2023, including the one just yesterday, but this cannot be readily verified independently. That tally does not include a number of drones belonging to the United States and other countries that the Yemeni militants shot down prior to October 2023.

Top Russian general killed in Moscow as U.S. envoy talks with Putin

Mary Ilyushina

A high-ranking Russian military official was killed Friday in an explosion in a suburb of Moscow, in what authorities are treating as a case of murder. The incident coincides with the meeting of President Donald Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, in Moscow for high-stakes talks with President Vladimir Putin.

The Kremlin disclosed few details following the three-hour meeting between Witkoff and Putin, their fourth in recent months, as Trump continues to push for a resolution to the three-year war in Ukraine.

Yury Ushakov, Putin’s foreign policy adviser, described the talks as “constructive,” saying they helped narrow the gap between Russian and U.S. positions not only on Ukraine but on several broader international issues. Ushakov added the possibility of resuming direct negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian representatives was discussed.

As Witkoff’s private jet approached Moscow ahead of the talks, Russia’s Investigative Committee, its top policing body, launched a criminal investigation into the death of Lt. Gen. Yaroslav Moskalik, who was killed when a vehicle rigged with an improvised explosive device packed with shrapnel detonated. Surveillance footage published from the scene suggests Moskalik was walking past the car at the time of the explosion.

Israel’s A.I. Experiments in Gaza War Raise Ethical Concerns

Sheera Frenkel and Natan Odenheimer

In late 2023, Israel was aiming to assassinate Ibrahim Biari, a top Hamas commander in the northern Gaza Strip who had helped plan the Oct. 7 massacres. But Israeli intelligence could not find Mr. Biari, who they believed was hidden in the network of tunnels underneath Gaza.

So Israeli officers turned to a new military technology infused with artificial intelligence, three Israeli and American officials briefed on the events said. The technology was developed a decade earlier but had not been used in battle. Finding Mr. Biari provided new incentive to improve the tool, so engineers in Israel’s Unit 8200, the country’s equivalent of the National Security Agency, soon integrated A.I. into it, the people said.

Shortly thereafter, Israel listened to Mr. Biari’s calls and tested the A.I. audio tool, which gave an approximate location for where he was making his calls. Using that information, Israel ordered airstrikes to target the area on Oct. 31, 2023, killing Mr. Biari. More than 125 civilians also died in the attack, according to Airwars, a London-based conflict monitor.

What’s secret? When is it secret? Well, that’s complicated

Kyle McCurdy

The argument over US officials’ misuse of secure but non-governmental messaging platform Signal falls into two camps. Either it is a gross error that undermines national security, or it is a bit of a blunder but no harm was done.

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has twice used Signal for sensitive national security conversions, including once in which he and officials discussed planned military operations against Houthis in Yemen. When we consider the security implications of this, we see that classification systems are complicated, subjective and nuanced. Many people, even those who have worked within government for years, don’t understand them.

A classification is simply a label that the originator of the information attaches to it based on his or her perception of the damage that would happen if it became public. Information can be declassified by group consensus and through a proper process, but it is generally up to the originator to make a reasonable judgment at the time.

Only certain government systems are permitted to hold the most sensitive information, and these are highly protected and monitored. They are usually air gapped, meaning they are separated from other networks and not connected the internet. Still today, the most sensitive information is shared only on specific coloured paper that is destroyed after being read in a special room. In 2013, the Russians even bought up a stock of typewriters to make sure they were truly offline. The much discussed secure compartmented information facility (SCIF) is there to protect from physical attacks such as eavesdropping or covert cameras.

30 Award-Winning Street Photos Make the Ordinary Truly Extraordinary

JEREMY GRAY

International street photography platform Pure Street Photography (PSP) announced today the winners and finalists of the Pure Street Photography Grant 2025, showcasing and celebrating incredible photographic voices from around the world.

Pure Street Photography, founded in 2020, is a female-led initiative co-founded by acclaimed photographer Dimpy Bhalotia and creative partner Kamar Kumaar Rao.

PSP is dedicated to being a supportive platform for photographers to share diverse, impactful, and thought-provoking photography with a global audience. A significant part of the platform’s appeal to photographers is its ability to help creators get feedback and refine their skills. To that end, this year’s Pure Street Photography Grant 2025, which celebrates 30 different photographers, provides expanded support and exposure for budding creators.

“These photographs reflect the pulse and purity of street life — spanning continents, cultures, and contexts,” Pure Street Photography says. “Each photograph captures more than just a moment; it tells a story that is layered, spontaneous, and emotionally resonant.”

“This grant is a celebration of the human spirit through photography. These 30 iconic photographers come from different corners of the world, yet their stories echo the same truth: there’s extraordinary power in how we see the ordinary,” says Bhalotia.

The Pentagon Can’t Be Run Like a Business

Mara Karlin

Over the last decade, calls to reform the Department of Defense have grown ever louder. Everyone, from Congress, which convened a special commission on the urgent need for change, Pentagon officials, who have drafted countless internal reports examining how to improve many aspects of the department's ability to function, and pleading defense industry leaders, seems to agree that things need to be done differently. And no wonder: accelerating technological change is reshaping conflict around the world. China is making historic progress upgrading its military, and Russia has redoubled its military modernization despite massive losses of personnel and equipment in its war on Ukraine. The increasingly turbulent security environment offers regular reminders that taking a business-as-usual approach to investing in the U.S. military is shortsighted.

The latest group to call for a shakeup at the Pentagon is the Trump administration’s so-called Department of Government Efficiency, which is turning its attention toward the Defense Department as its next target for reform. “We welcome DOGE to the Pentagon,” declared U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in February. The group, he said, would bring “actual businesslike efficiency to government.”

The Real Lesson of SignalGate

Ronald J. Deibert

In the weeks since the explosive revelation that top U.S. officials inadvertently shared attack plans in Yemen with a journalist on a Signal group chat, fresh questions about the Trump administration’s lax approach to digital security have continued to emerge. On April 20, The New York Times reported that the security breach is even worse than initially understood: Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had also shared many of the same details about the imminent U.S. bombing strike in Yemen in a second group chat with several family members, a personal lawyer, and others, using his private phone.

The fiasco now known as SignalGate raises many urgent issues related to national security. Communicating classified information via nonapproved channels potentially violates the U.S. Espionage Act, setting messages to automatically disappear contravenes U.S. federal laws on preservation of official records, and officials’ family members and journalists should certainly not be privy to this kind of information. These are huge lapses. But by focusing on National Security Adviser Mike Waltz’s unwitting inclusion of The Atlantic’s editor in chief, Jeffrey Goldberg, in the first chat group, much of the debate has downplayed an even larger problem: the very real possibility that a foreign government or other hostile power was snooping on the devices through which those communications were taking place.

Would De-Dollarization Threaten The Dominance Of The US Dollar? – OpEd

Dr. Bawa Singh, Sonal Meena and Jay Koche M

The U.S. Dollar (USD) has long been holding the strong position in the financial world as the primary reserve currency. The strong status of the USD has shaped the global financial world since the end of World War II. The dominance of the USD was solidified by the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944, which pegged the dollar to gold. Notwithstanding, the US abandoned the gold standard in 1971 and in the post of the same, the USD continued to dominate the global financial world due to the strength of the US economy, political stability, and the establishment of the petrodollar system. Under the petrodollar agreement which mandated the oil exporting countries to carry out the oil transactions in USD. This arrangement further bolstered the US to exert a strong dominance and influence over the global economic systems and implement effective international sanctions.

However, given the recent geopolitical and geo-economic developments, particularly the rise of the BRICS (comprising of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) has raised questions about the future of the dollar. The agenda of de-dollarization has become a central agenda for the BRICS countries, as they seek to reduce their dependence on the USD for their international trade and financial transactions. It is argued by many policy makers and practitioners that this shift is driven by several geopolitical and geo-economic factors, including the frequent use of the dollar as a tool for imposing financial sanctions. The frequent imposing of the financial sanctions further pushed many countries such as Russia, Iran, and Venezuela towards the de-dollarization. These countries perceiving that such actions on part of the US, threatening to their sovereignty and are motivated to seek alternatives to the dollar.

Trump Is Facing Six Wars, and He’s Losing All of Them - Opinion

Hal Brands

Donald Trump anointed himself, in his second inaugural, as the world’s “peacemaker.” Just three months later, his presidency is consumed by conflict. The coming months will be Trump’s season of crisis, a legacy-making period in which he must navigate three hot wars, a cold war, a potential war and a trade war.

Unfortunately, he’s starting from a deficit of his own making: His decisions have left America’s alliances strained, its economic power tattered, and its strategic competence in question.

The first war is the one Trump has always seemed most confident about ending: the cataclysmic conflict in Ukraine. Trump wagered that making peace would be easy — a matter of menacing Russia with sanctions and forcing Ukraine to give up on regaining lost lands. Yet Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s maximalist aims, and his belief that he is slowly winning, have made reaching a settlement all too hard.

Trump must choose, in the coming weeks, whether to really squeeze Russia — through harsher oil sanctions and other economic coercion, along with continued military and intelligence support for Ukraine — or walk away and let the war take its course. The first course would be distasteful for a president who often shows sympathy for Moscow and contempt for Kyiv. The second, by raising the risk of a Ukrainian defeat, could be disastrous for the security of Europe and the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Courts Block Trump From Withholding School Funds Over D.E.I., for Now

Dana Goldstein

President Trump was dealt a setback in his plans for American public education, as three federal judges issued separate rulings on Thursday pausing his ability to withhold funds from schools with diversity and equity initiatives.

The rulings block the administration, at least for now, from carrying out efforts to cut off billions of dollars that pay for teachers, counselors and academic programs in schools that serve low-income children. Two of the judges who issued the decisions were appointed by Mr. Trump. A third was appointed by President Barack Obama.

The cases were brought by teachers’ unions and the N.A.A.C.P., among others.

In one of the cases, Judge Landya B. McCafferty of the Federal District Court in New Hampshire said that the administration had not provided an adequately detailed definition of “diversity, equity and inclusion.” She also said the policy threatened to restrict free speech in the classroom, while overstepping the executive branch’s legal authority over local schools.

Why Zelensky can't and won't give up Crimea

Paul Kirby

Vladimir Putin initially denied having anything to do with Russia's capture of Crimea in February 2014, when mysterious masked commandos in unidentified green uniforms seized the local parliament and fanned out across the peninsula.

Those "little green men" marked the start of Russia's war on Ukraine, which culminated in the 2022 full-scale invasion.

The future of Crimea is now at the centre of President Donald Trump's peace plan and has prompted Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelensky to rule out recognising Russian control of the peninsula.

The exact terms of his plan have not been published, but reports suggest it would include the US recognising Crimea as a legal part of Russia - de jure in Latin.

For Trump, Ukraine's southern peninsula was "lost years ago" and "is not even a part of discussion" in peace talks.

But for Zelensky to renounce Crimea as an indivisible part of Ukraine would be unconscionable.

In the words of opposition MP Iryna Gerashchenko "territorial integrity and sovereignty is a red line for Ukraine and Ukrainians".

A Small Wars Journal Retrospective: Twenty Years of Crowd-Sourcing Irregular Warfare Studie

Introduction

It was twenty years ago this month that the late Dave Dilegge established Small War Journal (SWJ). His vision at the time was to create a modern virtual town square to allow for the timely exchange of ideas for everything related to “Small Wars” or what we call irregular warfare today. He found his inspiration in the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual first published in 1940 which to this day is arguably the most comprehensive manual for addressing all facets of warfare outside the traditional realm. Recall that this was before the explosion of social media platforms.

I met Dave Dilegge virtually in 2005 while I was serving in Korea after I had finished my final professional military education at the National War College the year before. We were in the midst of the Global War on Terrorism and I turned one of my war college essays into an article for the inaugural issue of Small Wars Magazine which was the first publication of Small Wars Journal titled “How do we Fight a War of Ideas.” It was an honor to be among the other plank holders: T.X. Hammes, Russell Glenn, Andrew Harvey, Steve Kluth, Ian Sullivan, Stephen Arata, Thomas Greco, and Adam Strickland. A number of us would contribute to Small Wars Journal and later other like-minded publications for the next two decades. Small Wars Journal provided us and so many others with the platform to express our ideas about small wars, irregular warfare, U.S. national security and the threats we face.

Out Thinking Our Adversaries

Mick Ryan

Thank you to the convenors of this symposium for your invitation to speak here today. I have been asked to discuss why leaders must read, write, research, and think critically about war, strategy, and military service and how research and writing can serve as leadership tools for future officers

I don’t suppose you have many Australians speak here you, and probably even fewer just-retired senior Australian Army officers!

But believe me when I say that even standing here in front of you is somewhat fantastical to me. I was brought up in a speck of a mining town in the Australian outback. It was a great place to grow up, particularly in the 1980s, which as we all know was the highpoint for music in all of human history!

Now, in this small town, I didn’t even wear shoes to school until high school. The idea that I would one day have the honor of speaking to cadets and staff at the world’s most famous military academy would have been dismissed out of hand by my friends and family, even if I had the audacity to imagine such a thing was possible.

National Defense University PressJoint Force Quarterly (JFQ), 117, ( 2nd Quarter April 2025)

A New Step in China’s Military Reform

Obstacles to Integrating Deterrence

America Needs Bold, Visionary, and Strategic Joint Force Leaders

Solving the Crisis: A Partnership Approach for Safe, Affordable Military Housing

Defusing Weaponized Interdependence: A New Approach to Measuring Country Reliability

Protecting ACE: Air Defense and Agile Combat Employment

Developing Alternative Manning Strategies to Maintain the Combat Effectiveness of the Joint

Force

Toward a 21st-Century Medical Offset Strategy

Both Joint and Not: Medical Support at Okinawa, 1945

Movement and Maneuver at Leyte, October 1944

Back & Forth 4: Should the United States Adopt a “Hack-Back” Cyber Strategy?

Matt Pearl and Alexander Klimburg

Since the emergence of the commercial internet in the United States in the 1990s, we have experienced many transformations, including the explosion in e-commerce, the rise of social media, and the development of cloud computing. During that time, we have also experienced remarkably consistent trends when it comes to cybersecurity: The volume, diversity, and sophistication of attacks have increased, as have resultant costs borne by individuals, businesses, and governments.

In response, for many of those years, governments largely focused on cyber defense and coordination, including strengthening defensive capabilities, cyber diplomacy and international cooperation, cybercrime laws and enforcement, public-private sector partnerships, and cybersecurity awareness and education. These efforts are necessary and laudable, but they have also proved to be insufficient. In that context, the United States announced in recent years that it would engage in offensive cyberoperations, and more recently, it is—along with several of our allies and partners—considering vastly expanding such efforts.

As the U.S. government decides how to go on offense, this Back & Forth issue will address whether Congress and the administration should authorize some form of “hack back,” or, in other words, allow nongovernment entities to engage in offensive hacking in response to being hacked.

Is Trump About to Abandon Ukraine?

Jacob Heilbrunn

Why agree to a deal when Trump may simply abandon Ukraine?

Tensions are mounting over peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Ever since he met with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office in February, President Donald Trump has made it clear that he views him as an obstacle to a settlement. In April, Trump blamed Zelenskyy for starting the war. Now, as peace negotiations are taking place in London (which American officials canceled plans to attend), Trump is lashing into Zelenskyy over his refusal to recognize Russian sovereignty over occupied Ukrainian territory and demand for a full ceasefire.

Who’s bluffing whom? Ukraine is stiffening its stance. No mineral deal has been signed, though Ukraine has agreed to begin work on a free trade area with America. On Wednesday, Zelenskyy declared, “We in Ukraine insist on an immediate, full, and unconditional ceasefire. We are also ready for an immediate ceasefire at least for civilian targets and have already stated this. This should be a shared first priority with all partners — saving lives.”

Trump was indignant. “He can have Peace or, he can fight for another three years before losing the whole Country,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. “We are very close to a Deal, but the man with ‘no cards to play’ should now, finally, GET IT DONE.” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt says that Trump is “frustrated” and “his patience is running very thin.” No doubt. Trump, who has the patience of a toddler, promised on the campaign trail that he could deliver peace in our time within twenty-four hours. Now, it’s turned into months.

Geostrategic thinking and quantum technology

Markus Holmgren

Introduction

The quantum industry is experiencing a boom. Although useful market-ready solutions are yet to be developed, expectations of revolutionary new capabilities – from codebreaking to secure communications and scientific development – fuel increased investment, research, and development in the quantum industry. These promises of future capabilities also influence geostrategic thinking and actions today, by guiding both build-up efforts and pre-emptive actions to slow down the development of strategic adversaries.

The influence of quantum technologies development is clearly visible in the tech rivalry between China and the United States, driven by growing concerns that one side may gain a major strategic advantage. Figure 1 illustrates this dynamic, as well as the fact that China and the US are far from the only relevant actors in the field, even if they compete with the widest range of strategies and methods. Public funding for quantum initiatives, as shown in the figure, is on the rise, and although its fulfilment is uncertain, it still influences the actions of others.

The intensifying tech rivalry increasingly forces companies and research organisations to choose between Chinese or US products in their supply chains. At the same time, global competition for talent has intensified, as many Chinese researchers and engineers who once filled Western research labs have either returned to China voluntarily or been rejected by the US, thus providing China with an influx of returning talent.

Mobilization, Movement, and Major War: Lessons from Desert Shield for Today’s Total Army

Stewart W. Bentley

At 8:50 pm on August 6, 1990, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a deployment order. It was the first formal move in what would three days later be officially named Operation Desert Shield. The United States Army’s mobilization and deployment of the equivalent of three corps-sized units for the operation was a phenomenal logistical achievement. Like its sister services, the Army overcame significant planning and operational challenges move manpower, weapons, vehicles, and the other materiel necessary to respond to Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait. Despite the passage of twenty-five years, the scope of the Desert Shield deployment offers lessons for today’s Army in the event of large-scale combat operations across its components—COMPO 1 (active Army), COMPO 2 (Army National Guard) and COMPO 3 (Army Reserve).

The Desert Storm Buildup

Due to the nature of the immediate threat of an Iraqi assault into Saudi Arabia following the occupation of Kuwait, the 82nd Airborne Division’s ready brigade was the first Army unit to land in country and was on the ground within thirty-one hours of alert (which included flight time). The brigade’s immediate mission was to secure airfields outside of Dammam for follow-on ground and US Air Force units. Simultaneously, Air Force aircraft were flying into theater and would have been vulnerable on the ground if an Iraqi air or missile attack had occurred. This necessitated the deployment of the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade with its Patriot batteries. The following graphic depicts the deployment timeframe for XVIII Airborne Corps units.

Could a Blobby enclave be sowing chaos at DoD?

Stavroula Pabst & Kelley Beaucar Vlahos

Discussing alleged Pentagon leaks with Tucker Carlson on Monday, recently ousted DoD official and Iraq war veteran Dan Caldwell charged that there are a number of career staff in the Pentagon who oppose the current administration’s policies. He then took particular aim at the the Defense Policy Board as a potential source of ongoing leaks to the press.

Caldwell claimed “most of the [DoD] leaks” were probably coming from career staff “hostile to the secretary, to the president, vice president's worldview.” But, he also told Carlson that “there's a less obvious place” the leaks could come from: the Defense Policy Board, which advises the secretary of defense on matters related to defense policy.

There is no evidence to his claim about the leaks, nor has there been any insight into the investigation reportedly embroiling Caldwell and two others who were pushed out of the Pentagon last Friday. Statements by Caldwell, who was serving as senior adviser to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, and others suggest the accusations against them are a setup. Caldwell’s interview with Carlson did little to shed light onto who specifically might be behind them, or why, though a Drop Site News report late yesterday underscored the fierce internal infighting that could have led to the present circumstances.

Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the Army War College (As Delivered)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PETE HEGSETH: Who dialed up Thunderstruck? I didn't choose it, but I like it. Please take your seats. It might have to become SOP. Well, good morning warriors. Warriors in the profession of arms. Others chose to be doctors and lawyers and other honorable professions. You chose to be warriors, leaders of men, leaders of our best men and women.

It's an honor to stand before you today amongst so many distinguished guests, congressman, Brigadier General Scott Perry, a graduate of this course as well. Thank you for being here, sir. This is your district also. It's about so many senior leaders, so many accomplished warriors, so many people who have given so much to this great nation.

As was mentioned, the Army War College is one of the vital military institutions in our country, helping our leaders advance at the strategic level. I want to thank everyone here that's a part, the teachers and the staff, support staff, everyone that makes it work. The work here helps to forge the next generation of military senior leaders.

Carlisle doesn't run without all of you. And I know a lot of you are soon looking out for your next assignments, congratulations. I'm here today to mark the first 100 days of the Trump administration and share what we have accomplished so far at the Department of Defense.

Critical Followership: Thinking, Failing, and Leading

Siamak Naficy

Introduction

Critical thinking is essential for military leadership, yet its counterpart— critical followership—remains underexplored. Effective military operations rely not only on strong leadership but also on subordinates capable of independent assessment, adaptation, and constructive feedback. Leaders emerge through experiences as followers, making critical followership an indispensable component of mission success.

Critical followership entails independent thought while remaining aligned with organizational goals. Unlike passive obedience, it fosters adaptability and resilience in dynamic environments. Understanding that leadership and followership are intertwined roles within the broader leadership framework is crucial. Effective followership enhances mission success through questioning assumptions, providing informed feedback, and executing orders with strategic awareness.

Positive vs. Negative Followership

Followership is not passive; it actively shapes organizational effectiveness. Critical followership—characterized by independent thinking, initiative, and alignment with the leader’s intent—enhances mission success. In contrast, uncritical followership, whether in the form of blind obedience or passive resistance, can lead to inefficiencies and mission failure.

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