A Radical General Who Dropped Blood In The Water: Pakistan, Pahalgam, And Punishment – Analysis

Aritra Banerjee

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On April 16, General Asim Munir, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, stood at the Overseas Pakistanis Convention in Islamabad and did what few modern generals dare so openly— he summoned the ghosts of the past, clothed them in religious and ideological absolutism, and paraded them into the present.

“It was our jugular vein, it is our jugular vein, we will not forget it,” he said, referring to Kashmir.

The phrase “jugular vein” in reference to Kashmir has a long and deliberate history in Pakistani strategic rhetoric. Liaquat Ali Khan, in the early 1950s, described Kashmir as Pakistan’s “jugular vein”, asserting that without Kashmir, Pakistan’s geographical and strategic viability would be incomplete.

Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf often reiterated this line to justify military posturing and proxy war in Kashmir. ISI chiefs did, too. By invoking this, Pakistan’s leadership has historically implied that Kashmir is essential for Pakistan’s survival, and that India’s control over it is a form of strategic strangulation.

This was a coded declaration of war from Gen Munir, rooted in a doctrine of grievance and supremacy.

How China–India relations will shape Asia and the global order

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee & Dr Yu Jie

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The China–US relationship is widely regarded as the defining geopolitical issue of the 21st century. But relations between China and India arguably hold greater long-term significance for the future of Asia and the global order.

These two nations are the world’s most populous, together accounting for almost 40 per cent of the global population. China is the world’s second largest economy, with India currently the fifth largest – and soon to be the third largest. Yet, despite their rise having important consequences for the future of global governance, China–India relations are poorly understood outside of those countries.

Tensions over a long-standing and unresolved territorial dispute play a significant role in the relationship. But this border dispute is merely a symptom of a much broader and deeper geopolitical rivalry. Both China and India view themselves as civilizational states and their growing prominence is introducing new areas of competition, from geo-economics to differing positions on global issues such as the green energy transition.

As Western policymakers increasingly see a rising India as a counterweight to China, a clearer understanding of the two countries and their interactions is essential. This research paper explores the main factors behind the relationship between China and India, and challenges several misconceptions about its nature.

Vance’s visit to India shows Trump is rebuilding ties

Brahma Chellaney

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President Trump’s return to the White House is reshaping America’s foreign policy with a nationalist, protectionist edge. Although this shift has frayed relationships with some traditional allies — especially in Europe, whose importance for U.S. policy appears to be eroding — the dynamics in Asia tell a different story.

American ties with key Asian partners such as Japan and South Korea remain steady. And Washington is rebuilding a once-strained relationship with India, the world’s largest democracy and an increasingly pivotal power in the Indo-Pacific.

President Joe Biden failed to grasp the long-term strategic significance of the U.S.-India partnership. His administration prioritized outreach to China, resumed indulgence of Pakistan, welcomed the overthrow of an India-friendly government in Bangladesh and stayed largely silent on Chinese encroachments on Indian borderlands, which triggered a tense Sino-Indian military standoff that has still not been fully resolved. These moves, coupled with ideological posturing, brought bilateral ties to a low point.

The change in administration, however, has opened the door for a course correction. Both nations are now working to reestablish mutual respect and trust. Vice President JD Vance’s visit to India this week — accompanied by Second Lady Usha Vance, their children and senior administration officials — signals a new chapter in the relationship.

Why a US trade deal won’t be enough for India

Raghu Gururaj

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This week, India and the US finalized the terms of reference for the impending negotiations on a free trade agreement. The roadmap is expected to be guided by an integrated approach toward lowering tariffs and non-tariff barriers, better market access and a robust enmeshed supply chain.

The “Liberation Day” tariffs announced by Donald Trump on April 2 cannot be more shackling for most countries, including India. The effects of Trump’s 26% tariff on India will not only significantly hurt Indian exports but will cast more than a shadow of doubt on its ability to adapt quickly to the realignment of global supply chains, which Trump’s draconian tariffs seek to alter fundamentally.

As the situation evolves, the quantum of tariffs and counter-tariffs has been reduced to mere numbers. Hopes for a fast US-China deal to resolve trade tensions have all but evaporated.

The 90-day pause on reciprocal tariffs, except for China, which faces a whopping 145% tax, is a breather for most nations. But no government would dare make long-term plans in this uncertain situation. In some sense, global trade is being rewritten in real-time.

The India-U.S. TRUST Initiative: Advancing Semiconductor Supply Chain Cooperation

Konark Bhandari

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The leaders also committed, as part of the TRUST initiative, to build trusted and resilient supply chains, including for semiconductors and critical minerals. While the joint statement is lean in terms of its objectives for joint cooperation on semiconductor supply chains, that is understandably so, as India and the United States have already managed to make steady progress in this area over the years.

However, semiconductors were also an area of focus at Carnegie India’s 9th Global Technology Summit, co-hosted with the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Some key areas and threads that emerged during the discussions convened were as follows:

A Bilateral Trade Agreement Will Guide Future Cooperation

In the past few years, significant investments have been made in India’s semiconductor ecosystem, jumpstarting the supply chain in the country. At the same time, the view here increasingly appears to be that while the U.S. CHIPS Act (along with the Indian semiconductor incentive scheme) did provide massive financial wherewithal for these firms to invest overseas in countries like India, it was not concurrently accompanied by a resolution of longstanding trade issues. Since approximately 70–75 percent of U.S. semiconductor firms get their demand from overseas markets, addressing trade barriers/market access issues in such markets would be critical to further cooperation in the semiconductor industry. Accordingly, American semiconductor firms would be keen to be able to sell to overseas markets such as India, for which, building facilities in India itself may be a better option, if the trade issues between both countries are resolved. Therefore, “friend-shoring” would likely remain a pillar of building resilient supply chains in semiconductors.

Trump Now Says China Tariffs Will Come Down Substantially, But Won’t Be Zero

Taejun Kang

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U.S. President Donald Trump said Tuesday that recently imposed tariffs on Chinese goods will “come down substantially,” but won’t be zero, in the latest zigzag for Washington’s stance on global trade.

The U.S. and China are waging a tit-for-tat trade battle, which threatens to stunt the global economy. The U.S. imposed tariffs of 145% on Chinese imports, prompting China to retaliate with tariffs reaching 125% on American goods. The U.S. also has imposed new tariffs on most other countries.

Trump told a White House news conference that “145% is very high” and could be lowered through China-U.S. negotiations.

“It’ll come down substantially. But it won’t be zero ‒ used to be zero. We were just destroyed. China was taking us for a ride.”

“But ultimately,” Trump said, “they have to make a deal because otherwise they’re not going to be able to deal in the United States. So we want them involved, but they have to ‒ and other countries have to ‒ make a deal, and if they don’t make a deal, we’ll set the deal.”

Personnel Problems Are Becoming Personal Problems for Xi Jinping

Willy Wo-Lap Lam

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Political developments among the elite are beginning to point to a dramatic truncation of the power of the “core of the party center” (党中央的核心), Xi Jinping. A recent article from the official mouthpiece of the military, the PLA Daily, reminds readers that “our principle is that the Party commands the gun” (我们的原则是党指挥枪) (PLA Daily, March 10). Another from the Party’s primary newspaper, the People’s Daily, urges readers to “ensure that the ‘knife handle’ is firmly held in the hands of the Party and the people” (确保“刀把子”牢牢掌握在党和人民手中) (People’s Daily, January 12). The “gun” and the “knife handle” are metonyms for the Party’s two sources of hard power, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the domestic security apparatus. For over 18 months, Xi’s protégés—or at least people appointed under Xi—have been disappearing from leadership positions across these systems.

These personnel shifts have undercut Xi’s hold on power, though this does not necessarily mean that he faces a clear challenger or that he is in danger of imminent removal. Xi, a 71-year-old princeling, is currently serving his third five-year term as head of the party, the military, and the government. He still seems destined to remain at least nominally at the helm until the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 21st National Congress convenes, likely in late 2027. At that point, he may garner a fourth five-year term. If so, his top-dog status will be maintained until the 22nd Party Congress in late 2032. However, it is unlikely he will be given the latitude to pursue his personal program in the way he has been in years past.

By Plan or Luck, Trump Landed His First Blow on China

Hal Brands

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With a single Truth, President Donald Trump’s global trade brawl became a US-China cage match. On Wednesday afternoon, Trump announced that he was further elevating sky-high tariffs on China — to 150% — while pausing his commercial assault against nearly everyone else. Furious ex post facto rationalization notwithstanding, the president didn’t get here through shrewd statecraft.

But Trump may have found a winning strategy for the economic cold war against Beijing — if he overcomes the challenges that Chinese retaliation and his own worst instincts pose.

It has been a wild two weeks for Washington’s China hawks. On “Liberation Day,” Trump slammed China with tariffs but also hammered allies and partners the US needs on its side against Beijing. Then he abruptly fired David Feith, the key National Security Council staffer on technological issues, at the behest of a MAGA conspiracy theorist, Laura Loomer. In the days thereafter, US-China tensions and tariffs spiraled upward, just as Trump called a 90-day trade ceasefire with the rest of the world.

Don’t believe the spin that this was all a ploy to bait and isolate China. Trump appears to have been surprised by Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s willingness to go blow-for-blow on tariffs — Beijing hit back with a levy of up to 125% on US imports. He needed a global offramp once the bond market, and some of his supporters, revolted (not that the ceasefire entirely stopped the bleeding). But just as Napoleon preferred lucky generals to good ones, Trump has landed in a potentially advantageous place against Beijing.

The Empty Arsenal of Democracy

Michael Brown

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It is every president’s nightmare. The Chinese military is massing troops in Fujian Province and an armada offshore, just across the strait from Taiwan. According to U.S. intelligence, this buildup is no mere feint—Beijing is really preparing for war. Global stock markets are crashing, as the world faces what economists estimate could be a $10 trillion shock. The White House must suddenly answer a question it has long put off: Will it use military force to defend Taiwan?

This is not an outlandish hypothetical. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made clear that retaking Taiwan is essential to what his government calls “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and Beijing is rapidly expanding its military. It is also just one of many scenarios that would result in a war involving Washington. China is threatening the United States’ treaty allies. Russia is menacing eastern Europe’s NATO members. Iran has accelerated its nuclear program. The odds that the United States might have to fight in a great-power war are higher today than at any point this century.

The U.S. military is arguably the most powerful in the world. But it is not ready for such a conflict. Its weapons are sophisticated. Its soldiers are second to none. Yet the United States has low stockpiles of munitions, its ships and planes are older than China’s, and its industrial base lacks the capacity to regenerate these assets. The U.S. supply of precision-strike missiles, for example, would last no more than a few weeks in a high-intensity conflict and would take years to replace. In war games that simulate a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, Washington runs out of key munitions within weeks.

Can Europe Compete in Africa’s New Great Game?

Paulo Aguiar

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In the aftermath of decolonization, Europe’s engagement with Africa was largely shaped by a developmental ethos rooted in normative ideals—shared values, democracy promotion, and human rights. For decades, European policy focused on capacity-building and humanitarian aid while avoiding direct political or military entanglements. These efforts included funding for rural electrification, water and sanitation projects, support for civil society, and institutional reform.

However, rising geopolitical tensions, shifting migration patterns, increasing resource dependencies, and the diminishing influence of former colonial powers have prompted a strategic reorientation. This article examines the evolution of European policy in Africa, arguing that its current trajectory reflects a recalibrated realism—blending normative commitments with a more transactional approach aimed at safeguarding its interests in a multipolar world.

Altruistic Aid or Strategic Assistance?

Europe’s policies in Africa are driven by a mix of post-colonial guilt and normative ambition. Development aid, governance initiatives, and multilateral partnerships are framed in the language of equality and human rights, promoting gender equity, rural development, and education. Yet behind this altruistic façade lie pragmatic objectives: stemming mass migration, cultivating stable trade partners, and buffering against regional instability that could spill into Europe’s immediate neighborhood.

Trump’s Ambitious Tariff Plan: Can He Really Close 90 Trade Deals in 90 Days?

Robert Kelly

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The administration of United States President Donald Trump has suggested it will broker ninety trade deals in ninety days in the wake of Trump’s imposition of ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs. Trump has instituted a substantial, across-the-board tariff of ten percent on imports into the US. He has also slapped country-specific tariffs on individual nations. Some of these tariffs, such as those on China, are hugely disruptive. Trump now suggests he wants to negotiate with his tariff targets. It is unclear whether any new trade deals would eliminate the tariffs.

If Trump follows through on his tariff war, many countries will effectively decouple from the US. Exorbitantly high tariffs on poor countries, particularly, will make their exports so pricey that they will likely stop exporting to the US altogether. The tariffs on China are even more punishing. Trump has repeatedly threatened to tariff China over one hundred percent! This would more than double the price of goods from China.

In practice, this would rapidly decouple the US and China. The unpredictable fallout from such a massive, rapid rupture is likely why Apple scrambled to get a tariff exemption and why Trump expects Chinese President Xi Jinping to call him to deal. But tariffs are unlikely to yield the rapid results—within ninety days—Trump demands.

Calm down: the ‘geopolitical crisis’ narrative is overblown

Gabriel Elefteriu

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It has become cliché to say that the advent of the second Trump administration has thrown the world into chaos. Just look at what we are told around the clock by experts, opinion makers, the media and pretty much anyone with a view on the matter. They are all competing in hyperbolic language to describe the state of the world. We hear of convulsions, tectonic changes, epochal transformations, mayhem and disarray in foreign affairs – all, of course, stemming from the White House’s new policies which are almost universally being described as “destructive” and “destabilising”.

In the shaken telling of much of the Trans-Atlantic community, the revised direction of US foreign policy presages unmitigated catastrophes. Ukraine is being thrown under the bus, we are told; Canada and Greenland are being targeted for US conquest; Europe is suddenly left at best defenceless, at worst a prey for both Trump’s and Putin’s equally-wicked quests for dominance. The tariffs are seen as almost akin to a declaration of war. Indeed, in the view of many sufferers of Trump Derangement Syndrome, America has transformed overnight from the continent’s key ally and security guarantor into its whip-wielding master, even enemy.

No wonder that nerves have snapped, even amongst the smartest, most cerebral and sensible of European and British observers, for whom total calamity is at hand and defence spending must – must! – be doubled or tripled if we are to stand a chance at avoiding some kind of “1930s”-something. As noted in these pages before, the very fact that “the 1930s” keeps recurring in our debates as, apparently, one of the only historical references for an otherwise largely strategically-illiterate “expert” class (see the West’s global strategic track record post-1992), gives the measure of just how low the conversation has fallen.

The imperative to protect water and water systems during armed conflict

Tadesse Kebebew

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According to the Water Conflict Chronology from the Pacific Institute, there is an increasing trend of using water as a means or method of warfare in contemporary armed conflicts. Water has been employed both defensively to impede the advance of enemy forces, offensively to target enemy positions, and as strategic targeting for a ‘‘political, social or economic objective’’. Numerous reports have also documented incidental or deliberate destruction of water systems and contamination of water resources during armed conflicts. These conducts have devastating direct and indirect impacts on civilians and the environment.

The direct impact includes damages to water treatment plants, pipelines, and reservoirs, leading to immediate disruptions in water supply. In conflict situations, ‘‘having access to water is increasingly a matter of survival’’. The indirect or reverberating effects extend beyond the immediate impacts and include the spread of waterborne diseases, livelihood disruptions, food insecurity, displacement and environmental degradation.

Moreover, the direct and indirect impacts can accumulate from the successive weakening of resilience due to repeated attacks or protracted armed conflicts. These cumulative impacts also lead to reduced community resilience and complicate post-conflict peacebuilding. Protection of water is therefore essential for restoring peace and stability. More broadly, as protecting water is protecting civilians, understanding and addressing these impacts is crucial.

The state of cyberwar in Ukraine — and how CISOs can help - Opinion

Christopher Burgess

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Earlier this month my researcher Barbara Schluetter and I had the pleasure of attending the Kyiv International Cyber Resilience Forum 2025, in Kyiv, Ukraine. Over the course of two days the various presenters from the government of Ukraine, EU organizations, neighboring European nations and other private entities outlined the current situation with respect to cybersecurity resilience in Ukraine. What was clear, is the conference monikers were spot on, “Fortress of the free world and firewall of the free world.”

Maciej Stadejek, director for security and defense policy of the European External Action Service, emphasized in his keynote how, with the EU in mind, the “boundary between peace and conflict is blurred” and the cyber conflict will continue long after the war has concluded and “partnerships need to be long term.”

Cyberwar

The kinetic war is evident each day, often multiple times a day. This is evidenced by the wail of civil defense sirens announcing the impending arrival of Russian missiles or drones. Oleksandr Potii, chairman of the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine commented how “Russia has been attacking Ukraine in an unprecedented scale,” targeting civilian infrastructure, apartment buildings, electric substations, communication nodes, etc. Every locale we had an occasion to visit had a plan in place in case of need to evacuate or shelter. This is the visible war taking place.

The Port of Baku Facilitates Trans-Eurasian Commerce (Part One)

Vusal Guliyev

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In December 2024, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev authorized a $12 million investment into the Port of Baku to initiate the second phase of its expansion. This phase aims to increase the port’s annual cargo capacity from 15 million to 25 million tons (Interfax, December 25, 2024). The region’s ongoing geopolitical instability, largely due to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing Western sanctions, has disrupted its established trade routes (Journal of Transport Geography, May 2025). These geopolitical upheavals underline the importance of Azerbaijan’s position between Europe and Asia as a transit state via the Port of Baku. Azerbaijan’s flagship port is capitalizing on its strategic location along the Silk Road to become a key hub for east–west connectivity.

The Middle Corridor (or the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route), which passes through Azerbaijan, has gained prominence as the only viable land trade route between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Europe that bypasses Russia (Geopolitical Monitor, November 8, 2022; see EDM, January 28). As disruptions to the Northern Corridor push Eurasian countries and businesses to seek alternative trade routes, the Middle Corridor route via Baku has emerged as a crucial lifeline (see EDM, April 19, 2022).

Georgian–Ukrainian Relations Experience Lowest Point in Diplomatic Relations

Zaal Anjaparidze

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Georgia and Ukraine are experiencing the lowest point in their history of diplomatic relations despite having once been viewed as close partners. They were even once considered a sort of package deal in their potential membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (NATO, April 3, 2008). On April 2, Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party amended its visa policy for Ukrainian citizens, reducing the visa-free stay duration from three years to one. This amendment comes just a year after the government extended Ukrainians’ visa-free stay from two to three years in solidarity with those fleeing the full-scale Russian invasion (Civil.ge, April 3). The reduction of the visa-free period appears to be Tbilisi’s penalty against Ukraine for supporting the pro-European Georgian opposition. Following Georgian Dream’s decision to postpone Georgia’s EU integration, Ukraine imposed sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgian Dream’s honorary chairman and founder, and 19 other officials, accusing them of “selling out the interests of Georgia and its people” (Jam-News; AFP, November 28, 2024; Kyiv Independent; Ukrainska Pravda, December 5, 2024). Additionally, there were reports that the Ukrainian delegation and the Georgian opposition jointly prepared a resolution that was critical of the current Georgian government in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, criticizing Georgian Dream for democratic backsliding and demanding new parliamentary elections (Civil.ge, January 29; Freedom; 1tv.ge, January 30).

US intensifying bid to end Ukraine war - but chances of success remain unclear

James Landale

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The pace of diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine is quickening.

Talks are taking place in London between officials from the UK, Germany, France, Ukraine and the United States. Donald Trump's special envoy Steve Witkoff is heading to Moscow for his fourth meeting with President Putin.

And yet there is little clarity about where these efforts are heading or whether they will be successful.

Not so long ago the American plan for ending the fighting in Ukraine was clear.

There would be an immediate, unconditional 30-day ceasefire followed by longer-term talks to establish a permanent settlement to the war.

Ukraine agreed to this and – under pressure from the US – made a huge concession; it would no longer demand the promise of long-term security guarantees before any cessation of hostilities.

America Will Miss Europe’s Dependence When It’s Gone

Edward Lucas

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The United States has long had a clear message to its European allies: Do more!

Spend more on defense, shoulder more risk, accept more inconvenience, spurn Soviet and Russian natural gas, catch Kremlin spies, push back against communist-led trade unions, send European armed forces to fight in U.S. wars—the list was long. Europe’s contribution was never enough. Indeed, discontent about burden-sharing precedes the founding of NATO. At a 1949 Senate hearing on U.S. accession to the alliance, Secretary of State Dean Acheson was asked if this would mean “substantial numbers of troops over there.” He responded: “The answer to that question, senator, is a clear and absolute no!” The assumption at the bloc’s founding was that U.S. support was a bridge to European self-reliance.

Trump’s Defense Plans Are a Reagan Redux

David Helps

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The Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) continued to steamroll the administrative state in recent weeks as Social Security became the latest target of billionaire Elon Musk’s rampage. Around the country, field offices of the Social Security Administration have lost as much as 57 percent of their staff, according to a New York Times investigation. The 72 million Americans who rely on Social Security checks now face longer processing times and a website that keeps crashing.

As DOGE widens its reach, even the military seems to be vulnerable to cuts. In March, the Defense Department claimed to be “working hand-in-glove with DOGE” to “trim the fat.” The announcement followed a proposal from February to cut some $250 billion from the Pentagon’s budget over the next five years. But on April 7, Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth pledged that the next defense budget would be a record-setting $1 trillion. “[W]e’re very cost-conscious, but the military is something we have to build,” Trump said at a press event that day.

The Return of Great-Power Diplomacy

A. Wess Mitchell

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Since returning to office in January, U.S. President Donald Trump has sparked an intense debate about the role of diplomacy in American foreign policy. In less than three months, he initiated bold diplomatic overtures to all three of Washington’s main adversaries. He opened talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin about ending the war in Ukraine, is communicating with Chinese leader Xi Jinping about holding a summit, and sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei about bringing that country’s nuclear program to an end. 

Order Without America

Ngaire Woods

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In a remarkably short time, the second Trump administration has upended many of the precepts that have guided international order since the end of World War II. President Donald Trump has rapidly redefined the U.S. role in NATO while questioning U.S. defense guarantees to Europe and Japan and even intelligence sharing with its Five Eyes partners: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. At the United Nations, the United States has sided with Russia and other erstwhile adversaries, such as Belarus and North Korea, and against nearly all its traditional democratic allies. European officials, scrambling to react, have begun wondering whether they need to develop their own nuclear deterrents and whether Washington will continue to maintain U.S. troops on the continent.

Yet just as important as these security considerations is the administration’s rejection of the treaties, organizations, and economic institutions that the United States has done so much to shape. On the first day of his second term, Trump issued executive orders to withdraw from the UN Paris climate accord and the World Health Organization and imposed a 90-day pause on all delivery of U.S. foreign aid. In early February, he ordered a sweeping 180-day review of all international organizations to which the United States belongs and “all conventions and treaties to which the United States is a party.” And more aggressive moves may be coming: Project 2025, the Heritage Foundation’s blueprint for the second Trump administration, which has anticipated many Trump policies, calls for a U.S. exit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, cornerstones of global development and economic stability that the United States has for decades guided with a firm hand.

Competition in cyberspace: a distorted representation

Julia Voo & Virpratap Vikram Singh

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Over the past two decades, state-linked efforts to shape and influence cyberspace have grown significantly in scale, targeting and impact, driven in part by rising societal dependence on digital infrastructure. Cyber and disinformation operations, intelligence gathering, and attacks on physical infrastructure, have become pervasive and increasingly normalised features of grey-zone competition. Yet, public attention has remained strategically myopic, excessively focused on a few well-known ‘adversaries’ and ‘threats’. Research by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) has identified at least 134 states and territories affected by disinformation operations and submarine cable disruptions, and at least 84 that are known to be conducting cyber operations and investing in submarine cables – activities that proactively shape the physical, logical and virtual layers of cyberspace. Together, these findings offer a more holistic representation of global cyber activity.

Cyber operations to protect and project In the early 2000s, state activity in cyberspace was both new and relatively limited. The United States–Israel Stuxnet operation, reported in 2011, was a rare but notable example of a sophisticated, destructive cyber operation with tangible real-world effects; it infected Iran’s SCADA systems at its Natanz facility, resulting in the destruction of its uranium-enrichment centrifuges and delaying the country’s nuclear programme. China’s multi-year APT1 campaign, reported in 2013, was likewise unprecedented at the time – it targeted 141 organisations across 20 industries for political and economic espionage.

Senior Pentagon Official Says Cyber Warfare Poses Significant Threat To Joint Force

Matthew Olay

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The dangers posed by cyber conflict are significant and require preparation by the joint force to counter such threats, according to a senior Defense Department expert on the topic during the Space Force’s Space Systems Command Cyber Expo 2025.

Director for Cyber Warfare John Garstka delivered keynote remarks at the event today virtually from the Pentagon. Garstka, who works in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Platform and Weapon Portfolio Management, said real-world cyberattacks on commercial critical infrastructure are on the rise.

Likening cyberspace to the fifth warfighting domain, with air, land, sea and space being the others, he said many people have a hard time grasping the impact of cyber conflict because they don’t have access to simulations of such attacks and the subsequent effects.

“What we have learned [from our wargaming] is that this is a significant threat that we have to prepare the joint force to deal with,” Garstka said.

He added that to prepare for such threats, DOD is focusing on the infrastructure necessary for supporting space systems missions.

“If you shut down the water or the power or the fuel, and you can’t provide a space system ground segment with power, then you [just] have a static display,” Garstka said.

Every AI Datacenter Is Vulnerable to Chinese Espionage, Report Says

Billy Perrigo

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Tech companies are investing hundreds of billions of dollars to build new U.S. datacenters where —if all goes to plan—radically powerful new AI models will be brought into existence.

But all of these datacenters are vulnerable to Chinese espionage, according to a report published Tuesday.

At risk, the authors argue, is not just tech companies’ money, but also U.S. national security amid the intensifying geopolitical race with China to develop advanced AI.

The unredacted report was circulated inside the Trump White House in recent weeks, according to its authors. TIME viewed a redacted version ahead of its public release. The White House did not respond to a request for comment.

Today’s top AI datacenters are vulnerable to both asymmetrical sabotage—where relatively cheap attacks could disable them for months—and exfiltration attacks, in which closely guarded AI models could be stolen or surveilled, the report’s authors warn.

Even the most advanced datacenters currently under construction—including OpenAI’s Stargate project—are likely vulnerable to the same attacks, the authors tell TIME.

“You could end up with dozens of datacenter sites that are essentially stranded assets that can’t be retrofitted for the level of security that’s required,” says Edouard Harris, one of the authors of the report. “That’s just a brutal gut-punch.”

Marine Corps Cyberspace Warfare Group opens War Room

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The Marine Corps Cyberspace Warfare Group (MCCYWG) officially opened its new War Room on March 27, 2025, marking a significant step forward in the Marine Corps' efforts to enhance its cyber defense capabilities. The facility is designed to support the Marine Corps Cyberspace Operations Battalion (MCCOB) and its Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs), providing centralized command and control (C2) to streamline operations and improve response capabilities.

The War Room aims to address the need for more agile and responsive cyber operations. Previously, CPTs focused on conducting on-site operations, which limited their ability to support external organizations. The new facility integrates critical capabilities which will improve collaboration and communication across teams, making cyber operations more effective and efficient.

“It’s all about war fighting,” said Col. Jamel Neville, commanding officer of MCCYWG. “The War Room enables our Marines and civilians to be ready to respond to threats with speed and agility”