Indian Strategic Studies: 04/25/25

25 April 2025

How the U.K. Deal on Diego Garcia Could Reshape U.S. Military in the Indian Ocean

Raghvendra Kumar

Introduction: The Context

Diego Garcia, an atoll and one of the largest of the 52 islands in the middle of the Indian Ocean, is geographically part of the Chagos Archipelago — a British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), which is one of the 14 overseas territories of the United Kingdom. However, its sovereignty is contested by Mauritius, an African island state in the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia hosts a joint Anglo-American military base with a deep-water port capable of berthing aircraft carriers, a long runway that enables deep-strike operations and accommodates heavy bombers and refueling aircraft, advanced satellite communication facilities essential for real-time command and control, and strategically pre-positioned military support and supplies — making it a key node for logistics, surveillance, intelligence, and strategic deterrence for the United States. This military base provides the United States with strategic depth and tactical command to project power far beyond its territorial boundaries into regions designated as primary areas of national interest by Washington — as witnessed during the Gulf War (1991), the War on Terror and the invasion of Afghanistan (2001–2021), the Iraq invasion (2003), and, most recently, the US strikes on Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Since 15 March 2025, the United States has launched relentless airstrikes on Houthi rebel hideouts in Yemen, responding to their continued disruption of the free passage of cargo, commercial shipping, and energy supplies in the Red Sea region. Operating in coordination with Hezbollah and backed by state-sponsored support, the Houthis have increasingly weaponized advanced technologies — including drones, missiles, and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) — to threaten vital maritime trade routes. These developments have not only jeopardized US and global interests but also pose serious ramifications for regional security, as state-sponsored non-state actors gain access to sophisticated weapon systems capable of holding critical infrastructure and sea lanes hostage — thereby acquiring the means to destabilize the entire region and turning it into a potential safe haven for transnational organized crime networks (TNOC).

SE Asia keeps the peace 50 years after Vietnam War

Michael Vatikiotis

On April 30, 1975, the last American helicopter lifted off the roof of the US embassy in Saigon hours before North Vietnamese tanks crashed through the gates of then-South Vietnam’s presidential palace, marking the end of the Vietnam War. Since then, Southeast Asia has been mostly unafflicted by interstate war.

There was, of course, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 and China’s retaliatory assault on Vietnam along their shared border months later in 1979. But these were largely legacies of Indochina’s larger conflict that started when France sought to defeat Vietnam’s bid for independence in the 1950s.

The lesson of this period half a century ago, which cost as many as four million lives, is that great powers were militarily defeated and failed to prevail. Southeast Asian states, although riven by internal tension and conflict, have since then managed to fend off external intrusion and coexist in awkward though peaceful equilibrium.

This signifies a historical resilience and immunity that, in today’s era of multipolarity and evolving spheres of influence, should serve Southeast Asia well. As other regions of the world fall prey to proxy conflict and perpetual instability – particularly the Middle East – the ten nations of Southeast Asia have managed to resist overt great power alignment and enjoy relative geopolitical stability.

Shattered Hegemony: Rivalry Between US And China In New Era Of Politics Of Force – Analysis

José Juan Ruiz

1. Introduction

For decades, the international system was characterised by the hegemonic position of the US, consolidated after World War II and strengthened after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, China’s re-emergence as a key player in the world’s economic, political and military dynamics has started to challenge US primacy, something that began to become evident in Donald Trump’s first Administration in 2017 and has intensified since his return to the White House.

In the few months that have elapsed since his return to power, there has been a radical change compared with previous Administrations, both in terms of rhetoric and in terms of economic and foreign policy. His protectionist policies, his withdrawal from global commitments and the imposition of tariffs on allies and rivals have caused acute uncertainty, while his foreign policy decisions have become increasingly reminiscent of the gunboat diplomacy of the 19th century.

China’s deceitful, disastrous projects in Latin America and Africa

Arturo McFields

Half-baked and shoddy projects, labor exploitation, debt traps and devastating environmental damage are part of the Chinese Communist Party portfolio. And people are noticing.

In 2014, the China Railway Construction Corporation won the bid for the “bullet train” in Mexico — a multi-billion-dollar project which, after 11 years, remains a dead letter. Lack of transparency was one of the main criticisms of this important railway infrastructure project that promised to revolutionize transportation in Mexico.

The Chicoasen II hydroelectric plant is another example of Chinese investments that have been strongly criticized for alleged labor rights abuses. Twelve-hour workdays, insufficient protective equipment, control over unions and lack of overtime pay are among the main claims of Mexican workers.

In Brazil, China has been questioned by international organizations for practices similar to modern slavery, both within and outside its borders. According to organizations like End Slavery Now, repression and human rights abuses are a huge challenge. In China, ethnic and religious minorities (Christians, Muslims and others) perform forced labor in the name of “re-education.” That helps the Communist nation compete with lower prices against U.S. products.

Moon, Mars — China leads to both - Opinion

Louis Friedman

In the Senate hearing considering the confirmation of Jared Isaacman as NASA Administrator, he and Senator Ted Cruz engaged in extensive dialogue about China. They strongly expressed the view that the United States must get our astronauts back to the moon before the Chinese get theirs there. Isaacman expanded that goal to assert that we should work on sending humans to Mars at the same time.

The six-decade old idea of a space race with astronauts putting footprints on the moon is still with us. It is good for politics, but not good for space development or for national strategy. Whether for commercial concepts like resource mining, or for military strategy like cis-lunar dominance, or scientific purposes like a lunar far side observatory or moon base, activity will be largely robotic, characterized by advanced technology of augmented reality, telerobotics, quantum communications and artificial intelligence. And with robotic missions and progress to a moon base, the Chinese are leading. In this decade they have conducted two lunar sample returns with rovers, including one to the lunar far side. The U.S. has never done a robotic lunar sample return. China has also begun emplacement of the lunar communication infrastructure and initiated first steps in development of the planned International lunar research station. In that same time, the U.S. has cancelled its only planned lunar rover and conducted several attempted smallsat missions with new companies — only one of which has succeeded with a two-week mission.

Hegseth Said to Have Shared Attack Details in Second Signal Chat

Greg Jaffe, Eric Schmitt and Maggie Haberman

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth shared detailed information about forthcoming strikes in Yemen on March 15 in a private Signal group chat that included his wife, brother and personal lawyer, according to four people with knowledge of the chat.

Some of those people said that the information Mr. Hegseth shared on the Signal chat included the flight schedules for the F/A-18 Hornets targeting the Houthis in Yemen — essentially the same attack plans that he shared on a separate Signal chat the same day that mistakenly included the editor of The Atlantic.

Mr. Hegseth’s wife, Jennifer, a former Fox News producer, is not a Defense Department employee, but she has traveled with him overseas and drawn criticism for accompanying her husband to sensitive meetings with foreign leaders.

Mr. Hegseth’s brother Phil and Tim Parlatore, who continues to serve as his personal lawyer, both have jobs in the Pentagon, but it is not clear why either would need to know about upcoming military strikes aimed at the Houthis in Yemen.

The previously unreported existence of a second Signal chat in which Mr. Hegseth shared highly sensitive military information is the latest in a series of developments that have put his management and judgment under scrutiny.

Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine

Lawrence Freedman

Introduction: Command as Politics

The word ‘command’ comes from the Latin mandare, meaning to commit or entrust, from which we also get ‘mandate’. The verb sense led to the noun sense, which was from the start synonymous with an order, but one that came with special authority. Contemporary dictionary definitions still point to authoritative orders, to be obeyed without question. The British Army has defined command as ‘the authority which an individual in military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by rank or assignment’. It ‘embraces authority, responsibility and accountability’, has ‘a legal and constitutional status’, and enables individuals ‘to influence events and order subordinates to implement decisions’.1

In a chain of command, orders start at the top and then cascade down until they reach the lowliest individuals. Below the supreme command, those in the chain are always accountable to someone at a higher level for what they do with the orders they receive, and for the quality of the orders they issue. Those on the receiving end of orders may have inner doubts and uncertainties, or even make known their misgivings openly, but the orders must still be followed and followed well. Commands are therefore much more than requests or suggestions, and, when a command is challenged, it is not only the wisdom of a particular instruction that is questioned, but also, potentially, the whole hierarchical structure behind it. To disobey an order is insubordination; to walk away is desertion; to depose a commander is mutiny.

This Is How Washington Loses the Pacific Islands

Camilla Pohle

The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Pacific Islands – because that’s what is happening – benefits China at the expense of U.S. national security. Washington’s latest series of policy blunders comes at a crucial time when China is seeking to expand its military presence beyond the First Island Chain, which could allow Beijing to project power farther into the region and complicate U.S. and allied contingency plans for a war in East Asia.

Building close partnerships with Pacific Island countries could help Washington prevent such an outcome, if U.S. leadership were interested in doing that. Instead, the United States is harming Pacific Islanders, destroying its relationships with Pacific Island countries, and letting China win the competition for influence.

And it’s only April.

Since January, the Trump administration has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement, withdrawn from the World Health Organization, suspended most foreign aid, accelerated deportations, and raised tariffs to an extreme degree with no discernible justification (then most of the additional tariffs were delayed). Any one of these policies would have damaged the United States’ ties with Pacific Island countries; there is no doubt that, collectively, they will severely undermine the United States’ relationships and its ability to secure its own interests in the region. These policies will make Pacific Island countries less likely to seek partnership with Washington in the future and reinforce the perception that the United States is withdrawing from the world stage, ceding ground to an ascendant China.

Pentagon “Meltdown”: Will Donald Trump Dump Pete Hegseth?

Jacob Heilbrunn

Ever since he became Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth has been sending out strange signals. Between purging the military of its top generals, he’s also been participating in a variety of Signal chats that pose a threat to national security. The Atlantic made waves earlier this month when it reported that Hegseth had shared top secret information about an impending American military strike on Yemen with a Signal chat group that somehow included its editor Jeffrey Goldberg.

In response, the White House sought to smear Goldberg. Now comes the revelation that Hegseth also shared the same information with another dozen or so people, including his brother and personal lawyer.

Once again, the White House is defending Hegeseth as the “victim” of a murky “plot.” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told Fox and Friends that “the president stands strongly behind Pete Hegseth.” That is, until he doesn’t.

Leavitt claimed that deep-state bureaucrats in the Pentagon were working overtime to subvert the overdue reforms that Hegseth is trying to institute: “This is what happens when the entire Pentagon is working against you and the monumental change you are trying to implement,” Leavitt said. “Unfortunately there have been people at that building who don’t like the change the secretary is bringing and they are leaking and lying to mainstream media, we have seen this game played before.”

Is US Manufacturing Truly As Fragile As It Seems? – Analysis

Zhou Chao

Just recently, the Trump administration in the United States has repeatedly imposed tariffs on China, with total tariffs on Chinese exports to the U.S. now reaching 145%. Many Chinese commentators have pointed out that this move is aimed at reviving American manufacturing. indeed, the Trump administration has made no attempt to hide this goal, openly stating that even if it means the country must swallow the bitter pills to bring manufacturing back. That being said, many Chinese analysts remain generally do not see a good probability of the revitalization of American manufacturing.

Industry insiders have observed that many in China hold a rather bleak view of the current state and future outlook of American manufacturing. They believe that the country’s manufacturing has been hollowed out to the point where it’s nearly nonexistent. What remains is only a limited number of industries with higher technological content and added value, while the overall industrial system is severely fragmented. Since the beginning of the 21st century, U.S. manufacturing has been in decline and has continued to shrink, with reshoring efforts yielding little effect.

The Rise and Fall of Great-Power Competition

Stacie E. Goddard

“After being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned.” So declared the National Security Strategy that President Donald Trump released in 2017, capturing in a single line the story that American foreign policymakers have spent the last decade telling themselves and the world. In the post–Cold War era, the United States generally sought to cooperate with other powers whenever possible and embed them in an American-led global order. But in the mid-2010s, a new consensus took hold. The era of cooperation was over, and U.S. strategy had to focus on Washington’s contests with its major rivals, China and Russia. The main priority of American foreign policy was clear: stay ahead of them.

Washington’s rivals “are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor,” Trump’s 2017 document explained. As a result, his National Defense Strategy argued the following year, interstate strategic competition had become “the primary concern in U.S. national security.” When Trump’s bitter rival Joe Biden took office as president in 2021, some aspects of U.S. foreign policy changed dramatically. But great-power competition remained the leitmotif. In 2022, Biden’s National Security Strategy warned that “the most pressing strategic challenge facing our vision is from powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy.” The only answer, it argued, was to “out-compete” China and constrain an aggressive Russia.

Erdoğan Sets His Sights on Israel

Reuel Marc Gerecht

The Turkish Republic is on the brink. As Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, its would-be sultan, dismantles the country’s secular democracy, President Donald Trump has seemingly taken little notice. Soon, though, Trump will have no choice but to pay attention. While Erdoğan consolidates power at home and prepares to project it abroad, he has set the stage for a clash with Israel. Indeed, Turkey has quickly emerged as perhaps the greatest danger to the Jewish state in the Middle East, escalating the threat of a conflict he won’t be able to avoid.

Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party have cowed their liberal opponents, co-opted most of the Turkish press, purged and restaffed the Turkish military—with special zeal after crushing a 2016 coup attempt—and revamped Turkey’s intelligence service. Last month, he arrested and falsely charged as a terrorist the most potent political rival he has faced since becoming prime minister in 2003: the mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu. Erdoğan even revoked İmamoğlu’s university degree, making him, in theory, ineligible to run for president. The country has erupted in protest; in response, the regime has tightened its grip and arrested hundreds of demonstrators.

The Numbers Don’t Lie: The United States Is Not Broke

When private sector companies become distressed, an entire ecosystem of experts springs into action. Turnaround specialists swoop in to replace management teams, cut spending, and negotiate with creditors. A sophisticated set of tools is deployed with vigor, much like triaging patients in hospital emergency rooms. Identifying which companies will survive has enriched many a bond investor, and executives experienced in navigating workouts are highly sought after.

The question of solvency is rarely clear-cut, and filing for bankruptcy is often a strategic decision. Companies can remain insolvent for some time but never file, while others seek court protection long before all options are exhausted. Deciding if and when to act is more art than science, as demonstrated by the divergent paths chosen by Ford and General Motors during the global financial crisis. The former, you may recall, had borrowed every penny it could before the crash and avoided bankruptcy; the latter used bankruptcy to right itself.

By any measure, the current U.S. fiscal situation is highly distressed. Total public debt outstanding exceeds $36 trillion, double what it was just a decade ago and more than 120 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Annual interest expense is set to surpass a staggering $1 trillion. The federal deficit was $1.8 trillion for fiscal year 2024, or 6.4 percent of GDP. Respected analysts argue the U.S. is already in what’s called fiscal dominance, defined as “an economic condition that occurs when a country’s debt and deficit levels are sufficiently high that monetary policy ceases to be an effective tool for controlling inflation.”

How Europe Can Deter Russia

Barry R. Posen

Ever since U.S. President Donald Trump began his effort to settle the war in Ukraine, European leaders have tried to assemble a military coalition capable of defending Kyiv. They have promised, specifically, to station forces in Ukraine. “There will be a reassurance force operating in Ukraine representing several countries,” said French President Emmanuel Macron in March. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer called for a “coalition of the willing” to help protect Kyiv.

This initiative may seem novel and bold, but it is old-think disguised as new-think. Europeans can call these forces whatever they want—peacekeepers, peace enforcers, a reassurance force, a deterrent force. But European leaders are simply repackaging NATO’s 1990s Balkan peacekeeping model for Ukraine. Penny packets of military force would be spread around the country to send the Russians a deterring message. Yet these forces would have limited combat power, and their credibility would depend on the promise of U.S. military force in reserve. European leaders even admit that their forces must be “backstopped” by Washington, which could provide massive air support in the event that the continent’s ground troops are attacked.

Europe Could Lose What Makes It Great

Anu Bradford, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Tommaso Pavone

“The European Union was formed to screw the United States. That’s the purpose of it and they’ve done a good job of it.” So claimed U.S. President Donald Trump in late February as he geared up to levy massive tariffs on Washington’s rivals and allies alike. His administration asserts that the EU hurts U.S. exporters by erecting barriers to free trade, including tariffs, state subsidies, and unfair regulations on American firms. The prior month, Vice President JD Vance had lodged his own complaints about Europe’s alleged perfidy, threatening that the United States might withdraw its security guarantees from Europe if the EU continued to aggressively regulate U.S. tech companies. This threatening rhetoric turned into reality in April, when Trump announced a blanket 20 percent tariff on goods from the European Union, as well as more targeted 25 percent penalties on steel, aluminum, and cars—all part of a blizzard of new tariffs on countries around the world that Trump dubbed “Liberation Day.” Although the Trump administration has since reduced the blanket tariff to ten percent as part of a 90-day “pause,” the targeted tariffs remain in place.

EU officials have approved a set of retaliatory tariffs targeting products such as poultry, grains, and metals, but these could still be suspended in reaction to the newly announced pause. But in seeking an off-ramp from tit-for-tat escalation, the EU may agree to make broader concessions to Washington. Those could include trimming the thicket of regulations that seek to protect EU citizens and constrain private companies. Were that to happen, the EU would risk losing what makes it truly influential in the world: its global regulatory superpower.

A history of tariff wars

Robert Tombs

To a non-economist like me, blind to the subtleties, it seems that the basic debate over trade hasn’t changed for centuries. Today, we are in the middle of a trade war that Louis XIV’s great minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the leading practitioner of mercantilism in the mid-17th century, would have thoroughly understood. Grab for your country a bigger share of world trade, reduce imports and increase exports, and you will be richer and more powerful. There is a brutal common sense to this idea that has enabled it to survive the exhaustive critique of Adam Smith a century later. After all, two of the most powerful men in the world, US president Donald Trump and his counterpart in China, Xi Jinping, remain in the Colbertist camp.

Smith, a far greater intellect, published The Wealth of Nations in 1776 not merely as economic theory, but also as a blueprint for modernity – a ‘commercial society’ superseding feudalism, violence and oppression. Freedom of trade would increase overall wealth, international cooperation, individual liberty and equality. Not least, it would prevent producers’ lobbies from conspiring against the public, including by abuse of political power – as 19th-century French economist Frédéric Bastiat put it, candlemakers would put a tariff on sunlight.

Smith’s view of unlimited expansion of wealth through increasing economic activity from which all could gain was the opposite of the mercantilist assumption of violent competition for limited resources. Mercantilists equated wealth with the accumulation of gold, of which there was a limited quantity. After Smith, this seemed absurd. Perhaps it seems less so today: what if the wealth and power of states in the future depends on the seizure of limited resources, most obviously rare minerals and energy sources?

The Global Trading System Was Already Broken

Michael Pettis

The sweeping tariffs announced by U.S. President Donald Trump on April 2, along with the subsequent postponements and retaliations, have unleashed an enormous amount of global uncertainty. Much of the world’s attention is on the chaotic, short-term consequences of these policies: wild stock market fluctuations, concerns about the U.S. bond market, fears of a recession, and speculation about how different countries will negotiate or react.

But whatever happens in the near term, this much is clear: Trump’s policies reflect a transformation of the global trade and capital regime that had already started. One way or another, a dramatic change of some kind was necessary to address imbalances in the global economy that have been decades in the making. Current trade tensions are the result of a disconnect between the needs of individual economies and the needs of the global system. Although the global system benefits from rising wages, which push up demand for producers everywhere, tensions arise when individual countries can grow more quickly by boosting their manufacturing sectors at the expense of wage growth—for example, by directly and indirectly suppressing growth in household income relative to growth in worker productivity. The result is a global trading system in which, to their collective detriment, countries compete by keeping wages down.

Real Military Reform Begins

Gary Anderson

America’s military has been adrift for some time. President Donald Trump’s defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, appears determined to set it back on the proper course. So far, he appears to be on track. He has largely deconstructed the corrosive DEI culture that has hindered both morale and recruiting. He is emphasizing lethality over bureaucracy and is moving to demand accountability for the debacle that was the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Perhaps most importantly, he is committed to rebuilding our defense industrial base, particularly in regard to shipbuilding, naval maintenance, and the production of sufficient ammunition to fight a prolonged major war. I have not seen such an uptick in morale among our uniformed service members since Caspar Weinberger became Ronald Reagan’s secretary of defense.

However, much remains to be done. There are four critical areas that must be addressed. Each of these was allowed to deteriorate during the Biden–Obama years. In his first term, Trump was unable to adequately address them due to incessant legal and social pressure from the Left. But he now appears to be ready to tackle these challenges through Hegseth.

Making the Navy and Marine Corps Great Again

The two services that have suffered the most from the Biden administration’s neglect are the Navy and Marines. The new secretary of the Navy designee has promised to go line by line over existing and future contracts to ensure that the waste and corruption of the past decade are eliminated, but the rot runs deeper than that. Until the military-industrial base is revitalized, shipbuilding and maintenance must be subject to innovative solutions, even if that means temporarily outsourcing them overseas.

America’s Next War Begins at Home

Mark Freedman

Suddenly, the lights go out. So does the heat. It’s not a localized disruption – all of DC is down. So are New York, Denver, and parts of Hawaii and Texas. It lasts for hours, then days. It becomes clear this was intentional, a massive cyber-attack by China. Businesses can’t function. Wall Street halts trading. Mass looting breaks out. Societal panic sets in.

While the scenario may sound extreme, the threat is very real. Many across the defense and national security community and pockets of private industry use shorthand to refer to it: Volt Typhoon (VT). It is the name of a Chinese hacking group tasked with sabotaging U.S. critical infrastructure to keep America distracted and cowed during a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan. The scenario is changing how members of both the government and private sector think about war, energy, and their respective roles maintaining a safe, secure, and economically prosperous United States.

A catastrophic VT attack is still hypothetical, but its precursors are all too real. During Russia’s three-year war in Ukraine, we’ve witnessed repeated cyberattacks on civilian energy infrastructure, often coordinated with missile strikes to maximize impact on the Ukrainian populace. Here at home, the Colonial Pipeline cyber-attack of 2021 provided a tiny preview of what VT could look like. Spikes in gas prices. Fuel shortages up and down the east coast. Bubbling alarm.

What Did US Businesses Have to Say About Trump’s Tariffs?

Gabriel Corsetti

The Trump administration’s new round of trade tariffs, announced on April 2, shocked the rest of the world and caused fears that global trade would be upended. President Donald Trump announced a sweeping 10 percent tariff on all countries exporting goods to the United States, and “reciprocal” tariffs on dozens of countries accused of applying unfair tariffs on U.S. exports. One of the main targets was clearly China, which got slapped with a 34 percent tariff across the board.

To date, the reciprocal tariffs have been placed on hold – except for the penalties on China, which have been hiked to 145 percent after several rounds of retaliation and escalation.

The America First Memorandum

The April 2 announcement had been in the making for several months. On January 20, Trump issued the “America First Trade Policy” presidential memorandum, mandating a comprehensive review of U.S. trade and economic policies. The memorandum required various government departments to make recommendations concerning trade deficits, unfair trade practices, and creating an External Revenue Service, and called for reviews of existing U.S. trade agreements, the de minimis exemption, and export controls.

Achieving Decision Dominance: Leveraging AI in Small Wars

Matthew Fecteau

The information environment is expansive, complex, and rapidly evolving. During contemporary conflicts, including gray zone and hybrid warfare, perception often outweighs reality. That is why artificial intelligence is critical for navigating this complex yet fluid landscape. The Department of Defense (DoD) can enhance its effectiveness within the information environment during “small wars” to achieve decision dominance, but it needs to further incorporate artificial intelligence and its respective capabilities within its doctrine and culture.

Decision dominance ensures the commander can better understand the area of operations and deprive the enemy of the ability to make timely decisions. This method emphasizes proficiencies, not physical capability. It is not simply a matter of denying the opposing forces their decision-making ability, but rather a strategy of influencing actions by offering specific choices and limiting alternatives for the opposing force. The concept of decision dominance suggests that when an opposing force is left incapable of acting—having been stripped of all practical choices—it will cease fighting, perhaps even before major combat commences.

The DoD’s performance is in a precarious state. The last war that most closely resembled a victory was the 1991 Gulf War, and even that was convoluted, as the belligerents withdrew but remained in power. In Afghanistan in 2001, the U.S. Joint Forces won the initial stages of the war. Still, the Taliban adopted insurgent tactics and used the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan to plan their return and destabilize the environment. This led to the perception that the Afghan government was unable to protect its citizens, and the Afghan military surrendered en masse despite trillions in investment. In Iraq in 2003, the U.S. Joint and Combined Forces won the initial phase of the war and fought the later part to a stalemate.

Reforming Pentagon Software Practices Key to Countering Threats, Report Finds

Joanna Ye

The United States is facing its most complex geopolitical challenges since the Cold War, and its defense is anchored in an acquisition system ill-suited to match the pace of modern technological innovation.

Fixing it will require a “software-centric” transformation, a recent report found.

The Atlantic Council’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare released a final report in March outlining its recommendations for the Defense Department to transform into a software-centric organization better prepared to meet the demands of “deterring and combating digital age threats.”

The department must embrace the concept of “software-defined warfare,” which will allow it to increase the speed, accuracy and scale of information sharing for “dramatically faster decision-making and maneuvering compared to U.S. adversaries,” the report said.

Whitney McNamara, nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program and co-author of the report, said: “We’re really thinking about enterprise approaches that allow us to scale this, make it reproducible, scalable across silos.”

Part of that includes training to encourage better understanding of commercial software development best practices from an acquisition perspective, she told reporters during a Defense Writers Group event.

New Doc Spells Out How USSF Will Use Space Control to Gain Space Superiority

Greg Hadley

The Space Force spelled out how it plans to fight a war in space in a new document last week, defining and refreshing many terms already familiar to military planners as USSF leaders seek to “normalize” orbital warfare.

“There’s been this undercurrent of ‘Space is special’ for decades—it’s classified,” said retired Air Force Col. Jennifer Reeves, now a fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. “And I think this is trying to do the exact opposite. It’s saying, ‘No, no, we are a warfighting service the way everybody else is a warfighting service. There is a joint lexicon here that applies to us as well, and this is what it is.’ And then they go into a deeper dive on some of the things on how it’s specific in space.”

The new “Space Warfighting: A Framework for Planners” lays out Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman’s vision as proclaimed at the AFA Warfare Symposium that the service would do “whatever it takes” to achieve space superiority.

“Space control comprises the activities required to contest and control the space domain,” the framework states. “The desired outcome of space control operations is space superiority. Space control consists of offensive and defensive actions, referred to as counterspace operations.”

High Stakes in Orbit

Taylor Hathorn

A discussion on the space race 75 years ago would highlight a series of achievements and competitions ping ponging between the United States (U.S.) and the Soviet Union. In a 2025 post-cold war era, due to a series of post-soviet economic and political transitions and challenges, Russia no longer remains the sole major player alongside the U.S. - China has exploded onto the scene. This continued competition carries consequences of technological advancement, national security, economic supremacy, and the very balance of global power in the 21st century.

The race to dominate space is not simply about technology or exploration; it is about safeguarding the principles of democracy and international cooperation. While conflict is not inevitable, we hold the responsibility to protect and defend the final frontier. Should China be allowed to lead in space governance, it would set a dangerous precedent for how new frontiers are utilized in the future to progress an oppressive societies’ belief-systems, as they have shown in areas such as the Belt and Road initiative.

Sidelining democratic principles is not something the U.S. allows when gravity is at play, nor should it be allowed on the final frontier. Winning this race against China ensures that space remains a domain where transparency, free enterprise, and peace thrive, shaping the future of humanity's exploration.

The Army’s New Main Battle Tank Built for Just 1 Mission

Kyle Mizokami

How the AbramsX Could Keep the M1 Tank Dominant Beyond 2050

The U.S. Army wants to field a major update to its fleet of M1A2 Abrams tanks, and a mockup presented by General Dynamics just might show the way. The AbramsX, unveiled in 2022, is advertised as a full update for the five-decade-old tank design. The update could allow the tank to continue to serve past 2050.

While the AbramsX is definitely the conversation starter its designers meant it to be, the final tank could differ in several respects from what the Army wants.

AbramsX: The History

The AbramsX was introduced by defense contractor General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) at the 2022 Association of the U.S. Army conference.

GDLS was the original developer of the M1 Abrams in the late 1970s and oversaw the production of several thousand tanks into the 1990s. The company has also produced a range of variants, from the original M1 to the M1A1, M1A2, and today’s M1A2SEPv3 standard.

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