24 April 2025

The Emerging Exception: India Sees Itself as Transcending Middle Power

Rajiv Bhatia

According to Encyclopedia Britannica, a middle power can be defined as “a state that holds a position in the international power spectrum that is in the ‘middle’ – below that of a superpower which wields vastly superior influence over all other states, or of a great power, but with significant ability to shape international events.” Brazil, Germany, and South Africa fit this definition well. But today, India’s geostrategic positioning, economic trajectory and global role set it apart.

As the world’s most populous country and the fifth-largest economy (rapidly advancing toward becoming the third-largest), India is a unique case. It is the largest democracy, a major technological force, and an active global player with diversified interests across all continents. The traditional label of middle power or power fails to capture India’s growing status. It may be, as External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has said, “a leading power” or, as many in the country see it, “an emerging great power” guided by its expansive worldview.

India has successfully adopted a balanced approach toward the great powers, its neighbors in South Asia, players in the extended neighborhood, and other Global South countries. The effectiveness of its foreign policy machine in recent years is mainly due to the government’s success in developing an integrated and well-coordinated approach and the deep personal interest Prime Minister Narendra Modi has taken in this domain.

Afghanistan And The National Resistance Front – Analysis

Luke Coffey

In 2021 the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan after President Joe Biden’s disastrous withdrawal. Since then, the situation there has deteriorated considerably. The country faces an acute humanitarian crisis affecting millions and has once again become a haven for transnational terrorism.

The National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan

Since the Taliban’s return to power, only one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan, led by Ahmad Massoud. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in more than a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued to fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support.

The NRF has two primary focuses:

Military resistance. The organization is working to expand its grassroots armed resistance nationwide, starting by holding Panjshir and conducting asymmetric attacks. In the long term, it seeks to control provinces beyond Panjshir and build a broader operational base—similar to the Northern Alliance in the 1990s. Given the group’s limited resources, persuading local power brokers to defect will be essential.

Taiwan a critical US partner: Schriver

Fang Wei-li and Esme Yeh 

Washington has reasons to consider Taiwan a critical partner and would likely continue its commitments to Indo-Pacific allies and partners, former US assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs Randall Schriver told the Global Taiwan National Affairs Symposium XIII in Taipei yesterday.

Speaking via a prerecorded video, Schriver said Taiwan is one of the US’ critical partners, as it not only plays a key role in the semiconductor sector, but is also the eighth-biggest trading partner and the sixth-largest agricultural product export market to the US.

Taiwan is also the second-largest buyer of US arms, he said, adding that the two countries’ ties are built on common values and interests.

Given that Taiwan is at the center of the Indo-Pacific region, it is indispensable to countries upholding the free and open Indo-Pacific order such as the US, Japan and the Philippines, he said.

It is understandable that people doubt that US commitments to Indo-Pacific partners would continue or they question whether such partnerships are valued by US President Donald Trump, he said.

Southeast Asia’s Quiet Revolt Against the Dollar: Should the US Be Worried?

Karishma Shah

A decade ago, a traveler from Singapore visiting Bangkok or Jakarta would likely rely on U.S. dollars or a global credit card to settle the bill. Today, things are changing. A Malaysian tourist in Thailand can pay for street food by scanning a QR code, with money instantly debited from their account in ringgit and credited to the vendor in baht. Such small conveniences are part of a broader, quiet revolt in Southeast Asia – a concerted effort by regional governments to reduce their reliance on the U.S. dollar in trade and finance.

For now, the U.S. dollar remains dominant in the region’s commerce. Between 80 and 90 percent of exports from Southeast Asian countries are invoiced in USD, reflecting the greenback’s long standing role as the default currency for pricing goods. Most regional currencies are also informally tethered to the dollar’s movements, and central banks stockpile dollars as reserves for stability. This dollar dependence has historically served Southeast Asia well by facilitating trade and investment. But recent events have exposed its downside and galvanized a push for change.

The Danger of a Trump Doctrine for Taiwan

Philip Hou

In his first foreign policy blitz of his second term, President Donald Trump is aiming to reshape the United States’ global footprint with bold strokes: imposing sweeping tariffs on China in a bid to revive domestic manufacturing, while exploring options to acquire Greenland for its strategic access to the Arctic and to annex Canada as the 51st state to dominate the Americas. The Trump administration is also extricating the United States from its responsibilities in Ukraine through direct negotiations with Russia to end the war – even if it means justifying Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s eastern flanks on the basis that they are “Russian-speaking.”

This new Trump Doctrine of dominating the Western Hemisphere while scaling back commitments elsewhere in the world could have tangible effects on U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Will the United States continue to serve as a trustworthy partner and security backer for Taiwan, as it has for decades? A second Trump presidency may bring about a transactional U.S. retrenchment, leaving Taiwan dangerously exposed – unless Taipei adopts a more self-sufficient and politically flexible posture.

Make China great again? How Trump’s attacks on universities will backfire

Andrew Dessler

There’s an important battle brewing over university overhead rates. Sounds boring, right? But hang with me and you’ll see why this is so crucially important to America. It will determine whether breakthrough technologies emerge in American labs or Chinese ones.

Last week, the Department of Energy slashed university overhead rates to 15 percent. They claim this saves taxpayers $405 million annually while ensuring funds support “support scientific research—not foot the bill for administrative costs and facility upgrades.” This is dangerously misleading.

To understand why, let me start by explaining what “overhead” means. When you picture a university research lab, you probably imagine scientists in lab coats, surrounded by high-tech equipment, performing groundbreaking experiments. What you see in this mental image are what we would call “direct costs”—things that are directly involved in a research project.

What you don’t see are the countless support systems making that research possible. Air conditioning, electricity for lighting, wifi, janitorial services, administrative support for payroll and purchasing, and a million other things that cannot be neatly assigned to a particular research project but without which research cannot be done.

Behind the Fleet: The PLAN Reviews Logistics Development in the 13th Five-Year Plan

Conor Kennedy

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) implements its development programs in five-year plans, reflecting the approach taken by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government to overall development. It is currently implementing its 14th Five-Year Plan, which was drafted near the conclusion of the 13th. [1] The PLAN’s development of major new platforms, such as the rapid pace at which it has launched new warships, has received the most attention from analysts. Less visible is the modernization of logistics that has occurred behind the scenes and that underpins and supports those new capabilities. PLAN logistics have undergone extensive development and continue to receive top-level leadership attention. According to PLAN sources, the 13th Five-Year Plan was a transformative period that reshaped the naval logistics system to better focus on becoming joint, lean, and efficient. [2]

An analysis of achievements made during the period of the 13th Five-Year Plan can shed light on the prospects for successful implementation of the current plan. Official PLAN sources typically offer a summary of such progress, including the major logistics achievements touted by the PLAN in its previous five-year plan. PRC President and Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized the importance of his military’s logistics meeting his development goals, calling on the PLA to “build all the logistics necessary for war” (建设一切为了打仗的后勤) (China Military Online, September 26, 2022).

East Asia’s Geopolitical Crossroads: The Impact Of Rising Powers And Strategic Competition – OpEd

Simon Hutagalung

A combination of ongoing historical tensions and unaddressed conflicts alongside fast-paced economic and military advancements has generated an environment suitable for competition between these powers. China’s remarkable economic development, together with its forceful military strategy, brought forth a new power dynamics that challenge the United States’ historical dominance in East Asia.

Beijing’s territorial ambitions in the South China Sea and the East China Sea and its Belt and Road Initiative have reshaped regional power dynamics and compelled neighboring countries to redesign their security frameworks and alliances. Japan and South Korea maintain their economic and technological power, but their historical disputes and security concerns create obstacles for a united front against a rising China.

East Asian regional power dynamics became more complicated because Russia expanded its regional influence. The Chinese and North Korean relationships with Russia have intensified as Moscow has built up its military ties while expanding its economic cooperation, particularly through energy exchanges. The ongoing tensions with the West drive Moscow to build stronger regional strategic connections, which offer alternative economic and security frameworks to Western leadership. Russia now holds an extraordinary position because it functions both as an opposition force to regional alliances while simultaneously acting as a diplomatic mediator between opposing sides. Russia’s growing military activities, which combine joint exercises with China and weapons exports to the region, have increased regional power dynamics concerns.

Understanding Chinese Espionage Through 900 Cases | SpyCast


Unveiling China’s Espionage Landscape

The video opens by framing China’s intelligence apparatus as a critical tool for safeguarding the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) interests, especially as China’s global footprint expands. It emphasizes the Ministry of State Security’s (MSS) growing sophistication in gathering military, political, and economic intelligence, mirroring the operations of other major global powers. A key takeaway is China’s unique “whole-of-society” approach to espionage, contrasting it with the more compartmentalized methods of Western intelligence agencies.

Tactics, Motivations, and Strategic Thought

The discussion pivots to China’s exploitation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and national security laws for intelligence collection, compelling participation from companies and individuals alike. It raises thought-provoking questions about the motivations behind this participation, probing the influence of Chinese cultural norms, such as Confucianism, where requests can carry significant weight. The video also examines the enduring impact of Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” on China’s strategic calculus, highlighting the preference for achieving dominance through non-kinetic means like media manipulation and economic leverage.



‘Complacent’ US risks losing out to China in Global South tech race, report says

Meredith Chen

The United States has been warned to stop being “complacent” and engage with the Global South to consolidate its foothold in its escalating technological competition with China.

Developing countries were expected to play an “increasingly critical” role in advanced technology over the coming decades, and their ties with China would probably strengthen, according to the Atlantic Council, a Washington think tank.

“The United States cannot afford to underestimate the role that will be played by the Global South in shaping global technology competition,” the report said.

“Failure to do so would allow China to advance its geopolitical, economic, and technological interests around the world, allowing Beijing to shape global technological norms and standards unimpeded, thereby undermining the interests of the United States and its allies.”

It added: “The United States cannot afford to be complacent in the global competition in critical and emerging technologies. Doing so will result in falling behind China [in three areas]: geopolitical, economic and normative.”

Acquisition Pros: Are You Prepared for War?

Pete Modigliani

Imagine you wake up one morning in the not too distant future, hop on your phone, and read that China overnight launched a series of attacks on Taiwan. In addition, China attacked U.S. bases in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii with volleys of missile and cyber attacks. While the damage is still being assessed, one thing is clear -

We are now at war with China.

You throw on your uniform, kiss your spouse and kids, and head into the office early. You’re a program manager for one of DoD’s hundreds of weapon systems. You get a call from the Pentagon. DoD leaders determined your program is one of a priority set of capabilities deemed critical to combat China.

Your orders are to develop a plan to accelerate deliveries ASAP to INDOPACOM. Schedule is now your #1 priority. Expect Congress to appropriate hundreds of billions in additional funding to the DoD, which your program can tap.

Upon hanging up the phone, you assemble your leadership team in the conference room and relay the orders.

The Enigma Of China’s Debt Crisis – Analysis

Jiahao Yuan

China’s economic growth trend, which continues to stall, has become an important and attractive research topic for economists worldwide. Since Q3 of last year, China’s central government has begun to launch a series of fiscal and monetary policies in order to stimulate the economy to get back on track. Amongst all of the policies, the most striking is the “debt reduction plan” of up to 10 trillion yuan (1.36 trillion US dollars). The Chinese government has launched this unprecedented economic stimulus policy as a response to the current debt crisis, which has become the primary factor affecting many of China’s de facto predicaments, such as sluggish consumption, declining investment, shrinking exports, declining income and deflation, etc. If the current debt crisis cannot be properly resolved, it will gradually become the last straw that breaks the camel’s back for China’s macro-economy.

Explicit and implicit debt

Firstly, it is necessary to clarify that the debt mentioned in the article is not the same type as in the “debt trap”, which has essentially become a buzzword in the international geopolitical arena. The so-called “debt trap” mainly refers to China’s external sovereign financing to other less-developed countries (LDCs). In contrast, the debt referred to in this article is China’s domestic debt. More specifically, it mainly refers to the debt of Chinese local governments. At the same time, the Chinese government’s debt reduction plan is also aimed at local government debt rather than the debt undertaken by the central government.

Trump Says Tariff Deal With China Likely Within 3-4 Weeks

Taejun Kang

U.S. President Donald Trump said that Washington and Beijing were in talks on tariffs, expressing confidence that the world’s two largest economies would reach a deal over the next three to four weeks.

The U.S. and China are waging a tit-for-tat trade battle, which threatens to stunt the global economy, after Trump announced new tariffs on most countries. Specifically, the U.S. has imposed tariffs up to 145% on Chinese imports, prompting China to retaliate with tariffs reaching 125% on American goods.

“We are confident that we will work out something with China,” he said during a late Thursday afternoon executive order signing in the Oval Office.

“Top officials” in Beijing had reached out to Washington “a number of times” said Trump, adding that the two sides have had “very good trade talks” but that more remained, though he offered no evidence of any progress.

Asked about timing on any agreement, Trump said: “I would think over the next three to four weeks.”


Hegseth Said to Have Shared Attack Details in Second Signal Chat

Greg Jaffe, Eric Schmitt and Maggie Haberman

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth shared detailed information about forthcoming strikes in Yemen on March 15 in a private Signal group chat that included his wife, brother and personal lawyer, according to four people with knowledge of the chat.

Some of those people said that the information Mr. Hegseth shared on the Signal chat included the flight schedules for the F/A-18 Hornets targeting the Houthis in Yemen — essentially the same attack plans that he shared on a separate Signal chat the same day that mistakenly included the editor of The Atlantic.

Mr. Hegseth’s wife, Jennifer, a former Fox News producer, is not a Defense Department employee, but she has traveled with him overseas and drawn criticism for accompanying her husband to sensitive meetings with foreign leaders.

Mr. Hegseth’s brother Phil and Tim Parlatore, who continues to serve as his personal lawyer, both have jobs in the Pentagon, but it is not clear why either would need to know about upcoming military strikes aimed at the Houthis in Yemen.

The previously unreported existence of a second Signal chat in which Mr. Hegseth shared highly sensitive military information is the latest in a series of developments that have put his management and judgment under scrutiny.

The Real Reason Trump Wants 1,000 U.S. Troops Out of Syria

Brandon J. Weichert

A recent report from Howard Altman at the defense news site The War Zone indicates that the Trump administration is contemplating returning half of all U.S. troops currently serving in Syria to the United States.

If one listens to conventional commentary and analysis of this proposal, one can expect to be greeted with a sea of emotions and handwringing. The U.S. position in Syria—which has persisted more or less unaltered since the 2016 fight with the Islamic State (ISIS), despite major changes on the ground—has become something of a sacred cow in the halls of the Pentagon and Congress.

Critics have condemned the move, accusing Trump of abandoning America’s erstwhile Kurdish allies in Eastern Syria (where the bulk of American forces have been stationed). Others are quietly lamenting losing access to the oil and gas fields around the eastern city of Deir ez-Zor. Supporters of the move have criticized the U.S. presence in Syria as a “forever war” with no end in sight and no way to disentangle the United States, and lauded Trump’s decision to draw down American forces, however difficult conditions on the ground may be for such a move.

America’s Decision to Pull Out of Syria Is All About Iran

What no one seems to understand is that, regardless of one’s opinion on the U.S. role in Syria—and indeed, there is an abundance of evidence to suggest that the military’s continued presence in Syria is legally dubious—the Trump administration is drawing down U.S. troops from the country in order to reduce the amount of targets for Iran’s ballistic missiles.

Misinformation Strategy And Media Bias In The Gaza War – Analysis

Andrew Fox and Tatiana Glezer

Throughout the war in Gaza, Israel has faced accusations of genocide—not only in the International Court of Justice but also in the court of public opinion where media narratives have amplified these claims. Our research has identified strategies that Hamas has used to shape perceptions of the conflict both within Gaza and in the international media. These efforts emphasize civilian suffering while downplaying Hamas’ role as an active combatant, significantly influencing how the conflict is understood globally.

This article examines two specific areas:

The Report Questionable Counting: Analyzing the Death Toll from the Hamas-Run Ministry of Health in Gaza, published by the Henry Jackson Society, examines the methods by which casualty data in Gaza are reported. It provides a critical assessment of the fatality figures released by the Gaza Ministry of Health (MOH) during the ongoing conflict.1 In doing so, it highlights notable inconsistencies, methodological issues, and potential misrepresentations that appear to inflate civilian casualty figures, potentially shaping international perceptions and media narratives. Below, we provide a summary of the report’s key findings.

The US Remained World’s Largest Liquefied Natural Gas Exporter In 2024 – Analysis


The United States exported 11.9 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in 2024, remaining the world’s largest LNG exporter.

LNG exports from Australia and Qatar—the world’s two next-largest LNG exporters—have remained relatively stable over the last five years (2020–24); their exports have ranged from 10.2 Bcf/d to 10.7 Bcf/d annually, according to data from Cedigaz. Russia and Malaysia have been the fourth- and fifth-largest LNG exporters globally since 2019. In 2024, LNG exports from Russia averaged 4.4 Bcf/d, and exports from Malaysia averaged 3.7 Bcf/d.

U.S. LNG exports remained essentially flat compared with 2023 mainly because of several unplanned outages at existing LNG export facilities, lower natural gas consumption in Europe, and very limited new LNG export capacity additions since 2022. In December 2024, Plaquemines LNG Phase 1 shipped its first export cargo, becoming the eighth U.S. LNG export facility in service. We estimate that utilization of LNG export capacity across the other seven U.S. LNG terminals operating in 2024 averaged 104% of nominal capacity and 86% of peak capacity, unchanged from the previous year. While Europe (including Türkiye) remained the primary destination for U.S. LNG exports in 2024, accounting for 53% (6.3 Bcf/d) of the total exports, the share of U.S. LNG exports to Asia increased from 26% (3.1 Bcf/d) in 2023 to 33% (4.0 Bcf/d) in 2024. U.S. LNG exports to other regions, including the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America, also increased last year and accounted for 14% (1.6 Bcf/d) of total exports, compared with 8% (0.9 Bcf/d) in 2023.

By Land, Sea and Air, U.S. Military Faces Cyber Threats to Mobility

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery & Annie Fixler

A direct military engagement between the United States and a near-peer adversary would require the swift mobilization and deployment of a sizable U.S. military force. Moving troops and equipment efficiently over land, sea, and air is essential to America’s ability to project power, support partners and allies, and sustain forces to fight and win wars. Alongside the U.S. military’s own assets, commercially owned and operated critical infrastructure enables this military mobility. While U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) conducts logistical operations to facilitate the mobility of U.S. forces, civilian-owned rail networks, commercial ports, and airport authorities will handle transportation of the majority of servicemembers and materiel during a significant, rapid mobilization. U.S. adversaries know that compromising this critical infrastructure through cyber and physical attacks would impede America’s ability to deploy, supply, and sustain large forces. As the U.S. intelligence community’s 2024 annual threat assessment warned, China would “consider aggressive cyber operations against U.S. critical infrastructure and military assets” in the event of an imminent conflict with the United States. Beijing would seek to use these operations not only as a deterrent against further U.S. military action but also specifically to “interfere with the deployment of U.S. forces.”

Over the past year, the intelligence community has revealed how deeply Chinese hackers known as Volt Typhoon penetrated U.S. transportation, energy, and water systems. Volt Typhoon demonstrated China’s capability to gain and maintain persistent access to closed systems and preposition malicious payloads to cause disruption and destruction. Meanwhile, other Chinese Communist Party (CCP) malicious cyber operations, including Flax Typhoon, hijacked cameras and routers, and Salt Typhoon burrowed deep into U.S. telecommunications networks. In addition to enabling potential disruption, compromising critical infrastructure allows Beijing to amass information about the movement of goods, surreptitiously watching as the United States moves its military equipment across the country. Given these threats, the U.S. military has a vested interest in the security of the nation’s critical transportation infrastructure.

Do not Ignore the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Conflict

Cameron Hendrix

Introduction

The humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is only deepening as March 23 Movement (M23) and Rwandan forces continue their push deeper inside the nation. Should the recently proposed ceasefire fail, the likelihood of the conflict spilling over into a regional war in one of the most densely populated parts of the world increases dangerously. As each day peace is not achieved, the risk of a humanitarian disaster not seen since the Congo Wars escalates. To prevent this disaster, nations with the ability to help develop peace should provide greater focus on the region and support solutions led by third-party African nations.

Context

As the M23 group continues its crusade into the DRC, Rwanda’s true intentions are increasingly suspect. Ostensibly to rid the Eastern DRC of those responsible for the Rwandan Genocide, the truth, in part, seems to lie in Kinshasa’s vast mineral reserves in the region. Rwandan mineral exports have doubled since the most recent phase of the conflict and the country is exporting more than it mines, a mathematical impossibility. Rwanda has capitalized on limited DRC governmental control of its eastern borders, seizing large swathes of the $24 trillion worth of minerals in its territory.

The Naval Academy Canceled My Lecture on Wisdom - Opinion

Ryan Holiday

For the past four years, I have been delivering a series of lectures on the virtues of Stoicism to midshipmen at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Md., and I was supposed to continue this on April 14 to the entire sophomore class on the theme of wisdom.

Roughly an hour before my talk was to begin, I received a call: Would I refrain from any mention in my remarks of the recent removal of 381 supposedly controversial books from the Nimitz library on campus? My slides had been sent up the chain of command at the school, which was now, as it was explained to me, extremely worried about reprisals if my talk appeared to flout Executive Order 14151 (Ending Radical and Wasteful Government D.E.I. Programs and Preferencing).

When I declined, my lecture — as well as a planned speech before the Navy football team, with which my books on Stoicism are popular — was canceled. (The academy “made a schedule change that aligns with its mission of preparing midshipmen for careers of service,” a Navy spokesperson told Times Opinion. “The Naval Academy is an apolitical institution.”)

The Latticework: Indo-Pacific Security Moves Beyond US Naval Primacy

Tyler Bray

The United States faces a dangerous strategic contradiction in the Indo-Pacific: expanding security commitments alongside eroding capacity to fulfill them. At the heart of this contradiction lies what can best be described as a “capability-commitment gap.” While the United States has strengthened security pledges to Indo-Pacific partners, its capacity to sustain this posture has deteriorated to crisis levels.

U.S. shipbuilding capacity now represents just 0.1 percent of global market share, while China commands 46.6 percent, creating a staggering disparity in the ability to sustain naval power in any prolonged confrontation. This represents a form of hollow maritime power – outwardly impressive but internally weakened in capabilities that translate hardware into strategic effect.

This gap has not gone unnoticed by regional actors facing daily Chinese gray zone operations. Rather than simply lamenting the United States’ decline, they are constructing new security arrangements and reimagining their roles in a regional order no longer dominated by a single maritime hegemon. The result is not a simple fracturing of the U.S. hub-and-spoke alliance system but the emergence of a “latticework” of interlocking security relationships with distributed responsibilities.

Trump’s 100 Days of Failure in Ukraine

CARL BILDT

It has been nearly 100 days since Donald Trump returned to the US presidency and Russian missiles continue to rain down on Ukrainian civilians. Despite Trump’s pledge to end the war on “day one,” peace is nowhere in sight. When will the administration acknowledge that it is failing?

Trump’s initial demands were straightforward: stop fighting and start negotiating. After his first conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin, he announced that a complete cessation of fighting was imminent, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky welcomed that prospect.

Since then, however, Putin and his small team at the Kremlin have obviously succeeded in dragging Trump’s inexperienced negotiator, Steve Witkoff, down a rabbit hole of complex conditionalities and impossible demands. After many weeks of this, even the most dimwitted of negotiators should have realized that Putin has no intention of agreeing to a ceasefire or accepting Trump’s plan or timetable.

Ever since he launched his full-scale invasion in February 2022, Putin has relied on Russian military might to deliver him control over Ukraine. He went in with an army of roughly 200,000 contract soldiers, but has since expanded the invasion force to around 600,000 with selective mobilizations and huge financial incentives. Yet despite suffering 700,000-800,000 casualties, with more than 200,000 dead, the supposedly mighty Russian army controls less Ukrainian territory – 18.3% to be precise – than it did at this time three years ago.

Why Does America Have a “Space Force”?

Harrison Kass

Why did the United States establish its Space Force in 2019?

To answer that question, one must first understand the historical context of America’s role in space exploration over the past 80 years. Let us back up to the 1950s—and the true beginning of the Space Age.

The concept of sending artificial objects, and potentially humans, into space was well-understood by the turn of the 20th century. Early engineers such as Robert Goddard designed successively more powerful rockets. Before these rockets were used for breaching the atmosphere, they were put to much deadlier use during the Second World War—particularly under Nazi Germany, whose scientists developed the V-2 rocket and used it to rain terror upon Allied cities. After the war, these scientists and their rocket technology were vigorously poached by both the United States and the Soviet Union, and both sides incorporated them into their own space programs.

The Soviet Union’s launching of the Sputnik satellite in 1957 marked a searing moment in the public’s consciousness and the beginning of a new military age. Launching the Space Race between the Americans and the Soviets, Sputnik inspired the great powers to assert themselves in the heavens—which many assumed would be the last frontier of warfare, and the most consequential.

Toward America 4.0

Robert McNally

On the 250th anniversary of the start of armed colonial rebellion against British rule, a timely backdrop for considering long cycles in US political history and their implications for America’s present circumstances and prospects.

Roughly every eighty years, the United States reinvents itself following a decisive meta-crisis: the Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II.

These three prior decisive meta-crises resolved core national disputes by forcing binary choices between opposing ideological factions: patriots versus loyalists, abolitionists and unionists versus secessionists, and internationalists versus isolationists.

During the decades before each meta-crisis, Americans tried to have it both ways, striking compromises to delay resolution between unreconcilable ideas. But ultimately, as Abraham Lincoln put it, the nation was compelled to become “all one thing or the other.”

A crucial but often overlooked point is that, before these decisive crises, the winning and losing factions were minorities, usually viewed as fringe.

Being Responsive to Combatant Commanders

Pete Modigliani and Matt MacGregor

The primary purpose of the defense acquisition enterprise is to acquire and deliver capabilities for the operational commanders to use to deter and if necessary, win wars.

Per Title X, the military services are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the forces. The Combatant Commands are joint military commands responsible for geographic (e.g., INDOPACOM) or functional areas (e.g., CYBERCOM).

Ample debate over the last few decades includes the case that the Services too often put their parochial views above those of the Joint Force (we have written about this ourselves). Combatant Commanders remain frustrated by what they view as “the system” not delivering the capabilities they require at the speed and quantity needed to complete their missions.

This was a major reason for the initiation of the European (EDI) and Pacific Deterrence Initiatives (PDI). In particular PDI was driven by years of Congress getting massive unfunded lists from INDOPACOM that the Services had seemingly ignored. The 2020 $20B wish list that INDOPACOM had submitted to the Hill turned into a 2021 NDAA provision with $6.9B allocated to address the combatant command needs. Predictably, this was hijacked by the Services (and OSD) to buy more ships and planes…when commanders really needed “long-range weapons, missile defenses, and critical enablers such as logistics capabilities, training ranges, and support infrastructure.”