Flexibility and awareness will help India deal with Trump (again)

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

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India navigated relations with the United States quite skilfully during the first Trump administration, better than many other US allies did. Doing so a second time will be more difficult, but India’s strategic awareness and manoeuvrability will help it work with Donald Trump’s America once again.

The chaotic early months of the Trump administration have shown Washington’s partners that they must carefully navigate relations with the US for the next few years.

Indo-Pacific partners will likely fare better than European ones, as China appears to be a key and continuing concern for the US. And among Indo-Pacific partners, India probably stands to do better than others. India generally and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in particular show strong understanding of the game when they refrain from reacting to Trump’s negative comments.

This is unusual: the Modi government has usually been somewhat sensitive to outside criticism. Modi may be looking to the day when Trump moves on from whatever unpalatable comments he makes.

Taiwan’s Evolving Response to China’s Grey Zone Actions

Dr Philip Shetler-Jones

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‘Grey zone’ as a qualifier for challenges, threats and even warfare describes an approach that seeks results from action below the threshold of war or armed conflict. Attempts to frame a precise definition raise theoretical and practical questions. Can action ‘below the threshold’ of war be a form of ‘warfare’, or is the threshold subjective and open to manipulation? Can grey zone action be deterred without threatening to cross the line into a state of war? How can the victim of aggression escape a trap where moves to deter grey zone challenges attract condemnation for ‘provocation’ or ‘escalation’ that might be more damaging than the original attack?

China’s ‘campaign against Taiwan’, which Sir Alex Younger, former Chief of the UK Secret Intelligence Service, described as ‘a textbook on subversion, cyber and political harassment’, presents a compelling case study for understanding the grey zone phenomenon. While Taiwan’s situation is distinctive in some ways, the grey zone pressures it faces – including incidents such as sabotage of undersea infrastructure, election interference and digitalised disinformation – closely parallel those faced by other countries in Europe and Asia.

An understanding of Taiwan’s evolving response to the grey zone is instructive for policymakers experiencing similar challenges. The purpose of this policy brief is to draw insights from Taiwan’s experience, leading to policy recommendations that could have wider application. The brief traces the emergence and defining features of the ‘grey zone’ concept, then looks at China’s actions and Taiwan’s responses, and concludes with recommendations.

The PRC Sees ‘Window of Opportunity’ With Europe

Arran Hope

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“A certain strategic window” (一定的战略窗口期). That is how two scholars describe the opportunity for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to deepen its ties with Europe amid current tensions with the United States. The argument comes from an article published in the journal World Affairs (世界知识) in which the authors—one of whom runs the Centre for European Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai—write that the international system is “undergoing the most profound strategic transformation since the collapse of the bipolar pattern” (正经历着自两极格局瓦解以来最深刻的战略转型). They suggest that the PRC and Europe might be able to get over their “values barrier” (价值观藩篱) and use their economic and trade exchanges as “ballast” (压舱石) to help alleviate Europe’s current crisis (World Affairs, April 1).

This view is one of many currently being debated within the PRC system, but it has traction. Some more measured voices in the PRC’s academic community evince doubts about the Beijing’s ability to capitalize on this perceived opportunity. However, there is little disagreement over whether or not this strategy should be pursued. A survey of high-level statements and bilateral talking points between the PRC and European governments and the European Union (EU) indicate that Beijing has intensified its long-running attempts to divide the continent’s democracies from the United States. From the European side, certain reported statements suggest a degree of receptivity to these overtures.

Donald Trump Could Struggle to Force Europe's Hand on China

Kate Plummer

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As relations between the U.S. and China deteriorate, the European Union risks becoming caught in the crosshairs.

And any attempt by President Donald Trump to force the EU to choose between the two countries is unlikely to succeed, experts told Newsweek.

Trump initially went for a wide-ranging tariff hike on all trading partners, with China hit hardest. He would pause the majority of what he called "reciprocal" tariffs, including the 20 percent targeting the EU, while still maintaining the baseline 10 percent on all countries. But with China, he would engage in tit-for-tat rises with President Xi Jinping, which have culminated to 245 percent on most Chinese goods.

While the tariff increases have appeared to have paused for now, the U.S. is hitting at China via its other trading partners.

But Kyle Haynes, assistant professor at Purdue University's department of political science told Newsweek that while the Trump administration was "trying to force Europe to choose between the U.S. and China," he didn't expect Europe to bite.

Why China curbing rare earth exports is a blow to the US

Ayeshea Perera

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As the trade war between China and the US escalates, attention has been focused on the increasingly high levels of tit-for-tat tariffs the two countries are imposing on one another.

But slapping reciprocal tariffs on Washington is not the only way Beijing has been able to retaliate.

China has now also imposed export controls on a range of critical rare earth minerals and magnets, dealing a major blow to the US.

The move has laid bare how reliant America is on these minerals.

This week, Trump ordered the commerce department to come up with ways to boost US production of critical minerals and cut reliance on imports - an attempt by Washington to reclaim this critical industry. But why exactly are rare earths so important and how could they shake up the trade war?

What are rare earths and what are they used for?

"Rare earths" are a group of 17 chemically similar elements that are crucial to the manufacture of many high-tech products.

Designed in US, made in China: Why Apple is stuck

Annabelle Liang

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Every iPhone comes with a label which tells you it was designed in California.

While the sleek rectangle that runs many of our lives is indeed designed in the United States, it is likely to have come to life thousands of miles away in China: the country hit hardest by US President Donald Trump's tariffs, now rising to 245% on some Chinese imports.

Apple sells more than 220 million iPhones a year and by most estimates, nine in 10 are made in China. From the glossy screens to the battery packs, it's here that many of the components in an Apple product are made, sourced and assembled into iPhones, iPads or Macbooks. Most are shipped to the US, Apple's largest market.

Luckily for the firm, Trump suddenly exempted smartphones, computers and some other electronic devices from his tariffs last week.

But the comfort is short-lived.

The president has since suggested that more tariffs are coming: "NOBODY is getting 'off the hook'," he wrote on Truth Social, as his administration investigated "semiconductors and the WHOLE ELECTRONICS SUPPLY CHAIN".

US may soon force allies to take sides in trade war with China

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The Trump administration is so erratic in its policy announcements that simply knowing if it really means what it says presents a considerable challenge. But if the government of the United States is indeed serious about conducting a protracted trade war against its principal geopolitical rival, China, a host of unpleasant consequences for traditional US allies like Britain will flow. The most severe scenario would be an attempt by the US to make allies choose between America and China as a trading partner. Worryingly, this “you’re with us or you’re against us” approach seems to be gaining traction in the White House.

Where the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Talks Are Headed

Ray Takeyh

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The indirect talks between the United States and Iran in Oman have achieved their foremost objective: more diplomacy. After U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in 2018, the two countries’ relations grew even colder. This weekend’s meeting was the first face-to-face meeting since the U.S. withdrew seven years ago.

Leaders agreed the talks were “constructive” and decided to hold another round on April 19. This next round will also be held in Oman and will again be indirect, with the Omani foreign minister shuttling between the U.S. and Iranian delegations.

Did either side indicate any new areas of compromise or hurdles?

The Iranian position remains that the talks should focus on the nuclear issue and sanctions relief, with Iran repeatedly stating that its nuclear program is only intended for peaceful purposes. The Islamic Republic views the meetings as a means of giving confidence-building measures that its program is not for military purposes in exchange for lifting sanctions.

Why Iran Doesn’t Need the Bomb

John Allen Gay

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As the United States and Iran sit down for another round of talks in Rome, Tehran is debating the future of its nuclear weapons program. That’s not surprising. Yet, the bomb won’t solve the Islamic Republic’s deterrence problem. It will put Iran in an arms race it cannot win, and it will give Iran an option at the top of the escalation ladder when its problems run all the way up and down it.

There are various positions in the Iranian nuclear conversation: outright weaponization, revision of Iranian nuclear doctrine, a repeal of the fatwa against nuclear weapons, enrichment to weapons grade, advanced weaponization research, or some combination of the above. All are intended to raise Iran’s level of deterrence.

There has been favorable discussion of Kenneth Waltz’s view that the spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East could result in regional stability if an Iranian bomb countered Israel’s. Indeed, there is an obvious logic to Iran considering nuclear weapons. An operational nuclear program would make any adversary think twice before hitting Iran.

Most discussion of Iranian nuclear acquisition has centered on whether Iran can quickly build a weapon without triggering an Israeli or American strike. Yet, there’s not enough focus on the day after Iran gets a bomb. Iran would be taking its first step into the world of nuclear deterrence. That world is not a destination, but a new zone of competition. And this would diminish Iran’s benefits from weaponization, since Iran is not well-positioned for that competition.

America Needs Bold Joint Force Leaders

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Executive Summary

Communication is a critical element to the human experience. As warfighting demands high-quality, immediately available, and secure communications, you would think that the Services and the forces who fight together have something as simple as radios sorted out. While I do not have any immediate field experience to draw on, I can offer a look at how the good intentions of the military Services, almost 20 years ago, failed to ensure that units fighting alongside each other were trained to rapidly communicate when conditions of life and death were at play.

In chapter 3 of Navy SEALs Jocko Willink and Leif Babin’s The Dichotomy of Leadership (St. Martin’s Press, 2018), Babin describes the direction given to a group of SEALs prior to moving into the Iraqi city of Ramadi in 2006. The simple request from the team commander was for all team members to learn how to reprogram their radios to change frequencies to communicate with other SEAL teams as well as with Army and Marine units. No one readily complied, and when asked to perform reprogramming before stepping off, none of the team members beyond the radioman were able to do so. The team perceived ownership of such a simple task as the responsibility of a single specialist on the team. But what if the team members were separated and had radios but could not reprogram them to communicate with another Service’s team?

Babin’s part of the story was to consider the responsibility of leaders within a team both to maintain standards for themselves and to enforce them—and to do so in a way that ensures success without generating disloyalty or mistrust. The simple task of radio reprogramming resulted in Babin’s being able to directly call off an Army tank’s fire on his team’s position, saving them to fight another day.

America Can Still Lose the AI Race

Keegan McBride & Adam Thierer

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Hidden behind the United States’ strategy in the unfolding trade war, tariffs, and rapid restructuring of the world’s economic system lie two uncomfortable truths.

First, rapid artificial intelligence (AI) advancements are redefining the world’s digital future. As recently discussed by the New York Times: “The Government Knows A.G.I. Is coming." Second, while the United States has historically enjoyed a global leadership position in technological development and diffusion, this is no longer guaranteed.

In fact, without substantial changes, a techno-authoritarian future is far more likely. China is increasingly outperforming the United States and its allies, thanks to its embrace of a digital, automated, and interconnected world and its capacity to export low-cost technological solutions abroad.

Now, more than ever, America must work with its allies to forge new technological partnerships that reflect liberal and democratic values in order to counter and outcompete a formidable digital China in its aim to establish a techno-authoritarian global order.

The AI Control Agenda

New Thinking Needed on National Defense

Stephen Bryen

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Defending America and America’s friends and allies is expensive. If you add up the price tag—not even including secret programs or the cost of U.S. intelligence—our current defense expenses stand at $875 billion per year. When you add the cost of intelligence, which is vast, the total cost of defense rises to about $1 trillion annually.

Despite these expenditures, the Ukraine War has exposed some dramatic inadequacies. We have learned that America’s arsenal as it stands today would be quickly depleted in any future sustained conflict. And we’ve learned that our allies are in far worse shape.

This raises the question of how we can spend so much on our national security but still have a military that seems so woefully underprepared for a major conflict. Consider, for instance, the remarkable fact that, unlike Israel, we have no national air defense system.

Historically speaking, the heyday of American defense production was during World War II. Vast civilian industries were converted to produce guns, artillery, tanks, and jeeps—and new plants were commissioned to build airplanes and ships.

Leveraging the Force We Have with Modified Concepts of Operations

Robbin Laird

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Recently I talked with my colleague Brian Morra, who served in the USAF and worked in defense industry for several decades. We discussed the challenge of how to enhance “the fight to night one force” in the short to mid-term.

He started by citing an example which highlights how the force can leverage its C2 and ISR advantages mentioned earlier by Secretary Wynne to shape new con-ops. The case is of the USAF working with the U.S. Navy in ship defense – both combat and commercial – against the Houthis in the Middle East.

As he noted, the Houthis have been using a wide range of strike capabilities against shipping. The dilemma of using high-cost weapons to defend against much cheaper projectiles has been a key problem.

The USAF came up with a con-ops innovation to deal with the problem. F-16s operating in the Middle East have been using their LITENING targeting pods to identify targets and to kill or degrade those targets using laser guided weapons hitherto used in air to ground operations. The aircraft can carry weapons for higher value targets but have used a much lower priced weapon to kill many of the Houthi’s projectiles.

Tariffs Can Help Secure U.S. Critical Mineral Supply Chains—if They’re Done Right

Reed Blakemore & Alexis Harmon

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Critical minerals have officially entered the tariff spotlight. On Tuesday, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order launching an investigation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to determine whether critical mineral imports impair U.S. national security. The Commerce Department investigation will help determine whether and to what extent the Trump administration will levy tariffs on imports of critical minerals as part of its sweeping global tariff efforts.

The United States is over 50 percent import-reliant on forty of fifty designated critical minerals. With China dominating many mineral supply chains from extraction to processing to finished products, U.S. policymakers have spent years trying and largely failing to effectively de-risk supply chains. U.S. critical mineral suppliers face a complex set of challenges: volatile and opaque price signals, Chinese market manipulation through subsidies and dumping that undercut other projects, and the inherently higher costs of U.S. projects due to stricter environmental and labor standards.

Now, the Commerce Department has 180 days to assess how imports create vulnerabilities in U.S. critical mineral supply chains, investigate foreign market distortion, and strategize how to boost domestic processing. Tariffs could be highly effective tools in addressing these challenges—but optimal results require a scalpel, not a chainsaw.

Is a Russia-Ukraine Cease-Fire Deal Slipping Away From Trump?

Max Boot

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U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff arrived in Paris on Wednesday to consult with French leaders about President Donald Trump’s efforts to negotiate a cease-fire in Ukraine, among other topics.

The trip could be interpreted as a welcome recalibration by the Trump administration given how little heed its officials have previously paid to European views—and how often the president has belittled these allies for supposedly not paying enough for defense and not trading fairly with the United States. Now, with the Trump administration seeing the chances of a Ukraine cease-fire slipping away, its representatives seem to be hoping the French can help salvage Trump’s hopes of ending the Russia-Ukraine war. French President Emmanuel Macron is leading Europe’s effort to provide Kyiv security guarantees if a deal is hammered out.

Regardless of what the Europeans do, the odds of a successful cease-fire seem remote because Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown scant interest in calling off his brutal war of aggression. Witkoff’s meeting with Macron follows his visit to Moscow last week where he said he had “compelling” talks with Putin about the conflict in Ukraine—though it does not appear to have compelled the Russians to do much.

Assessing UK Ransomware Policy: Workshop Report

Jamie MacColl, Dr Gareth Mott and Jen Ellis

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Introduction

Over the past several years, ransomware attacks have become a persistent national security threat. Attacks against hospitals, schools and businesses of all shapes and sizes have normalised what should be intolerable: organised cybercriminals regularly disrupting and extorting victims, causing misery in the process and undermining the UK economy and society.1

Despite some operational success and increased international collaboration against ransomware criminals, significant policy interventions have not been forthcoming. The UK government, like many other national governments, has received criticism for its lack of progress on ransomware. In December 2023, for instance, the parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy published a report that argued: ‘If the UK is to avoid being held hostage to fortune, it is vital that ransomware becomes a more pressing political priority, and that more resources are devoted to tackling this pernicious threat to the UK’s national security.’2 Much of this criticism has been directed towards the Home Office, which is the lead department for the government’s counter-ransomware strategy.3

After several years of development, the UK government has launched a consultation on a set of legislative proposals that aim to reduce the impact of ransomware on the UK and increase the amount of intelligence available to operational agencies on incidents and payments. The consultation has three main proposals:4

Shuttering of State office leaves US largely defenseless against foreign influence warfare, officials say

PATRICK TUCKER

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A small office in the State Department tasked with monitoring foreign disinformation threats was shuttered Wednesday by the Trump administration, the latest in a series of steps the White House has taken since January to dismantle entities that monitor foreign influence and information campaigns, or respond to them. As that effort continues, experts say, the United States and audiences around the world could be left virtually defenseless against increasing Chinese and Russian efforts to turn global populations against the United States.

But that’s not how the administration sees it. “Over the last decade, Americans have been slandered, fired, charged, and even jailed for simply voicing their opinions. That ends today,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio posted to X Wednesday in an announcement about the closure of the Counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference hub, known as R/Fimi.

R/Fimi was a remnant of the Global Engagement Center, which was created in 2016 by the Obama administration to counter Russian disinformation efforts. Rubio said the GEC “actively silenced and censored the voices of Americans they were supposed to be serving,” a claim that officials at the Global Engagement Center have denied and for which there is no evidence.

What America Gets Wrong About the AI Race

Radha Iyengar Plumb and Michael C. Horowitz

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For several years now, the United States has been locked in an intensifying race with China to develop advanced artificial intelligence. Given the far-reaching consequences of AI for national security and defense, as well as for the economy, the stakes are high. But it is often hard to tell who is winning. Many answers focus on performance: which AI models exceed others in speed, reasoning, and accuracy. By those benchmarks, the United States has a clear, if not commanding, lead, enabled by the presence of world-class engineers, billions of dollars in data center investments, and export controls on the most.

How to Survive a Constitutional Crisis

Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar

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On December 3, 2024, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol attempted to seize control of the country by abruptly declaring martial law. What happened next reveals how democracies can unleash antibodies to resist dangerous threats to the body politic and defend their system of government. Although Yoon had sent military forces to surround the National Assembly and block legislators from taking an emergency vote rescinding his order, legislators rushed to the building and were able to enter. Meanwhile, the military officials and intelligence agencies that the president sought to enlist refused to cooperate, the courts refused to stand aside, and the media reported developments accurately. In the end, backed by overwhelming public support, the National Assembly voted unanimously to rescind the order, putting a stop to the president’s gambit.

Yet even though the South Korean episode ended successfully, it raises an unsettling question about the future of another democracy, which happens to be the world’s most powerful country: the United States. What if Yoon had begun his attempted takeover just a touch more gradually—say, by purging the leadership and midlevel staff at security agencies and replacing them with his own loyalists; normalizing the forced removal of individuals from South Korea and defying court decisions over time even when the courts’ orders were clear; cracking down on law firms, former officials, and even members of his own party who challenged him or defied his wishes in order to uphold the law; and, aided by pliant legislators from his own party, progressively wresting control of government spending—including even money already allocated—from the legislature? As Donald Trump’s second administration vows to deny federal funds to states to bring their actions in line with the his views, pressures the country’s leading law firms into providing hundreds of millions of dollars of pro bono services for causes approved by the president, threatens to end the independence of agencies such as the Federal Reserve, and moves ever closer to open defiance of court decisions, the problem of how to strengthen and even preserve law-bound democracy in the United States is drawing new attention.

Iran’s AI Ambitions: Balancing Economic Isolation with National Security Imperatives

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Executive Summary

Iran recognizes the vital role artificial intelligence (AI) will play in its future economic viability, regional influence, and national security and has begun to implement a top-down effort to achieve regional technological competitiveness. Since the Supreme Leader issued a directive in 2021, Iran has endeavored to develop a national strategy and oversight mechanism for AI and foster a technological ecosystem to drive domestic research and development. However, two key factors — Tehran’s global economic isolation, and its deeply entrenched system of government control and oversight — have almost certainly hindered Iran’s national AI development.

In 2024, as Tehran’s support for its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel embroiled Iran in unprecedented regional conflicts and ongoing cyberwarfare, new insights emerged about how Iran has implemented AI technologies in its national security apparatus. Iran has used AI to bolster its capabilities in four main areas: cyberattacks, influence operations, military and intelligence systems, and domestic repression. These priorities will continue to propel Iran’s development and implementation of AI, almost certainly posing an increasing threat to Iran’s Western and regional adversaries. In cyberspace, AI will likely augment Iranian threat actors’ spearphishing and social engineering tradecraft, while AI’s implementation in Iran’s drone and missile arsenal is likely to pose the greatest physical threat from emerging technology.

AI in the Military Domain: A briefing note for States

GIACOMO PERSI PAOLI & YASMIN AFINA

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Until January 2023, multilateral discussions on AI in the military domain were confined to the remit of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) of the High Contracting Parties [to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] related to emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. In this context, AI has been discussed as a technology that could enable advanced levels of autonomy in weapons systems. These technological advances bring to the fore a host of legal and policy challenges, both pre-existing and novel, including compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law, ethical considerations, and wider policy questions.

A key instrument of international humanitarian law, the CCW was designed to ban or restrict the use of specific types of weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious, or to have indiscriminate effects.4 As such, most of the discussions related to AI occurring within the general framework of the CCW and the specific context of the GGE on LAWS focused on use of these systems in military targeting, with an emphasis on legal compliance.

The use of AI as an enabler for more advanced and sophisticated levels of autonomy in weapons systems is certainly a very important issue, but it only represents a very small portion of the range of possible military applications of this technology.5 The potentially transformative effect of AI on all aspects of society, including national security and defence, has become a mainstream topic of discussion among policymakers and the general public alike, particularly following the public release of ChatGPT in late 2022.

Advancing Governance at the Nexus of Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Weapons

Fei Su, Vladislav Chernavskikh and Dr Wilfred Wan

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Introduction

Rapid developments in artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities have driven government investment in efforts to explore their applicability in military contexts, including in nuclear forces.1 The extent to which AI capabilities will be adopted by the military remains debated, but they have potential utility across nuclear weapon systems. This includes in early warning and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), in nuclear command, control and communications (NC3), and in delivery systems, and also in conventional systems with counterforce potential.2 However, the use of AI in these systems would have an impact on deterrence practices and has the potential to upend strategic predictability and stability.

While reducing nuclear risks is in the collective interest of all states, there has been no discussion on establishing effective governance frameworks specifically tailored to the nexus between AI and nuclear weapons. Broader governance discussions pertaining to the use of AI in military operations have primarily focused on issues of safety, security and responsibility; these concerns are also likely to shape debates in the AI–nuclear context. However, discussions have not yet been effectively adapted to the unique challenge of nuclear forces, particularly when considering their interconnectivity with other critical technologies and domains, such as information and communications technology (ICT) and outer space.3

The Pentagon Once Tried to Build Iron Man’s Suit. It Didn’t End Well.

Brandon J. Weichert

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Marvel’s 2008 film Iron Man is widely considered by fans and critics alike to be the best of all the Marvel comic book films. The iconic film launched one of the world’s most successful media franchises. It also apparently had a degree of influence in a massively expensive—though ultimately failed—covert military technology program.

In 2013, the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) undertook an ambitious effort to create a “supersuit” akin to what audiences saw Robert Downey, Jr’s iconic superhero wearing in the 2008 film. The final product came to be known as the Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit, or “TALOS” for short—but, as one might expect, was a far cry from the screen version.

How Adidas Became a Defense Contractor

There were other partners on the TALOS program, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the U.S. Army Research, Developing, and Engineering Command (RDECOM), and private firms like Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and Revision Military.

Apparently, Adidas, the shoe and sports apparel company, was involved, too—illustrating the absurdity of the defense contracting process. Said one defense expert at the time that TALOS was announced, “It’s more than just a suit, it’s more than Hollywood, it’s more than us doing interviews in the media. It’s about changing the way we do acquisitions.”

Reimagining Combat Power for Tomorrow’s Battlefield: The Enhanced Brigade Combat Team

Joshua Suthoff

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Recent pictures of webs of fiber-optic cables draped on tree limbs on the front lines in Ukraine—cables from expended one-way attack drones—are reminiscent of the mounds of expended artillery casings in World War I. Both images of the detritus of war, separated by more than a century, are stark reminders of the continuous effort by belligerents to gain an upper hand through technology, tactics, and attrition. In the near future, the US Army could be called upon to project combat power into an operational environment defined by the current array of threats with little notice. In such a scenario, every logistical action to move brigade combat teams into position would be under threat, with moves constrained by limited sea and air assets. Every modal move counts in order to deliver the most credible combat formation and critical logistics to the conflict area. And once these brigades arrive they will face a myriad of enemy threats including robotics, rockets, and missiles, all designed to cheaply counter the US brigade combat team construct. The United States cannot enter a war of attrition—certainly not on these terms. Formations need to be agile and efficient to fight and exploit success in the opening engagements of a war all while relying on limited logistical resources. For the Army, there is a solution: reorganizing some of its armored brigade combat teams into enhanced brigade combat teams.

The current Army brigade combat team (BCT) designs (infantry, armor, and Stryker) vary in their ability to rapidly deploy to a combat zone and then survive. Their strengths and weaknesses are not balanced within the formation, but normally require task organization and teaming to meet mission requirements. Infantry and Stryker brigade combat teams (IBCTs and SBCTs) both have significant numbers of infantry, and both lack organic armor support. The M10 Booker mobile protected firepower platform is an attempt to improve IBCT lethality. However, an M10 is not a tank and units equipped with them are not organic to IBCTs. The reverse is true for armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs): They present large signatures, require significant logistics, and need more infantry.

State of the Army 202

MEGHANN MYERS

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The Army is going all-in on its effort to finally crack the code on rapid acquisition in a giant bureaucracy.

Transformation in Contact is in its second wave this year, expanding beyond infantry brigade combat teams to Stryker and armored units with planned expansion for protection and sustainment troops to get their chance to test the latest technology in the field and report back with their suggestions.

“So in the Army, we like to say they're only lessons observed—they're not lessons learned until we actually change how we train and operate, change how we organize, and then change how we buy things, and that is the idea behind transforming in contact,” Gen. Randy George, the Army’s chief of staff, told Defense One in a recent interview.

George had just returned from visiting 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division in Germany at the Combined Resolve exercise, where soldiers tested out the TiC concept in cold weather for the first time.

“And so we learned a lot of lessons about, you know, battery technology as an example, and the challenges with cold weather,” George said. “And that had a lot of impact with the drones that we were flying.”