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22 April 2025

The National Security Implications of Starlink’s Entry Into India

Gurshabad Grover

Last month, Bharti Airtel and Reliance Jio announced partnerships with Starlink to provide satellite-facilitated internet connectivity in India, probably speeding the conclusion of Starlink’s five-year journey to enter the Indian market.

The internet service provider (ISP) space in India is already hyper-consolidated, with Airtel and Jio accounting for 81 percent share of the market. Naturally, the duopoly has been apprehensive about competition with their services and investments. Notably, the two companies had already entered partnerships to make inroads into providing satellite internet in India. In 2020, the Bharti Group made significant investments in OneWeb; and in 2022, Reliance Jio created a joint venture with SES to provide satellite internet in India. Both initiatives had advanced toward getting regulatory approvals to start providing services to customers.

These deals follow Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the U.S., which included a meeting with Elon Musk, senior adviser to the U.S. president and the CEO of Starlink’s parent company SpaceX. Even U.S. President Donald Trump assumed Musk met Modi because the former “wants to do business in India.” The timing and nature of the developments have raised eyebrows within the political opposition in India, which alleges that the deals were struck under government pressure, ostensibly to appease the U.S. government.

India's rare earth crisis: Missiles and defense held hostage by China's control


India's ambitions to dominate in cutting-edge missiles, satellites, and a thriving tech industry rest on a shaky foundation: rare earth materials. These 17 critical metals, like Neodymium for powerful magnets and Dysprosium for advanced electronics, are the backbone of everything from defense systems to electric vehicles. Yet, India is trapped in a precarious position, producing just 2,900 metric tons in 2024 a mere fraction of its soaring demand. With nearly 90% of its rare earth imports sourced from China, which controls the global supply, India's defense and tech dreams are dangerously reliant on a single supplier. This isn't just a supply chain problem; it's a matter of national security for a nation striving to be a global powerhouse.

Rare earth materials are a group of 17 metallic elements, including the 15 lanthanides plus Scandium and Yttrium, prized for their unique magnetic and electrochemical properties. Despite their name, they're not rare Cerium, for instance, is more abundant than copper but their scattered deposits make extraction costly and complex. These metals are indispensable for high-tech applications, powering permanent magnets in missiles and electric vehicles, phosphors in smartphone screens, and catalysts in clean energy systems. India's heavy reliance on these materials underscores their strategic role in driving economic growth and bolstering national defense.

Japan’s Military Awakening - Opinion

Julian McBride

After decades of stagnation and a state of vassalage under the United States, Japan is preparing to transform its self-defense forces into a full-fledged military to counter various threats. In 2015, under then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Tokyo discussed efforts to begin remilitarization and transform the self-defense forces into a full-fledged military—particularly due to China’s rapid force projection. In late 2022 and early 2023, Japan officially started the process of remilitarization as the Russian invasion of Ukraine changed the geopolitical landscape across the globe.

Former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stated in late 2022 his intentions to push Japan to meet the 2% GDP allocation for defense, similar to NATO’s standards, to meet rising threats in the Asian Pacific. Presenting a five-year strategy on reinvigorating its armed forces, Tokyo plans to allocate $320 billion towards defense, third only to the United States and China. The soon-to-be-instituted Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) will be a major flashpoint in command and control of all branches of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Coordination in the PJHQ will allow the general officer staff to closely monitor and respond to any crisis management, such as North Korean missile launches, Russian aggression via the Pacific fleet, and Chinese threats to the Japanese islands and Taiwan.

Analyzing the PLA’s Early April Exercises in the Taiwan Strait

Chieh Chung

Since February of this year, the activities of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around Taiwan appear to have intensified.

First, from February 1 to March 31, the PLA conducted up to eight “joint combat readiness patrols.”

On April 1 and 2, the PLA conducted military exercises around Taiwan for two consecutive days. The exercise on April 1 was not specifically named, while the exercise on April 2 was designated the codename “Strait Thunder-2025A.” The latter name raises suspicions as to whether this represents another PLA military exercise aimed at undermining Taiwan’s jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait, in addition to the “Joint Sword” exercises.

Overview of PLA Exercises in Early April

On April 1 at 7:46 a.m., the PLA Eastern Theater Command suddenly announced the organization of joint exercises involving the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force around Taiwan.

According to statistics from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), as of April 2 at 6:00 a.m., the PLA had dispatched military aircraft on a total of 76 sorties into the airspace surrounding Taiwan, with 37 of these entering Taiwan’s “response area.” The surface forces deployed included 15 naval vessels and four China Coast Guard ships, of which at least 13 naval vessels and two coast guard ships entered Taiwan’s “response area” and advanced toward the 24-nautical-mile adjacent zone. Additionally, a PLA Navy (PLAN) carrier battle group centered around the Shandong aircraft carrier maneuvered to a tactical position 440 kilometers south of Japan’s Yonaguni Island to conduct relevant exercises.

Trump tariffing China at the worst possible time for Xi Jinping

Gordon Chang

"There are no winners in a trade war or a tariff war," wrote Xi Jinping this week. If he’s talking about China, he’s absolutely right. Across the board, the Chinese will suffer.

In America, the story will be different. When the dust settles on President Donald Trump’s tariffs, there will be 340.1 million people much better off.

For more than four decades, China’s regime has been implementing predatory and criminal trade practices. For various reasons, the U.S. and other countries have let matters slide.

Trump in his first term, in 2018, fired a warning shot with his 25% tariffs. Unfortunately, the Chinese regime did not take the hint. This month he raised the general tariff rate on China’s goods to 145%.

Trump’s trade actions could not have come at a worse time for Xi.

As an initial matter, his economy is stumbling. It cannot be growing at the 5.4% pace reported Wednesday for the first quarter of this year. Price data for March – the Consumer Price Index was negative for the second-straight month and the Producer Price Index was negative for the 30th-straight month – indicates the country has entered a deflationary spiral. That phenomena suggests the economy is now contracting and will do so for some time.

US should look before it leaps into South China Sea

Lyle Goldstein

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth took a trip across the Pacific recently and it came at an uncertain time.

This awkward situation is due to the Signal chat controversy that’s engulfed Washington but also as many allies in the Asia-Pacific are concerned about their relationship with the US. Following Hegseth’s trip, China launched large-scale military drills around Taiwan, underscoring the tensions which characterize this region.

Hegseth visited Hawaii, Guam and Japan, but his most significant stop was the Philippines, a country that has experienced very significant tensions with China in recent years.

That’s especially true of contested claims in the South China Sea, a domain of growing military rivalry that encompasses a variety of issues, including maritime law, crowded sea lanes, drilling for hydrocarbon resources, fisheries, large new Chinese “reef bases” and even the deployment of nuclear weapons.

The key to understanding this volatile issue is to comprehend the overlap between the South China Sea and the Taiwan question.

Win Fast or Lose Big Against China

Bradley T. Gericke

It seems that “protraction” as a way of war is having a moment, especially through the lens of a future war against China. The Army is holding wargames and conferences addressing it. Even fresh scholarship is skeptical of short wars. All of which is somewhat bewildering because history is replete with long wars, and the record of long wars is one of much blood and great cost. Tinkering with notions of protracted war allows military decision-makers to be distracted and to make a poor bargain, like the trade made by the legendary Doctor Faust that comes with extraordinary cost.

Clearly, the cost of long wars is extraordinarily high. In every respect, long wars should be an unwelcome result, not an outcome to be acquiesced. The Army especially cannot afford to mischaracterize the inevitability of long war. Acceptance of protraction as an inevitability is to surrender the United States’ best way to win militarily against China, which is to fight and win the first battle of any war. Appearing to accept that the United States will not win the first battle in a US-China war could also fatally undermine deterrence by signaling a lack of confidence in US capabilities. Winning in a future contest and strengthening deterrence means making decisions now: real choices must be made regarding forward posture, organizational structure, training, and modernization to create a battlefield system that leverages US advantages.

‘Strait Thunder-2025A’ Drill Implies Future Increase in PLA Pressure on Taiwan

Tai-yuan Yang and K. Tristan Tang

On April 1, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command announced a joint training drill (่”ๅˆๆผ”่ฎญ) around Taiwan. The next day, it declared the initiation of the “Strait Thunder-2025A Drill” (ๆตทๅณก้›ท้œ†-2025Aๆผ”็ปƒ) (Xinhua, April 1, April 2). According to data from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, over the course of these two days, the PLA deployed 135 aircraft, 38 naval vessels, and 12 official vessels in the surrounding area.

Strait Thunder-2025A was a routine large-scale training drill. The PLA has conducted such activities with increasing frequency in recent years and, as indicated by the “A” in the drill’s title, will continue to do so in the near future. The scope of military activities during the recent drill is depicted in Figure 1 (Ministry of National Defense, April 2, April 3; LTN, April 1, April 2). Numerous reports and analyses have focused on the strategic or political considerations behind the PLA’s military actions, as well as the logic behind the naming of the operations (CNN, April 1; CNA, April 1, April 2; Global Times, April 2; The Guardian, April 2). However, few have examined the military implications of these actions themselves.

He Weidong’s Possible Downfall and Xi’s Trust Deficit With the PLA

K. Tristan Tang

As early as March 13, reports began to suggest that He Weidong (ไฝ•ๅซไธœ), a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), had come under investigation following the big annual political gatherings in Beijing known as the “Two Sessions” (The Epoch Times, March 14). The Financial Times, citing five people familiar with the matter, reported on April 10 confirming He’s removal (Financial Times, April 10). This reporting followed He’s absence from the Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries (ไธญๅคฎๅ‘จ่พนๅทฅไฝœไผš่ฎฎ), held from April 8–9. This event was attended by all other members of the Politburo, as well as senior three-star generals on the CMC, including CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission Zhang Shengmin (ๅผ ๅ‡ๆฐ‘), Minister of National Defense Dong Jun (่‘ฃๅ†›), Director of the Equipment Development Department Xu Xueqiang (่ฎธๅญฆๅผบ), Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department Xu Qiling (ๅพ่ตท้›ถ), and Deputy Director of the Political Work Department He Hongjun (ไฝ•ๅฎๅ†›) (CCTV, April 9). (See Figure 1).

He Weidong has not made any public appearances since the Two Sessions and has been absent from key events. Although he still appears in the official list of Politburo members on Xinhua’s website and the government has yet to release any related information, his absence raises the possibility that, barring major illness, he is under investigation. Alternatively, as the Financial Times report suggests, He Weidong may have been suspended or removed from his position already (Xinhua, accessed April 10).

Weakened US Relations Is Pushing Europe Towards China - Opinion

Ali Mammadov

In 2022, NATO declared China a strategic priority for the next decade for the first time in its history, citing growing security challenges. Until then, the alliance had focused primarily on the Soviet Union and later Russia as its main threat. Adding China to the list signaled a shift in NATO’s strategic direction. While the U.S. and its European allies appeared to agree on this move, whether that consensus will hold in the coming years remains to be seen.

For Europeans, Russia has long been a greater threat than China. Russia is geographically closer, has history of military aggression in Europe, and, most recently, invaded Ukraine demonstrating its willingness to expand influence through force. For the United States, however, China has been the more pressing long-term concern, given its growing power in the international system. As a country that experienced the unipolar moment and viewed itself as the leader of the liberal order, the U.S. sees China’s rise primarily as a great power rivalry rather than just a security threat.

European states, by contrast, have not viewed themselves in such terms for a long time. Having experienced multilateralism firsthand through the European Union, they have been more open to a world order in which multiple powers share leadership and address global challenges collectively. While Europe has had its own disputes with China—including over electric vehicles—it has generally taken a softer stance than the U.S. on broader issues concerning Beijing. Given that the EV issue is already getting resolved, it is likely that the relations may become even less tense.

Yemen And The Houthis: The Human Cost – OpEd

Neville Teller

Yemen is at the epicenter of national and international interests at odds with each other and battling for supremacy. At the heart of the turmoil is Iran, financing and weaponizing the Houthis in order to establish both a strong Shia presence on the Arabian peninsula, and a continued front against Israel to replace the weakened Hezbollah and Hamas. The burden of suffering has fallen on the hapless people of Yemen. They continue to bear the human cost.

Today’s catastrophe started in the sadly misnamed “Arab spring” uprisings of 2011. Inside Yemen they resulted in mass protests against the long dictatorial rule of its president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. He was forced to step down in favor of his vice-president, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. In 2015 Hadi sponsored a revised constitution for Yemen that proposed a federal system split between northerners and southerners, but the Iran-backed Houthi rebels rejected it.

The Houthis are a fundamentalist Shia group. The ex-president, Saleh, although a Sunni Muslim, decided to collaborate with them in a bid to return to power. It was through Saleh that the Houthis were able to gain control of most of the Yemeni military, including its air force. As a result, and supported with military hardware from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, they overran large tracts of the country, including the capital city, Sana’a.

Gaming Out Iran Negotiations

Kamran Bokhari

The Trump administration’s diplomacy with Iran is about much more than nuclear nonproliferation. Whatever happens will have massive implications for Tehran at a time when the regime is on the verge of a critical leadership transition. In many ways, the U.S.-Iran talks are much more difficult than the efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war. Regardless of their outcome, U.S.-Iran negotiations will reshape the Middle East and reverberate across Eurasia.

On April 15, U.S. President Donald Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, called on social media for Iran to eliminate its nuclear enrichment program. A day earlier, following a meeting with Iran’s foreign minister in Oman, he had told Fox News that the administration sought only limits on Iran’s enrichment capabilities, not full dismantlement. This rhetorical shift came after a contentious White House meeting that included Witkoff, Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, national security adviser Mike Waltz and CIA Director John Ratcliffe. According to an Axios report, Vance, Hegseth and Witkoff favor compromise to secure a deal, while Rubio and Waltz demand full dismantlement.

Al-Shabaab, Houthis Join Forces To Disrupt Red Sea, Gulf Of Aden Shipping


Somalia’s al-Shabaab and Yemen’s Ansar Allah rebels have struck an alliance that threatens to destabilize more of the Red Sea region along with parts of the Horn of Africa.

At the heart of the alliance is a simple equation: Al-Shabaab has money and needs weapons to fight the Somali government. The Ansar Allah rebels, known as the Houthis, have weapons and need money to operate in parts of northwestern Yemen where they are the de facto government.

The two groups have formed an alliance despite their different religious and political positions. Al-Shabaab members follow Sunni Islam and are an al-Qaida affiliate. The Houthis are Shiites like their patron, Iran, which has supplied them with small arms and light weapons in violation of a United Nations arms embargo on Yemen. In 2020, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime reported that some of those weapons end up in Somalia.

Al-Shabaab and the Houthis are making common cause in disrupting Red Sea and western Indian Ocean shipping. A February U.N. report confirmed that al-Shabaab and Houthi personnel met in Somalia in July and September 2024. During those meetings, the Houthis agreed to supply al-Shabaab with weapons and technical assistance in return for ramping up piracy and ransom kidnappings in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia’s coast.

American Foreign Policy Is Lost In a Multipolar World

Andrew Latham

American Foreign Policy: Lost in the New World Multipolar Era

“The best-laid schemes o’ mice an’ men gang aft agley” – or, in standard English, “the best-laid plans of mice and men often go awry.” That line from the famous Scots poet Robert Burns lands differently in April 2025 than it did when he first wrote it – and even when it landed a year ago. We’re living in the wreckage of a world of failed strategic assumptions. The American-led order isn’t fraying. It’s fractured – it’s totally agley.

Grand strategies crafted in think tanks and federal agencies now lie scattered across a world that no longer plays by yesterday’s rules. The real crisis in international affairs today isn’t Ukraine, Taiwan, or the Red Sea. It’s that the geopolitical architecture we spent 30 years propping up has collapsed, and the foreign policy establishment still hasn’t caught up.

Multipolarity isn’t a prediction. It’s the present tense.

Washington continues to talk like it’s managing a rules-based order. But in reality, we’re negotiating a post-American world from a position of fatigue, debt, and denial. And the real danger isn’t China, Russia, or Iran. It’s the growing mismatch between U.S. commitments and U.S. capacity. We’re trying to fight on three fronts, reassure every ally, deter every rival, sanction every rogue, and still believe we’re the center of global gravity. That’s not strategy. It’s inertia with delusions of grandeur.

How Pete Hegseth Is Streamlining the Pentagon

Mackenzie Eaglen

The Department of Defense’s new business-minded leaders under Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth are channeling a venture capitalist’s mindset with a flurry of broad and deep reviews: cut the fat, scale what works, kill what doesn’t. These methods, foreign to the bureaucracy, will ensure the overhauls are substantial and enduring.

The Pentagon’s tech modernization is being reoriented around mission outcome metrics rather than compliance or procurement throughput. Leaders are taking a hard look at internal inefficiencies, from paper-based processes to bloated and redundant office functions to faster acquisition timelines, especially for software and dual-use systems.

First up was the 8 percent budget scrub to reinvest into higher priority investments within the defense budget. Then there was the major defense weapons program review to identify waste and realign government spending with more shared risk with industry. Now the team is plotting to map the mammoth civilian workforce to warfighter priorities exclusively.

The deep dive into the almost-800,000-strong federal defense civilian workforce is especially welcome. This vast group of employees generally only ever gets larger, no matter the push from various administrations to streamline.


Russia Develops Infrastructure for Operational Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons from Belarusian Territory

Alexander Taranov

Satellite images indicate significant infrastructure development in Asipovichy, Belarus, where a storage site for Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) may have been established since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (EDM, May 9, 2024; February 13). This includes the construction and renovation of barracks, ammunition storage facilities, and specialized hangars intended for Iskander-M operational tactical missile systems. A dedicated rail spur is being built to connect these facilities (Svaboda.org, March 24).

Construction of new hangars began in October 2022 at Military Unit 61732 in Asipovichy. The 465th Missile Brigade of the Belarusian Ground Forces, equipped with Iskander-M missile systems, is located here. One hangar was completed in mid-2023, and two more foundations were laid in the fall of 2023. Based on observed layouts, each hangar can accommodate one Iskander division. This confirms the formation of a new missile brigade in Asipovichy with 12 Iskander-M launchers (see EDM, March 13; Svaboda.org, March 24). Satellite imagery confirms that as of February 25, construction there is nearing completion. In addition to the Iskander-M hangars, three buildings for storing vehicles and equipment, a renovated barracks, a warehouse, administrative buildings, and even a sports complex with a football field have been completed since mid-2023 (Svaboda.org, March 24).

Trump, Shattered Diplomacy and International Society - Opinion

Kieran O'Meara

Diplomacy is an intricate phenomenon. In his seminal work on the topic, Adam Watson (1982: 11) accentuates that diplomacy concerns the complex and multifaceted dialogue between distinct and independent civic political units, fundamentally maintaining international society. Forged from the interplay of constitutively reproduced and mutually recognised practices, as Hedley Bull (2012: 13) succinctly identifies, an international society ‘exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.’ In the contemporary context, international society has been globalised to include all omni-acknowledged sovereign states, and so it may be referred to interchangeably with ‘Global International Society’ (GIS).

Functioning as one such institution through its commonly performed role in legitimating action, the practice of diplomacy functions in similar vein to WD40 on a rusted hinge. By this, I propose that it permits antiquated and otherwise corroding entities – entities formed in a socio-relational context sometime in the past – the capability to co-manoeuvre and interconnect with fluidity. It is the facilitation of dialogue, as ease of formalised and legitimate intercourse that grants Diplomacy its status as a key institution of GIS.

Europe’s Need for an Indo-Pacific Strategy - Opinion

Julian McBride

The Indo-Pacific region is emerging as a center-point of trade, innovation, and several brewing conflicts that could intertwine the global community. Various countries in the European continent currently have economic, diplomatic, and military cooperation and trade agreements in the region that will affect them amidst American indecisiveness and rising influence by geopolitical rivals in the Indo-Pacific. Europe, which needs to prepare for autonomous contingencies amidst a rift with the U.S. government, will need a concrete strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. Preparations to enhance partnerships and grow alliances in the defense, trade, and technological center will need to be a priority for European nations.

Several major conflicts are brewing in the Indo-Pacific that will affect Europe. One is China’s military preparations for a potential invasion or naval blockade of Taiwan. Taipei’s semiconductors and geography make the country critical to the First Island Chain strategy and trade with Europe, which hinders Chinese naval (PLAN) operations. Furthermore, PLAN aggression in the South China Sea is creating an existential crisis for Vietnam and the Philippines, which are major traders with Europe. Any armed naval engagement in the South China Sea would drastically affect global trade and embroil much of Southeast Asia and the United States, which holds a mutual defense pact with the Philippines and a strategic partnership with Vietnam.

The Paradox of Trump 2.0

Prosper Malangmei

In his return to the White House, Donald Trump once again sounded the slogan “Make America Great Again” (MAGA), which echoed nationalist pride and nostalgic appeal. Yet, beneath the populist rhetoric lies a paradox: while claiming to restore American greatness, Trump’s political agenda systematically undermines the pillars that historically sustained it. From the liberal international order (LIO) and democratic institutions to America’s global economic leadership and soft power influence, Trump 2.0 appears not to be rebuilding American preeminence but instead dismantling its foundations. As the United States (U.S.) retreats from global leadership and veers into political polarisation, it risks ceding geopolitical ground to China and descending into domestic instability. What results is not a renewed era of greatness but a new phase of grief—economically, diplomatically, and ideologically.

To understand what is at stake, one must first ask: what made America great? The post-World War II LIO is central to the answer. Anchored by institutions such as the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), these institutions were primarily designed by the U.S. to foster peace, economic interdependence, neoliberalism, free trade and democratic norms. Coupled with this institutional architecture was America’s unparalleled soft power—a term coined by Joseph Nye (2004)—referring to its ability to influence global affairs not through coercion but through attraction. Hollywood, Silicon Valley, and the Ivy League exemplified a cultural and intellectual hegemony that inspired admiration and emulation worldwide. The American Dream, symbolising economic growth and individual liberty, became an aspiration for many who want a better living standard.

What Trump really wants from Canada

Anthony Zurcher

Machias Seal Island is a tiny dot on maps of North America. But the fogbound rock is significant for its location in an area known as the "Grey Zone" – the site of a rare international dispute between Canada and the United States.

The two neighbours and long-time allies have each long laid claim to the island and surrounding water, where the US state of Maine meets Canada's New Brunswick province – and with that claim, the right to catch and sell the prized local lobsters.

John Drouin, a US lobsterman who has fished in the Grey Zone for 30 years, tells of the mad dash by Canadian and American fishermen to place lobster traps at the start of the summer catching season each year.

"People have literally lost parts of their bodies, have had concussions, [their] head smashed and everything," he says.

The injuries have been caused when lobstermen have been caught up in each other's lines. He says one friend lost his thumb after it became caught up in a Canadian line, what Mr Drouin calls his battle scar from the Grey Zone.


The Cost of the Government’s Attack on Columbia

Christopher L. Eisgruber

The United States is home to the best collection of research universities in the world. Those universities have contributed tremendously to America’s prosperity, health, and security. They are magnets for outstanding talent from throughout the country and around the world.

The Trump administration’s recent attack on Columbia University puts all of that at risk, presenting the greatest threat to American universities since the Red Scare of the 1950s. Every American should be concerned.

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The rise of the American research university in the 20th century depended on many factors, including two crucial turning points. The first, at the start of the century, was the development of strong principles of academic freedom that allowed people and ideas to be judged by scholarly standards, not according to the whims or interests of powerful trustees, donors, or political officials. Stanford’s dismissal in 1900 of Edward Ross—an economics professor who had incited controversy with his remarks about, among other topics, Asian immigrants and the labor practices of a railroad run by the university’s founders—catalyzed a movement to protect the rights of faculty members to pursue, publish, and teach controversial ideas. Significant governance reforms took place in the same period, shifting control of professorial appointments from boards of trustees to presidents and faculties.

Trump says US will 'pass' on Ukraine peace talks if no progress soon

James Waterhouse

Donald Trump has said the US will "take a pass" on brokering further Russia-Ukraine talks if Moscow or Kyiv "make it very difficult" to reach a peace deal.

The US president told reporters in the Oval Office on Friday that he was not expecting a truce to happen in "a specific number of days" but he wanted it done "quickly".

His comments came hours after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that the US would abandon talks unless there were clear signs of progress within days.

"We're not going to continue with this endeavour for weeks and months on end," Rubio said, adding that the US had "other priorities to focus on".

This comes as Russian strikes on Ukraine continue, with two people reported killed and more than 100 injured in the north-eastern cities of Kharkiv and Sumy on Friday.

Moscow launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and Russian troops have been advancing - albeit slowly - in eastern Ukraine.

President Vladimir Putin has placed a number of conditions on any potential ceasefire.

AI And Africa’s ‘Counterfeit’ Journalists – Analysis

Karen Allen

Not long ago, journalism tools comprised a notebook, a typewriter and possibly some coins for a telephone box to phone copy into the news desk. Then computers, email and cell phones brought speed, connectivity and the potential to demand greater accountability of the world’s leaders, as the media took advantage of improved communications technologies.

After the 1993 Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia, which was broadcast around the world and shaped the future of counter-terrorism operations, the 2002 Iraq war marked a new era of 24/7 news broadcasting.

Round-the-clock coverage enabled newsrooms to expose global events in real time. The Broadband Global Area Network satellite system relayed quality images and audio at speed. It was replaced by systems like LiveU, an industry standard using multiple cellphone connections to deliver broadcast news.

Each new iteration of technology has left the basic principles of news journalism intact. Key to the profession is the ability to hold power to account as part of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a free press.

However, a worrying trend is the abuse of emerging technologies to pollute the information environment. This can be done by distorting what we see or read, manipulating how information is delivered, or impersonating the messenger. That is, mimicking journalists, who traditionally have been considered a credible source for fact-based information.

Cyber and Cognitive Warfare in the Digital Age

Lin Choi

What does warfare look like in 2025? For students gathered at Chung-Ang University in Seoul, the answer was clear: it’s no longer just tanks and missiles, but also algorithms, disinformation, and digital sabotage.

In the first lecture of the 2025 FNF x Hanmiyeon lecture series, Assistant Professor Tae-Eun Song from Korea National Diplomatic Academy unpacked the challenges Korea faces in responding to cyber and cognitive warfare. The lecture, themed “Cyber and Cognitive Warfare in the Digital Age,” took place on April 10, 2025, focused on how invisible battles, waged through disinformation, digital sabotage, and psychological manipulation, are reshaping the very foundations of international diplomacy and defense.

Prof. Song, an expert in cybersecurity, guided the audience through how cyberattacks have become a central tactic in modern warfare, used to disorient populations, paralyze infrastructure, and weaken a state's capacity to respond.

She examined the Russia–Ukraine war as a case in point, where cyber operations were used as a prelude to conventional attacks. As Microsoft’s Tom Burt observed, the Russian invasion effectively began not on February 24, but the day before on February 23, with a sweeping cyber assault that targeted over 300 Ukrainian systems. This shift underscores how the frontlines of modern war have expanded into digital and psychological realms, where influence, disruption, and manipulation can precede physical force.

Innovation in Defense is Interesting, but Agility is Everything

Tim Ray & Jim Smith

As DOGE shifts its eyes to the Department of Defense and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth calls on his defense leaders to accelerate their workforce and recapitalization plans, our national security ecosystem has an unprecedented opportunity to radically restructure and set itself not for yesterday’s wars, but tomorrow’s security.

To seize the moment, DOGE and Secretary Hegseth's team have many reform options at their disposal: streamline bureaucratic processes, overhaul acquisitions, and double down on innovation. These are logical improvements. Many are essential. But like fixing an aircraft mid-flight, time is the defining performance indicator. And it is a sense of urgency, agility, and adaptability that will enable America’s success.

Great power competitions – be it between nation states or rival companies – are won by those that out-pace their adversaries. Advancing capabilities at a rapid pace leaves adversaries ‘playing catchup,’ trying to understand and then react. Consider Amazon, innovating quickly to stay ahead of large, capable retailers like Walmart who continually scramble to gain online market share.