‘Extreme’ US-China decoupling could cost US$2.5 trillion in equity, bond sell-off: Goldman

Zhang Shidong

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A decoupling between the world’s two largest capital markets could cost US$2.5 trillion in an extreme scenario, as investors from the US and China are forced to divest their holdings of equities and debt instruments, according to an analysis by Goldman Sachs.

US investors could be forced to sell nearly US$800 billion of Chinese stocks trading on American exchanges in case of a decoupling, the US investment bank’s analysts led by Kinger Lau and Timothy Moe said in a report on Monday. On the flip side, China could liquidate its US Treasury and equity holdings amounting to US$1.3 trillion and US$370 billion, respectively.

The sell-off was based on the assumption that US investors would be restricted by US regulations from such investments, they said.

The risk of US-China decoupling has shown signs of spreading beyond trade after Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the option of delisting US-traded Chinese companies was on the table amid a tit-for-tat tariff war between the two nations. The Trump administration has slapped a 145 per cent duty on exports from China, while Beijing has struck back with a 125 per cent levy on all US imports and another 20 per cent on selected American goods.

The Conventional Wisdom Is That China Is Beating Us. Nonsense.

Tyler Cowen

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Even before Trump’s “Liberation Day” and the market volatility it ushered in, a deep pessimism had already set in among the pointy-headed class of which I am a reluctant member.

At nearly every conference, in nearly every WhatsApp group, and in most mainstream media commentary, the conventional wisdom has been clear: China is ascendant. A combination of their discipline and their manufacturing expertise—coupled with our decadence and profound vulnerability with high-quality semiconductor chips made in Taiwan—has made the Chinese century inevitable. The only question is how we are going to manage our own decline.

I am not convinced.

These people are right that the world is on the verge of some major geopolitical changes that will fundamentally reshape the world, particularly the relationship between America and China. But they are changes that are far more radical than whatever the tariff rate will wind up being—and changes that I believe will largely favor the United States and disfavor China.

China’s Arsenal of Missiles Could Paralyze the U.S. Military in a Crisis

Julian McBride

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China’s Medium and Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile Threat in the Indo-Pacific: What Can the U.S. Military Do?: China currently has one of the world’s top military capabilities, with force projection power to upend the quiet storm in the Indo-Pacific. China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, and its navy, the PLAN, have a wide variety of assets that threaten dozens of countries in the region, including medium—and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMS and MRBMs).

China’s medium—and intermediate-range ballistic missiles are a critical asset in the PLA’s arsenal and a countermeasure against growing U.S.-Backed regional alliances and partnerships. They could be used in several brewing conflicts in the Taiwan Strait, the Luzon Strait, and the South China Sea. Indo-Pacific countries and the United States should focus on figuring out ways to defend and counteract Beijing’s growing rocket force.

China’s Growing Ballistic Missile Fleet and Capabilities

The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) currently utilizes an estimated 1,300 medium-range ballistic missiles called Dongfeng (DF). The People’s Republic created the DF through the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, which uses different variations of the Dongfeng depending on mission needs.

PLA Perceptions of and Reactions to U.S. Military Activities in Low Earth Orbit

Jackson Smith & Cristina Garafola

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In March, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) announced the successful launch of a fifth batch of satellites to comprise its broadband G60 megaconstellation, also referred to as the Qianfan (千帆; “Thousand Sails”) Constellation. This latest batch was launched on the Long March 8, a new generation rocket designed specifically for placing assets in low earth orbit (LEO) (MIIT, March 12). The PRC’s increased efforts to capitalize on dwindling space in LEO have been driven in part by developments in U.S. space capabilities.

Over the past several years, U.S. activities in LEO have attracted great interest within the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Analysis of professional military education textbooks and journal articles written by PLA scholars and Chinese industry experts indicates that the PLA associates the development of LEO as a warfighting domain with the fielding and expansion of the commercial Starlink constellation, operated by the American firm SpaceX. [1] By linking Starlink with U.S. military activities in LEO, PLA researchers attach specific security implications to Starlink, which in turn has led to a range of countermeasures being proposed, as well as the development of indigenous Chinese LEO systems (China Brief, September 6, 2024).

Perceptions of Starlink Inform PLA Views of pLEO and LEO as a Warfighting Domain

A survey of research from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the United States’ use of space as a military domain since the 1990s reveals that the PLA’s shift in focus toward LEO is closely tied to the PLA’s assessments of the operational significance of Starlink. Taking a closer look at the evolution of PLA space research, therefore offers a more holistic perspective on the origins of its emphasis on LEO, proliferated LEO (pLEO), and Starlink, as well as PLA analyses’ tendency to equate the three. [2]

The High Stakes of U.S.-Iran Talks

Burcu Ozcelik

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Since U.S. President Donald Trump’s unexpected Oval Office announcement that talks with Iran would take place in Oman, diplomacy sceptics on both sides of the Atlantic have described a range of scenarios, from bad to worse to apocalyptic.

Critics warn that even initiating dialogue could backfire. Talks could embolden Tehran or allow its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) space to take covert action against the United States. The possible consequences of a failed negotiation are also important to consider. The likelihood of military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities and military targets may have diminished, but the option remains firmly within the realm of near possibility. The recent uptick in U.S. force posture across the region—including increased activity at the Diego Garcia base—underscores that the military option is far from shelved.

The Iranians are walking into the talks from an indisputable position of weakness. Israel’s multi-front military offensive since the October 7 attacks has systematically degraded both the symbolic power projection of Iran-affiliated proxies in the region, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as their military strike capabilities and material assets. The Houthis in Yemen are also under intensified aerial strikes. These are just the most recent losses. Iran suffered a major setback in 2020 when a U.S. drone strike killed its top IRGC general Qassem Soleimani at a Baghdad airport.

How Trump’s Coercion Could Backfire in Asia

Lynn Kuok

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A century after the “wedding of the oceans”—the moment when U.S. President Woodrow Wilson ordered the final step in the creation of the Panama Canal, linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and reshaping global trade—the United States is seeking to regain its influence over the waterway. In his inaugural address in January, President Donald Trump claimed that China was “operating” the canal and vowed that the United States would be “taking it back.” At a press conference, Trump refused to rule out using economic coercion, or even military force, to get his way—news reports later revealed that the White House had directed the Pentagon to draw up plans to seize the waterway by force. These threats seem to have had an effect: Panama has withdrawn from China’s Belt and Road Initiative and accepted the sale of port operations at each end of the canal by the Hong Kong holding company CK Hutchison to a group of investors led by the U.S. firm BlackRock. China’s antitrust regulator has since launched a review, stalling the deal, but whatever the ultimate fate of the canal, the episode sent a signal that Washington is willing to present countries with a stark ultimatum: side with the United States or face the consequences.

Washington is deploying coercive, us-or-them approaches elsewhere, too. Trump has demanded concessions in response to sweeping tariffs, pushed India to abandon an effort to reduce U.S. dollar dominance, and conditioned U.S. support for Ukraine on the country’s willingness to accept a peace deal with Russia, telling President Volodymyr Zelensky to “make a deal or we’re out.” Most explicitly, in February, Trump established a “fast track” investment process for “specified allies and partners”—but only on the condition that they refrain from “partnering” with “foreign adversaries in corresponding areas.”

Military schools offer test case for Trump education reforms

Lexi Lonas Cochran

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Military academies could increasingly show what President Trump wants to see from public schools and colleges.

While K-12 districts and universities are fighting back against book removals; transgender athlete bans; and the termination of diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) programs, the administration has a far freer hand at military institutions.

Military schools fall under an entirely different set of laws and regulations from public ones and are under the direct control of Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, though a recent protest at a military middle school in Germany shows students are not entirely on board with their reforms.

“Historically speaking, the military has always been one step ahead politically of where society is because of the controlled environment,” said Bobby Jones, president of Veterans for Responsible Leadership.

“In some respects, the military can be used as a social experimentation area because of the controlled environment, and everybody has to roger up to the orders,” Jones continued, adding “it would not surprise” him if what is happening at service academies was indicative of what the Trump administration wants at other universities.

How a trade war becomes a shooting war - Opinion

Max Boot

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In 2014, the eminent political scientist Graham Allison wrote an influential book called “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?” The subtitle referred to a famous passage in Thucydides’s “History of the Peloponnesian War”: “It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this inspired in Sparta, that made war inevitable.”

Allison surveyed the history of the past 500 years and found 16 cases in which a major nation’s rise has disrupted the position of a dominant state. In 12 of those instances, the result was war. And that includes two of the most horrific conflicts in history: World War I was caused in no small part by the rise of Imperial Germany, and World War II was caused by the rise of both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Allison sounded an alarm that another conflict was brewing because the rise of China was threatening U.S. hegemony. There was nothing inevitable about a U.S.-China conflict, he wrote in 2014, but the odds were that one would eventually erupt.

Allies Weigh In On The Future Under Trump 2.0

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Over the past two and a half months, as President Donald Trump’s administration has upended long-standing policies and assumptions about America’s role in the world, The Cipher Brief spoke to experts in multiple countries, all of which are U.S. allies, and all of which stand to be profoundly affected by the changes. From North America to Europe to Asia, shifts in the U.S. economic and geopolitical posture are producing a combination of concern and reflection among national security experts in many corners of the world.

In this report, The Cipher Brief shares excerpts from some of our most recent interviews with experts from a half dozen countries: Canada, Germany, Poland, Estonia, the Philippines and the United Kingdom. Not surprisingly, their reflections and reactions differ, given the range of national interests and differences in their relationships with the U.S. One thread ran through all the conversations: A hope that the sudden ruptures in U.S. policy – and in the world order – are not irreparable.

The Paradox of Liberty: Narrative Warfare and America’s Identity Crisis

Wesley Winkler

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The Problem

America was once a nation of stories. Freedom. Justice. The lone cowboy carving his own fate. The immigrant who builds something from nothing. The dream that anyone—anyone—could make it.

Now? We’ve lost the plot.

For all our talk of rugged individualism and self-determination, we Americans no longer know who we are. The melody of our story was lost in the cacophony of narrative warfare.

The American story is no longer told.

And when a nation stops telling its own story, someone else will do it for them.

The U.S. national security apparatus has failed to grasp what our adversaries already know: narrative is not just a tool. It is the mechanism by which humans define identity, differentiate the self from others, and make sense of the world.

America’s failure in this space is more than just an intellectual weakness—it’s a forfeiture of power, influence, and legitimacy. While we bicker over politics and seek comfort over moral courage, Russia, China, and other asymmetric adversaries are filling in the blanks.

Top U.S. Commanders See Major Pacific Risks

Tom Nagorski

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A pair of top U.S. military commanders warned Congress last week of dangers in their areas of operations which could factor in a potential war with China: the catastrophic fallout from a conflict over Taiwan; and the risk that the U.S. is falling behind in both military innovation and non-kinetic areas.

In separate appearances, Admiral Samuel J. Paparo Jr., Commander of INDOPACOM, painted a nightmarish picture of what a Taiwan war might look like; and Army Gen. Bryan P. Fenton, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), suggested ways in which the U.S. risked finding itself at a disadvantage in any such conflict.

Trump’s Tariffs Will Ensure America Can Win the Next War

Alexander B. Gray

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In announcing the recent “Liberation Day” tariffs, the Trump administration has offered several explanations for returning the United States to its highest cumulative tariff rates since the first decade of the twentieth century. The president, in imposing a 10 percent universal tariff and additional reciprocal tariffs on numerous countries, spoke to the fundamental American desire for fairness. The universal tariffs, now paused, have already successfully driven dozens of countries to the negotiating table, seeking to make a fair deal with the United States. The restoration of a vibrant manufacturing sector, protected by sound trade policies, will have salutary socioeconomic effects on communities across the United States.

These arguments are valid and important, and Americans of all political persuasions have a vested interest in the success of President Donald Trump’s trade agenda. Yet the most critical argument in favor of the Trump tariffs is one of national security: without a tariff policy that fundamentally reorients manufacturing capacity to the United States, the American military will be unable to sustain a protracted conflict with its greatest likely adversary, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Trump’s tariff agenda is not simply a policy preference; it is essential for the security and safety of the United States in the decades to come.

Why ASEAN Countries Often Run Trade Surpluses

James Guild

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When U.S. President Donald Trump unveiled his tariff plan to the world a few weeks ago, Southeast Asian countries were especially hard hit, with tariffs ranging from 18 percent on the Philippines to nearly 50 percent on Cambodia. Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos were looking at tariffs of between 24 and 48 percent.

ASEAN was seemingly treated more harshly than other regions because many of its member states run trade surpluses (in goods) with the United States, and Trump is obsessed with bilateral trade imbalances. Although the U.S. backed down within days, Trump’s wild ride does raise an interesting question: Why do so many countries in Southeast Asia run large trade surpluses, and is this actually a bad thing?

The simple answer is that countries in Southeast Asia run large trade surpluses because many have followed a model of economic development called export-oriented industrialization. One of the more reliable ways for an emerging market to accelerate economic growth is to manufacture things like textiles and electronics and then export them to foreign markets. Emerging markets can make these goods at lower cost because production inputs, such as labor, are generally lower than they are in the U.S. or Europe.

Russia doubles down on the Shahed

Matthew Bint & Fabian Hinz

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Russia’s use of one-way attack uninhabited aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs) in Ukraine intensified during the latter months of 2024 and has shown little sign of slowing in 2025.

Ukrainian Air Force figures show that since June 2024, there has been a month-on-month increase in OWA-UAV attacks, with 2,300 launched in November 2024 and 2,696 in January 2025. This growth has been enabled by Russia’s ability to increase local production of a version of the Iranian Shahed 136 OWA-UAV.

In 2022, Iran began supplying Shahed 131 and Shahed 136 OWA-UAVs for Russian use in the war in Ukraine. Shortly thereafter, Iran initiated a large-scale technology transfer programme to facilitate the production of these systems in Russia. Domestically manufactured variants of the Shahed 136, designated Geran-2, remain the cornerstone of Russia’s deep-strike OWA-UAV campaign.

Shahed production facilities

Russia’s commitment to the use of long-range OWA-UAVs is not only reflected by the increasing number of systems but also by the expansion of its production capacity. Ukrainian sources have previously stated that Russia produced more than 6,000 OWA-UAVs in 2024 and aims to increase these numbers through 2025. This claim is supported by satellite imagery showing the development of infrastructure for Shahed production.

Winning Without Fighting: How the United States Can Prevail in Irregular Warfare

Madyn Coakley & Brett Benedict

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China is no longer just investing in infrastructure abroad—it is building narratives, reshaping norms, and promoting authoritarian frameworks to overturn the liberal international order. In September 2021, President Xi Jinping addressed the UN General Assembly and introduced the Global Development Initiative (GDI), an unprecedented effort to lead the future of the Global South. Branded as a vision for “balanced, coordinated, and inclusive growth,” the GDI garnered wide support among developing nations. 

But that was only the start. Soon after, Beijing also unveiled the Global Security and Civilization Initiatives (GSI and GCI), expanding its agenda beyond economics to security and governing norms. These initiatives signal more than a rebranding of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—they represent a strategic effort to redefine the rules and norms of the international system.

Together, they form the backbone of Beijing’s grand strategy to achieve “national rejuvenation” by 2049. Instead of resorting to open conflict, China seeks to elevate itself to superpower status by developing economic and technological dependencies, discreetly extending its military influence through dual-use infrastructure, and spreading authoritarian norms abroad to shape perceptions and behavior in Beijing’s image. Meanwhile, Russia wages hybrid warfare in Eastern Europe and Africa, Iran expands its influence through regional proxies, and transnational violent extremist groups continue to thrive, further straining the liberal international order that China seeks to upend.

US Army could get super network speed, slashing energy use by 90% with new antenna

Prabhat Ranjan Mishra

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Researchers are making efforts to create new antennas that offer the speed of 5G networks but use only ten percent of the energy than current systems.

At a time when 5G networks require more energy than previous generations and each base station consumes as much energy as 73 U.S. households, a high network that consumes much less energy could be a cost-effective and profitable solution for all.

Funded by the U.S. Army, researchers at the University of Notre Dame are making efforts to offer a solution with much less energy consumption as the rollout of 5G technology has come with a steep energy cost.

New low-power antenna

Researchers revealed that the new low-power antenna is a type of millimeter-wave gradient index (GRIN) lens antenna. Although GRIN lenses have existed for over a century, the idea of developing a GRIN lens antenna for 5G networks once seemed far-fetched to most researchers in the field of wireless technology.

“Right now, a large portion of the cost to operate a cellular network is for electricity. If you look at a cell tower, you can see why: It uses a different antenna for each band, and these rely on active, powered chips,” said Jonathan Chisum, an associate professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering.

The Case for a U.S.-Led Military Alliance in Space

Andrew Hanna and Kathleen Curlee

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Far out in geosynchronous orbit, a Russian satellite moves through deep space. Cosmos 2553, nicknamed “Sput-nuke,” is designed to carry a nuclear payload that could render most satellites unusable. Meanwhile, China is pouring billions of dollars into developing advanced space capabilities, including anti-satellite weapons.

These weapons, known as ASATs, could change modern life on Earth as we know it—threatening GPS, weather forecasting, geospatial intelligence, and more. Also at stake is the burgeoning $1.8 trillion space economy that relies on open and free access to space.

The principles of a free, open, and peaceful space are enshrined in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which all major space powers have ratified, including the U.S., Russia, and China. The U.S. had sought to build on that landmark treaty when it launched the Artemis Accords in 2020, which 54 countries have so far signed on to. But the refusal of Russia and China to get on board—alongside the Kremlin’s veto last year of the first ever U.N. Security Council resolution on outer space, which condemned the placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit—are a sure as sign as any that a new approach is needed.

Every Marine A Drone Pilot: Individual Lethality To Go From Meters To Kilometers

Joseph Trevithick

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The increasing prevalence of weaponized drones, especially first-person-view (FPV) kamikaze types, and other man-portable precision munitions could lead to a change in the U.S. Marine Corps’ famous mantra of “every Marine a rifleman,” according to the general who oversees the training of the service’s new recruits.

Marine Lt. Gen. Benjamin Watson, who is currently head of Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM), talked yesterday about how the evolving nature of modern warfare is also impacting the very core of his service’s warrior ethos. Watson’s remarks came during a panel discussion on Marine Corps modernization at the Navy League’s Sea Air Space 2025 exhibition.

“One of our mantras, kind of bumper stickers, which has real meaning for us culturally as a service, is sort of ‘every Marine [a] rifleman,'” Watson said. Now, “the idea [is] that any Marine, using a precision weapon, can kill somebody who needs killing at ranges up to 500 meters.”

'The Risk…Is Not Winning.'

Chad Williamson

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It’s rare for a four-star general to speak in such stark, unscripted terms. But when the commander of our nation’s elite special operations forces (SOF) sounds the alarm on deterrence, modernization, and the future of irregular warfare—we should listen. Carefully. Not with partisan ears. Not through budget spreadsheets. But through the sobering lens of a strategic horizon being reshaped not by missiles, but by messages.

"There is a void out there that’s not being filled by our message," testified General Bryan Fenton before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Fenton’s testimony pulled back the curtain on a growing reality that in the cognitive domain—where perception, narrative, trust, and truth collide—the United States is not keeping pace. Our adversaries are not just advancing on physical terrain, they are contesting the information space with speed and sophistication.

The general's refrain—"small teams, small footprints, big impact"—captures the asymmetry of the modern battlefield. U.S. Special Operations Forces operate in 80 countries not to dominate but to connect, partner, and amplify. The value of these engagements is not just in capability-building, but in trust-building. And trust, as Fenton reminded the committee, is the true currency of enduring power.

The Partition of Ukraine: How the War with Russia Ends?

Michael Rubin

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The Idea of Partition for Ukraine: Bad Idea

Put aside how this would reward Russian belligerence and perhaps encourage Russian President Vladimir Putin to repeat in Moldova and northern Kazakhstan the land grabs he has undertaken in Georgia and Ukraine.

Putin may accelerate his conquests if he figures he can count on President Donald Trump and Kellogg to rationalize aggression in a way future U.S. presidents will not.

Putin might toast Kellogg’s compromise, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan might insert himself as a behind-the-scenes mediator.

Still, both Russia and Turkey might rue the day they acquiesce to any change in Ukraine’s borders. Frankly, so too might China and Nigeria.

Putin justified Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in part on the need to protect Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine whom many Kremlin voices and their amplifiers in the West said did not want to be part of Ukraine anyway. The willingness of Russian-speaking Ukrainians to fight and die for their country belied this, while the brutality of Russian forces ended any latent sympathy some Ukrainians had toward Moscow.

From Thucydides to Twitter

Phillip Dolitsky

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The recent shuttering of the Office of Net Assessment marks the end of an era at the Pentagon, closing the book on one of the few institutions that helped America think beyond the present moment. Whatever replaces it—whether it’s a restructured version of the same office or a new entity altogether (perhaps something with a name like the Office of Strategic Advantage)—will face a challenge far greater than mere bureaucratic reorganization: the modern strategist is drowning in information.

Crafting good military strategy requires slow, deliberate judgment and creativity, away from the noise of the present. Today, however, the strategist is often expected to function less like a grandmaster at a chessboard, creatively calculating future moves, and more like a stock trader, reacting in real-time to an unceasing flood of open-source intelligence, social media updates and political noise. The temptation to prioritize the immediate over the enduring, the transient over the real, is a relentless struggle in our digital age, and the sheer volume of information often obscures the truths that actually matter.

Elon Musk, Owner of X, Complains He’s Losing ‘Propaganda War’

Naomi LaChance

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Elon Musk, who owns one of the world’s biggest social media platforms, has spent many millions of dollars on politics as he helps Donald Trump slash the federal government and continue the administration’s attack on immigrants. Now, Musk is saying that he is losing the “propaganda war,” potentially through his own choices.

Recent polling shows people don’t like Musk. On Friday, numbers pundit Nate Silver posted on X that Musk’s popularity is at negative 14 points. Trump, for comparison, is at negative 5 points. The chart shows that Musk’s popularity markedly decreased when Trump took office, with 39.6 percent of respondents viewing him favorably as of this month.

Musk blamed this decline on liberals waging a successful propaganda campaign against him, and suggested that Republicans are not boosting him in kind. But he also more or less admitted he is making himself unpopular.

Hegseth’s Memo, What To Do Next

Tim Ray & Jim Smith

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As DOGE’s eye shifts to the Department of Defense and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth calls on his defense leaders to accelerate their workforce and recapitalization plans by the end of the week, our national security ecosystem has an unprecedented opportunity to radically restructure and set itself not for yesterday’s wars, but tomorrow’s security.

To seize the moment, DOGE and Secretary Hegseth's team have many reform options at their disposal: streamline bureaucratic processes, overhaul acquisitions, and double down on innovation. These are logical improvements. Many are essential. But like fixing an aircraft mid-flight, time is the defining performance indicator. And it is a sense of urgency, agility, and adaptability that will enable America’s success.

Great power competitions – be it between nation states or rival companies – are won by those that out-pace their adversaries. Advancing capabilities at a rapid pace leaves adversaries ‘playing catchup,’ trying to understand and then react. Consider Amazon, innovating quickly to stay ahead of large, capable retailers like Walmart who continually scramble to gain online market share.

Yet, crucially, outpacing an adversary does not require out-spending them. Apple defeated Nokia with quick design cycles focused on the user experience, despite Nokia spending nearly ten times more on R&D. Outspending creates an impressive collection of capabilities, but, a sustained competitive advantage requires a relentless focus on outcomes, not just capabilities.

Empires of the Future

Graham McAleer

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Techno-futurists commonly believe that a totally human-made future will advance individual liberty. Bruno Maçães is doubtful, arguing in World Builders: Technology and the New Geopolitics that the future will more likely see us living inside a metaverse crafted by one of the superpowers. He foresees AI delivering “a radical increase in the centrality of sovereign power” and believes the goal of today’s geopolitics is a hegemonic second genesis where all reside in an artificial cosmos that will be either American or Chinese.

This is not fairyland stuff, argues Maçães, for recent events show that the great powers are trying to scale up the smart city. In the imperialism of the future, a superpower aspires to be “a global system administrator.” A case where, as Maçães puts it, “your opponent is playing a video game. You are coding it.” This will be the consummation of the history of empire, for peoples will live so immersed in a state power metaverse that government and ordinary life are utterly fused: “the culmination of ideological power: a will disguised as thing.”

Maçães works for the consultancy firm Flint Global. A member of the European Council on Foreign Relations and one-time Secretary of State for European Affairs in Portugal, Maçães is the author of numerous highly regarded books on geopolitics. He is linguistically gifted—together with European languages, his research mines Russian and Chinese texts—and his books are characterized by a deft blending of philosophy and prediction. World Builders is sophisticated thinking, and time may prove Maçães right, but I wonder. There are four building blocks to his argument, and each can be queried.

Command Posts, the Iron Triangle, and 1st Armored Division in WFX 23-4

Doni Wong

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Introduction

In small wars and large-scale combat operations (LSCO), command posts require not only trained personnel, but mutually supportive physical infrastructure to properly execute the six functions of a command post per ATP 3-90.5, 2-5. During 1st Armored Division’s (1AD) most recent Warfighter Exercise (WFX), which focused on LSCO against a peer competitor in the European region, the Division further refined its own command post operations. The intention of this field report is to share key findings from that exercise, WFX 23-4, with the reader. The key findings from the exercise include: (1) a mutually supportive command post system, (2) acknowledgement of limitations of even the most ideal system, and (3) the need for iterative training with the appropriate focus and rigor to identify shortcomings.

During WFX 23-4, 1AD created a resilient and robust command post system through a deliberate training progression. The train-up, starting in the deserts of Fort Irwin’s National Training Center (NTC), and culminating with Warfighter (WFX) 23-4, 1AD Staff proved its capability through constant tests, mission-generated friction, and relentless contention with the opposing forces (OPFOR). Throughout these challenges 1AD’s headquarters maintained their full range of capabilities and it experienced no loss of tempo from inefficient systems and processes. 1AD used a framework known as the Iron Triangle to build a mutually supportive network of command posts, covering the inherent weaknesses of any single or desynchronized command post.