Indian Strategic Studies: 04/17/25

17 April 2025

Manipur and the Myanmar Conflict: Challenge for India with Implications for Regional Security Competition

Srini Sitaraman

The ongoing internal conflict in Myanmar is not just an isolated struggle; its ripple effects are fueling long-term ethnic tensions in Manipur, India. The political instability, armed resistance, and humanitarian crisis unfolding across Myanmar’s western states—particularly in Chin, Kachin, and Shan—are directly linked to the ethnic conflict in Manipur. As Myanmar remains embroiled in a civil war against the ruling Tatmadaw military junta, the conflict’s transnational impact continues to exacerbate the already fragile ethnic dynamics in India’s northeastern states. This interconnected security challenge requires a nuanced, multi-faceted, and conscious response from New Delhi, recognizing the unique circumstances faced by each border state.

Manipur: The Epicenter of Spillover Effects

Although the India-Myanmar border spans 1,100 miles with three key northeastern states—Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram—the Myanmar conflict disproportionately affects Manipur’s security environment. Unlike Nagaland and Mizoram, where cross-border ethnic kinship exists but is less volatile, Manipur is experiencing an intensified security crisis due to the deep ethnic linkages between Myanmar’s western provinces and Manipur’s Kuki-Zo and Meitei communities. The Free Movement Regime (FMR), which historically allowed unrestricted cross-border movement, has facilitated the movement of refugees, armed militants, and illicit trafficking networks.[1] This has further complicated Manipur’s existing ethnic strife as armed groups leverage the border to regroup, reinforce, and retaliate against rival factions.[2]

The ongoing clashes between the Kuki-Zo and Meitei communities in Manipur mirror the broader ethnic divisions in Myanmar, making the situation even more volatile.[3] Cross-border kinship ties have led to the direct involvement of armed factions on both sides, escalating violence within Manipur.[4] The porous border has also enabled the influx of weapons and narcotics from Myanmar, aggravating security concerns for India. Given Manipur’s unique geographic and ethnic context, the Myanmar conflict catalyzes and prolongs the extreme internal instability in the state.[5]

China holds more trade war cards than Trump thinks

Linggong Kong

When Donald Trump pulled back on his plan to impose eye-watering tariffs on trading partners across the world, there was one key exception: China.

While the rest of the world would be given a 90-day reprieve on additional duties beyond the new 10% tariffs on all US trade partners, China would feel the squeeze even more. On April 9, 2025, Trump raised the tariff on Chinese goods to 125%.

The move, in Trump’s telling, was prompted by Beijing’s “lack of respect for global markets.” But the US president may well have been smarting from Beijing’s apparent willingness to confront US tariffs head-on.

While many countries opted not to retaliate against Trump’s now-delayed reciprocal tariff hikes, instead favoring negotiation and dialogue, Beijing took a different tack. It responded with swift and firm countermeasures.

On April 11, China dismissed Trump’s moves as a “joke” and raised its own tariff against the US to 125%. In retaliation, Trump later raised his tariffs on China to 145% before declaring an exemption for certain electronics.

The two economies are now locked in an all-out, high-intensity trade standoff. And China is showing no signs of backing down.

Why Beijing Is Standing Up to Trump - Analysis

Deng Yuwen

Despite threats from U.S. President Donald Trump to impose sweeping tariffs worldwide, only China has truly stood firm. The European Union and Canada have also displayed tough attitudes, but Beijing has responded with two rounds of reciprocal tariffs against the United States, alongside nontariff measures such as export controls, the addition of new U.S. firms to China’s “unreliable entity list,” and antitrust investigations. Rhetorically, China has declared it will “fight to the end” against what it calls Washington’s unilateralism.

Beijing is under no illusion that this course of action will offend Trump. It understands well that to “fight to the end” may lead to a complete halt in bilateral trade—tantamount to an economic decoupling in practice. With current tariff rates now effectively nearing 150 percent, and exemptions limited to essential or irreplaceable goods, most trade is no longer feasible. Prior to diplomatic normalization, bilateral trade between the two nations was only around $2 billion. If trade today can be maintained at even 20 percent of pre-tariff levels, under these rules, it would be considered a success.

IDEOLOGY TO ACADEMIA: THE ROLE OFCONFUCIUS INSTITUTES IN SOUTH ASIA

KAVYAA KANNAN

The intersection of education and nationalistic ideology has long been a contested area in several disciplines. Education not only serves as an influence and a tool in shaping national identity, but also shapes international diplomatic relations and strategy. This dual role is highlighted in several studies across international relations, economics, law, business management, history, and sociology (cf. Bénéï 2007, Peterson et al. 2001, Kipnis 2011). China uses educational diplomacy as a strategic tool on several fronts; enabling cross-country cultural and technology exchanges, and allowing for diplomatic relations and infrastructural projects (Jain 2021). Establishing Confucius Institutes (CIs) in other countries, is a key strategic move that China frequently employs in order to facilitate cross-country exchanges. The use of higher education to promote a series of multifaceted goals leads to the creation of a system of education wherein cultural, nation-branding pedagogies are emphasised, while at the same time it acts as a step towards achieving their more comprehensive long-term developmental goals.

In South Asia, the presence of Confucius Institutes reflects an effort by China to extend its soft power and influence in the region. Often considered another upcoming superpower, India is one of China’s competitors in the economic and technological realm. On the other hand, China is making major inroads in terms of strategic relations with Nepal and Pakistan through projects such as the Belt-and-Road Initiative and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (Curtis et al. 2024, Gupta 2023). Analysing the role of Confucius Institutes in South Asian countries, while examining their impact as tools of soft power in advancing China’s national interests provides valuable insights into geopolitical challenges and differences that affect perceptions of the region. This article aims to integrate insights from historical studies as well as emerging contemporary literature from the field of China Studies to investigate the dynamics of China’s foray into educational diplomacy and emphasise the importance of education in international relations and its implications for the evolving power dynamics in the region.

Adapting to the PLA’s Near Constant Satellite Surveillance

Kristin Burke

The U.S. and Chinese militaries have something new in common. Both must now operate under each other’s nearly constant satellite surveillance.1 Luckily, the United States has a legacy tool to alert commanders of foreign satellite overflights; the U.S. military just needs to consistently use it, even at bases in the United States. The Chinese continue to use their version of the satellite warning system, arguably with success. Usage of the tool is down in the United States, but routinely high in China. Indeed, in the words of a unit of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) Special Operations Forces, “It is equally important to be good at ‘hiding’ as it is to be able to ‘fight’ …by using superior concealment capabilities to evade your adversary's intelligence reconnaissance… the adversary [becomes] ‘blind’ and ‘deaf.’”2

This article attempts a red team analysis of increasing Chinese satellite surveillance to find additional methods of adaptation for the United States military. The article suggests that the U.S.’s existing tools should be used to compliment new plans, rather than be thrown out. The suggestion is based on an analysis of how the Chinese military has responded to decades of satellite surveillance from the United States.

New problem, but the same useful solution

Even though the U.S. and China share this same problem, their responses are different. Current U.S. mitigation plans are focused on funding more satellites, potentially using offensive counterspace weapons, or even simply letting the adversary see more in an attempt to deter. 3 The Chinese on the other hand have for decades rigorously buttressed their operational security at the same time as advancing technological solutions like counter-ISR.4

Where Were Big Tech’s CEOs on Tariffs?

Lauren Goode

If you logged on to X or Bluesky this past week, you were likely swept up in the onslaught of posts about Trump’s reciprocal tariffs and the plunging stock market. And, if you follow the tech industry as closely as I do, you probably also noticed who wasn’t posting about the tariffs: many of the same tech founders and CEOs who flanked Trump on Inauguration Day in January. Jeff Bezos, Tim Cook, Sundar Pichai, and Mark Zuckerberg have kept mum on the topic of tariffs (although both Pichai and Zuckerberg have continued posting about AI). Meanwhile, Elon Musk—well, we’ll get to that.

The silence was deafening, considering that the “magnificent seven” collectively lost trillions of dollars in market value following Trump’s tariff announcement last week. But there’s a cold logic behind these tech leaders holding their tongues in public—particularly for those who sell hardware. The US has become a highly volatile nation where the whims of the president must be taken into consideration before using any political chip or making a public statement, especially in an environment where that statement could be irrelevant an hour later.

“The sand doesn’t stop shifting long enough to make a cogent statement,” one top communications executive, who has worked closely with two Big Tech CEOs, tells me.

Trump threatens new tariffs on smartphones days after exempting them

Madeline Halpert

Donald Trump says Chinese-made smartphones and other electronics will not be exempt from tariffs - adding they are simply moving into a different levy "bucket".

European stock markets bounced up on Monday morning after Friday's official announcement that some of these products would escape levies of up to 145%.

China has called on Donald Trump to "completely cancel" his tariffs regime, and "return to the right path of mutual respect".

However US officials said on Sunday that products would be subject to a "semiconductor tariff" instead, with Trump expected to reveal more details later.

US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said the new levy would be in addition to a host of global tariffs the US imposed earlier this month, then paused for 90 days.

"We need our medicines and we need semiconductors and our electronics to be built in America," he added.

On Saturday, a US customs notice revealed smartphones, computers and some other electronic devices would be excluded from the 125% tariff on goods entering the country from China.

Losing A War Before It Started

Phillips P. OBrien

Hi All,

The best single argument that I can make that Trump is not acting like a Russian agent is that he is being too blatant in his action. Agents, or so we are told, should be inconspicuous and not draw too much attention to themselves. They normally do not want to openly do the work of their controllers, lest they blow their cover. Beyond this, however, what we see in Trump is a persistent, almost pathological, drive to weaken the USA internally and externally. Any Russian agent would be hard pressed to do more. Internally he is disregarding unanimous decisions of the Supreme Court (which if allowed to stand will destroy the whole concept of the rule of law in the USA), has hobbled Congress by compelling it to give up its powers, and is trying to break the independence of America’s press and universities. Far from being “conservative” this is the most radical set of destructive policies he could follow—and it is very hard to see how the genies that he is releasing will ever be put back in their bottles

In terms of international relations he is being just a destructive to America’s world position. Under the guise of making America “great again”, he has pursued a set of policies that is weakening America’s influence, destroying the relationships on which the American century was based, and strengthening those countries which see themselves as America’s adversaries.

A running list of Trump's second-term national security controversies

Justin Klawans, The Week US

President Donald Trump's second administration has not been lacking in scandal. One of the largest incidents recently occurred among high-ranking administration officials and has been dubbed "Signalgate." But this is far from the White House's only controversy related to national security.

Signalgate

On March 24, Jeffrey Goldberg, the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, revealed that he had been added to a group chat in the messaging app Signal about an upcoming U.S. strike against the Houthis in Yemen. Members of the chat included Vice President J.D. Vance, National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and others.

Soon after Goldberg was added to the chat, bombs began falling in Yemen, confirming that the conversation was real. It is "not uncommon for national security officials to communicate on Signal," said Goldberg in his initial article. But the app is "used primarily for meeting planning and other logistical matters — not for detailed and highly confidential discussions of a pending military action." The discussion "concerned the timing and rationale of attacks on the Houthis" and eventually "veered toward the operational," Goldberg said in a follow-up article.

Decision Point for Putin is Set Too Close for His Comfort

Pavel K. Baev

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Steven Witkoff, U.S. President Donald Trump’s key negotiator, met last Friday in what could mark a decisive moment in making or breaking a peace deal on Russia’s war against Ukraine. This conversation lasted about 4.5 hours, but next to nothing has been revealed about its content and outcome. This resounding silence indicates Putin’s displeasure with the U.S. pressure and perhaps his reckoning with the need to make a decision on at least a ceasefire. In the meantime, two Russian Iskander missiles struck the Ukrainian city of Sumy on Palm Sunday, observed as a holiday by many Ukrainians, killing 34 people including two children (Kyiv Independent, April 14). Russia’s Ministry of Defense has claimed responsibility for the strikes, justifying them as targeted against a meeting of the command staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Seversk operational-tactical group (Telegram/@Ministry of Defense of Russia, April 14).

Putin arranged the meeting with Witkoff in St. Petersburg, likely to buy himself more time before making any concessions, as an unnecessary and curtailed session was held on the prospects for building up the Russian Navy (Kommersant, April 12). The real purpose of holding the talks in St. Petersburg was apparently to create an opportunity for Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s newly-promoted courtier who was also present for the talks in Saudi Arabia, to take Witkoff to the grand choral synagogue on the eve of Pesah, or Passover (see EDM, February 18; Fontanka.ru, April 11). The setting implied that the Russian leader prepares to celebrate Easter, as is his established habit, after which the preparations for the Victory Day parade would occupy his agenda, which further implied that talks on an armistice could only occur in mid-May after these events occur.

The real ‘Great Replacement’

Dawn Stover

Non-white immigrants are “poisoning the blood” of the United States, destroying American culture, threatening to turn white Americans into a minority, and taking jobs from American citizens. The Democratic Party is importing immigrants to tip the scales in US elections.

That’s according to the Great Replacement, a fringe conspiracy theory that was invented by the French writer Renaud Camus in the late 1990s and has become increasingly mainstream within the Republican Party. Prominent figures such as JD Vance, Elon Musk, and Tucker Carlson have spread the theory. President Donald Trump has echoed its language, and an October 2024 national poll found two-thirds of Republicans endorsing some form of the theory.

It turns out that the Great Replacement is real. However, it isn’t brown-skinned immigrants who are coming for your government, your job, and your culture. It’s AI.

A debunked theory. The Republican version of the Great Replacement, which is primarily about undocumented immigrants coming into the United States and voting out the white majority, is hogwash. Noncitizens are not allowed to vote in federal elections. Of the 678 million votes cast in presidential elections over the past 22 years, fewer than 100 were cast by noncitizens. That’s according to the Heritage Foundation, the conservative organization behind Project 2025, which keeps detailed records of proven voter fraud.

The Old War Is Over in Gaza, and a New One Is Underway

David E. Rosenberg

When Israeli jets struck Beit Lahia, Rafah, Nuseirat, and al-Mawasi last month, killing some 400 Palestinians in the process, the assault seemed like the resumption of the war being fought in Gaza since the Oct. 7, 2023, when Hamas-led militants attacked Israel and killed 1,200 people. The two sides had struck a cease-fire agreement in January that included the release of some Israeli hostages—but the truce fell apart in just weeks. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed the new assault as a means of forcing Hamas to release the remaining hostages. “From now on, negotiations will be conducted only under fire,” he said in a televised address on March 18.

But three weeks into the fighting, it has become clear that Israel is now waging a different war, with different goals and tactics—sufficiently different that it might be useful to think of January as the end of the first Israeli war in Gaza triggered by Oct. 7 and the March assault as the beginning of a second one. Netanyahu suggested as much recently when he said that “this is only the beginning,” the implication being that this wasn’t a war to rack up tactical gains before resuming talks but rather something bigger.

Time for the rest of the West to club together

Hugo Dixon

The rest of the West can no longer rely on the United States. The European Union, Japan, Britain, Canada and others need to reduce their dependency on Washington while not becoming reliant on China. That means weaning themselves off the dollar, boosting cooperation in trade and defence, and reaching out to emerging economies such as India.

As U.S. President Donald Trump swings his wrecking ball through the global trading system and bullies formerly staunch American allies, other developed countries will have to form a new club without the U.S. They can be stronger if they work together. Mark Carney, Canada’s prime minister, has suggested as much.

Trump will dislike any initiative that smacks of other countries joining forces against the United States. He has already warned, opens new tab Canada and the European Union not to coordinate their response to his chaotic tariff policy.

The president’s massive U-turn on trade last week has weakened his position on the global stage. But he remains a formidable force. So the rest of the West would be wise to avoid antagonising him unnecessarily.

DETHRONING THE DOLLAR

Trump is not just tearing up the world trading system. His administration is undermining faith in the dollar, which accounts for 58%, opens new tab of official reserves.

Shootings, debt and political paralysis show Brussels is falling apart

Hanne Cokelaere

A string of fatal drug-related shootings in the heart of the city that houses the EU’s institutions has brought home just how far Brussels has fallen: bankrupt, plagued by violence and crime, and politically wrecked.

In the first month and a half of this year alone, 11 shootings claimed the lives of two people and injured another four. They haven’t stopped. Unthinkable just a few years ago, the attacks betray a city in sharp decline and reveal the desperate need for some strong political leadership.

But Brussels doesn’t have any.

Belgium’s labyrinthine political structure contains a multilayered system of government, each with its own powers and often beset by infighting. When they work, things are fine, but when they don’t, paralysis results. And things don’t get much more paralyzed than in the Brussels region where, nine months after the election, politicians are still arguing with no government in sight.

It’s not just the coordination of Brussels’ crime-fighting that has been exposed by the political mess. The construction of social housing and major infrastructure projects also risks being delayed. Subsidies — such as for charities, NGOs and cultural projects — are frozen. Funding for social welfare centers, police and local authority work is shrouded in uncertainty. Public debt is piling up almost as quickly as the garbage bags on the dirty streets.

Stephen Miran Makes a Thoughtful Case for Tariffs

Matthew Blakey

Though often viewed as blunt, outdated, and inflationary instruments, tariffs may offer the United States a strategic path forward. As Stephen Miran, Chairman of Trump’s Council of Economic Advisors, argues, tariffs—if used correctly—can help restructure the global trading system, rebalance fiscal policy, and preserve American competitiveness.

The Harvard-trained economist and former senior Treasury advisor penned a trailblazing November 2024 essay titled “A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System”, in which he argues that tariffs, when combined with strategic policy can be noninflationary and revenue- generating tools that advance US interests.

In the paper, which has largely flown under the radar, Miran presents a view in which America’s vast trade deficits, manufacturing decline, and fiscal imbalance are the expected consequences of America’s role as the issuer of the world’s reserve currency. This arrangement requires the U.S. to run “twin defects”- by issuing vast quantities dollar-denominated assets like Treasuries and simultaneously becoming a net-importer to supply the world with dollars needed for global transactions.

A Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Europe Is All but Certain - Analysis

John R. Deni

The Trump administration has only just begun to fill its ranks with the political appointees who will flesh out the future of U.S. defense policy. One item sure to be on their agenda is a review of U.S. military deployments around the world, known in Pentagon-speak as a posture review. As part of this process, officials are likely to scrutinize the status of U.S. military forces in Europe.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s first-term policies—and early rhetoric during his second term—indicate that the U.S. military presence in Europe is likely to change fundamentally as a result of the posture review. Over the last 80 years, the United States has played a leading role in conventional defense and deterrence in Europe. But the Trump administration has made clear that Europeans should take on primary responsibility for defending the continent.

Russia’s Hybrid Attacks in Europe: From Deterrence to Attribution to Response

Henrik Praks

Introduction

As Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has entered its fourth year, its hybrid attacks have become a regular occurrence across Europe.1 While the focus previously was on activities in the cyber and information domains, Russia now frequently employs kinetic attacks. Cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and attempts to manipulate electoral processes are accompanied by sabotage against infrastructure, arson, and other physical attacks conducted by persons recruited by Russian intelligence services. Moreover, Russia and its vassal state of Belarus utilise migration pressure against neighbouring countries, while navigation systems in many areas are affected by electronic interference. Since late 2023, four commercial ships travelling to or from Russian ports in the Baltic Sea have been suspected of cutting data and electricity cables as well as the seabed gas pipeline.

These malign activities can no longer be dismissed as mere nuisance, given their rising frequency and intensity. Russia’s aggressive actions now represent an escalating campaign of hybrid warfare, directly affecting the security and stability of European nations. As Russia is not unique in using hybrid methods, their effects and our response are closely followed by other actors, first and foremost China. Autocratic regimes favour hybrid warfare precisely because democratic states struggle with responding directly and proportionally while also being more open and much easier to penetrate for such subterfuge. The attacks are usually deliberately designed to complicate detection, evade accountability, and hinder decisive responses. Additionally, the targeted nations may lack the capability or the political will to respond effectively.

Jamestown FoundationChina Brief, March 28, 2025, v. 25, no. 6

Autonomous Battlefield: PLA Lessons from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

The Party’s One-Way Approach to People-to-People Exchanges

PRC Deploys DeepSeek Across Local Governments

Battling Nihilism: The PRC’s Quest for Autonomy

Brain-Computer Interface Systems, Qiyuan Lab, and the PRC’s AI Push

Russia’s Progress Slows In Ukraine, Despite Flouting Ceasefire Terms – Analysis

Hudson Institute

By Can Kasapoğlu

1. Battlefield Assessment

According to defense intelligence reports from the United Kingdom, the pace of Russia’s territorial gains decreased last month. But Ukraine continues to struggle to generate sufficient manpower to face Russia’s forces, which the Kremlin has augmented with record-high conscriptions and North Korean troops.

In March Russia seized 55 square miles of Ukrainian territory. In comparison, Russian forces captured more than 280 square miles of Ukrainian soil in November 2024. The Russian military is now gaining less than two square miles per day, sometimes at a cost of over 1,000 casualties. This is in part a result of Ukraine’s efforts to stabilize the front in Pokrovsk, a fulcrum of its defensive architecture for the eastern half of the country.

Still, the slowing pace of Russia’s territorial gains does not mean that the Kremlin has reduced its operational tempo. The Pokrovsk front, particularly the axis approaching the city from the southwest, continues to see intense fighting and heavy casualties. The Russian military also registered tactical gains near Velyka Novosilka and the important flashpoint of Kharkiv.

Trump’s Tariff Gambit: A Blunt Instrument In A Sharpening Global Trade War – Analysis

Dr. Imran Khalid

In another characteristically brash maneuver, Donald Trump has intensified his economic confrontation with Beijing, announcing an unprecedented 125 percent tariff on Chinese imports while granting a 90-day tariff reprieve to every other major trading nation. Far from being a calculated economic strategy, the move appears tailor-made for campaign optics, an attempt to project toughness against China while mollifying allies and partners he had antagonized on April 2.

But behind the performance lies a dangerous gamble. Trump’s decision to selectively isolate China is more than a tactical jab. It’s a provocation aimed at economically cornering Beijing while reshaping the global trade order around a self-serving American center of gravity. The problem? This approach is shortsighted, economically risky, and geopolitically counterproductive.

Beijing views these tariffs not simply as economic pressure, but as strategic coercion. In response, China has already imposed retaliatory duties on American imports, but this is likely just the beginning. Expect a two-tiered response from China: short-term countermeasures aimed at immediate damage control and long-term systemic shifts designed to reduce vulnerability to American economic power. In the short term, China will target key U.S. exports, especially agricultural goods and high-value manufactured components from politically sensitive states. It will also double down on efforts to court the very countries Trump has temporarily exempted from tariffs, expanding bilateral trade and investment deals to create a buffer zone against Washington’s hostility.

Russia Has Unlocked the Secret to Hypersonic Missiles—And That’s a Direct Threat to America

Matt Berman

Hypersonic missiles are capable of traveling more than 3,800 miles per hour and striking targets over 1,700 miles away. While America has yet to deploy a hypersonic missile system amid multiple delays, its adversaries, particularly China and Russia, have already raced ahead. Their weapons may have nuclear payload capabilities that can cross oceans, worrying some American officials about the status of comparable U.S. weapons for defense and deterrence.

Now, the U.S. Army finally seems close to deploying its first hypersonic missile system. Officially known as the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, the system better known as “Dark Eagle” represents a leap in missile technology. However, the project deadline has continued creeping farther past its 2023 deadline since the Army initiated its accelerated delivery six years ago. Amidst recent news that the missile is technically flightworthy, a question remains: are these potentially expensive delays simply a sign of continued testing or a symptom of doubts and speculation in the military community about the ultimate purpose of such a missile? Does the system’s very potential—a high level of destruction—cause too much concern for it to be rolled out in battle yet?

Satellite Internet Explained: How It Works & Why It Matters

Ashwin Prasad

Introduction

Internet connectivity in a country is often likened to neuron connectivity in a human body.1 It enables the transmission of information in real-time across the various discrete systems and actors. It is a fundamental technology that holds enormous integrative abilities across technologies in the civilian and military domains. Internet infrastructure equips this connectivity and consequently becomes central to national strategic information infrastructure.

Internet connectivity can be provisioned by infrastructure on the ground, from space, or, a combination of the two. Ground-based networks for internet connectivity are the most prevalent. They use land-based infrastructure, such as cables, antennas, and towers. Highly populated urban centres present the easiest opportunity for these ground-based internet infrastructure investments. Despite the high initial capital expense, groundbased networks can cater to a large customer base in a densely populated region and therefore are able to offer internet services at low costs. With increasing digitisation and higher smartphone penetration, ground-based networks have also expanded to non-urban population centres.

Despite the cost advantage, ground-based networks suffer many limitations. Their need for local physical infrastructure makes ground-based networks economically unviable in sparsely populated areas. Also, natural disasters like floods and earthquakes can disrupt ground-based internet when communication is critical and downtime is not an option. Even when networks remain functional, disasters and emergencies are accompanied by a sharp surge in usage, resulting in network congestion and tower overruns. 3 Additionally, the demand for ready internet availability on-the-go in remote locations or for operations in temporary sites cannot be fulfilled by groundbased systems.

Could this breakthrough in robot manufacturing reshape warfare?

PATRICK TUCKER

A new way to train factory robots could revolutionize how militaries make drones and other weapons, enabling high-volume manufacturing close to front lines. And beyond the battlefield, it shows a possible path forward in the next era of manufacturing, a topic central to the competition between the United States and China, which the National Defense Strategy calls the “pacing challenge.”

The paper, published in the January issue of the International Journal of Extreme Manufacturing, lays out a transformative vision of AI-driven additive manufacturing, or AAM.

Today’s factory robots only are capable of a set number of rigid movements, are difficult to adapt to new tasks, and require highly specialized places on production floors. They can’t see when they are lined up incorrectly, or when they make mistakes.

The new system—developed by an international team of researchers from California State University, Northridge; the National University of Singapore; NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory; and the University of Wisconsin-Madison—uses highly-skilled engineers to train robots in a much fuller range of human-like movements, enabling them to perceive and (on a basic level) understand what they are doing. When combined with 3D printing technology, the framework opens up the possibility of complete end-to-end manufacturing of electronics, like the small drones re-shaping the battlefield in Ukraine.

INTEGRATED DETERRENCE IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL

The Principles of Deterrence Still Hold, It’s Just More Complex

At its core, the foundational intellectual and practical tenets of deterrence still hold in this era of renewed strategic competition and evolving technological complexity. Deterrence remains the use of policies and threats of action to induce an actor to stop or prevent an action from taking place (as opposed to compellence, which is the use of policies or threats of action to force an actor to do something). Deterrence is part of grand strategy and statecraft, designed to ensure that two parties or more of considerable power can co-exist. Its success is based on something not happening as opposed to an action occurring. It is, therefore, often difficult to define what action or series of actions caused the effect.

Successful deterrence remains predicated on shaping adversary perceptions—it is inherently part of a broader dialogue between states. If the threats or responses do not exceed the level of target aggression or willingness to incur pain—if, in effect, the potential costs do not outweigh the perceived benefits of acting—deterrence is ineffective. As described below, this necessitates considerable understanding of one’s adversary and oneself. Deterrence is also based upon clarity of policy and intention. If the policy or intentions are unclear or vague, or they create alternative courses of action (such as pre-emptive action), deterrence will be ineffective. Equally, the responses themselves require clarity—it is no use leaving the response unclear as it creates space for adversary interpretation. Finally, the deterring state’s threats must be credible—the aggressor or adversary must believe that the deterring state will carry out its threats.

At the edge: What it takes to bring fast, robust decision-making to the tactical edge

In today’s battlespace, rapid and informed decision-making is more critical than ever to mission success. But at the tactical edge, where warfighters encounter isolated, unpredictable environments with limited and unreliable communication networks, traditional cloud computing simply can’t process and relay information fast enough, if at all. What warfighters in these environments need is technology that can operate independently from traditional data centers to deliver robust data quickly where and when it’s needed.

“We need edge computing solutions that are fast, efficient and capable of handling complex analytics right at the point of sensor collection,” said Katherine Martin, a chief engineer at Booz Allen who specializes in tailoring machine learning capabilities to establish decision advantage at the tactical edge, speaking at the recent Defense One Genius Machines conference. Tactical edge computing is a way to process data locally in real time. It is completely disconnected from the cloud and does not rely on centralized servers. This type of technology is critical in medical military operations, for example, where warfighters need to take rapid, decisive action.

“In these environments, there's no time to wait for data to be sent to a data center, be processed and then get sent back. Tactical edge computing puts the decision-making power directly in the hands of the warfighter, wherever they are, even in the most isolated locations,” Martin said.