Indian Strategic Studies: 04/16/25

16 April 2025

Interpreting India’s Cyber Statecraft

Joe Devanny and Arthur P.B. Laudrain

Introduction

This paper explores India’s cyber statecraft by illustrating how India uses its cyber capabilities, policies, and engagement in cyber diplomacy to further its national strategic objectives. The paper focuses principally on the international diplomatic and operational dimensions of India’s cyber statecraft, but it also explains the connection between domestic and international aspects of Indian strategy. India is widely seen as an influential emerging power of the Global South and as a committed advocate for reform of global institutions. However, there is considerable ambiguity surrounding India’s cyber doctrine.

Following a series of similar studies for the Carnegie Endowment’s Technology and International Affairs Program, this paper focuses on cyber diplomacy in so-called middle ground states.1 These are states in the Global South perceived as being pivotal in the competition for influence between liberal like-minded and authoritarian states. Like previous studies on Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico, this paper situates India’s approach to cyber statecraft in the context of contemporary global debates in cyber diplomacy, principally regarding responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The complexity of India’s bilateral relationships with China and Russia and the intricacies of its approach to managing “multi-alignment” are further reasons for the considerable Western interest in understanding the objectives and mechanisms of Indian cyber statecraft.2

BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants

Stewart Patrick, Erica Hogan, Oliver Stuenkel, Alexander Gabuev, Ashley J. Tellis, Tong Zhao, Gustavo de Carvalho, Steven Gruzd, Amr Hamzawy, Etsehiwot Kebret, Elina Noor, Karim Sadjadpour, Ebtesam Al-Ketbi, Victor Mijares, Ovigwe Eguegu, Abdulaziz Sager, Gilles Yabi, Sinan Ülgen, and Trinh Nguyen

Introduction

At their October 2024 summit in Kazan, Russia, the original five members of the BRICS coalition—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—welcomed into their fold four new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In January 2025, Indonesia became the bloc’s tenth member. Nine other nations have been officially designated as “partner countries,” and some two dozen have either been invited to join (for example, Saudi Arabia) or expressed interest in doing so (for example, Türkiye). BRICS states including Russia have touted the group’s expansion as a defining moment, heralding the dawn of a post-Western world order in which the “global majority” is finally empowered.

Among analysts, the significance of the BRICS expansion remains a matter of debate. On paper, “BRICS+” has the potential to become a major geopolitical and geoeconomic force. The bloc already boasts about 45 percent of the world’s population, generates more than 35 percent of its GDP (as measured in purchasing power parity, or PPP), and produces 30 percent of its oil. BRICS countries have also established an extensive and thickening latticework of intergovernmental cooperation. In addition to founding dedicated institutions such as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), created in 2014 with an initial funding of $100 billion, and the New Development Bank (NDB) established in 2015 with an initial subscribed capitalization of $50 billion, the coalition has (like the G7 and G20 forums) embraced networked minilateralism, launching transnational partnerships and working groups on topics of shared interest from energy security to health, climate change, sustainable development, and technology transfer. BRICS avowedly seeks to challenge Western-dominated institutions of global economic governance, as well as to displace the U.S. dollar from its entrenched role in the world economy. Many analysts therefore depict BRICS expansion as a watershed moment in the shift to a more egalitarian international system.

Afghanistan New Geopolitical Game Among Russia, US, and China’s Strategies

Background Information

Following the US withdrawal in 2021, the Taliban merged territorial control and reconstituted governance mechanisms under a theocratic regime. Although not officially recognised, Russia and China, among other regional powers, have kept in touch with the Taliban leadership.

In early 2025, Russia’ General Prosecutor’s Office petitioned the Supreme Court to delist the Taliban as a terrorist organisation. This legal-political manoeuvre reflects Moscow’s intent to expand its influence and economic ties in Afghanistan, which it frames as a stabilising force in Central Asia. Commenting the upcoming Russian decision, Afghan government spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid stated that removing the Taliban from the list of terrorist organisations would pave the way for stronger diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries.

Concurrently, the People’s Republic of China has intensified military and intelligence cooperation with the Taliban. Between 8 and 12 January 2025, Chinese military intelligence officials visited the Wakhan Corridor, reportedly to complete joint security coordination frameworks and reinforce border defence mechanisms. The region is critical because of its proximity to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and historical use as a transit route for extremist elements.

In April 2025, reports emerged alleging a US C-17A aircraft landed at Bagram Air Base, carrying senior CIA personnel, potentially including Deputy Director John Ratcliffe. Unconfirmed and possibly speculative reports have raised regional concerns about a potential, covert US return to Afghanistan, perhaps tied to containing Iran, Russia, and China in the region and broader intelligence efforts.

Hundred-Year Storm Tides Will Occur Every Few Decades In Bangladesh

Tropical cyclones are hurricanes that brew over the tropical ocean and can travel over land, inundating coastal regions. The most extreme cyclones can generate devastating storm tides — seawater that is heightened by the tides and swells onto land, causing catastrophic flood events in coastal regions. A new study by MIT scientists finds that, as the planet warms, the recurrence of destructive storm tides will increase tenfold for one of the hardest-hit regions of the world.

In a study that will appear in One Earth, the scientists report that, for the highly populated coastal country of Bangladesh,what was once a 100-year event could now strike every 10 years — or more often — by the end of the century.

In a future where fossil fuels continue to burn as they do today, what was once considered a catastrophic, once-in-a-century storm tide will hit Bangladesh, on average, once per decade. And the kind of storm tides that have occurred every decade or so will likely batter the country’s coast more frequently, every few years.

Trump is waiting for Xi to call. The Chinese see it differently

Kylie Atwood, Kayla Tausche, Kevin Liptak, Jeremy Herb and Alayna Treene

A tariff reprieve from President Donald Trump sent global markets soaring on Wednesday, with the White House saying it’s been in touch with dozens of countries about striking deals, lining up calls and meetings in the coming weeks.

But one country was conspicuously absent from any outreach: China

As the rest of the world received a 90-day respite, Trump escalated tariffs on China, saying the US will now charge an extra 145% on all Chinese goods that arrive in the US. In response, Beijing ratcheted up its own tariffs on American goods Friday to 125%, and the country’s leader — who Trump is urgently working to engage — warned China was “not afraid” of a prolonged trade conflict.

In private discussions hours before China announced new retaliatory tariffs, the Trump administration warned Chinese officials against such a move, according to a source familiar with the discussions.

The Chinese were also told – once again – that Chinese President Xi Jinping should request a call with US President Donald Trump.

China Doesn’t Fear Tariffs. It Fears a Credible US Industrial Strategy.

Li Qiang

On April 2, U.S. President Donald Trump rolled out a bold new tariff package aimed at jumpstarting U.S. manufacturing. It sparked headlines across the world, but two challenges remain unresolved: a severe skilled manufacturing labor shortage and a fragile, incomplete supply chain.

The United States does not lack jobs; it lacks stable and accessible quality employment. A 2024 report from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce noted that Wisconsin had only 54 available workers for every 100 job openings, with Pennsylvania and other Midwestern states facing similar shortages.

According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, as of January 2025, there were approximately 513,000 unfilled positions in the manufacturing sector – further highlighting the ongoing labor shortage and making it difficult for companies to sustain large-scale production in the United States.

Companies in the U.S. also struggle to live up to their labor promises. Foxconn’s failed pledge to create 13,000 jobs in Wisconsin – ending with fewer than 1,000 by 2023 – stands as a cautionary tale of what happens when policy fails to align with labor and supply realities. Similarly, after struggling to staff its Nevada Gigafactory, Tesla shifted focus to Shanghai – where its facility now produces over half of the company’s global deliveries. In 2024 alone, the Shanghai plant delivered 916,660 vehicles, as reported by Bloomberg.

Arsenal of Democracy

Ryan Brobst & Bradley Bowman

Introduction

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are sprinting to strengthen their military capabilities and are increasingly working together to threaten the United States and its interests. Thankfully, Americans have valuable partners in Taiwan, Ukraine, and Israel who are willing to fight to defend themselves and the interests they share with the United States. But to be successful, Taipei, Kyiv, and Jerusalem need American weapons. By transferring these arms, Washington can defend its interests without sending American troops to the battlefield.

But can the United States simultaneously arm Taiwan, Ukraine, and Israel? Or must Washington choose between them? And can the United States arm its partners while also producing the weapons the U.S. military needs? How healthy is the American defense industrial base (DIB) when it comes to building the weapons beleaguered democracies need? And how can the American arsenal of democracy be strengthened?

China’s H-20 Stealth Bomber Fleet To Carry “Hundreds” of Tactical Nuclear Warheads by 2035

Kris Osborn

The emerging, yet mysterious Chinese H-20 stealth bomber is very much on the Pentagon radar, as it is expected to arrive within a few years as a rival to the US B-21 and bring unprecedented ranges and nuclear-capable, high-altitude broadband stealth to the global threat equation.

Very little is known about the H-20, and there have been few publicly available renderings, and while the platform appears quite stealthy to the observer’s eye, top Pentagon weapons experts are concerned about the People’s Liberation Army Air Force production capacity and anticipated fleet size, as it pertains to the H-20. The Pentagon’s annual military report on China has consistently cited an H-20 threat, stating as far back as 2018 that the H-20’s 8,500km range armed with 2,000 km range CJ-20 ALCMs can “expand long-range offensive bomber capability beyond the second island chain,” placing areas such as Guam, Hawaii and the US at risk.

Beyond the mere question of range and global reach, the H-20 could present a very serious “nuclear-mass” threat, according to top Pentagon researchers studying Chinese weapons and production capacity. In little more than a decade, China could potentially deploy a fleet of at least 50 H-20 bombers capable of attacking with hundreds of nuclear warheads.

Why China Won’t Give In to Trump

Michael Schuman

On Tuesday, President Donald Trump bragged that many foreign leaders were “kissing his ass” to avoid the steep tariffs he’d imposed on their countries. But China’s leader, Xi Jinping, was not one of them. “We are waiting for their call,” Trump said of China’s leadership in a social-media post.

He might be waiting for a while. Xi became China’s most powerful political figure in half a century by promoting a new Chinese nationalism—not by kowtowing to anyone, least of all the president of the United States.

“Seeking to negotiate on U.S. terms would be deeply embarrassing for Xi and could potentially weaken his standing and even control over the Communist Party and the country,” Steve Tsang, the director of the SOAS China Institute at the University of London, told me. That’s because the party justifies Xi’s dictatorship by portraying him as the ultimate defender of the Chinese people—the man who will restore China’s past glory and attain the “Chinese dream” of national rejuvenation. He must be seen standing up to foreign oppressors who seek to humiliate China and thwart its rightful rise.

“The Chinese people will never allow foreign forces to bully, oppress, or enslave us,” Xi said in a speech commemorating the centennial of the Communist Party in 2021. “Whoever nurses delusions of doing that will crack their heads and spill blood on the Great Wall of steel.”

The Qatar Conundrum – OpEd

Neville Teller

On April 2, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described Qatar as “a complex country”. The epithet seems a trifle inadequate. Qatar is close to mirroring Winston Churchill’s famous description of Russia – “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.”

Dubbed “the wild card of the Middle East”, Qatar makes for an intriguing case study. This stand-alone and gas-rich Gulf state – the wealthiest country in the world on a per capita basis –is best known to the general public as having won the hosting rights for the 2022 FIFA World Cup in somewhat dubious circumstances.

Qatar has long pursued a foreign policy that appears self-contradictory to the world in general, and positively infuriating to its Arab neighbors. While offering itself as a key US ally in the Middle East, it has also consistently backed hardline Islamists — from Hamas in the Gaza Strip, to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, to wild-eyed jihadists in Assad’s Syria.

“We don’t do enemies,” a one-time foreign minister of Qatar once said. “We talk to everyone.”

Trump’s new talks with Iran could end in a deal — or a war

Joshua Keating

American negotiators are headed to Oman this weekend for a round of high-level talks with Iran over its nuclear program. President Donald Trump dropped the surprise announcement Tuesday during his Oval Office meeting with Benjamin Netanyahu. (Netanyahu was reportedly surprised by the news as well, one of a number of disappointments for the Israeli prime minister at the meeting.)

“We have a very big meeting, and we’ll see what can happen,” Trump said. In an apparent reference to the possibility of military strikes on Iran, he added, “I think everybody agrees that doing a deal would be preferable to doing the obvious. And the obvious is not something that I want to be involved with or, frankly, that Israel wants to be involved with if they can avoid it.”

The prospect of Israeli or US military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities has loomed over the region for years, but has seemed somewhat more likely over the past few months. Iran’s stockpile of near-weapons grade uranium has dramatically grown — meaning the regime is closer than ever to an actual weapon. Israel, meanwhile, feels emboldened after the remarkable military success it has had against Iranian proxies since the October 7, 2023, attacks, not to mention its successful strikes on Iran itself. Trump said on Wednesday that if military strikes do take place, Israel would be the “leader.”

The Counteroffensive: Can Ukraine's military survive without Elon Musk's Starlink systems? - opinion

Artem Moskalenko

After a busy day at work as a software engineer, Oleg Kutkov returns to his apartment in Kyiv. He steps out onto the balcony — but not to smoke or water the flowers. Oleg’s balcony is a workshop. There, he repairs Starlink terminals damaged at the front and sends them back to soldiers.

"At first, I used to work with Starlink as a hobby. But when I fix them now, I realize it's not just a hobby — it’s the main means of communication at the front," Oleg told the Counteroffensive.

Hundreds of thousands of people in Ukraine — including The Counteroffensive’s Kyiv office — depend on Starlink satellites, which have replaced internet networks damaged during the war. Civilians in hospitals, schools, and frontline areas all rely on it — as does the military along the entire front.

But U.S. President Donald Trump and Elon Musk see Starlink as leverage over the Ukrainian government. Starlink is part of Musk’s company, SpaceX, and although Ukraine and its partners pay for the system’s operation, Musk can theoretically shut it off at any time.

The new world disorder

Shivshankar Menon

In barely two months, President Donald Trump has made evident the phase transformation that is underway in global geopolitics. We are witnessing the end of the US-led world order, the demise of the West as a unified geopolitical force and the diminished agency of the liberal globalisers who determined US foreign policy for extended periods.

To be sure, the protectionism, isolationism and nativism bordering on racism that we now see in the US is not new. President Trump's adoption of these policies is a result of long-building historical trends. This means that they are likely to be long-lasting and that there is no going back to earlier times. The manner of their implementation is, of course, uniquely his own. For many years to come, the US and Europe will be preoccupied with their internal reordering and regional security issues.

The effects of this shift on the world and India are many and consequential. Though put on hold for three months, Trump's tariffs and abandonment of international norms, commitments and institutions amount to America turning away from the world. The legitimacy of US power and influence and her reputation as a reliable ally or partner have diminished considerably.

Gaza’s Fault Lines Are Less Linear Than Meets The Eye – Analysis

James M. Dorsey

Like much else in the Middle East, Gaza’s fault lines are less linear than meets the eye. At first glance, it’s Israel, backed by the United States, against the rest of the world.

March 18’s United Nations Security Council debate spotlighted that divide. US Interim Ambassador Dorothy Shea was the only representative to accuse Hamas rather than Israel of breaking the ceasefire, reigniting hostilities and worsening an already catastrophic humanitarian disaster in Gaza. Similarly, Israel and the US stand alone at first glance in supporting US President Donald Trump’s vision of Gaza as a high-end beachfront real estate development void of much of its indigenous population.

The rest of the international community supports the Arab world’s alternative plan that calls for an end to the war, an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the creation of a Palestinian interim administration of the Gaza Strip and the temporary resettlement of Gazans in safe zones in Gaza. Meanwhile, the war-ravaged territory is reconstructed to the tune of $53 billion.

So far, it all seems straightforward. But dig a little deeper, and the fault lines begin to blur.

3 things Trump does well in tariff negotiations, and 3 things he doesn’t get

J.P. Singh

Thucydides’ maxim from the 5th century B.C. — that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” — seems to be the core of President Trump’s negotiating strategy. Herein lies the Greek tragedy. President Trump is miscalculating the odds of a win with this approach when applied to American trade policy in the 21st century.

Here are three things that Trump does well in terms of his negotiation calculations and three things that he does not understand at all.

First, Trump’s recurring negotiation tactic is that if he inflicts economic harm on the trade partners, they have no choice but to negotiate. A “win” in the trade negotiation depends on alternatives for each side. Negotiation theorists use of the term BATNA or “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement” refers to the alternatives available to negotiating parties. Trump calculates that America’s 15.9 percent of total global imports, the biggest market in the world, forces countries to fall on their knees — in his own words, “kissi n g my ass” — to negotiate with the U.S.

Second, the politics: Trump is right that America can get a better deal from bilateral than from multilateral negotiations involving three or more countries. In bilateral negotiations, the U.S. holds better cards, to use the metaphor that Trump deployed in his contentious Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Can Europe buy all its energy from the USA? Trump’s pitch meets reality

Konstantinos Bogdanos

In the greater picture of his trade wars, Donald Trump pushed a bold idea: Europe should buy all its oil, gas and coal from the USA. It is a loud, daring proposal. Can the EU make it work? Should it even try? Let us cut through the haze with hard facts that avoid unicorns or wishful thinking.

Begin with the numbers. Europe needs about 4.7 billion barrels of oil yearly, 15 billion cubic meters of gas annually, and roughly 300 million tons of coal equivalent each year. The US produces around 4.85 billion barrels of oil yearly and over 1 trillion cubic meters of gas annually. It sounds close, but hold on. America consumes 7.3 billion barrels of oil itself every year, so it already leans on imports to keep running.

Redirecting enough to cover Europe’s full demand would compromise US markets or demand an impossible production surge. Things with coal are worse. US output stumbles far below Europe’s needs. Gas sounds doable, but even that faces hurdles.

Now consider logistics. Moving that much energy across the Atlantic is a brutal challenge. Europe’s LNG terminals process only 200 billion cubic meters of gas a year -too little to replace all other suppliers with American imports. New terminals require years and billions to build, with no quick payoff. Oil flows more easily, with US crude already reaching European refineries, but scaling to 100 per cent demands costlier shipping and port upgrades.

Report to Congress on Hypersonic Weapons

The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.

Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part, to the advances in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a number of hypersonic weapons programs and have likely fielded operational hypersonic glide vehicles—potentially armed with nuclear warheads. Most U.S. hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.

The ‘new world order’ of the past 35 years is being demolished before our eyes. This is how we must proceed

Gordon Brown

After a week that started with the worst financial volatility in recent history and ended with the most serious escalation so far of the China-US conflict, it is time to distinguish the tectonic shifts from the tremors. If nothing changes, the 2020s risks being remembered as this century’s devil’s decade – the term historians once used for the 1930s. It will be defined not just by seven million people who have died of Covid-19 and rising global poverty and inequality – but also by a dismembered Ukraine, a burnt-out Gaza and little-reported atrocities in Africa and Asia, each testimony to the violent displacement of a rules-based global order by a power-based one.

Indeed, before our eyes, every single pillar of the old order is under assault – not just free trade but the rule of law and the primacy we have long attached to human rights and democracy, the self-determination of peoples, and multilateral cooperation between nations, including the humanitarian and environmental responsibilities we once accepted as citizens of the world.

Power shifts are, of course, the stuff of history. Within the space of two centuries, four world orders have risen and fallen. The first two – the balance of power that emerged after the defeat of Napoleon in the early 19th century, and the post-1918 Treaty of Versailles system born after four dynastic empires collapsed – ultimately ended in the carnage of world wars. Then came the post-1945 architecture, led by the US and the United Nations; and, after 1990 with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, what US president George HW Bush called a “new world order”.

Congress Hates Trade Wars—but Doesn’t Mind Real Wars

Daniel R. DePetris

It’s perhaps no surprise that Donald Trump, a man who says that “tariff” is the most beautiful word in the English language, is a fan of trade wars. During Trump’s first term, he slapped selective tariffs on steel, aluminum, solar panels, and washing machines. Then as now, China was the country that received the most pressure. In 2019, Trump raised tariffs to 25 percent on about $200 billion worth of Chinese goods, and Beijing quickly retaliated.

This week’s chaotic roller-coaster of a ride, however, makes that era look stable in comparison. Trump’s imposition of a “reciprocal” tariff regime, his walk-back of that very same regime in favor of a near-universal 10 percent duty, and his increase in levies on Chinese goods to 145 percent has the markets and the brains of economists around the world spinning in perpetual motion. Between April 2 and April 8, the S&P 500 lost about 12 percent of its value. Soon thereafter, even the bond markets went into turmoil as investors dumped U.S. treasuries.

Markets and businesses hate chaos and value predictability. So do politicians, most of whom like to play it safe and whose ambition is usually restricted to grandstanding for the cameras during a congressional hearing. Trump’s tariff madness, however, has actually caused some pushback above and beyond the usual press release expressing concern.

The Missing Link in the AI Stack: Why Digital Infrastructure Is Essential to U.S. Leadership

Navin Girishankar and Matt Pearl

In his first major policy speech, Vice President JD Vance outlined the administration’s initial vision for AI development. His remarks covered key elements of the AI stack from his perspective, including “high-quality semiconductor design and manufacturing facilities, reliable power, computing power, [and] frontier applications.” These are, indeed, key enablers of the stack that will be necessary for the United States to win the global AI race.

Vance’s speech, however, ignored another key enabler of the AI stack, and it is one on which the United States is vulnerable: the networks over which AI traffic travels. This oversight may be attributable to the fact that the non–People’s Republic of China (PRC) telecommunications equipment sector has faced challenges in recent years. When quarterly profits shrink, it is easy to adopt an out-of-sight, out-of-mind reaction. The irony in this development is that the reason for the Western telecom infrastructure industry’s issues is that the PRC undertook a systematic, years-long campaign to kill off non-PRC vendors. Thus, our neglect of a technology that may be critical to winning the AI race against the PRC is due, in large part, to actions by the PRC.

The United States underestimates the key role of networks—and the connectivity that they enable—in the AI race at its own risk, particularly when considering the centrality of networked infrastructure to the diffusion of previous technologies. To grasp this point, we need only try to imagine the Industrial Revolution without the railroad; the modern, global financial industry without the telegraph; or social media, e-commerce, or streaming without the internet.

From Production Lines to Front Lines

Becca Wasser and Philip Sheers

Introduction

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine laid bare the challenges the U.S. defense industrial base (DIB) faces. The COVID-19 pandemic had illustrated the brittleness of international supply chains, but the lessons learned from that experience failed to translate into action in the defense sector. The conflict in Ukraine served as a stark wake-up call that underscored the limitations of the American DIB. Subsequent insecurity in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East reinforced DIB constraints as rising requests from allies and partners for munitions, platforms, and air defense systems stressed already thin supply chains and further depleted dwindling U.S. stockpiles. The DIB is struggling to simultaneously meet the current needs of the U.S. military while also supplying its allies and partners across the globe—let alone meet the future demands of a great power conflict against an advanced competitor like China.

America is no longer the arsenal of democracy it once was. The DIB of today is not the DIB that helped the United States and its allies win World War II and prevail in the Cold War. In the more benign post–Cold War environment, the Pentagon bought significantly fewer weapons, which forced the DIB to contract and consolidate. At the same time that the defense marketplace shrank and became less competitive, the Pentagon prioritized budgetary efficiency and waited to place weapons orders when needed instead of stockpiling weapons or maintaining excess production capacity as a hedge. Today, despite the renewed importance of industrial policy to U.S. economic and national security and the Trump administration’s desire to restore American manufacturing prowess, the DIB is beset with chronic challenges that are not improving quickly enough to ensure U.S. and global security. The DIB lacks the capacity to produce a diverse array of defense capabilities at relevant scale, and it does not possess the responsiveness and flexibility to dynamically and swiftly surge production in times of crisis. The DIB also lacks the resilience required to withstand global shocks and the strain of modern conflict. Without significant industrial reform, the United States is at risk of being unable to deter China and Russia from aggression and, if needed, win a future great power conflict.

Army Fast-Tracks AI & “Computing at the Edge” to Counter Enemy Drones

Kris Osborn

What if hundreds of small enemy micro-drone explosives descend upon an Army mechanized formation to overwhelm vehicle-mounted guns or other kinetic, on-the-move countermeasures, while an offensive armored convoy operation moves to “close with an enemy?”

Considering these kinds of contingencies, it would be difficult to underestimate the emphasis the Pentagon is now placing upon Counter-UAS given the scope and nature of the fast-evolving threat. Commercial and government entities such as Army Futures Command’s Army Applications Laboratory are fast expanding the operational sphere of C-UAS to include AI-enabled detection and discernment systems and new non-kinetic applications, yet staying in front of the threat is quite difficult given the pace at which weapons and drone applications are evolving.

“If you take a look at the recent wars between Russia and Ukraine and in the Middle East, you’re seeing a rise of autonomous systems. You’re seeing a rise of things in the cyber domain. And you’re seeing a rise of what I would call low cost lethality, low cost weapons systems,” Dr. Casey Perley, Director, Army Applications Laboratory, Army Futures Command, told Warrior in an interview.

Facebook’s Zuckerberg Oversaw Censorship Tool For China: Whistleblower

Alan Lu

Meta compromised U.S. national security and freedom of speech to do business with China, a company whistleblower testified before U.S. senators.

Sarah Wynn-Williams, a former global policy director at Facebook, told the U.S. Senate on Wednesday that Meta founder Mark Zuckerberg personally designed and implemented a content review tool for Facebook that was used in Hong Kong and Taiwan.

The tool, according to her, would automatically submit a Facebook post for review by a “chief editor” whenever it received over 10,000 views.

“One thing the Chinese Communist Party and Mark Zuckerberg share is that they want to silence their critics. I can say that from personal experience,” Wynn-Williams said at the congressional hearing.

This tool was operational in both self-ruling Taiwan and China-controlled Hong Kong, where the Chinese Communist Party has been expanding its united front efforts.

AI for Military Decision-Making

Emelia Probasco, Helen Toner, Matthew Burtell, and Tim G. J. Rudner

Introduction

Artificial intelligence promises to help military commanders make sense of vast amounts of data at superhuman speeds. The military has a strong motivation to take advantage of AI, and among the most interested within the armed forces are commanders charged with making operational decisions in war. These commanders must continuously “observe, orient, decide, and act” on a fast-paced and multidimensional battlefield where decisions are life-and-death.

The historical desire for sophisticated tools to maintain battlefield awareness, support military planning, and even predict future enemy movements or reactions has led to the creation of everything from weather modeling to campaign modeling to early warning systems.

The strong and understandable desire for AI-enabled decision support systems (DSS) must be tempered, however, by an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of these systems, which should dictate when and how they are deployed.

We begin with a brief history of efforts to fight through the fog of war and the emergence of decision frameworks with supporting tools, linking these to the recent quest for AI-DSS. We then demonstrate the widespread interest in applying AI for decision support among the world’s most powerful militaries. Finally, we characterize the opportunities and risks of applying AI to military decisions and offer a basic framework to guide the deployment of these systems.

Useful Practices for Deep and Dark Web Intelligence Collection

The Digital Terrain: Definitions and Strategic Relevance

The internet comprises three distinct layers, each relevant to different dimensions of intelligence work.

The surface web refers to content readily accessible and indexed by standard search engines. This segment constitutes a small percentage of the internet—less than 5%—and lacks significant operational intelligence for covert or harmful actions.

The deep web encompasses all content that is not indexed by traditional search engines. It includes university databases, password-protected portals, subscription-based information repositories, and internal communication platforms. Although much of the deep web is benign, we can derive intelligence value from unindexed forums, private extremist blogs, and academic encryption networks. It serves as a bridge between open and clandestine content.

The dark web is a concealed subsection of the deep web, intentionally hidden and accessible only through anonymising technologies, such as the Tor Browser (The Onion Router) and I2P (Invisible Internet Project). It is the primary hub for cybercriminal infrastructure, illicit marketplaces, extremist propaganda, and covert communication. Hidden services host dark web sites using “.onion” domains, unreachable through traditional browsers.