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15 April 2025

India Sees Opportunity in Trump’s Global Turbulence. That Could Backfire.

Ashley J. Tellis

The tumultuous 100 days after Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency have been disruptive for the United States and the world. Despite New Delhi’s feigned optimism, U.S.-Indian relations have been disturbed as well. For a quarter century now, bilateral ties between Washington and New Delhi had been dramatically improving, as successive U.S. administrations—including Trump’s during his first term—wooed India in the context of the competition with China.

The embrace of India intensified during Joe Biden’s presidency, when New Delhi was viewed as an intimate collaborator in Washington’s efforts at confronting Beijing. Consequently, India’s domestic illiberalism and trade mercantilism were discounted as administration officials sought to build new partnerships in high technology, entice businesses diversifying from China to invest in India, and position India as a new manufacturing node to limit China’s industrial dominance. These goals aligned perfectly with India’s own ambitions to expand its national power, which had the virtue of—at least transitorily—aiding the United States to cement its geopolitical dominance and protect the liberal international order.

Trump’s return has altered the traditional direction of U.S. grand strategy in dramatic ways. His administration’s striking contempt for the liberal order is now clear, but it is also accompanied by atavistic attempts at territorial expansionism, the imposition of “reciprocal” tariffs on U.S. trading partners, and confrontations with many U.S. allies worldwide.

A New Triangle: The Interplay Between China and EU-India Relations

Philippe Le Corre

China has shaped the U.S.-India relationship for decades.1 Today, another significant triangle is emerging: the China-EU-India relationship. Indian and European leaders are strengthening ties. Both view China as a formidable economic and security rival while regarding the United States as a key security partner (and, for Europe, a long-standing ally).

What is the current state of EU-China and EU-India relations? As India’s influence and economic appeal grow, could it become a viable alternative to China for European business leaders and policymakers? How is Brussels incorporating India into its strategies to address a potential crisis in Asia or the broader Indo-Pacific?

Twenty-five years ago, the European Union viewed China as a top priority for business, cultural exchanges, and diplomacy. Following the introduction of Beijing’s open-door policy in 1978 and with strong encouragement from Chinese authorities, European companies flocked to China. Initially, many Europeans used Hong Kong as an intermediary for business, but by the mid-1990s, Guangdong Province and Shanghai became key gateways to the Chinese market, particularly for Germany and France.2 Trade and investment surged, especially after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which was widely supported by European political and business elites. Today, China remains the EU’s largest trading partner, with substantial European investments across the mainland.


After FM Phone Call, Are Pakistan-US Ties on the Mend?

Muhammad Murad

On April 7, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar held a telephone conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio – their first discussion since the current Trump administration took office on January 20. During the call, they discussed regional security, economic cooperation, and the current state of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship, which, despite some recent improvements, remain weak.

Dar reiterated Islamabad’s commitment to strengthening ties with Washington and emphasized the importance of enhancing bilateral cooperation in counterterrorism, trade, and investment. Rubio expressed a strong interest in collaborating with Pakistan on trade and investment, particularly in the area of critical minerals. He noted that trade and economic cooperation would be a defining feature of future relations between Washington and Islamabad.

Furthermore, U.S. Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated that Rubio thanked Islamabad for the arrest and transfer of Mohmmad Sharifullah, allegedly an Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) commander who took part in the 2021 Kabul airport bombing, to the United States. U.S. President Donald Trump had also publicly praised Pakistan for its help in arresting Sharifullah during his joint address to the U.S. Congress on March 4.

Central Asian States Have Put Aside Their Territorial Disputes. Why Now?

Temur Umarov and Alibek Mukambayev

The Ferghana Valley, divided on the political map between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, has resembled a battlefield ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Hundreds of people have been killed in skirmishes and armed clashes in the region over the past three decades. Agricultural conditions rendered any kind of resolution seemingly impossible: resources are limited in this predominantly agrarian, densely populated, arid region. In addition, officials in all three states used the border conflicts for domestic political purposes.

On March 31, however, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan assembled in the Tajik city of Khujand to solemnly declare an end to all of their territorial disputes. Future conflicts cannot be ruled out completely. But for now, Central Asia’s leaders see far greater benefits from cooperation than from aggression. That might be the only guarantor of stability in the Ferghana region.

National borders in Central Asia were only demarcated in the 1950s, and the republics remained dissatisfied with the outcome. Regular conflicts occurred between the Central Asian republics even during the Soviet era, when the borders between them were purely administrative. When the Soviet Union fell, each newly independent state began to interpret discrepancies on old Soviet maps in its own favor, which only exacerbated the problem.


China acknowledges its role in years of cyberattacks against US over support of Taiwan: report

Ronny Reyes

Chinese officials shocked their American counterparts during a secret meeting where they allegedly revealed Beijing was behind a series of cyberattacks against the US due to Washington’s support of Taiwan, according to a new report.

Officials from China and the former Biden administration met in secret last December in Geneva, Switzerland amid growing tensions over threats to Taiwan’s sovereignty — with Beijing dropping all pretenses and revealing that they played a role in hacking attacks on US ports, water utilities, airports, and other targets dating back years, the Wall Street Journal reported.

The extent of Beijing’s role was left ambiguous, but US officials interpreted it as a clear threat regarding America’s support of Taiwan as an independent nation, officials familiar with the meeting told the outlet.

The secret meeting was held with top officials from both nations and led by Nate Fick, the then-US ambassador-at-large for cyberspace and digital policy, along with Wang Lei, a top cyber official with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, officials said.

While China had previously blamed all claims of cyberattacks and espionage on rogue hackers, such as the Volt Typhoon group, Wang made it clear that the hacks were a direct result of the situation in Taiwan, which Beijing insists will be annexed in the coming years.

Why Beijing Thinks It Can Beat Trump

Scott Kennedy

This may be the shortest-lasting revolution in history. Just one week after U.S. President Donald Trump imposed so-called reciprocal tariffs on the world as part of a plan to replace a global trading system based on most-favored-nation status and national treatment with individually negotiated bilateral arrangements, he has effectively called off the experiment. Yes, there are still 10 percent tariffs imposed on most everyone, along with higher tariffs on autos, steel, and aluminum, but these are likely ceilings, and the only direction for these barriers to move is down.

The one exception, of course, is China, which—we must now always emphasize, as of this writing—faces U.S. tariffs of roughly 150 percent, if one includes the standard tariffs on trading partners, the penal tariffs imposed during Trump’s first term and left in place by President Joe Biden, the 20 percent on fentanyl-related goods, and the duties announced on April 9.



How Tariffs on China Brought Back Decoupling With a Vengeance

Cameron Abadi and Adam Tooze

Since U.S. President Donald Trump announced his “Liberation Day” tariffs on countries around the world, the United States has experienced a stock market crash, a bond market crash, a blizzard of recession predictions, contemplations of catastrophe of various kinds, and then a sudden policy reversal and a fragile reprieve on financial markets. What’s left is an outright trade war with China and the outlines of a new global economic status quo.

How did we end up with a policy of decoupling from China? What have we learned about Trump’s understanding of power? And does Trump ultimately want the U.S. economy to look like China’s?


Why Trump's War With China is Much Bigger Than Trade

Matthew Tostevin and Didi Kirsten Tatlow

"If the United States will not fight the world's largest tyranny politically, then inevitably, it will have to fight it economically, and eventually, militarily," Chinese dissident Wei Jingsheng told the U.S. Congress in 2000.

What has emerged as a trade war by President Donald Trump with Xi Jinping's China underlines the much larger struggle for global dominance between the rival powers and the very real possibility of the military conflict for which both sides are now gearing up intensively.

"China and America Aren't Just in a Trade War. It's a Fight for the 21st Century," wrote Matt Pottinger and Liza Tobin, both senior China hands and veterans of the first Trump administration. "Xi and Trump are now in a zero-sum contest for global supremacy," they argued in the Free Press.

Dissident Wei's comments came at a Congressional hearing ahead of China's 2001 access to the World Trade Organization, which helped propel it to the status of the greatest manufacturing power and America's main strategic rival.

Market Abuse

Americans argue that China abused its global market access: stealing intellectual property, supporting strategic industries, manipulating its currency and depriving foreign companies—especially those from the U.S.—of fair access to Chinese markets. China denies any malpractice.

US-China trade war: economic fallout and strategic realignment - Opinion

Lakhvinder Singh

The intensifying trade war between the United States and China has moved beyond a bilateral economic dispute, evolving into a global geopolitical confrontation with profound implications for East Asia. The economic fallout from escalating tariffs is expected to have wide-ranging consequences, including the restructuring of global supply chains and a realignment of strategic relationships in the region.

Although the US launched the trade war in an effort to curb China’s economic rise, the outcomes thus far indicate a reversal of those goals – strengthening China’s position in global trade, eroding US influence among key regional allies, and accelerating the shift toward a multipolar order in East Asia.

It is time for Washington to pause and fundamentally reconsider its strategy.
Disruption of the post-war global trading order

The US-China trade war now represents the most significant disruption to the global trading system since the formation of the post-World War II liberal economic order. Triggered by the imposition of steep tariffs – up to 125% by the US and 84% by China – the conflict now affects over $650 billion in bilateral trade, encompassing a wide range of consumer and industrial sectors.

From Trade War to Cold War? A Dangerous Shift Is Underway in China-US Relations

Chenxi Shen

On April 9, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a significant escalation in the ongoing trade conflict with China, raising tariffs on Chinese imports to 125 percent. Merely hours earlier, Beijing had declared its own retaliatory measure – raising tariffs on a range of U.S. goods to 84 percent, effective April 10 at 12:00 p.m. This tit-for-tat dynamic has become increasingly emblematic of the current state of China-U.S. relations, marked by rising tensions and shrinking avenues for compromise.

China’s response was swift and assertive. Beyond economic retaliation, Beijing filed a formal complaint against the United States through the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement mechanism, signaling a willingness to utilize both legal and institutional tools.

Public messaging from Chinese state entities has also grown notably firm. The People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Communist Party, echoed a long-standing narrative: “China does not want to fight, but is not afraid to fight.” This sentiment was reinforced by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, who shared a historical video of Chairman Mao Zedong’s 1953 speech during the Korean War on social media, quoting: “Not afraid of provocation.” The invocation of wartime rhetoric is symbolically powerful – it not only signals Beijing’s psychological readiness for confrontation but also taps into national memory and patriotic legitimacy.

Chinese weapons giant develops anti-drone barrage system to counter wartime swarm tactics

Liu Zhen

China has unveiled the world’s first close-in anti-drone barrage weapon system, a groundbreaking innovation against drone swarms and high-speed missiles, according to its developer.

The Bullet Curtain system, developed by China’s largest arms maker Norinco, employs a unique “plane-to-point” interception method, creating a wall of projectiles to blanket incoming targets with overlapping firepower.

It was revealed in the April edition of the Norinco publication Modern Weaponry.

“Imagine the target is a fly. The traditional air-defence interception is like throwing stones at the fly continuously … and now the barrage system is like swinging a fly swatter, which covers the entire area where the fly may move,” Yu Bin, the chief designer of the system, said in the report.

“While traditional air-defence weapons only hit at a single point, we are building a canopy capable of countering a saturation attack,” he said.



Will iPhones cost more because of Trump's tariffs on China?

Liv McMahon & Zoe Kleinman

The world's most popular gadgets - phones, laptops, tablets, smartwatches - could be about to get a lot more expensive in the US.

Many of them are made in China, which now faces a 145% tariff on its goods imported to the US, under President Donald Trump's controversial trade policy.

The effect this may have on the iPhone and its maker Apple is under the spotlight - with some analysts saying if costs are passed onto consumers, iPhone prices in the US could rise by hundreds of dollars.

And if the tariffs impact the value of the dollar, it could become more expensive to import iPhones and other devices around the world - potentially leading to higher prices in UK shops.


Ben Wood of CCS Insight told the BBC that if tariffs remain in place, Apple may raise iPhone prices globally when the next iteration is launched.

"It is unlikely the company would want to have differentiated pricing globally," he said - as the tech giant would want to avoid people buying the device cheaply in the UK and selling it on for profit in the US.

Iran’s Deterrence Dilemma

John Allen Gay

Iran cannot deter Israel. Israel’s military and covert capabilities have had free rein to take on the Islamic Republic and its partners. Iran’s deterrence failure has brought the regime to an uncomfortable choice: risk everything to dash for nuclear weapons, or place itself at the mercy of Jerusalem and Washington. How did things get here?

Before April of last year, Iranian deterrence looked solid enough. Tehran had a four-legged stool of answers to Israeli and American threats.

The first leg was the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force’s (AF) arsenal of thousands of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, ready to strike around the region. They’d used this tool to retaliate against the U.S. assassination of IRGC Quds Force (QF) commander Qassem Soleimani in 2020, hammer ISIS targets in Syria, and conduct many lower-profile strikes on Kurdish separatists and alleged Israeli safehouses in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The second leg was Iran’s network of proxy groups. The IRGC-QF had strong relations with a robust array of militant groups across the greater Middle East, stretching from recruiting pools among the marginalized Shia populations of Afghanistan and Pakistan, to militiamen in Iraq and Syria, to the Houthis of Yemen. The crown jewel of this network was Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group that boasted some 150,000 missiles, rockets, and drones able to strike across the length of the land of Israel.

US special envoy meets Putin as Trump urges Russia to 'get moving' on Ukraine ceasefire

Dearbail Jordan

US envoy Steve Witkoff met Vladimir Putin in St Petersburg on Friday, as Donald Trump urged the Russian president to "get moving" on a ceasefire in Ukraine.

The Kremlin said the meeting lasted for more than four hours and focused on "aspects of a Ukrainian settlement". The meeting, Witkoff's third with Putin this year, was described by special envoy Kirill Dmitriev as "productive".

Trump, the US president, has expressed frustration over the progress of talks. On Friday, he wrote: "Russia has to get moving. Too many people ere [sic] DYING, thousands a week, in a terrible and senseless war."

It comes as Trump's Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg denied suggesting the country could be partitioned.

The Times earlier reported that, during an interview with the paper, Kellogg had proposed British and French troops could adopt zones of control in the west of Ukraine as part of a "reassurance force".

Russia's army, he reportedly suggested, could then remain in the occupied east. "You could almost make it look like what happened with Berlin after World War Two," the paper quoted him as saying.

Kellogg later took to social media to say that the article had "misrepresented" what he said.

How drones, data, and AI transformed our military—and why the US must follow suit

GEN. VALERII ZALUZHNYI

Ukraine’s tactical drones are “inflicting roughly two-thirds of Russian losses,” making them “twice as effective as every other weapon in the Ukrainian arsenal,” says a recent study by the Royal United Services Institute. This is a remarkable development for weapons considered relatively unimportant just three years ago—but it exemplifies how Ukraine is changing how the West will fight its wars.

At the risk of oversimplification, wars have always been about managing information, people, and equipment. Stone-age warriors, Napoleon, Patton, and Schwarzkopf all faced these tasks, though certainly on a vastly different scale. Napoleon introduced new ways to control unprecedented quantities of soldiers and materiel, enabling him to operate across distances and against adversaries far more effectively than anyone before him. Decades later, Helmuth von Moltke refined battlefield management by loosening the Napoleonic grip. “War is an art, not a science,” he wrote, acknowledging human judgment in command and control and introducing extensive planning, decentralization, and flexibility. The Prussian leader’s ideas have formed the basis for Western warfare strategy ever since—until the Russo-Ukraine conflict changed everything.

The technological realm has seen similar revolutions. Command and control were transformed by radio, computers, and satellites. Precision munitions gave field commanders the ability to direct “surgical” strikes at much lower costs than their less advanced opponents. During the Cold War, the U.S. military developed frameworks to harness these advances and counter numerically superior Soviet forces. Put to the test in Iraq, the Air-Land Battle concept enabled U.S. forces to dismantle Saddam's substantial military within weeks.

The Case for a “Trump to Tehran” Strategy

Comfort Ero

On Saturday, April 12, American and Iranian officials will restart talks over curbing Tehran’s nuclear program. The talks come after U.S. President Donald Trump sent a letter, in early March, to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei proposing negotiations. “We have a very big meeting,” the president said in announcing the talks. “We’ll see what can happen.”

There are reasons to hope that Trump’s overtures will succeed. The president has an almost instinctive love of dealmaking, and he has said he wants to make Iran prosperous again. But there are also reasons to be trepidatious. 

Why Trump May Get Away With His Tariff Trauma

Nahal Toosi

As President Donald Trump announced historically high tariffs across the world this week, I expected a number of affected governments to rapidly and collectively fight back.

Instead, with the exception of China and a few scattered reprisals from allies, we’re seeing mainly cautious reactions. Foreign officials are talking about “calibrated” responses and keeping a “cool head.” Some are clearly hoping diplomacy will persuade Trump to back off some or many of his tariffs.

In conversations with diplomats, economists and former U.S. officials, I asked why. Weren’t they concerned this muddled, cautious global reaction would be too weak to persuade Trump to change course, or even embolden him to get tougher?

But these experts argued that there are compelling reasons many governments are not acting fast or in unison — not the least of which is that the world’s countries are not good at collective action, and many believe they have a better shot at accomplishing more, for themselves at least, if they avoid escalating the fight with Trump.

Besides, it’s not at all clear if any moves by other countries will deter Trump’s tariff mania.

Under Trump, You ‘Petition The King’

Nathan Gardels

Francis Fukuyama is an American political scientist at Stanford University. His books include, among others, “The End of History and the Last Man,” “Political Order and Political Decay,” and “Liberalism and its Discontents.”

Noema Editor-in-Chief Nathan Gardels recently sat down with Francis Fukuyama at Stanford University for the Berggruen Institute’s upcoming “Paradigm Shift” podcast series. Fukuyama is the noted author of books such as “The End Of History And The Last Man,” “The Origins Of Political Order” and “Liberalism And Its Discontents.” What follows is an excerpt of their wide-ranging conversation.

Nathan Gardels: You said some years ago that democracy cannot survive the lack of belief in the possibility of impartial institutions. Today, that level of trust is almost zero and worsens daily with the continued denigration of the courts by the Trump team. Even Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts says such attacks are very dangerous to the rule of law. Where does the meter of democracy’s survival stand today?

Francis Fukuyama: Since Jan. 20, I place it much lower. There was much discussion before the election asking, “Is Trump a fascist?” Is he an authoritarian?” I tended to poo-poo some of that. Comparing him to Hitler, I felt, was just a little overheated. But now one must admit he’s definitely an authoritarian. In these short months, you’re already seeing America turn toward authoritarianism.

Is the US making $2bn a day from tariffs? Trump claims fact-checked

Gerry Georgieva, Tom Edgington & Lucy Gilder

President Donald Trump has announced sweeping changes to his import tax regime to allow time for trade talks.

A 90-day pause will be applied to countries that were facing tariffs over the 10% baseline. China, however, will see an even larger hike with tariffs on its imports rising to 125%.

President Trump had been justifying his tariffs with a series of claims about how the US is the victim of "unfair trade".

However, several of his claims about global trade were unsubstantiated or even false. BBC Verify has been taking a closer look.

Is the US making $2bn a day from tariffs?

Before the 90-day pause, Trump claimed "we're making a fortune with tariffs - $2bn a day".

He made the claim on Tuesday, one day before the pause. Trump then repeated the figure in front of reporters following the latest changes, saying "we're now making $2bn a day" - although he did not specifically link the number to tariffs.


US Army robots now think, talk, understand like soldiers to support human combat team

Kapil Kajal

The US Army has advanced research in robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), and autonomy to boost human-machine teaming between its robots and soldiers.

The US Army researchers have showcased some of their latest innovations to advance the future of human-machine integration for the battlefield in the National Robotics Week event from April 5 to 13.

The robotics researchers from the US Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Army Research Laboratory (DEVCOM ARL) are advancing ground and air autonomous systems and energy systems to support the future mobility and maneuverability of these systems.

Robots now think, talk, and understand like soldiers

The ARL showcased one of its breakthroughs in the event. This involves integrating generative AI with robotics for battle damage assessment operations.

Due to this integration, the ARL robots can now understand and respond to natural language, offering the Soldier human-like interactions.

“We are bridging the gap between humans and robots, making them more intuitive, responsive, and, ultimately, more useful for the Soldier,” said Phil Osteen, a lead researcher for the Artificial Intelligence for Maneuver and Mobility, or AIMM program.

The US trade deficit: Myths and realities

Maurice Obstfeld

Sharp increases in tariffs on imports of foreign goods likely will do little to reduce the U.S. trade deficit and may not stop it from rising further, suggests a paper discussed at the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA) conference on March 27.

“U.S. trade deficits are high and likely to rise, notwithstanding new and prospective tariffs,” writes the author, Maurice Obstfeld of the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

In his paper— “The U.S. Trade Deficit: Myths and Realities”—he examines the causes and consequences of the United States’ longstanding trade deficit. The United States has run a deficit in every quarter, except one, since the second quarter of 1976 and the annual deficit has averaged 3.1% of the gross domestic product since 2008, he notes.

“There is a lot of political rhetoric about the trade balance across the political spectrum. The message is that the trade deficit is always a bad thing and the result of either nefarious foreign machinations or the U.S. embracing globalization,” Obstfeld said in an interview with the Brookings Institution. “My message is that the reality is more nuanced.”

The North Sea Chessboard: Germany against Britain

Big Serge

If you ask someone to name the worst military or geostrategic blunders in history, the standard answers will tend to center on doomed invasions of the Russian interior, either in the form of Napoleon’s 1812 campaign or the Third Reich’s invasion of the USSR. Someone with a deeper well of knowledge might point to a more esoteric and specific blunder: perhaps Erwin Rommel’s failure to neutralize Malta, the Byzantine division of forces at Manzikert, or Britain’s Gallipoli campaign. Perhaps we could return to the age of heroes and cite the Trojans bringing that wretched wooden horse into their city without inspecting its interior.

What most of these mistakes (perhaps with the exception of the Trojan Horse) have in common is that, although they all misfired spectacularly, they at least possessed a certain strategic logic which made them defensible on theoretical grounds. Mistakes, the actions of the enemy, and bad luck can all compound to create a disaster, but usually there is no sense that decisions were made for no reason at all. Usually.

Between 1897 and 1914 Imperial Germany conducted its own geostrategic blunder of the highest order, when it unilaterally launched a naval arms race against the greatest sea power of the age in the Royal Navy. What is remarkable about the German naval buildup is that it was justified on tenuous strategic speculations about the British response; despite the fact that it was apparent in real time that these speculations were untrue, the buildup continued for its own sake, and Germany repeatedly eschewed opportunities to turn aside from a dead end path.

From Duct Tape to Penicillin, GPS to Superglue: Thank the DOD

Lisa M. Krieger

Some of the U.S. military’s most defining technologies have nothing to do with missiles, tanks, guns, and other deadly weaponry. While important in war, these innovations—from duct tape and blood banks to GPS— ultimately play a far larger role on the home front, improving everyday lives.

But now scientists are worried the Trump administration’s budget cuts threaten the long and historic funding growth for Department of Defense-supported breakthrough science, risking America’s global dominance in a tech-driven economy and undermining future payoffs.

“Every single day, people engage with DOD-funded research,” said Jeff Decker, a former 2nd Ranger Battalion light infantry squad leader in the U.S. Army, deployed four times to Iraq and Afghanistan. He now directs Stanford University’s Technology Transfer for Defense Program, which helps transition new technologies from the laboratory to commercial products and defense capabilities.

“The core goal is knowledge,” Decker said. “If we lose that, not only does it hollow out the ability for campuses to do research … it also hollows out the specter of what we’ll have 30 years from now.”

Boosting Interoperability of Joint Forces with AI: A Unified Language for Joint Warfighting

Richard Farnell

On 6 June 1944, Supreme Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower led the Allied multinational coordination of operation code-named Overlord, which took place on the beaches of Normandy in France; this operation involved 12 nations and led to the success of breaching a Nazi defense wall of over 2,400 miles of obstacles, mines, bunkers, machine guns, and artillery.1 On that date, Allied forces executed one of history's most significant, prominent joint warfighting operations. Although this operation did not have dramatically evolved technologies of today’s military services, some view it as one of history’s most successful joint operations. The utilization of radios, phone systems, signaling, and decoding enabled reliable interoperability during one of the deadliest conflicts in human history. Today, there is a new question we must ask ourselves: are we at pace to have this level of interoperability, utilizing advanced technologies, in a large-scale future conflict?

In today's Great Power Competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) must prioritize interoperability across all DoD military services in the interest of National Security and to achieve relative advantage and convergence in a complex multi-domain construct. AI can help military leaders with planning, procurement, and integration of advanced technology to improve interoperability among joint forces and allied partners. With rapidly evolving technology and proprietary data-centric systems within each military service, in addition to those used by allied partners, there are often challenges with software compatibility, lexicon, and network infrastructures. These challenges can all affect operational technologies that joint forces utilize to effectively compete in a complex multi-domain environment.

INDOPACOM CO Paparo Outlines Risk of Western Pacific Conflict

John Grady

War in the Western Pacific would shatter global economies, run the risk of spreading nuclear conflict and leave half a million “deaths of despair” in its wake, the senior American commander in the Indo-Pacific told the Senate Armed Services Committee Thursday.

When asked why Americans should care about Taiwan’s future, Adm. Samuel Paparo said closing the waterway separating it from China, one of the world’s major trading channels, could be more devastating than the Great Depression in the 1930s globally. It would also expose the United States’ dependence on Taipei for semiconductor production, essential to modernizing and growing the domestic economy.

Chinese aggressive military actions toward the self-governing island have increased by 300 percent. As he has noted in the past, these are “not exercises but rehearsals” for a possible forcible takeover.

War in the region Paparo said, could produce “a 25 percent reduction in GDP [gross domestic product] in Asia, an effect of 10 to 12 per GDP reduction in the United States of America, unemployment spiking at 7 to 10 percent” above normal levels “and 500,000 excess deaths of despair.”