ASEAN must act as Myanmar’s junta weaponizes quake disaster - Opinion

Samady Ou

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The earthquake that struck Myanmar on March 28 was not just a natural disaster; it has become yet another weapon in the military junta’s brutal campaign to consolidate power.

Instead of facilitating aid and relief for those affected, the country’s ruling military junta has reportedly used the chaos to target resistance-controlled areas, bombing opposition strongholds and blocking humanitarian assistance.

This blatant exploitation of the disaster underscores the regime’s sustained repression over the past three years and the urgent need for a decisive regional response.

At next month’s 46th ASEAN Summit, the bloc faces a defining moment in its handling of the situation in Myanmar. Malaysia, the current chair, has the opportunity to lead a meaningful response, but doubts remain over its ability or willingness to do so.

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s choice of advisors – Cambodia’s former Prime Minister Hun Sen and Thailand’s ex-leader Thaksin Shinawatra – suggest that democracy and human rights may not be the priority they should be in addressing the crisis.

Since 2021, Myanmar has been embroiled in a bloody civil war, following a decision by the military to cancel election results won resoundingly by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy and abandon the country’s tentative steps towards democratization.

Would Trump defend Taiwan?

Gabriel Elefteriu

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President Trump’s tariff bombshell is more than simply a historic economic decision with geopolitical consequences on the side, as second-order effects. “Liberation Day” is best understood, first and foremost, as the fullest and cleanest expression of a certain geopolitical vision, with trade and economics only in a supporting role as instruments for realising it in practice. Trump is not just out to fix trade imbalances or re-industrialise the US: he wants to reshape the world and America’s place in it.

The approach seems to be that of taking a completely fresh look at America’s existing international alliance commitments and relationships – military, diplomatic and economic – and reviewing these “entanglements” from first principles to see what still makes sense from an America First point of view. This is a de facto reset of the geopolitical board, where the pre-Trump status of being a “friend and ally of the US” carries little weight with the current president, especially on tariffs. Such an approach is shocking to allied sensibilities, but only because most of our political and policy elites still cling to a world that is rapidly disappearing.

US-China trade war is on: Could it turn violent, and when?

Jake Werner

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Today Trump suspended his global trade war with all countries except China. This confirms that, even as all eyes were on the chaos in the financial markets, the far bigger threat from Trump’s “liberation day” was a sharp escalation in the US–China conflict that could now plausibly turn violent within the next couple years.

Prior to Trump’s “liberation day” the two countries had an unhealthy relationship with steadily building pressures toward conflict. The Biden administration not only retained almost all of the first Trump administration’s antagonistic measures against China but expanded and intensified them. Though it eventually revived the diplomatic exchanges that the first Trump administration shut down, Biden declined to work with China to mitigate the zero-sum forces pushing the two countries against each other.

The new Trump administration quickly imposed a sharp increase on China’s already high tariffs. Yet both sides were initially willing to seek an agreement that could have at least reduced tensions. After the election, Beijing sent a series of delegations to Washington in hopes of understanding what kind of concessions Trump was seeking and how to get talks started. It informally suggested a range of issues on which it could give ground, ranging from currency valuations to guarantees on dollar centrality to industrial investment in the United States.

Underestimating China

Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi

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Success in great-power competition requires rigorous and unsentimental net assessment. Yet the American estimation of China has lurched from one extreme to the other. For decades, Americans registered blistering economic growth, dominance of international trade, and growing geopolitical ambition, and anticipated the day when China might overtake a strategically distracted and politically paralyzed United States; after the 2008 financial crisis, and then especially at the height of the COVID pandemic, many observers believed that day had come. But the pendulum swung to the other extreme only a few years later as China’s abandonment of “zero COVID” failed to restore growth. Beijing was beset by ominous demographics, once unthinkable youth unemployment, and deepening stagnation while the United States was strengthening alliances, boasting breakthroughs in artificial intelligence and other technologies, and enjoying a booming economy with record low unemployment and record high stock markets.

A new consensus took hold: that an aging, slowing, and increasingly less nimble China would not overtake an ascendant United States. Washington shifted from pessimism to overconfidence. Yet just as past bouts of defeatism were misguided, so is today’s triumphalism, which risks dangerously underestimating both the latent and actual power of the only competitor in a century whose GDP has surpassed 70 percent of that of the United States. On critical metrics, China has already outmatched the United States. Economically, it boasts twice the manufacturing capacity. Technologically, it dominates everything from electric vehicles to fourth-generation nuclear reactors and now produces more active patents and top-cited scientific publications annually. Militarily, it features the world’s largest navy, bolstered by shipbuilding capacity 200 times as large as that of the United States; vastly greater missile stocks; and the world’s most advanced hypersonic capabilities—all results of the fastest military modernization in history. Even if China’s growth slows and its system falters, it will remain formidable strategically.

U.S. Forces in the Middle East: Mapping the Military Presence

Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow

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The United States maintains a considerable military presence in the Middle East, with forces in more than a dozen countries and on ships throughout the region’s waters. That presence expanded in 2024 as the United States focused on deterring and defeating threats from Iran and its network of armed affiliates in the region, including Hamas (Gaza Strip), Hezbollah (Lebanon), the Houthis (Yemen), and several Iraq- and Syria-based militant groups. In March 2025, U.S. Central Command forces launched an offensive air strike on Houthi-controlled territories in Yemen from war ships stationed in the Red Sea.

Since the October 2023 outbreak of war between Hamas and Israel, a U.S. ally and defense partner, U.S. forces in the Middle East have been increasingly targeted by some of these groups—and have regularly responded with counterstrikes. Meanwhile, U.S. and coalition ships have been protecting merchant shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, defending against near-daily Houthi drone and missile attacks.

The Pentagon has also responded as hostilities between Israel and Iran as well as Israel and Hezbollah have flared in recent months. In April 2024, U.S. warplanes and ships successfully intercepted dozens of drones and missiles fired at Israel in an unprecedented direct attack by Iran. In October of the same year, the United States announced it sent dozens of additional aircraft (four squadrons) to the region. The move came as Israel commenced a ground incursion against Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran launched another, larger barrage of missile strikes against Israel. U.S. naval forces reportedly shot a dozen interceptors at the Iranian missiles. In March 2025, B-2 stealth bombers were also reportedly being deployed from their home base in Missouri to the joint U.S.-United Kingdom military base in Diego Garcia, an island part of the British Indian Ocean Territory that is within striking range of Houthi territory and Iran.

Eight Commandants, One Message

CDR Salamander

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Yes, you could dismiss this as parochial on their and my part—but that would be a mistake.

There remains to this day no better way to project power ashore on a global scale than the self-contained capabilities that only the United States has…and we are on the knife’s edge on having enough of it to allow this comparative advantage to be there when the nation needs it.

Every Commandant of the Marine Corps since 1995 signed a letter posted over at RealClearDefense that is worth your time as it covers an unbroken three decades of professional experience at the very highest levels.

Of all the services, one could safely argue that the Marines have done better than most in their choices of top leadership. Not perfect, but on average, superb. They stick together on the important things.

As such, when they all get together to make a point, you should pause and give it a listen.

Winning the Next War Will Require an Intel-Logistics Partnership

Lieutenant Colonel Christian Palmer, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

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During the 2009 Afghanistan troop surge, a group of Marines at Camp Bastion passed the time waiting for a flight by playing spades with a “most wanted” deck from a previous deployment to Iraq. This was a deck of cards produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency labeled with high-value enemy targets ranked by their importance. Saddam Hussein was the ace of spades, for example. The Marines began discussing what a deck might look like for their own regiment.

They concluded that the most senior personnel, such as the regimental commander, battalion commanders, and primary staff, might not be the aces. These positions were so critical that the table of organization is designed to make them instantly replaceable by executive officers and deputies. They debated who might be the real aces—the critical losses from which the regiment could not easily recover. They soon found themselves talking about low-density subject-matter experts in support functions—in short, logisticians and key maintenance personnel.

This realization points to the concepts of counter-logistics targeting and assured-logistics analysis: The examination of enemy and friendly support, respectively, to find subtle but critical vulnerabilities to either exploit or protect. Counter-logistics also includes predatory logistics—the seizure and use of enemy assets.

For Africa's Stability, All-Inclusive Dialogue Is the Only Way Forward | Opinion

William Ruto

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As the conflict in Sudan enters its third year, we must grasp its impact on the people of Sudan, neighboring states—including Kenya—and the broader region. There should be no doubt that the risks of protracted conflict and humanitarian disaster compel us to pursue a comprehensive peace. This peace must end the suffering of the Sudanese, restore the country to a path of realizing its immense potential, and reinforce stability in our shared neighborhood.

First, it is critical to recognize that the Sudanese conflict has triggered a humanitarian catastrophe of alarming severity, scale, and duration. Hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost, and millions of livelihoods have vanished. Over 10 million Sudanese—20 percent of the population—are currently displaced from their homes. Many of these displaced people have sought refuge in Kenya and other nearby countries. This influx puts intense pressure on fragile states such as Chad, South Sudan, and Libya, all of which must now contend with significant resource constraints and vulnerabilities.

Trump is taking the Monroe Doctrine global

Brahma Chellaney

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President Trump’s second term is proving even more disruptive than his first, especially for the world order.

In under 100 days, he has upended international norms, challenged key alliances and reasserted American power with blunt confidence. The emerging pattern reveals something deeper: a revival and global extension of the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine.

First declared in 1823 by President James Monroe, the Monroe Doctrine sought to prevent European powers from meddling in the Americas. Its premise was simple: The Western Hemisphere was a U.S. sphere of influence.

Under Trump, this idea is being reinterpreted, expanded and aggressively enforced — not just in the Americas but across the broader Western world.

Ten Tariff Questions Never Asked

Victor Davis Hanson

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1.Trump’s So-Called “Trade War.”

Many call the American effort to obtain either tariff parity or a reduction in the roughly $1 trillion trade deficit and fifty years of consecutive trade deficits “a trade war.” But then what do they call the policies of the past half-century by Europe, Asia, China, and others to ensure asymmetrical tariffs, pseudo-health and security trade restrictions, and large surpluses?

A trade peace? Trade fairness?

2. Do Nations Prefer Surpluses or Deficits?

Why do most nations prefer trade surpluses and protective tariffs?

Are Europe, Asia, China, and others stupid? Are they suicidal in continuing their trade surpluses and protective or asymmetrical tariffs?

Is the United States uniquely brilliant in maintaining a half-century of cumulative trade deficits? Do Americans alone discover the advantages of a $1 trillion annual trade deficit and small or nonexistent tariffs?

Why Are Israelis So Happy?

Natan Sharansky and Gil Troy

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The numbers are in: Israel is a happy place. Despite constantly facing vicious enemies and enduring a year and a half of sustained fighting and funerals, Israel ranks in the top 10 countries with the highest levels of happiness, according to the newly released 2025 World Happiness Report. At No. 8, Israel contrasts sharply with other war-torn countries that are quite reasonably miserable: Ukraine sits at 111, and Lebanon, which opened a second front against Israel in October 2023, is third from the bottom, at 145. Even advanced Western nations such as Great Britain and the United States, in 23rd and 24th place, respectively, have a glee gap with Israel. How come?

An illuminating if perhaps counterintuitive datapoint is that, since Oct. 7, 2023, Israelis have rushed ahead with making babies. Baby booms often occur postwar, not in the middle of one. But Israelis have continued to affirm life even while mourning more than 1,700 dead. At almost three babies per woman, Israel already has the leading birth rate among member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—a forum of 37 democracies with market-based economies—and in the final months of 2024, it witnessed an estimated 10 percent increase in births.

Europe’s path to global influence

Peter Rough and Abram Shulsky

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Apparently, the U.S. administration’s overtures to Russia and its suspension of military assistance to Ukraine reminded the continent’s leaders of the cynical adage that one is either at the table or on the menu.

“There is only one thing that counts, and that is speed,” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said in February, announcing a 70 percent increase in military spending. Meanwhile, in neighboring Germany, Chancellor-in-waiting Friedrich Merz is reportedly finalizing a special fund for the Bundeswehr worth hundreds of billions of euros. And the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas even argued that “it’s up to us, Europeans, to take this challenge” of leading the free world.

But is Europe really on the cusp of transforming into a geopolitical power?

In terms of population, technological development, and economic size and strength, Europe could easily qualify as a great power. However, the continent’s future will depend on more than its nations’ ability to convert their economic might into defense capabilities.

To truly become the great power some aspire it to be, Europe will need a political structure that enables it to exercise the leadership long provided by the U.S. And its outlook for forging such a structure faces significant hurdles.

How to Make Putin Laugh….Keep Trump Waiting

Monte Erfourth

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The Laughter Heard Around the World

When Russian President Vladimir Putin was informed he was running late for his scheduled call with U.S. President Donald Trump on Tuesday, his response was telling: a smile, followed by laughter shared with those around him at the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs congress in Moscow. The moment, captured on video and widely circulated on social media, spoke volumes about the curious dynamics of the Trump-Putin relationship. As noted by Pekka Kallioniemi, a nonresident research fellow at the International Centre for Defense and Security, "They're literally making fun of Trump and his convoy."[1]

This was not an isolated incident. Putin has a history of keeping American officials waiting, including Trump's Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, who reportedly waited eight hours while Putin met with Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko.2 Though the Trump administration denied these reports, the pattern reveals something significant about how Putin views his American counterpart – not as an equal to be respected, but as someone to be managed.

The March 2025 phone call, initially scheduled to begin at 9 a.m. ET but delayed by an hour, was ostensibly to discuss a potential ceasefire in Ukraine after three years of devastating conflict. What emerged instead was a stark reminder of the imbalance in what Trump has characterized as a potentially productive relationship.

Map Shows US Military Commands Targeted for DOGE Cuts

Ellie Cook and John Feng

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Senior Republicans have said they are "very concerned" about reported Pentagon discussions on widespread changes to the U.S. military structure and footprint abroad, as extensive government cuts start to reach the Department of Defense.

Why It Matters

The U.S. has the West's most powerful military, and a global footprint to both support its allies and to deter its adversaries in different regions.

But the Trump administration has turned away from Europe, where the U.S. military has tens of thousands of personnel stationed, and looked toward how it will contend with the challenge posed by an ascendant China.

There are also growing concerns among current and former military figures and experts about how senior White House officials have thawed relations with Russia and purged several of the highest-ranking U.S. military figures, including the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General Charles Q. Brown Jr.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said last month that the Pentagon would be leaning heavily on tech billionaire-turned-presidential aide Elon Musk and his Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) to "find fraud, waste and abuse in the largest discretionary budget in the federal government."

Is This Game Over for the Houthis? - Analysis

Burcu Ozcelik and Baraa Shiban

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While the fighting power and military arsenal of other Iran-backed proxies in the so-called axis of resistance, Hamas and Hezbollah, have been eroded significantly since the attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, the Houthi movement has survived relatively unscathed. Since the cease-fire and hostage deal was announced between Israel and Hamas in January, the Houthis have been on standby as the de facto enforcers of the agreement, retaining the leverage to resume violence at a time of their own choosing. On March 11, the Houthis announced that the group will resume its attacks in the Red Sea as a response to Israel blocking humanitarian aid entering Gaza. This balance of asymmetrical power is what the United States seems to be targeting in a series of intense airstrikes that could extend into the coming weeks.

The shift in U.S. policy under the Trump administration, from targeted strikes to a broader, more aggressive campaign, marks a significant escalation. This change reflects a hardening stance against the Houthis, moving beyond containment to active disruption of their capabilities. The decision to target political leadership alongside military assets suggests a desire to dismantle the Houthis’ organizational structure, not just degrade the immediate military threat they pose.

Trade Wars Are Easy to Lose

Adam S. Posen

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“When a country (USA) is losing many billions of dollars on trade with virtually every country it does business with,” U.S. President Donald Trump famously tweeted in 2018, “trade wars are good, and easy to win.” This week, when the Trump administration imposed tariffs of more than 100 percent on U.S. imports from China, setting off a new and even more dangerous trade war, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent offered a similar justification: “I think it was a big mistake, this Chinese escalation, because they’re playing with a pair of twos. What do we lose by the Chinese raising tariffs on us? We export one-fifth to them of what they export to us, so that is a losing hand for them.”

In short, the Trump administration believes it has what game theorists call escalation dominance over China and any other economy with which it has a bilateral trade deficit. Escalation dominance, in the words of a report by the RAND Corporation, means that “a combatant has the ability to escalate a conflict in ways that will be disadvantageous or costly to the adversary while the adversary cannot do the same in return.” If the administration’s logic is correct, then China, Canada, and any other country that retaliates against U.S. tariffs is indeed playing a losing hand.

But this logic is wrong: it is China that has escalation dominance in this trade war. The United States gets vital goods from China that cannot be replaced any time soon or made at home at anything less than prohibitive cost. Reducing such dependence on China may be a reason for action, but fighting the current war before doing so is a recipe for almost certain defeat, at enormous cost. Or to put it in Bessent’s terms: Washington, not Beijing, is betting all in on a losing hand.

The Forever War in Gaza

Amos Harel

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Less than two months after he committed to a phased cease-fire with Hamas, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu resumed his country’s war in the Gaza Strip. On March 18, Israeli air force jets attacked military sites, killing more than 400 Palestinians, including over 300 women and children, according to Gaza’s Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health—a devastating toll even by the war’s earlier standards. The short-lived truce had allowed for the release of 30 hostages Hamas took during its shock attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, as well as the repatriation of eight deceased captives. Last week, the Israeli government proposed resuming a cease-fire in exchange for the return of 11 more hostages and 16 more bodies.

But even if Hamas and Israel hammer out a new, short-term agreement to halt hostilities, Gaza is unlikely to see real peace any time soon. Since the horrific October 7 massacre, which claimed the lives of around 1,250 Israelis, Netanyahu has pursued two goals with his military operations in the strip—free all the hostages and destroy Hamas. But these goals cannot be achieved at the same time: Hamas refuses to subscribe to a peace process that involves its own annihilation, and as long as Israel is committed to that outcome, Hamas’s surviving leaders have a powerful incentive to hold on to hostages to deter Israeli attacks that might kill them.

Behind the Curtain: In just 80 days ...

Jim VandeHei & Mike Allen

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President Trump has done more unprecedented, lasting things in 80 days than many presidents do in a four-year term.

Why it matters: There are 1,382 days to go in this term.

So let's step back and appraise the indisputable acts of power that have changed America in Trump's first two months and three weeks, as synthesized by Axios' Zachary Basu:

1. A new global economy.

• Trump has declared an all-out war on globalism, detonating every one of America's trading relationships — allies and adversaries alike — by imposing the largest tariffs in nearly a century.
• Trump's push for a manufacturing renaissance has helped secure at least $1.6 trillion in U.S. investment pledges. But his tariff rollout melted markets globally and dramatically raised the threat of a recession.
• The renewed trade war with China carries the biggest potential blast radius, with the world's two largest economies engaged in a tit-for-tat escalation that could snarl global supply chains.

2. A new world order.

• The rules-based system forged after World War II is dead: Trump has withdrawn from multilateral institutions, threatened to expand U.S. territory to Greenland, Gaza and Panama, and alienated America's closest allies.
• Canada, stewing in nationalist fervor from Trump's tariffs and his "51st state" mockery, has declared our close relationship "over" and is looking to other allies for security and economic cooperation.
• Europe is in the midst of its own radical transformation, singed and stunned by Trump's tariffs, constant insults, undermining NATO and siding with Russia over Ukraine.
• Years of U.S. strategy designed to isolate China is up in flames, with Asian allies turning to Beijing for trade refuge and Taiwan fearing it could meet the same fate as Ukraine.

12 Questions for a Writer: Douglas Waller

Lethal Minds Journal

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1. Who are you, what have you written, and why?

In almost two decades as a Washington journalist, I covered the Pentagon, Congress, the State Department, the White House and the CIA. From 1994 to 2007, I served in TIME Magazine’s Washington Bureau, first as a correspondent and then as a senior correspondent. At TIME, I covered foreign affairs extensively as a diplomatic correspondent, traveling throughout Europe, Asia and the Middle East as well as in the Persian Gulf region. I came to TIME in 1994 from Newsweek, where I reported on major military conflicts from the Gulf War to Somalia to Haiti. Before joining Newsweek in 1988, I served as a legislative assistant on the staffs of Senator William Proxmire and then-Representative Edward J. Markey. The Determined Spy is my seventh book on the military or intelligence. For my historical biographies I’ve gravitated toward charismatic yet controversial figures. World War II spy chief Wild Bill Donovan, the subject of one of my biographies, was certainly that kind of figure. People either loved or hated him. Frank Wisner, my latest biographic subject, was that as well. Few were neutral on him. I find as a biographer, that these kinds of subjects are more interesting—and challenging—to tackle.

Authoritarians’ Achilles’ Heel: Leveraging Space-Based Internet to Seize Competitive Initiative

Christopher Culver

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For approximately thirty years, China has been modernizing with a competitive strategy focused on capabilities tailored to attack key vulnerabilities of the US military: targeting aircraft carriers, satellites, forward air bases, and command-and-control nodes to deter or prevent its ability to intervene in a potential regional conflict. The strategy has yielded an array of kinetic and nonkinetic counterspace systems, missiles, air and naval assets with multilayered ranges and effects, and cyber capabilities—supported by an exponential increase in satellites that can detect US forces and an arsenal of at least six hundred operational nuclear warheads, projected to grow to one thousand within five years. This unprecedented pace of modernization will continue as the People’s Liberation Army matures its multidomain precision warfare concept to leverage artificial intelligence and big data to rapidly identify and launch precision strikes against US vulnerabilities.

The US military’s ability to project traditional military power across the Pacific is seriously threatened by these capabilities. But seeking to compete by developing systems that can overcome them requires expenditures that, while potentially beneficial if they become politically feasible, are not sustainable. The United States faces an enduring challenge because of the difficulty and expense of projecting power over such vast distances while China fights from home. Beijing can therefore respond to US investments with less time and expense, fueled by an industrial base that is outpacing the United States and a political system that can deliver military resources with greater consistency and long-term focus.

Can VPNs Be Tracked by the Police?

Drew Robb

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Virtual private networks are designed to preserve online privacy by encrypting internet traffic and hiding IP addresses that can be used to determine user location. Most users are aware of this when they try to access a website or service when they are overseas. The IP address generally triggers the loading of a URL in the local area and may restrict access to a U.S. service or site. A VPN can be used to circumvent such restrictions and limitations. For example, a U.S. user traveling in Europe might be blocked from accessing paid streaming services that the user could access if he or she were physically located in the U.S. A VPN masks the local European IP address and can enable the person to view U.S.-based content.

A VPN server, then, replaces an IP address with its own as it passes the encrypted data to the public internet. For example, if you live in New York, your IP address will show that you are connecting from New York. However, if you connect to a VPN server based in Amsterdam, the IP address appears to indicate that the user is based in the Netherlands.

On the surface, VPNs seem to hide the digital footprint of a user. However, they are not a guarantee of complete anonymity. For example, ISPs are aware of when someone is using a VPN, but they can’t view specific online activity protected by a VPN, such as browsing history, DNS queries, downloaded files and personal data. However, VPNs are useful in preventing Big Brother — in the form of various government agencies — from snooping on users and where they visit online. The use of an encrypted VPN tunnel offers a large measure of protection against unwanted eyes.

What Would Tina Say? Cyber Security Challenge Spokesperson Speaks Out

Jeff From 

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April Fools' came early this year as top Trump administration officials failed the Cyber Security Challenge 2025 yesterday by conducting sensitive war operations via the cutting-edge platform known as... a group chat. The DoD’s Cybersecurity Awareness Challenge Representative, Tina, was flabbergasted that our nation’s elite defenders did not learn the lessons from the beloved Cybersecurity Challenge. “WTF!,” Tina exclaimed. "What the f--- do we have to do to get you folks to understand you don't use your damn cell phone for secret s---?!"

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Vice President JD Vance, and National Security Advisor Michael Waltz demonstrated their mastery of operational security by accidentally adding The Atlantic's Editor-in-Chief Jeffrey Goldberg to their "Houthi PC small group" on Signal. The group shared detailed military plans for airstrikes in Yemen, complete with target information, weapons packages, and attack timing—information that Goldberg described as sending "a chill down my spine."

When questioned about the security breach, Hegseth, who had previously assured the chat participants that "we are currently clean on OPSEC," responded with characteristic confidence: "Nobody was texting war plans, and that's all I have to say about that." This clear statement came right on the heels of the White House confirming the messages were authentic. Great check on integrity, Pete!

ChatGPT vs. Google Gemini Which AI is Smarter

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Google Gemini and ChatGPT are both sophisticated AI models developed by separate businesses. Their features, designs, and objectives are distinct. Google Gemini provides a wider range of features, such as the ability to generate images and videos, whereas ChatGPT concentrates on natural conversations and text-based jobs. Though they were constructed with different objectives in mind, both are strong. Gemini strives for a more multi-modal experience with extra creative capabilities, whereas ChatGPT is best at text-based interactions.

ChatGPT vs. Google Gemini AI Battle for the Future

1. Developer and Ecosystem:

ChatGPT: There are many versions of ChatGPT, that are produced by OpenAI and belong to the GPT family. It can be found online, through mobile applications, and OpenAI API. Special tools based on GPT are also available from OpenAI for tasks like coding.

Google Gemini: A component of Google’s AI strategy to rival models such as GPT is Gemini. It has connections to other Google services, such as Google Workspace and Search. Gemini improves its productivity by utilizing Google’s robust search and processing capabilities.

Our Nation Must Have Warriors

Michael Furay

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It is odd that the former Chief of Naval Operations John Richardson (CNO, 2011-2015), was the force behind the resurrection of the book, The Rules of the Game (1996), by Andrew Gordon. The book went out of print before the United States Naval Institute Press republished it in 2013. The book, which examines the Royal Navy between the battles of Trafalgar and Jutland, has several lessons that the CNO deemed important enough to merit his intercession to bring it back into print, and he discussed these in his May 2017 remarks following a presentation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

According to Richardson, "…there are a lot of interpretations about what the major messages of that book are…." For Richardson, the primary takeaway is that there is a tension between trusting a commander's initiative and understanding of the mission and the new technological ability to micromanage those commanders from Washington.

For many other readers, the book’s chief message is the difference between "ratcatchers" and "regulators." “Ratcatcher" was coined by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Walter Cowan. He was talking about his then battlecruiser senior, Admiral David Beatty, and his "ratcatching instinct for war." In short, Cowan deemed Beatty the consummate warrior. This view was in marked contrast to his opinion of Admiral of the Fleet John Rushworth Jellicoe, a quintessential "regulator." Regulators were those officers who achieved seniority during the years of peacetime, and from too much technological change. For regulators, this change became all-absorbing and minimized the primacy of warfighting and warrior admirals.

Hunting and the enemy in Modern Counterinsurgency: Malayan developments

Thomas Probert

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Introduction

As the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) was ongoing, a number of military memoirs were published which gave some insight into its prosecution on the ground. These included Anthony Crockett, Green Beret, Red Star (1954); M.C.A. Henniker, Red Shadow Over Malaya (1955); Oliver Crawford, The Door Marked Malaya (1958); Richard Miers, Shoot to Kill (1959) and J.W.G. Moran, Spearhead in Malaya (1959). In his paper ‘The Military Memoir in British Imperial Culture: The Case of Malaya’ (1994), John Newsinger wrote: ‘Inevitably, a number of these accounts explicitly portray the conflict as a hunt for a particularly dangerous kind of game.’1 He argues that: ‘These hunting analogies obviously derive from the importance of blood sports within British upper-class culture both at home and throughout the Empire.’2 And that: ‘They also reflect the disparity between the two sides in the conflict, the inability of the guerillas to hit back effectively against British troops except under the most favorable conditions.’3

In Terrorism, InsurDarwinism, dian-English Literature, 1830-1947, (2013), Alex Tickell noted that the blood sports narrative had long been associated with the practice of counterinsurgency, being evidenced in India a century earlier as the British suppressed rebellion there.4 Robert H. MacDonald, in The Language of Empire: Myths and Metaphors of Popular Imperialism, 1880-1918 (1994), linked the hunting metaphor to imperial narratives of warfare through training, suggesting it was the natural way for British officers to conceptualize the small wars of Empire: ‘To officers encouraged to believe that the best training for war was the field, the story of the hunt was a natural analogue.’5 John M. Mackenzie (1989) has argued that Scouting for Boys, by Robert Baden-Powell, employed hunting terminology to socialize Britain’s youth for its imperial enterprise.6 He goes on to argue that the hunt itself played into ideas about Social Darwinism, ‘the fittest were created through the rugged individualism of the Hunt.’7