30 March 2025

Russia and Chinese private military and security companies in Africa: two competing models?

Djenabou Cisse, Simon Menet & Marie de Vries

The private military and security companies (PMSCs) sector has grown considerably in recent decades, particularly in Africa. The rise of security challenges on the continent, such as increased terrorist threats, inter-community conflicts, civil wars, and insurrectionary conflicts, along with some governments’ difficulties in addressing them, have led to greater reliance on PMSCs. Both local and foreign companies operate in this sector, undertaking tasks like protecting nationals and supporting the operations of local armed forces. Russian and Chinese companies are among the most active in Africa. Since the 2000s, China and Russia have emerged as significant players in international security and have subsequently expanded their presence on the continent, notably through PMSCs.

The expansion of Chinese PMSCs in Africa has primarily been driven by the need to ensure the safety of over a million Chinese nationals on the continent and to protect China’s economic interests. As Africa’s leading trade partner, China registered a trade volume of 282 billion dollars in 2022. For instance, a company like Frontier Services Group (FSG) claimed in 2019 that Africa was its most important source of revenue
. As for Russian PMSCs, the African market has so far been dominated by the paramilitary group Wagner, which has established itself as the main tool for expanding Russian influence, notably by providing security for certain regimes, for example in the Central African Republic and Mali, and by participating in information manipulation campaigns.

PRC Mining in Tibet – a European Perspective

Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) dominates the global supply chains for critical raw materials (CRM) needed to produce green energy technologies, like solar modules and electric vehicle (EV) batteries. By dominating the mining, metallurgy and material science sectors, often referred to as the “three Ms”, China dominates much of the world’s clean-tech supply chains.1 Yet, while China dominates refining, it faces its own supply vulnerabilities, reflecting the complexity of global dependencies. In order to keep its lead, the PRC needs Tibet’s rich resources, including its lithium and copper. Going forward, Beijing is likely to expand mining activities on the Tibetan Plateau, displacing and disempowering the Tibetan people, polluting their rivers, land and air, with far-reaching regional and global implications.

In contrast with the PRC, the European Union (EU) is just catching up in the global CRM race. Burdened by its internal fragmentation, the bloc has struggled to manage its exposure to China. At present, the EU sources 90 percent of its solar modules from the PRC, and Europeanmanufactured solar modules are heavily reliant on components imported from the PRC.2 Overall, the bloc depends on China for 98 percent of its supply of rare earth elements (REE) and around 60 percent of its CRM.3 The geopolitical risks for Europe are clearly high. Alarmed by China’s position at the center of global supply chains, Europe has started de-risking from China. 

Hydrogen-powered Houthi drones


Documentation

On 12 and 13 November 2024, CAR deployed to Mokha, a key port city on the south-west coast of Yemen, alongside maritime security units of the Yemeni National Resistance Forces (NRF). Established in 2018, the NRF is commanded by General Tareq Saleh, who is also part of the Yemen Presidential Leadership Council .

In Mokha, CAR investigators documented a sample of cargo that NRF security personnel had seized aboard a trading vessel (pictured) in the southern Red Sea on 3 August 2024.

The vessel had been transporting a consignment of chemical fertiliser products to the Houthi-controlled port of Salif. NRF personnel discovered, however, that the cargo also contained a large amount of undeclared componentry for the development of advanced conventional weapons, including uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs):

Hundreds of airframes and fins for use in the local assembly of 270mm Badr-class precision-guided artillery rockets (pictured);


Why is the US bombing Yemen in the first place?

Rafi Schwartz

Washington continues to reel this week after The Atlantic editor Jeffrey Goldberg published a stunning report detailing his experience being accidentally added to a group chat of Trump administration officials. Using the messaging app Signal, they were coordinating a military strike on Houthi targets in Yemen. Goldberg's story, the second half of which was released after the White House insisted there had been no breach of top secret protocols, has become a major scandal for President Donald Trump and members of his Cabinet.

House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.) on Tuesday demanded in a letter to the White House that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth be "fired immediately" for the breach, while Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) raised the possibility of a congressional investigation into the episode. While the political ramifications of this "Signalgate" scandal remain to be fully seen, the incident has brought public attention to a broader and perhaps more materially pressing question: Why is the United States bombing Yemen at all?

Clearing global shipping lanes

The White House has said that strikes against the Houthi group, which have played a key role in Yemen's ongoing civil war, are "due to attacks on Navy ships and shipping" in the Red Sea by the Iran-backed Islamist group, said Military.com. The bombardment will end the "minute the Houthis say 'we'll stop shooting at your ships, we'll stop shooting at your drones,'" said Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth last week to Fox News host Maria Bartiromo before The Atlantic's story was published. The campaign is about "freedom of navigation" and "restoring deterrence," Hegseth said.

Europe in danger: Νavigating a future without Trump’s America

Steven Everts

Since his inauguration, Donald Trump has unleashed a torrent of initiatives, threats and decisions upon the world. Each day brings a new target and another broken taboo. Last autumn, discussions focused on how to ‘Trump-proof’ the transatlantic relationship. Plans were in place to counter his threats – whether imposing tariffs on European trade or linking America’s NATO commitments to increased European defence spending, preferably on US-made weapons.

But what we are seeing now is more radical and more damaging. There is something akin to a ‘cultural revolution’ underway, characterised by ideological extremism, the silencing of internal critics and the imperative of loyalty to the leader. In six short weeks, Trump and his team have threatened to seize European territory, abandoned Ukraine while bullying its president, aligned with Europe’s far right, and attacked the EU’s regulatory autonomy in the tech sphere.

Shockwaves are reverberating across Europe, triggering a flurry of crisis meetings in different configurations as leaders scramble to respond. Meanwhile, European public opinion is ahead of its politicians. Trust in the US among Germans has plummeted from 84% to just 16%, only slightly above Russia’s 6%. Strikingly, support for Europe’s populists is waning, suggesting a recognition among voters that the Trump tornado is harmful to European interests.

The Effect of Trump Tariffs on Mexico and Canada

Andreas Baur and Lisandra Flach

US President Donald Trump has recently announced that tariffs on US imports from Canada and Mexico will take effect on March 4, 2025. This policy brief shows that the US tariffs would have a large impact on the North American neighbors. In the event of retaliation, all sectors of the economy (services, agriculture, and industry) in the three directly affected countries, including the US economy, would experience value-added losses. Moreover, in terms of trade flows, Canada would have to expect a long-term permanent decline in total exports of up to 28%, while Mexico could see a drop of more than 35% and the US of 22%. The close ties with the US due to their geographical location and the sectoral structure of their bilateral trade flows make it harder for Mexico and Canada to divert trade flows to other trade partners. Now more than ever, they should act to diversify their trade relations. 

Trade Model and Scenarios 

We employ the ifo Trade Model, which is a quantitative trade model based on Caliendo and Parro (2015). 1 International linkages are captured through input-output relationships, with the model incorporating both tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. The model covers 141 countries and 65 economic sectors, accounting for over 90% of global value added. It is parameterized through econometric estimations resulting from theoretical equilibrium conditions, allowing us to simulate general equilibrium effects of various trade policy scenarios.

Doubling down, not backing down: defending the EU’s digital sovereignty in the Trump era

Georg Riekeles , Max von Thun & Pencho Kuzev

The European Union (EU) is founded on the rule of law, with independent, democratically elected institutions that ensure the strongest protection of fundamental rights and values. Any company – European or not – that wishes to operate in the EU market must comply with the legal framework of the Union and its member states. However, over the past months, the EU, various member states, and democratic leaders have faced relentless attacks from U.S. tech billionaires with direct influence in the White House. Europe has been accused by U.S. tech platforms of censorship, stifling innovation through overregulation, and unfairly targeting them with enforcement actions inaccurately described as “tariffs”. President Donald Trump, Vice-President JD Vance and other leading Republicans have themselves issued a series of threats, promising not to let Europe “take advantage of our companies” and even using NATO funding as a bargaining chip.

These accusations conveniently ignore that these same corporations have benefited massively from open access to the European market, the world’s largest digital service market outside the U.S., while being responsible for inflicting huge damage on Europe’s economy and democratic institutions. In 2021, the U.S. exported $283 billion in digitally-deliverable services to Europe, almost twice the amount going the other direction, and more than double U.S. exports to the entire Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, through their monopoly power and anti-competitive practices, U.S. gatekeepers have exploited the consumers and businesses dependent on them and stifled the emergence of European innovators. Most ominously, Europe’s societal and democratic fabric is reeling from the multiple shocks of systemic amplification of mis- and disinformation, calculated distortions of European electoral processes, and the general degrading of Europe’s public space through the promotion of conspiracies, hate speech or other illegal and extremist content.

The Trade Imbalance Index: Where the Trump Administration Should Take Action to Address Trade Distortions

Stephen Ezell, Trelysa Long and Robert D. Atkinson

Introduction

The second Trump administration has taken office looking to put U.S. trade relations on a more equitable footing with the rest of the world. President Trump has railed that other nations “are taking advantage of us” and vowed to ensure that U.S. companies are treated fairly in international markets. As Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently told U.S. allies, “I know you’ve gotten used to a foreign policy in which you act in the national interest of your country, and we sort of act in the interest of the globe or global order. But we are led by a different person now.”1

To enact the president’s vision, the White House has instructed the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), in coordination with the departments of Commerce and Treasury, to identify “any unfair trade practices by other countries and recommend appropriate actions to remedy such practices” by April 1, 2025.2

Meanwhile, the president has already trained his fire at several nations in the opening weeks of his administration—notably Canada, China, Colombia, and Mexico—but the to-do list is long, as an increasing number of countries around the world have adopted mercantilist trade practices in recent decades.3 Against that backdrop, the administration should focus on countries where systematically unfair, mercantilist trade policies are inflicting the most significant damage on the U.S. economy and U.S. corporations (large and small alike), and where the United States stands to gain the most by restoring balanced trade. Accordingly, the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) has developed the “Trade Imbalance Index” described in this report. It evaluates 48 countries (15 of which are included in the “European Union” bloc) on 11 measures to ascertain which are the biggest trade mercantilists or scofflaws and where the Trump administration should concentrate its attention as it seeks to advance a trade policy that more effectively defends U.S. interests and ensures more balanced trade relations.

AI, National Security, and the Global Technology Race: How US Export Controls Define the Future of Innovation

Nury Turkel

President Donald Trump has called China’s DeepSeek artificial intelligence (AI) system a “wake-up call” for the American technology sector and emphasized the need for the United States to remain “laser-focused” on winning the AI race.

His warning reflects growing concerns that China’s rapid advancements in AI—enabled by loopholes in US export control laws—pose a direct threat to national security and economic dominance. Without decisive action, the United States risks losing its competitive edge in one of the most consequential technology races of the twenty-first century.

The launch of DeepSeek has heightened security concerns in the United States, leading to calls for stricter export controls to curb China’s access to advanced AI technologies. In response, the state of New York banned DeepSeek from government devices, citing serious national security risks, including data privacy vulnerabilities and state-sponsored censorship. The Pentagon and Capitol Hill also banned the use of the chatbot. Meanwhile, Beijing continues to advocate for open-source AI, arguing that broader accessibility fosters global technological advancement. However, critics warn that unrestricted openness could enable adversarial nations to exploit cutting-edge AI research for mass surveillance, cyber warfare, and disinformation campaigns. While open-source AI has fueled rapid innovation and democratized access to AI tools, its potential misuse—particularly by authoritarian regimes—raises concerns about national security and economic competition.

Deterring or Spiralling? Emerging Technologies, Strategic Stability, and Prospects for Sino-European Arms Control


A new HCSS report by Davis Ellison, Tim Sweijs, and Timur Ghirotto warns that emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) threaten global strategic stability, highlighting the need for stronger arms control, especially with China. As technologies like hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence (AI), cyber warfare, and space-based systems advance, their impact on nuclear deterrence grows more critical.

While alarmist narratives often exaggerate the risks of EDTs broadly, they do pose real, specific threats by undermining second-strike capabilities, increasing crisis instability, and fuelling arms races. This report identifies three primary ways EDTs affect strategic stability:
  1. Enabling First Strikes – Advanced technologies may encourage pre-emptive attacks.
  2. Disrupting Command and Control (C3) Systems – Cyber and space-based disruptions could weaken deterrence by impairing communication and early-warning systems.
  3. Enhancing Second-Strike Defences – New measures to conceal or protect nuclear assets may shift deterrence dynamics.

Key EDTs analysed include hypersonic missiles, cyber warfare, directed energy weapons, space-based technologies, and AI, all of which are critical for NATO and European defence.

Ten Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War

Dr Christina Schori Liang

The Ukrainian military has gained respect for holding out against its numerically and technologically superior enemy through innovative tactics and technology. These adaptations, often finding cheaper and asymmetrical solutions to countering a stronger adversary, have also provided potential blueprints for terrorists to adopt. This analysis aims to focus on the twenty-first-century war tactics being employed in the Russia-Ukraine war to gain fresh insights into what types of strategies terrorists will employ and how countries will need to counter them.

Wars are not merely battles of weapons and resolve; they are testing grounds for the future and unique laboratories for technological and strategic advancements. The Russia-Ukraine war has been depicted as the first commercial space war, the first full-scale drone war, the first 3D printing war and the first Artificial Intelligence (AI) war. At the same time, the war is stealthily ushering in a new age of Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWS) that are reinventing air, land and naval warfare.

War tactics and strategies are open source. With round-the-clock international news and social media coverage, terrorists worldwide can monitor the unfolding war in real time by accessing encrypted messaging apps, social media platforms, image boards, video-sharing platforms, and the dark web.

Trump’s trade bazooka tactic and the strategic “debalancing” in Asia

Valérie Niquet

The Trump administration launched a new trade war against China and its traditional allies in Asia, Japan and South Korea in the first few weeks after his nomination. The objective was to correct what Washington saw as systemic economic imbalances and unfair trade practices, including undervalued currencies – Japanese yen, or Chinese yuan. This posture follows the America first policy of his first mandate, when Donald Trump unilaterally decided to quit the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a brainchild of Japan, the closest ally of the United States in the region.

Beyond tariffs and countermeasures, the broader consequences of this economic confrontation may significantly reshape Asia’s strategic landscape. As the region continues to navigate the aftershocks of these policies, the long-term implications remain fluid, with major actors recalibrating their positions in response to an evolving geopolitical order.


CYBER GOVERNANCE : ISSUES FOR THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

John K. Costello

Cyber governance remains a persistent challenge for every administration. As cyber threats evolve, agency missions mature, and technology advances, governance models must responsive in adapting while ensuring long-term sustainability and coordination. Cybersecurity’s unique positioning as a multi-agency, cross-sectoral issue further complicates governance, as agencies may hold conflicting equities—whether through their enterprise cybersecurity responsibilities, primary cyber missions (CISA, NSA, CYBERCOM), adjacent functions (FDA, DOE), or occasional involvement in cyberrelated national security efforts (OFAC sanctions, law enforcement investigations). This ever-changing threat landscape, quickly evolving technology ecosystem, lack of centralized planning and role assignments, and the resulting dispersion of responsibility has led to duplicative efforts, regulatory inconsistencies, and inefficiencies in both policy and operations.

Despite numerous legislative and executive measures aimed at improving interagency alignment, efforts to centralize authorities and streamline coordination have often exacerbated fragmentation—adding additional coordinating bodies rather than consolidating existing functions. This challenge is rooted in both the executive branch, where agencies resist ceding authority, and in Congress, where jurisdictional divisions favor narrow, incremental legislative changes over broader restructuring efforts. It is further exacerbated by the Constitutional bias for firewalls between private and public sector activities (e.g., the private sector is expected to pursue its aims with minimal disruption from the public sector and no expectation of continuous collaboration in framing and executing sector initiatives). Discord in governance is a result of a steady expansion of authorities and budgets without a corresponding improvement in strategic unity or operational efficiency. Cyber governance in the United States has thus evolved not from a central plan but through an incremental, additive process—layering new authorities, structures, and initiatives atop existing ones rather than undertaking comprehensive reform. This approach while adaptive often lacks coherence and efficiency.

Russia and Ukraine agree naval ceasefire in Black Sea

Ian Aikman

Russia and Ukraine have agreed to a naval ceasefire in the Black Sea in separate deals with the US, after three days of peace talks in Saudi Arabia.

Washington said all parties would continue working toward a "durable and lasting peace" in statements announcing the agreements, which would reopen an important trade route.

They have also committed to "develop measures" to implement a previously agreed ban on attacking each other's energy infrastructure, the White House said.

But Russia said the naval ceasefire would only come into force after a number of sanctions against its food and fertiliser trade were lifted.

US officials have been separately meeting negotiators from Moscow and Kyiv in Riyadh with the aim of brokering a truce between the two sides. The Russian and Ukrainian delegations have not met directly.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the deal to halt strikes in the Black Sea was a step in the right direction.

"It is too early to say that it will work, but these were the right meetings, the right decisions, the right steps," he told a press conference in Kyiv.

Stopping Israel’s War in Gaza


A ceasefire that brought welcome respite to war-torn Gaza has been broken. The truce marked a pause in Israel’s military assault on the strip, sparked by Hamas’s attack on 7 October 2023. That attack and the subsequent war in Gaza have left at least 50,000 Palestinians and 1,600 Israelis dead. Gaza is in ruins, its 2.2 million surviving people enduring terrible poverty, hunger, disease, grief, uncertainty and fear. Though suffering far fewer casualties, Israelis remain traumatised by the shock of Hamas’s 7 October attack and the continuous anxiety of the hostages’ lengthy captivity. The war has also rocked much of the Middle East, as Iran itself and militant groups in the Tehran-backed “axis of resistance” fired at Israel on several fronts.

The now shattered ceasefire – part of a broader deal concluded on 19 January – came as a relief to everyone. Though Israel still made sporadic strikes, killing some 150 people, Palestinians in Gaza could at least begin to pick up the pieces of their lives. The sides exchanged captives, opening the possibility of an end to Israel’s hostage nightmare as well as the return of hundreds of nearly 10,000 Palestinians incarcerated by Israel, many on flimsy “security” pretexts. Discussions about what a peaceful dispensation for Gaza might look like gathered momentum. A plan formulated by Arab leaders on 4 March and welcomed by Britain, China, France, Germany and Italy, among dozens of other countries, suggested a path to a more lasting peace. The Houthis in Yemen, now the most potent of the “axis” groups, halted their attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes and Israel as the ceasefire took hold.
[The 18 March] bombardment was some of the most ferocious of the war to date.


The EU’s Dilemmas in the Black Sea Region: Security and Enlargement

Koen Claessen

Acknowledging these challenges, the EU has begun to recalibrate its engagement, as evidenced by the European External Action Service’s ongoing work on a Black Sea Security Strategy and the region’s inclusion in the 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence.[1] However, as the EU seeks to enhance its engagement in the Black Sea region, it must confront two fundamental dilemmas: the extent to which it seeks to act as a geopolitical player and how to balance geopolitical urgency with the gradual, methodical process of EU integration.

Strategic Promises & Perils

The Black Sea holds significant economic potential for the EU, particularly in the fields of connectivity, energy security, and regional development. As a maritime connection between the EU and the Caucasus, it forms a crucial component of the Middle Corridor—a multimodal trade route linking China to Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus. With the EU seeking to bypass Russia and Iran in its trade with Asia, and instability threatening maritime routes through the Red Sea, the Black Sea’s role in Euro-Asian trade has gained renewed strategic importance.[2] The Black Sea region is also relevant to the EU’s energy security and green transition, exemplified by the Black Sea Submarine Cable—a planned high-voltage connection within the EU’s Global Gateway initiative that would link Azerbaijan’s renewable energy sector to the EU via Georgia and Romania.[3] Moreover, the Black Sea hosts Romanian offshore gas fields and significant offshore wind potential, both of which could enhance EU energy security, with the latter also supporting its green transition. Furthermore, the Black Sea remains a critical factor in the economies of EU members Romania and Bulgaria as well as candidate states Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.[4] Ukrainian ports, in particular, play a vital role in global food security through their grain exports. These diverse economic interests underscore the Black Sea’s growing importance in for EU.

Toward Globalization 2.0: A New Trade Policy Framework for Advanced-Industry Leadership and National Power

Robert D. Atkinson and Stephen Ezell

Introduction

From the fall of the Soviet Union to the 2016 election of President Trump, America rode the globalization horse, leading the charge for the near complete global integration of finance, investment, and trade. In this utopia, economic borders would be a thing of the past, capital would find its highest and most efficient use anywhere around the world, and the globe would be awash with win-win outcomes. Sure, some workers might get hurt, but they could move frictionlessly to thriving communities and “learn to code” or install solar panels and weatherize homes. It was America’s destined role to lead the world to this brighter place. Those who didn’t embrace that view were, well, beyond the pale and accused of being ignorant of basic economic principles.1

It is easy to look back with incredulity—and for some, even disdain—but this would forget the heady days after the long Cold War, and the belief in, as former U.S. State Department official Francis Fukuyama called it, “The End of History.”2 Or as former Intel CEO Craig Barrett stated, “Capitalism has won and economy trumps all going forward.”3 With the exception of a few malcontents, who didn’t agree? Indeed, it was, and for many still is, a simple, seductive, and sublime conception.

Army releases version 2.0 of its unified network plan


The U.S. Army has released its Army Unified Network Plan 2.0. While the first AUNP, published in 2021, focused mainly on the first phase of the plan – to unifying the network – AUNP 2.0 focuses mainly on phase two and some of phase three, which are to “operationalize the Unified Network” from 2024 to2026, and to “continuously modernize and transform the Unified Network” in 2027 and beyond.

Since the publication of the first AUNP – which provided the roadmap for converging Army tactical and enterprise networks around common standards, systems and security to “reduce complexity and increase integration” across the force – global events and emerging technologies have resulted in a persistently contested information environment. As a result, a far more data-centric approach to the Army Network is needed to harness its power to fight and win during multidomain operations.

Reflecting these changes, AUNP 2.0 focuses on five lines of effort to complete the Army’s portion of the Department of Defense Information Network: 1) establish the Unified Network; 2) posture the force to support MDO; 3) ensure security and survivability based on zero trust principles; 4) transform the Army’s Unified Network investments, policy and governance; and 5) continuously improve the Unified Network.

Navigating Waters

Bhawna Prakash and Abhinav Subramaniam

Introduction

Safe water and sanitation are vital to human life. However, despite global efforts, as of 2022, 2.2 billion people still lack access to safely managed water services, and 3.5 billion are without safely managed sanitation services, resulting in conflicts and threatening global governance. The United Nations predicts that global water demand will increase by 20–30 percent by 2050. The annual economic value of water and freshwater systems is already estimated to be $58 trillion, or approximately 60 percent of global GDP, and is under threat from the freshwater ecosystem crisis. Climate change further exacerbates challenges for developing economies by causing floods, droughts, and extreme weather conditions, necessitating international and bilateral cooperation.

In India—an important strategic partner for the United States in terms of geopolitics, economic development, and international trade—long-term water security will be critical for national and human security, as well as economic development. However, water and sanitation fail to rank among the top bilateral priorities in the U.S.-India partnership, which should instead harness U.S. knowledge in areas of greatest impact for both countries while also capitalizing on the opportunities presented by India’s rapid expansion in the water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) sector. The sector should be prioritized given the vast potential to expand trade, private investments, and greater collaborations from U.S. service providers, such as business and technology groups and industry associations.

The Leaked Signal Chat, Annotated


Excerpts of a Signal chat published Monday by The Atlantic provide a rare and revealing look at the private conversations of top Trump administration officials as they weighed plans for U.S. strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen.

The chat, which was created by national security adviser Michael Waltz, included the following users, among others:
  • Vice President Vance
  • Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth
  • C.I.A. Director John Ratcliffe
  • “MAR,” the initials of Secretary of State Marco Rubio
  • “TG,” the initials of director of national intelligence Tulsi Gabbard
  • “Scott B,” appearing to be Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent
  • “S M,” the initials of the White House deputy chief of staff Stephen Miller
  • Susie Wiles, White House chief of staff
  • Steve Witkoff, special envoy to the Middle East and Russia
President Trump has downplayed the inadvertent inclusion in the group of Jeffrey Goldberg, the editor in chief of The Atlantic, claiming that officials did not share classified information. The new revelations Wednesday, however, led to mounting calls by Democrats for Mr. Hegseth to step down, saying he behaved recklessly and could have endangered American troops.


Azerbaijan, Israel, and United States Seek Trilateral Cooperation Format

Vasif Huseynov

On March 6, the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel is engaged in discussions with the United States “to establish a strong foundation for trilateral cooperation between Israel, Azerbaijan, and the U.S.” (The Jerusalem Post, March 6). This statement coincided with debates in the Knesset on “Upgrading the Strategic Alliance between Israel and Azerbaijan” (The Jerusalem Post, March 6). The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) highlighted Azerbaijan’s role as a “strategic ally in the Caucasus region,” with bilateral cooperation spanning security, trade, technology, and energy. Israeli National Missions Minister Orit Strock, speaking on behalf of the government, emphasized the unique and long-standing friendship between Israel and Azerbaijan (The Jerusalem Post, March 6).

The proposal for this trilateral format positions Azerbaijan as a crucial bridge between the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and the West. The initiative follows two visits by Hikmet Hajiyev, foreign policy advisor to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, to Israel in recent months. Hajiyev’s December 2024 visit to Israel was followed by another in mid-February, during which he met with Netanyahu (Report.az, December 9, 2024, February 19). According to Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, these discussions covered “recent developments in the Middle East and the Caucasus, regional security, and strong bilateral relations between Israel and Azerbaijan” (Report.az, December 9, 2024). Additionally, some reports suggest Azerbaijan may have been mediating between Israel and Türkiye (Caliber.az, December 11, 2024).


Ukraine Brings War Home to Russia

Richard Arnold

On the morning of February 3, an explosion ripped through the northwest Moscow “Scarlet Sails” 29-story apartment complex, killing one person and injuring another four (RIA Novosti, February 3). The target of the attack was most likely paramilitary leader Armen Sarkisian, who was also killed in the explosion. According to the Telegram news publication Shot, Sarkisian was taken to the intensive care unit of the Botkin hospital after the attack and died without regaining consciousness after shrapnel penetrated his heart (Rambler.ru, February 3). Following the explosion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in an interview with British journalist Piers Morgan, did not deny that the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) was involved when asked about the attack. He stated, “I know the [SBU] eliminated one person that stands behind killings of Ukrainians in the East of our state during the times of the Revolution of Dignity” (YouTube/@PiersMorganUncensored, February 4; Kyiv Post; Interfax-Ukraine, February 5). One of the risks for Russian President Vladimir Putin in launching the full-scale invasion was that the effects would rebound and cause problems within Russia, which appears to be the Ukrainian playbook (see EDM, April 25, 2024). The “Scarlet Sails” apartment complex was a symbolic target, as it is located in the same part of the city where the former pro-Kremlin Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych resides.

Ukraine Was Just Knifed In The Back

Phillips P. OBrien

Hi All,

An update on the big story of last night—which reveals the real peril that Ukraine and Europe find themselves in when dealing with the Trump Administration.

Yesterday the US and Russia can only be said to have brutally outmaneuvered the Ukrainians (and Europeans) and placed them on the horns of dilemma. The “Black Sea Ceasefire” as it is being called, was negotiated by the USA in one way with Ukraine and then another way with Russia. The result is that unless Ukraine now rejects it, or if Europe comes to its aid and does not agree to its sanctions busting terms—Russia will be handed a huge win and Ukraine will find itself in a more perilous position.

I’ve been trying to find out from some Ukrainians that I trust what happened, and here is my best estimate based on what I have found.

First: The US and Ukraine negotiated about a Black Sea Ceasefire on its own (no strings attached). The Ukrainians were not wild about it—as they have in many ways already achieved many of its goals on their own. The Ukrainians have already cleared the the Russian Black Sea Fleet from almost all of the Black Sea and forced it out of Crimea into Russia. At the same time, the Ukrainians have opened up shipping out of Odesa, and are now utilizing the port successfully to ship out grain, etc.

An Introduction to Capabilities and Limitations of Large Language Models and Generative AI Technology

Daniel G. Shapiro

Many approach the rise of machine learning tools like large language models (LLM) and multimodal generative artificial intelligence (GAI) with great expectations. These systems have multiple capabilities and diverse applications. For example, they can answer questions, analyze sentiment, generate images from text, and follow instructions. Common applications include content creation, translation, code generation, cybersecurity, candidate screening, storytelling, and virtual assistants. LLM and GAI capabilities are growing at an enormous rate, with major new systems and applications announced each week.

This storm of development inspired IDA researcher Dr. Daniel Shapiro to conduct an assessment of what these tools can achieve in principle, with the goal of tying readers’ expectations for their capabilities and limitations to a core understanding of the technology. This report explains why generative AI and large language models are able to demonstrate “a level of intelligence that has never been seen before in a computing system”, and are at the same time, “impaired models of cognition”. Given this understanding, they draw implications for future development.

LLM is a statistical model of a large training corpus that creates new content from prompts by generalizing past examples. Training an LLM on every sentence in every book ever written results in a statistical model of what comes next given what was seen before. Because that model reflects the knowledge expressed in training texts, LLM prompts can mine it to produce new output.

Artificial Intelligence and National Defence: A Strategic Foresight Analysis

Alex Wilner & Ryan Atkinson

Introduction

Foresight, the Future of AI and National Defence

Strategic foresight is the systematic study of the future. It is both loved and misunderstood by casual observers and experts alike. It is loved because, at its core, foresight’s very ethos rests on the simple truth that strategic surprise is a dangerous position in which to find oneself. Foresight’s structured approach to thinking about medium- and longterm change and uncertainty can provide a solution to understanding and avoiding adverse developments. As a methodology with dozens of research tools and techniques, foresight promises us forward-leaning insights beneficial to our longterm survival and growth. The process allows for the systemic exploration of possibilities and trends that shape the future. Weak signals are identified as early indicators of potentially significant change, which inform multiple future scenarios covering a range of possibilities and reduce the risk of being surprised by unexpected events.

Foresight is often incorrectly conflated with forecasting, a related methodology with deep and well-regarded ties to economics and political science, mathematics and physics, computer and data sciences, management and business administration, Earth and climate sciences, and other disciplines. Forecasting, using the terminology of “prediction,” promises insights on the nearterm future — often from minutes to weeks to months ahead — anchored to quantifiable data, statistics, simulations and structured modelling. Foresight, by contrast, speaks of “anticipation,” with promises of insights on the far future — usually years to decades to generations ahead — driven by qualitative observations, systems dynamics, informed intuition and a speculative and grounded accounting of change. A central difference is that prediction focuses on calculating and estimating likely future events given the current relevant data, whereas anticipation involves the preparation for a range of future scenarios with an emphasis on adaptability to uncertain futures.