28 March 2025

India’s path to AI autonomy

Mohamed Elbashir, Kishore Balaji Desikachari

India’s unique approach to AI autonomy: A three-pillar strategy

India is taking a distinctive approach to the global race for artificial intelligence (AI) supremacy. While the United States and China focus on AI for economic dominance and national security, India’s vision revolves around AI autonomy through the development of homegrown AI solutions that are closely linked to its development goals.1 This approach seeks to position India as a prominent global AI leader through a three-pillar strategy that distinguishes it from other major nations. India’s vision of AI autonomy is based on:
  • Democratizing AI through open innovation: Leading the development of open-source models and platforms that make AI more accessible and adaptable to India’s local needs including the Bhashini platform, which incorporates Indian languages in large language model processing, and the iGOT Karmayogi online learning platform for government training.
  • Public-sector-led development applications: Implementing AI solutions to address critical development challenges through government-led initiatives in healthcare, agriculture, and education, ensuring that technology meets societal needs.
  • Global leadership in AI for sustainable development: Championing the integration of AI to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals2 (SDGs) on a global scale while pushing ethical AI governance and South-South collaboration.
This strategy seeks to establish India as a global AI leader while addressing pressing social issues, closing economic gaps, and improving the quality of life for its diverse population of over 1.3 billion people.


Taliban Reject Trump’s Call To Surrender Captured US Arms – Analysis

James Durso

On 1 March 2025, after his first Cabinet meeting, U.S. President Donald Trump said the Taliban should return the equipment the U.S. abandoned in Afghanistan as it withdrew in August 2021. He added that U.S. troops should return to Bagram air base, which he claimed was occupied by Chinese troops.

This isn’t the first time Trump demanded the return of U.S. equipment.

On the eve of his inauguration in January 2025, Trump declared that future financial assistance to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan would depend on the return of the abandoned U.S. military equipment. (The U.S. Department of Defense estimated that over $7 billion in military equipment was abandoned when U.S. forces evacuated Afghanistan in August 2021. Between October 2021 and December 2024, the U.S. provided over $3.6 billion in assistance to Afghanistan according to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.)

In February 2025, the Taliban replied the abandoned weapons were “spoils of war” and would be used against attempts to seize them.

We can safely put aside any talk of U.S. troops returning to Afghanistan, but even if the Taliban agreed to return the abandoned property, how would it happen?


Challenges to China’s Growing Interests in Afghanistan

Muhammad Murad

In a recent post on X, Amrullah Saleh, the former vice president of Afghanistan, accused Chinese mining companies, “in collaboration with Taliban commanders,” of “rampant plundering and theft” at gold mines in the northeastern regions of the country. He emphasized, “This exploitation occurs at the detriment of local communities, resulting in their alienation and mounting resentment.”

Since the rise of the Taliban in the early 1990s, relations between the group and China have gone through several dramatic phases. China neither had a role in the creation of the Taliban regime, unlike its regional ally Pakistan, nor did it recognize the Taliban as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan. During the Taliban’s first stint in power, from 1996-2001, China mostly stayed out of Afghanistan. However, it is alleged that the Chinese company Huawei Technologies was involved in providing the Taliban regime with a telephone system in Kabul during the late 1990s. Zhongxing Telecom (ZTE) was also alleged to have stakes in the same project.

Fast forward to the Taliban takeover of Kabul during the summer of 2021. Chargé d’Affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan Zhao Haihan praised the transition, saying, “Afghanistan ushered in a new era of independent development an the transition from chaos to order. The Afghan people have truly become the masters of their own homeland.”

Murky Waters: Navigating the Risks of China’s Dual-Use Shipyards

Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart and Aidan Powers-Riggs

China has emerged as the undisputed leader of the global shipbuilding industry. Over 300 shipyards dot China’s seaboard, churning out more than half of the world’s commercial vessels each year. These shipyards build the merchant ships that power global trade, but many are also charged with building China’s rapidly expanding navy.

Foreign companies have poured billions of dollars of revenue and transferred key technologies into these dual-use shipyards, accelerating China’s naval modernization. In underwriting the growth of China’s military and economic power, they risk marginalizing U.S. and allied competitiveness in a key industry and undermining peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.

In just a few short decades, China has transformed its navy from a modest coastal force into a vast, modern fleet with global reach.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is already the world’s largest navy by ship count, and the gap between it and the U.S. Navy is expected to grow in the coming years.

STRATEGIC REORIENTATION ON A.I. COMPETITION WITH CHINA


THE VIEW FROM LONDON

The first roundtable explored the UK and China’s competitiveness on AI, examining what the drive behind competition reveals about the UK’s geopolitical aspirations and positioning, while also addressing its domestic policy priorities. 

Held three months after the UK general election, the event welcomed a diverse group of opinion-shapers and experts from: policy and government; security, intelligence, and defence; research and academia; civil society and advocacy; and the private sector. The convening was held under the Chatham House Rule. 

With welcoming remarks, two plenary sessions, and issuefocused breakout sessions (on the technology, trade, and talent “drivers” of competitiveness), Rethinking UK-China Competitiveness on AI aimed to establish a shared understanding of what makes the UK—and other diverse democracies— competitive. The following event summary captures areas of agreement and divergence in the characterization of the UK’s net competitiveness vis-à-vis China, in addition to platforming several takeaways specific to the UK.

China Has Already Remade the International System

Michael B. G. Froman

In early February, as he flew in Air Force One above the body of water he’d recently renamed the Gulf of America, President Donald Trump declared that he would levy tariffs on all imported steel and aluminum. Two weeks later, he issued a presidential memorandum laying out new guidance for screening investment from Chinese firms in the United States and U.S. firms into China. And throughout the early weeks of his administration, Trump has emphasized the importance of bringing manufacturing back home, telling firms that, to avoid tariffs, they should make their products in the United States.

Tariffs and protectionism, restrictions on investment, measures designed to drive domestic production: Washington’s economic policy suddenly looks an awful lot like Beijing’s policies over the last decade or so—like Chinese policy with American characteristics.

The U.S. strategy of engagement with China was based on the premise that, if the United States incorporated China into the global rules-based system, China would become more like the United States. For decades, Washington lectured Beijing about avoiding protectionism, eliminating barriers to foreign investment, and disciplining the use of subsidies and industrial policy—with only modest success. Still, the expectation was that integration would facilitate convergence.

China’s Tech Triple Play Threatens U.S. National Security

Craig Singleton

Chinese Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping has defiantly declared that technological innovation is the “main battlefield” in China’s quest for global preeminence. But, Beijing’s bold bid to transform itself into a global science superpower is not merely an economic imperative—it is a means to strengthen China’s military might and cyber capabilities, with grave implications for the United States.

At the center of Xi’s vision are what he calls China’s “new productive forces”—breakthroughs in advanced batteries, biotech, LiDAR, drones, and other emerging technologies that promise to redefine the next industrial revolution. By dominating these sectors, Beijing aims to ensure Chinese technology is deeply embedded within critical American supply chains—everything from power grids and ports to communications networks —thereby converting China’s commercial success into a powerful geopolitical tool of leverage.

Here at home, Beijing’s strategy is unfolding in three interlocking phases—penetrating, prepositioning, and profiting—which together form an insidious framework that both erodes America’s technological edge and undermines homeland security.

Russian Energy Shortages Require Bans, Tariffs, and Purchasing Electricity From China

John C. K. Daly

Russia’s energy industry is experiencing difficulties caused by rising sanctions, declining exports, and Ukrainian drone and missile assaults on infrastructure, in turn creating challenges for domestic electricity generation (see EDM, April 18, October 16, November 13, 2024, February 27). Two months after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin demanded an update of the “Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2035” that was approved in 2020 to address these problems. He also demanded that the “horizon” of planning be updated and extended to 2050 (TASS, April 14, 2022). Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev stated in February that this update would be delivered by the end of March (Russian Energy Ministry, June 9, 2020; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 16). The document defined the strategic goals of the country’s fuel and energy complex to promote Russia’s socio-economic development and strengthen and preserve Russia’s presence in the global energy sector. The issues the Russian energy sector has been facing have made fulfilling these goals more and more problematic.

The energy shortages resulting from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine are most deeply affecting Russia’s eastern regions, so much so that it is considering importing electricity from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a reversal of previous years during which it exported electricity there, most recently in 2023 (E²nergy, February 19). Last year Russia reduced its electricity exports to the PRC by three times its previous export rate. The volume of electricity exports from Russia to the PRC in 2024 amounted to less than one billion kilowatt hours (kWh), down from 3.1 billion kWh in 2023 (TASS, December 18, 2024). This decrease is attributed to a deficit in Russia’s Far East energy system (TASS, December 18, 2024; Interfax, February 6).

Fixing America's Universities

Michael Hochberg

Introduction

Recent events have highlighted the federal government’s leverage over America’s elite universities; the Trump administration has acted rapidly and with great force to punish anti-semitism on campus. By threatening to withdraw funding, the administration has demonstrated the ability to bend the universities to their will on this critical issue. But this is a short-term fix and will be reversed immediately should the threat of punishment be withdrawn: A grudging willingness by faculties dominated by the progressive left to tamp down the most extreme behaviors on campus does not represent a change in institutional culture or values. America’s elite universities need to be reshaped into institutions where the faculty and student bodies include citizens with views that broadly represent the diversity of thought across the society.

The relationship between the federal government and America’s elite universities was a driving force in the recent election cycle and has since become headline news. In a public announcement, President Trump called for the reestablishment of the American university: His intention is that American traditions and Western civilization would henceforth be valorized and Marxist indoctrination eliminated. In this vision, entrance and exit exams will be institutionalized to measure the impact of higher education; bureaucrats who enforced “diversity, equity, and inclusion” will be removed. The accreditation system for colleges and universities will be reformed to enforce these changes; those academic institutions that do not comply will find their endowments taxed. President Trump wants to make academia great again. How much of this can be done directly by the federal government is an open question.

What Elections Mean for Canada and the Future of North America

Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Ryan C. Berg, and Henry Ziemer

On March 23, newly minted Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced snap elections for April 28, kicking off a contest to determine Canada’s future at a critical juncture. The election pits the incumbent Liberal Party, which has received a second wind since January in part due to tariffs and political threats from the United States, against the Conservative Party under the leadership of “Canada First” politician Pierre Poilievre. No matter the outcome, however, the next leader of Canada will inherit a tense relationship with the United States, public pressure to deliver economic gains, and an increasingly fraught global security environment that impinges upon Canada’s sovereignty.

Q1: New Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney called snap elections—what happens now?

A1: After winning the Liberal Party’s leadership race on March 9, Mark Carney, now prime minister, decided to call a snap election. After just 10 days as prime minister, Carney seeks to take advantage of the Liberal Party’s improved polling numbers and to win a mandate of his own. It is also likely that Carney wagered that it is better to call elections on his terms than to wait for a no-confidence vote in Canada’s Parliament, which had been prorogued since early January as a result of the Liberal Party’s leadership race.

The elections are now set for April 28, 2025, sending parties sprinting for the finish in a quick 37-day election—the minimum required by law. Governed by the Westminster, first-past-the-post system, 343 individual elections in districts (“ridings” in Canadian parlance) will take place across the country. Given the close polling numbers between the Liberal and Conservative parties, the election appears to be a toss-up.

Here Are the Attack Plans That Trump’s Advisers Shared on Signal

Jeffrey Goldberg

So, about that Signal chat.

On Monday, shortly after we published a story about a massive Trump-administration security breach, a reporter asked the secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth, why he had shared plans about a forthcoming attack on Yemen on the Signal messaging app. He answered, “Nobody was texting war plans. And that’s all I have to say about that.”

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At a Senate hearing yesterday, the director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, John Ratcliffe, were both asked about the Signal chat, to which Jeffrey Goldberg, the editor in chief of The Atlantic, was inadvertently invited by National Security Adviser Michael Waltz. “There was no classified material that was shared in that Signal group,” Gabbard told members of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Ratcliffe said much the same: “My communications, to be clear, in the Signal message group were entirely permissible and lawful and did not include classified information.”

Riyadh talks agree on Black Sea fighting lull, not full ceasefire

Stephen Bryen

​The White House released two statements on the result of the negotiations in Riyadh. Both White House statements highlight the Black Sea as the main topic.

There was a significant difference in the delegations for these “technical level” discussions.

The US delegation was led by Andrew Peek, a senior director at the White House National Security Council, and Michael Anton, a senior State Department official. The Russian delegation was led by Sergey Beseda, who is an adviser to FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov. Grigory Karasin, a career diplomat and former deputy foreign minister, participated with Beseda.

The Ukrainian delegation differed significantly It was headed by Rustem Umerov, Ukraine’s defense minister. Pavlo Palisa, a top military adviser to President Volodymyr Zelensky, was present, as well as several military officers.

The Ukrainians met with the US side on Sunday, March 23 and a second time after the conclusion of the US-Russia meeting.

From what we know, the US-Russia meeting stretched over a 12 hour period. The second Ukrainian meeting with the US has been described as quite brief.

How DOGE Can Retake the Commanding Heights: Overhauling How America Equips Its Warfighter

John G. Ferrari, Elaine McCusker & Todd Harrison

Four forces acting on the Pentagon this year could fundamentally improve its organization, weapons procurement, operational support, and personnel management. Specific recommendations for the first of these forces, the work of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), started with a February 2025 working paper. 1 The second and third forces, budget reconciliation that will set defense spending levels and the nature of America’s strategic leadership in the world, will be covered in future papers. This paper will continue specific recommendations for DOGE as it explores the fourth dynamic, opportunities to overhaul the defense industrial base, supply chain and military technology advancements, that could, and should, change how America equips its warfighters. 

To start, a quick look back will help illuminate where we are, and what is likely to happen next if we don’t change course. 

In the early 1990s, the DoD made a decision that set the trajectory for American defense production. Then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin convened a meeting with major defense industry leaders, now famously known as the “Last Supper,” to warn them that the end of the Cold War meant drastic reductions in military spending. The deeper message was clear: the government would support industry consolidation and companies would have to downsize and merge, or perish.2 


When Efficiency Harms the Mission

Melissa Flagg, PhD

Efficiency is very tidy. In peacetime, in normal times, one can have organizational charts, spreadsheets, and proxy measures. One can measure those, check the boxes, and pretend they mean something. The boss is happy, the boss’s boss is happy; if this is a government program, everyone up to Congress is happy. Even if they aren’t happy, they are still funding the project, so who cares? 

In peacetime, it is very nice to have centralized, tidy coordination that is planned so well into the future that one can project that there will be a breakthrough in experimental physics at 8 p.m. Greenwich Mean Time five years from last Wednesday. 

Efficiency is the illusion of control. It is finding the quantifiable optimum solution, even if one must ignore some complexity to get there. It is developing a spreadsheet and inserting formulas and concluding that the highest return on investment would come from doing A, B, and D while avoiding C and E. Spending a lot of money on different approaches to a problem does not seem very cost effective. 

But what if the problem is not well defined? What if the environment is guaranteed to change? What if there is an adversary who gets a vote on what will work? I’m not speaking only about war, but of any competition. Different approaches lend themselves to success in different environments, and one cannot assume the environment will never change—in fact, the only certain thing about the future is that it will be different than the present. One cannot know what will turn out to matter in the future. Committing completely to any single approach will almost necessarily make it the wrong approach, as it incentivizes an opponent to shift the basis of competition. This can turn out to be a dangerous false economy.

To win the AI race, the US needs an all-of-the-above energy strategy

Joseph Webster

The United States faces a “Sputnik moment.” Chinese firm DeepSeek claims its artificial intelligence (AI) model has achieved near-parity with US models in terms of functionality—at lower cost and energy use. While many AI analysts are skeptical of some portions of DeepSeek’s claims, particularly surrounding cost nuances, or even its ability to lower energy consumption, virtually all acknowledge that DeepSeek has made a serious technical achievement. DeepSeek’s technical breakthrough will intensify the US-China AI race, with significant economic and military stakes. While acknowledging uncertain AI-related energy demand, the United States must build substantial amounts of new electricity generation and transmission to win the AI competition with China.

To ensure US AI leadership, the United States must harness all forms of energy–while also promoting energy efficiency—allow a level playing field, and remove red tape constraining the buildout of critical enablers, especially transmission lines and grid enhancing technologies. A “some of the above” energy approach could force the United States to compromise on not only AI leadership, but also affordable electricity and other economic priorities.

Army War College Press Parameters, Spring 2025 no. 55, no. 1

Soldiering and Silences: Witnessing Child Sexual Abuse in Afghanistan

Ukraine’s Not-So-Whole-of-Society at War: Force Generation in Modern Developed Societies

Russian Novel Nuclear Weapons and War-Fighting Capabilities

Measuring Interoperability Within NATO: Adapted Off-the-Shelf or Bespoke Solution?

Adapting US Defense Strategy to Great-Power Competition

Tyranny of the Inbox: Managing the US National Security Agenda

Bridging Sky and Sea: Joint Strategies for Medical Evacuation in the Indo-Pacific

Deploying and Supplying the Joint Force from a Contested Homeland

Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Backsliding

By All Means Available: Memoirs of a Life in Intelligence, Special Operations, and Strategy

Innovating Under Fire: Lessons from Ukraine’s Frontline Drone Workshops

Jorge Rivero

Over the past three years of war, footage from Ukraine spread on social media has become a daily reminder of the outsized—and growing—role drones play on today’s battlefield. This footage emphasizes the centrality of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War, in particular, while also signaling their transformative role in modern warfare more generally. Drone strikes account for approximately 70 percent of Russian casualties and, in some parts of the front, 90 percent of Russian military equipment losses in engagements with Ukrainian forces. Advanced UAVs have given Ukrainian commanders unparalleled situational awareness, significantly enhancing operational effectiveness during offensive and defensive operations. Drones hasten effective force coordination and employment by enabling persistent surveillance of enemy movements. Additionally, drones play a critical role in mining Russian logistical routes, adjusting artillery and missile strikes, and easing the burden by providing logistics and, in some cases, medical support to Ukrainian forces. This integration of drone capabilities provides real-time aerial intelligence, allowing for tactical decisions executed with precision and responsiveness unattainable ten years ago.

Ukraine will need major rebuilding when war ends − here’s why the US isn’t likely to invest in its recovery with a new Marshall Plan

Frank A. Blazich Jr.

President Donald Trump wants Ukraine to repay the United States for helping to defend the country against Russia’s invasion.

Since 2022, Congress has provided about US$174 billion to Ukraine and neighboring countries to assist its war effort. Trump inflated this figure to $350 billion in a March 2025 White House meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron. Separately, he has suggested Ukraine could reimburse the U.S. by giving America access to its minerals.


Mining and refining these critical mineral resources would require major investment in infrastructure and economic development, including in parts of Ukraine severely damaged by fighting. Some analysts are calling for a return to the European Recovery Program, commonly known as the Marshall Plan.

The Marshall Plan used $13.3 billion in U.S. funds – roughly $171 billion in today’s dollars – to rebuild war-torn Western Europe from 1948 to late 1951. It is often evoked as a solution for reconstruction following global crises. Yet as a military historian and curator, I find that the Marshall Plan is not well understood.

Trump’s $16 Trillion Trade Blind Spot

RICARDO HAUSMANN

In August 1914, Europeans saw little value in the century of peace that had followed Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo. As historian Barbara W. Tuchman recounted in her 1962 book The Guns of August, public sentiment in Berlin, Paris, London, and Vienna was swept up by a wave of collective euphoria – a feverish excitement over the expected benefits of a swift and decisive world war. The result was four years of misery and devastation.

A similar sense of misguided bravado seems to pervade US President Donald Trump’s administration as it moves ahead with its reckless assault on the global security and trade order of the past 80 years. Convinced of an inevitable and easy victory, Trump has unilaterally declared war on the postwar order, failing to heed the lesson of Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, the military architect behind Prussia’s 1870-71 victory over France: No battle plan survives first contact with the enemy.

At first glance, the United States appears well-positioned to win Trump’s trade war against China and key trading partners like Canada, Mexico, and the European Union. In his public remarks, Trump often fixates on America’s large trade deficit in goods, which reached a record $1.2 trillion in 2024. According to him, the trade deficit is irrefutable proof that the US is being treated “very, very unfairly, very badly.”

When Demands For Peace Violate The Right To Self-Defense – Analysis

Kaspars Ģērmanis

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, I have encountered questions asking why Ukraine has not ended the war. Those asking believe that ending the war at any cost would benefit Ukraine. However, such a scenario would not be fair or even merciful.

London, Paris, Sevilla, Dakar—The Same Question Comes Up Everywhere

At the end of November 2023 in London, I heard the question—”Why is Ukraine not searching for peace?”—asked by a taxi driver on my way to the airport. He is not alone in his thoughts. It raises another question: “Why, even acknowledging that Russia is an aggressor, do some people question the responsibility of Ukraine?

The taxi driver was an Afghanistan-born Londoner who left his country due to a permanent and never-ending war. He viewed war as the worst thing, to be avoided at all costs. A few weeks later, in Paris, I met a young French man who rhetorically asked why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was not attempting to reach peace with Russia. At the end of February 2024, a Spanish man in Sevilla remarked that Ukraine should find peace since Europe has contributed much to it. Finally, in Dakar, Senegal, in January 2025, local professors expressed skepticism about whether Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s aim is the destruction of the state of Ukraine, suggesting that peace is a solution. Here, I must stress that the Senegalese did not insist that Ukraine was responsible for the war.

Are Europe and the US headed for a divorce? Or would that be folly?

Henry Olsen

If the United States and Europe were a married couple, you would probably say they are headed for a divorce. Like that couple, the two long-time partners could resolve their differences and renew their vows.

Doing that would require an honest discussion, however, of why they got together in the first place and how they have drifted apart over the years. That will require a painful re-examination, one that is by no means assured of justifying continuing the relationship.

The US-Europe transatlantic partnership dates back to the end of the Second World War. That’s an eternity in geopolitical terms. Most alliances last a few years, perhaps a couple of decades at most.

That long duration was not an accident. The partnership is touted today as one based on common, liberal democratic values.

But it was launched at a time when many of the founding members either were not liberal democracies (Turkey, Portugal) or had only recently re-established democratic regimes following extended periods of authoritarian rule (West Germany, Italy, Greece). Most other active participants had been conquered by Nazi Germany and were also re-establishing democracies.

Donald Trump’s Anti-Houthi Campaign Comes Up Short

James Holmes

What is the Trump administration’s strategy in the Red Sea, and will operations against Houthi militants prove decisive? The White House has certainly stepped up the air and missile campaign. U.S. Navy warships and carrier fighter/attack jets are pummeling key sites in Yemen with help from Air Force fighters—and, on occasion, bombers—and they are doing so more or less constantly. They are playing offense. Hammering away from aloft marks a departure from the more defensive posture favored by the Biden administration, under which Navy task forces defended themselves while striving to shield mercantile shipping from Houthi missiles and drones. But under the previous presidency, only intermittently did U.S. and coalition forces go on offense, sending warplanes and cruise missiles downrange to smite shore targets. The current strategy views a good offense as the best defense of the sea lanes.

Shock and Awe 2.0

Call the Trump approach Shock and Awe 2.0.

That’s a tribute to Shock and Awe 1.0, the Bush administration’s concept for air warfare against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq back in 2003. The logic propelling the Trump and Bush approaches is much the same. Air forces tend to disperse their efforts in space in order to strike a multitude of military and industrial targets. The scattershot approach divides up the firepower available to hit any one target—blunting the matériel and human impact of aerial raids. Moreover, there is often an intermittent, come-and-go rhythm to air campaigns. Aircraft cannot remain constantly overhead, since they run out of fuel and ordnance. Lulls in bombardment permit an antagonist time to adapt and recover from damage while muffling the psychological shock that comes from being under an aerial barrage.

Azerbaijan-Armenia Peace Deal Faces Hurdles

Onnik James Krikorian

On March 13, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov told the media that the text of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan had been finalized (Azertac, March 13). The announcement came as a surprise on the sidelines of the Global Baku Forum, an annual gathering of heads of state and government themed this year as “Rethinking World Order: Turning Challenges Into Opportunities” (President of Azerbaijan, March 13). A day earlier, Baryramov’s Armenian counterpart, Ararat Mirzoyan, told journalists that an agreement was within reach but did not divulge any details (Azatutyun, March 12). Following Bayramov’s announcement, the Armenian Foreign Ministry confirmed the news and expressed its readiness to agree on a time and place for signing the agreement (Azatutyun, March 13). There has been no joint statement.

The United States, European Union, France, Germany, the People’s Republic of China, and Russia have all voiced support for the agreement (X/@ABaerbock; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 13; DW; TASS; Armenpress; U.S. Department of State, March 14). Even multilateral organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) welcomed the news (X/@NATOpress; Armenpress, March 14).

The EU wants to censor the global internet

Freddie Attenborough

Brussels and Washington are once again at odds over Europe’s sweeping social-media restrictions, contained within the 2022 Digital Services Act (DSA). In a letter sent earlier this month, the EU’s vice-president for tech sovereignty, Henna Virkkunen, rejected claims made by Donald Trump’s team that the DSA is a tool for censorship. She insisted that the law ‘does not regulate speech’ and that the EU remains ‘deeply committed to protecting and promoting free speech’.

The letter was predominantly in response to US Republican congressman Jim Jordan, who chairs the powerful House Judiciary Committee. Jordan, a long-time critic of the DSA, outlined his concerns to Virkkunen in January, when he warned that the law’s impact on free expression could extend beyond Europe’s borders. Similar attacks have been made by US vice-president JD Vance and X owner Elon Musk.

According to Jordan, the DSA could ‘limit or restrict Americans’ constitutionally protected speech in the United States’. He also argued that the law, which compels platforms to mitigate ‘systemic risks’ linked to ‘misleading or deceptive’ speech, will likely incentivise companies to remove even lawful content.

A Fast $100 Billion, But Unclear Whether Spectrum Sharing Safe for Military Radars

Rebecca Grant, Ph.D.

In these tight budget times, some members of the U.S. Senate would dearly love to raise $100 billion for the U.S. Treasury by auctioning off portions of the broadcast spectrum where military radars operate.

There’s just one problem: no analysis has yet proven that the new auction of the spectrum, known as lower S-band, won’t impair vital military systems, now and into the future. Done wrong, an auction could disable some of America’s most advanced capabilities. President Donald J. Trump’s “Golden Dome” initiative might be affected, along with numerous other systems.

The electromagnetic spectrum is vital real estate for keeping America safe from missile attacks. As Sen. Maria Cantwell, D-Wash., said at hearings last month, “If we lose the spectrum war, we lose the war.”

To recap, the risk comes from a potential spectrum auction that would clear or compress a specific area of spectrum known as S-band. Specifically, putting the 3.1 to 3.5 gigahertz band on the chopping block could be disastrous because vital military radars operate in that exact frequency range.