22 March 2025

New Delhi Selects the French Dassault Rafale, America Left Out

Peter Suciu

Last month, during an Oval Office meeting between U.S. president Donald Trump and Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, Trump suggested closer ties between the two countries could result in the U.S. offering the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II to New Delhi. While such a deal likely seems complicated to imagine ever being completed, Moscow has also repeatedly tried to entice India into adopting the Sukhoi Su-57, as the world’s most populous nation is Russia’s most significant customer of military hardware.

However, even as New Delhi may continue to seek a fifth-generation fighter, last week, it announced it had concluded a deal with France to purchase more than two dozen Dassault Rafale omnivore fighters for the Indian Navy.

The Rafale M aircraft will replace the Indian Navy’s aging Russian-made Mikoyan MiG-29K and MiG-29KUB trainers, the carrier version of the MiG-29M, which India received nearly two decades ago.

The Russian-made all-weather multirole fighters are “currently operated by the [Indian] Navy as part of the 300 Squadron White Tigers and 303 Squadron Black Panthers”. In contrast, “the new fighters will operate from the aircraft carriers INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya.”

How the US Aid Freeze Shook up the Geopolitics of Nepal’s Power Trade

Mahesh Ganguly and Raza Siddiqui

On the day he returned to the U.S. presidency, Donald Trump issued an executive order freezing foreign aid for 90 days. Among the many projects impacted was a $500 million grant that was intended to develop critical infrastructure in Nepal. This funding, provided through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a U.S. governmental agency, aimed to enhance Nepal’s electricity transmission capacity, including a 200-mile 400kV transmission line facilitating power trade with India. The freeze not only raises questions about the future of U.S. engagement in Nepal but also alters the strategic calculus in a region where China and India are vying for influence.

The government of Nepal originally signed the MCC compact in 2017. However, domestic political hiccups, divided opinions among Nepali politicians, and persistent Chinese efforts to dissuade Nepal from accepting the grant delayed its ratification by five years. The Parliament of Nepal finally approved it in 2022 after much controversy.

In August 2024, the Millennium Challenge Account in Nepal signed a deal with India to initiate the construction of three high-capacity substations at Damauli, Ratmate, and New Butwal, along with a transmission line connecting New Butwal to the Nepal-India border. Nepal, which generates almost all of its electricity from hydropower, is subject to seasonal variations in its electricity supply. These transmission line projects aim to enhance imports of electricity during the dry season and exports in the wet season to bolster its energy security with a stable and reliable electricity supply.

Trump’s decision to suspend the MCC grant now casts uncertainty over these developments.

It is important to note that Trump’s move came shortly after China and Nepal successfully entered into a contract within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative on December 4, 2024. Like the MCC contract, this step followed a lengthy bout of negotiations since Nepal originally joined the BRI in 2017, due to Nepal’s concerns over debt and geopolitical signaling. Among the 10 identified projects to be executed under “aid-assistance financing,” the centerpiece is a proposal to develop a first-of-its-kind 220kV cross-border electricity transmission line from Jilong via Kerung in China’s Tibetan Autonomous Region to Rasuwagadhi, Nepal. This plan follows Nepal’s completed construction of its domestic Chillime-Trishuli transmission line. The line is designed to transport electricity generated from its hydropower projects in the Trishuli River basin to the national grid.

Taken together, the two lines are part of the larger proposed Kerung-Rasuwagadhi project, which will facilitate Nepal’s electricity trade with China in the future. Additionally, reports have surfaced that discussions are underway to build another electricity transmission line connecting Nepal’s Sankhuwasabha district to China, signaling deeper engagement in the electricity trade network.

Sandwiched between two rising Asian giants, Nepal has prioritized increasing its total electricity generation with an eye toward exporting some of that output. As outlined in its 16th five-year plan, Nepal aims to expand electric generation capacity from 3,157 MW to 11,769 MW and export 5,500 MW of electricity annually in the next five years. With 90 percent of its electricity generation coming from hydropower, Nepal possesses a technically feasible potential capacity of 83,000 MW and an economically viable capacity of 42,000 MW.

This vast hydro-electric potential has gained newfound significance in the foreign policy realms of its neighbors, strategically positioning Nepal at the center of the evolving power dynamics. Both India and China seek to secure their energy futures and assert their influence in the region. Meanwhile, the United States, through the MCC grant, has aimed to align Nepal with its broader Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China.

Over the years, China has intensified its influence in Nepal through both political and economic means, a development viewed with concern by both the United States and India. In Chinese strategic discourse, Nepal is viewed as a “crucial link” for advancing its grand plans for regional connectivity and financial largesse that would reduce Nepal’s decades long dependence on India, as well as an integral component of China’s broader development strategy in Tibet.

Over time China has successfully managed to influence Nepal’s stance on the Tibetan issue through securing its support and recognition of Beijing as the sole legitimate authority over Tibet. In that context, China venturing into cross-border electricity connectivity projects holds significant strategic value. These power projects could accelerate Tibet’s integration into regional trade networks and foster stability through stimulating industrial growth, facilitating the transfer of expertise, manpower, and materials, and optimizing the utilization of local hydropower resources for cross-border electricity trade. By deepening its engagement with Nepal, China is not only strengthening bilateral economic ties but also consolidating its broader strategic influence in the region while advancing its development goals in Tibet.

China’s investment in global energy-related infrastructure is a key pillar of its overseas strategy, accounting for nearly 31 percent of its total foreign investments. Reports indicate that its electricity transmission lines alone are valued at over $7 billion, with plans for additional expansion under the part of its “global energy interconnection initiative” in coming years. The renewed negotiations with Nepal signal China’s intent to regain momentum in electricity transmission infrastructure development, an area where progress had previously stalled.

India, on the other hand, has actively engaged with Nepal’s hydropower sector through establishing long-term power trade agreements and constructing multiple electricity transmission lines, including the Dhalkebar-Muzaffarpur and Dhalkebar-Sitamarhi 400 kV electricity transmission lines, with plans for further expansion and completion in the upcoming years.

Further, last year, both sides inaugurated another three 132 kV cross-border transmission lines, including the Raxaul-Parwanipur, Kataiya-Kusaha, and New Nautanwa-Mainhiya lines, and India agreed to buy 10,000 MW of electricity from Nepal over the next 10 years. Additionally, both countries entered a tripartite agreement with Bangladesh last year, and Nepal successfully exported 40MW of electricity to Bangladesh via India. India views the electricity trade as a key component of its strategic relationship with Nepal, and the increased export of electricity promises to strengthen ties between the two countries.

However, over the last decade the relationship between India and Nepal has remained fraught with political sensitivities. Tensions snowballed following Nepal’s 2015 constitutional amendments, alleged Indian support for ethnic protests against the change, the unofficial blockade at the border that followed, and India’s inauguration of a new road in the disputed Kalapani region. All these developments, along with the growing nationalist rhetoric in Nepal, fueled anti-India sentiment, which has significant repercussions in power trade dynamics.

Many Nepali experts argue that Indian dam construction projects in Nepal face deliberate delays, with Indian companies stalling progress to maintain long-term control, especially in border areas where India is perceived as asserting claims over Nepali rivers and hydropower resources. Others contend that India’s stringent approval process for Nepal’s power exports, driven by its strategic concerns, has erected substantial barriers. India has explicitly stated that it will not purchase electricity from projects involving any form of Chinese investment. To enforce this, India has demanded comprehensive financial disclosures from Nepali hydropower projects, including details of funding sources and financial institutions involved. Additionally, India has made the annual renewal of export approvals mandatory, entangling the process in bureaucratic red tape.

As currently there is no alternative market for selling the surplus electricity produced in the wet season, amid these procurement delays Nepal has witnessed occasional power spillage. This situation has caused frustration among Nepali officials and cast doubts about the long-term rationale of the electricity trade with India. Such complexities reinforce the perception that Nepal’s hydropower sector is being shaped by India’s strategic interests and managed by Delhi’s dictum rather than by Nepal’s economic priorities and broader development needs.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. suspension of the MCC grant further exacerbates these challenges, complicating Nepal’s electricity transmission projects and jeopardizing its overall power trade ambitions. For China, the freeze presents a window of strategic opportunity to expand its presence in Nepal’s electricity sector. While the suspension is temporary, China may seek to exploit anti-U.S. sentiment and Nepal’s perception of the United States as an unreliable partner. The decision could also raise concerns for India, which had tactically supported the MCC compact and was intricately involved in its formulation to counter China’s escalating influence in the region.

With Trump’s aid freeze and Nepal’s renewed engagement with China under the BRI, Nepal’s power trade and electricity networks stand at a crossroads. While a cross-border electricity connection with China presents an opportunity to diversify its power trade and strengthen its bargaining power, it also reflects Nepal’s broader intent to assert geopolitical autonomy beyond India’s influence. That said, the China-Nepal transmission line project is still under consideration – and concerns persist regarding debt sustainability, transparency, and China’s long-term strategic intentions under the BRI. It is vital for Nepal to carefully assess the implementation and the financing modalities of the project to avoid potential financial entrapment.

Given the country seeks to leverage its hydroelectric potential for economic growth, Nepal’s power trade strategy will continue to be shaped by the competing interests of the United States, China, and India. Whether Nepal can successfully navigate these geopolitical complexities to maximize its economic and strategic advantages, or whether external pressures will dictate its energy future, remains an open question. These evolving power dynamics suggest that Nepal’s role as a powerhouse in South Asia will be determined not just by its resource endowments but also by its ability to balance the aspirations of the powerful regional and global actors while safeguarding its own strategic interests.Authors

Guest Author
Mahesh Ganguly


Mahesh Ganguly is a junior research fellow, currently based at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

Guest Author
Raza Siddiqui


Raza Siddiqui is pursuing his master’s degree from Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.TagsThe Pulse


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Is China Losing Africa to India? | Opinion

Gordon G. Chang

"Africa is entering a period where, for the first time in modern history, it will not be dominated by external powers," Gregory Copley, president of the International Strategic Studies Association, told Newsweek. "The influence of Europe, Russia, the United States, and the People's Republic of China is giving way to what now appears to be a vacuum."

Africa, "fast becoming a key global center of gravity," may soon be able to determine its own future as others compete for money, power, and influence there. Two competitors will be—in fact, already are—the world's two most populous states, India and China.

Chinese Communists had a long head start. From the founding of the People's Republic, Beijing prioritized relations with the continent. Mao Zedong saw African nations as natural allies in his struggle with the Soviet Union for leadership of the worldwide Communist movement. He especially coveted Africa's votes in the U.N. General Assembly.

Today, the continent is still a high priority for Beijing, as seen from Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit in January. According to Beijing, 2025 was the 35th consecutive year a Chinese foreign minister made his first trip of the year to Africa.

At the moment, China is dominant on the continent. China is Africa's largest bilateral trade partner, the leading bilateral creditor, and the biggest investor.

Pakistan army's gym rat problem

Yudhajit Shankar Das

It's common gym knowledge that over-training a muscle is counter-productive. In Pakistan, the military is that overused muscle. The epicentre of power in the nuclear-armed Islamic country, the military is facing its biggest crisis till date. The bulging biceps were never as sore as they are today. It has been rattled by a barrage of deadly attacks soon after pro-Imran Khan supporters ransacked its self-esteem and rejected its political alternative.

While India has had smooth democratic sailing, both Pakistan and Bangladesh have large patches of military covering their tattered democratic records.

The creation of Bangladesh was the result of Pakistan using its military muscle to try and suppress the nationalist movement in East Pakistan. Under Operation Searchlight, the Pakistani army and militia massacred 7,000 people in one single night on March 25, 1971.

As guns burst open and chaos descended, Pakistan People's Party chief Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto witnessed the burning of Dhaka from the suite of his luxurious hotel. He then thanked the army for keeping Pakistan united. The same military became his nemesis.

General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq removed Bhutto in a coup in 1977 and executed him in 1979 after a contentious trial. Pakistan's tryst with dictators, however, began a decade after its birth when General Ayub Khan imposed martial law after a coup in 1958.

Pakistan: Hostage Nation – Analysis

Ajit Kumar Singh

“The bickering nation”. This one sentence aptly describes the current state of Pakistan, where the two major terrorist/insurgent formations – the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella group of 56 terrorist outfits, and the Baloch insurgents – have created havoc. A third terrorist group – the Islamic State – is also on a rampage. Meanwhile, the political landscape is turbulent, while the economy is in complete disarray.

Indeed, within a span of a week, between March 10 and March 16, 2025, Pakistan recoded at least 38 terrorist attacks, resulting in 104 confirmed deaths [including 14 civilians, 45 Security Force (SF) personnel and 45 terrorists). Unconfirmed reports, however, put the death toll to 406.

In the deadliest attack during this period, one that was brazenly audacious even by the Pakistani standards, on March 11, militants hijacked a train, the Jaffar Express, with over 400 passengers-onboard, after they blew up the railway track between Quetta, Balochistan, and Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), which took responsibility for the attack at Dhadar in the Bolan area of Balochistan, according to varying media reports, freed around 80 passengers, mostly women and children, but held hundreds of other passengers, most of them Pakistani Army personnel, hostage. They were demanding that authorities release jailed militants.

Pakistan Under Shehbaz Sharif: The State of the Nation

Farzana Shaikh

The expression “plus รงa change, plus c’est la mรชme chose” – the more things change, the more they stay the same – has become a common description of Pakistan’s repeated cycles of crises and its abiding struggle to ensure political stability, internal security, and economic growth.

The performance of the current coalition government, which took office in February 2024 under Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, offers few grounds for optimism. With domestic politics gravely polarized, security increasingly fragile, and the economy barely stable, there is little sign yet of an end to the chronic dysfunction that has thwarted the welfare of Pakistan’s 250 million people.

A Political Divide

The greatest challenge facing Sharif’s government is the crisis arising from the incarceration of former Prime Minister Imran Khan and the disputed results of general elections, held in February 2024. Khan, who leads the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI or Pakistan Justice Movement), has been in prison since May 2023 and currently faces more than 100 charges ranging from corruption to the instigation of violence. Although acquitted in the most serious cases relating to breaches of national security and incitement to violence, Khan is unlikely to be offered any immediate relief. In January he received a 14-year jail sentence for illegally receiving land from a property tycoon to establish a charitable trust.

Noshki Bus Attack: The Baloch Liberation Army’s Evolving Suicide Attack Strategy

Mehrzaad Baluch

The Baloch Liberation Army’s (BLA) self-sacrificing Majeed Brigade carried out a Fidayee (suicide attack) in Noshki, Balochistan on March 16. A suicide bomber in a VBIED (vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) targeted a Pakistan Army convoy consisting of eight buses on the RCD Highway, according to a BLA statement. The explosion completely destroyed one military bus, after which the Fateh Squad, the BLA’s elite unit, launched a coordinated ground assault.

According to the BLA, the Fateh Squad systematically eliminated all military personnel in another bus. The BLA claims to have killed a total of 90 Pakistani soldiers in the attack.

Pakistan’s military released far smaller casualty counts, saying that five people – “three security forces personnel and two innocent civilians” – were killed. The press wing of Pakistan’s military, Inter-Services Public Relations, also said that the military had killed three of the attackers.

The Noshki bus attack marks another escalation in the insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan’s southwestern province. The BLA is no longer relying on sporadic guerrilla attacks; its operations now involve highly coordinated battlefield tactics and the integration of suicide attacks with conventional guerrilla warfare. The Fateh Squad’s role in this attack highlights the BLA’s ability to conduct well-planned follow-up assaults, ensuring maximum damage after a suicide attack.

Bangladeshis Rise Against Mounting Lawlessness, US Intelligence Expresses Concern – Analysis

P. K. Balachandran

Mounting lawlessness in Bangladesh has triggered widespread street protests against the inaction and incompetence of the Muhammad Yunus-led Interim Government. US intelligence chief Tulsi Gabbard has expressed America’s concern in no uncertain terms. Neighbouring India is helplessly watching the deterioration in governance at its very doorstep.

While Bangladeshi politicians are interminably debating post-Hasina political reforms, elections, and ways to neutralize ousted Premier Sheikh Hasina, the average Bangladeshi is worried about the near-complete breakdown of law order, seen in a spate of mob lynching and mounting cases of rape and gender violence since the Interim Government led by Dr.Yunus took over in August 2024.

According to the Human Rights Support Society of Bangladesh (HRSS), at least 119 people were killed and 74 injured in 114 mob lynching cases in seven months since the Interim Government took office. In January and February alone, there were 30 cases of mob lynching, resulting in 19 deaths and 20 injuries, the report added.

The HRSS Executive Director Ijazul Islam, said that those lynched were suspected thieves, muggers, child kidnapers and violators of Islamic codes for females. Cases were filed, but few were fully investigated, with the result, the perpetrators went unpunished, Ijazul Islam added.

Does America Face a “Ship Gap” With China?

Stephen Biddle and Eric Labs

Over the past few years, concerns about China’s navy and its potential threat to U.S. interests have steadily grown. Two decades ago, the U.S. Navy had 282 battle-force ships against the Chinese navy’s 220, but by the mid-2010s this advantage had disappeared. Today, Chinese ships outnumber those of the U.S. Navy 400 to 295. If the United States’ shipbuilding pace remains unchanged, this so-called ship gap will only continue to grow.


China’s 2 Sessions: Slow Growth Collides With Tech Supremacy

Stefanie Kam

The recently concluded “Two Sessions” – an annual gathering of China’s top political bodies – highlighted the country’s challenge of balancing slowing economic growth with ambitious technological progress. A key takeaway from the Two Sessions is Beijing’s commitment to integrating private tech firms into national policy decisions on innovation. Leading high-tech firms would play an important role in advancing China’s technological self-sufficiency. The government work report emphasized integrating private tech firms, easing regulations, and investing in AI, quantum computing, and 6G.

The Two Sessions followed close on the heels of an earlier meeting, where top leader Xi Jinping met with private entrepreneurs to reaffirm China’s commitment to its socialist system and to protect private businesses’ legal rights while enforcing the rule of law against illegal activities. Xi envisioned private businesses as important actors driving wealth creation in the country first, followed by contributing to “common prosperity.” The key challenge is ensuring that businesses contribute to equitable wealth distribution, aligning economic growth with broader social objectives.

U.S. Companies Are Helping China Win the AI Race

Samuel Hammond

How secure is America’s lead in artificial intelligence? It wasn’t long ago that the conventional wisdom put China years behind the curve. This was partly because the United States introduced export controls in 2022 and 2023 that notionally embargoed Chinese companies from the most advanced AI chips.

Today, however, most experts I speak with believe China trails the U.S. on AI by at most six to nine months—if at all. Take the sudden rise of China’s DeepSeek, the impressive AI startup that began as a hedge-fund CEO’s side project. DeepSeek shocked the markets earlier this year by releasing R1, a “reasoning model” that replicated top AI firm OpenAI’s breakthrough o1 model only a month after the latter’s unveiling, and seemingly at a fraction of the cost.

OpenAI’s latest models still top the leaderboards, but only because they have access to vastly more computing resources. What DeepSeek nonetheless demonstrated is just how few technical barriers stand in the way of competing at the AI frontier. As DeepSeek’s CEO Liang Wenfeng put it in an interview last year, “money has never been the problem for us; bans on shipments of advanced chips are the problem.”

Can Iran Save Itself?

Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar

Over the past year, Iran has grappled with a series of setbacks. Hamas and Hezbollah, Tehran’s long-standing nonstate regional allies, have been weakened by Israel. President Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria collapsed suddenly and spectacularly. The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency, meanwhile, signals a revival of the “maximum pressure” policies that hobbled the Iranian economy starting in 2018. These looming challenges have led many U.S. officials and analysts to argue that the Islamic Republic is facing a strategic defeat. Richard Haass, writing in Foreign Affairs in January, suggested that “Iran is weaker and more vulnerable than it has been in decades, likely since its decadelong war with Iraq or even since the 1979 revolution.” According to this view, Iran has presented its opponents with an opportune moment to target its nuclear facilities or extract major concessions for a new nuclear deal.

The prevailing belief that Iran is now more susceptible to U.S. coercion or Israeli attack, however, is not shared by Tehran. The Islamic Republic views these external challenges as temporary setbacks, not signs of defeat. In Iran’s view, Hamas and Hezbollah, despite being badly beaten, have actually emerged as winners in their asymmetric conflict against Israel. They survived as guerrilla organizations against a powerful U.S.-backed conventional army. Critically, Hamas has retained at least some popularity among Palestinians, and Hezbollah continues to enjoy the backing of Shiites in Lebanon. In Yemen, the Iran-aligned Houthis have solidified their role as a steadfast supporter of the Palestinian cause and a key member of Tehran’s so-called axis of resistance by attacking Israel and disrupting shipping in the Red Sea.

Trump fails to get Putin to stop the shooting

Jamie Dettmer

“Plan A is: Get the shooting to stop,” said U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Sunday, noting the U.S. administration’s main goal is to secure a quick ceasefire before moving on to broader talks about a settlement to permanently end Russia’s war on Ukraine.

But that clearly isn’t what Russian President Vladimir Putin has in mind, as he demonstrated by withholding his agreement to a full 30-day ceasefire in his 90-minute phone conversation with U.S. President Donald Trump on Tuesday. Shortly after the call, Russia launched a drone assault over Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities.

Offering the diplomatic bare minimum, the Russian leader said he would hold off striking at Ukraine’s energy infrastructure for 30 days — a self-serving concession as that will save Russia’s energy system from being hit by the Ukrainians, who have just dramatically increased the range of their powerful Neptune subsonic cruise missiles from 200 kilometers to 1,000 kilometers.

All in all, Trump and his motley crew of special envoys, family members and presidential pals seem keener to converge with Russia on broader geopolitical issues than really press Putin hard on Ukraine.

Engineering an End to the Ukraine War

George Friedman

When the United States entered talks with North Vietnam near the end of the Vietnam War, it hadn’t been militarily defeated, but it had failed in its mission to destroy the Viet Cong. North Vietnam had not won the war either, but the outcome of the conflict was clear: Neither side could fully subdue the other. Geopolitically, South Vietnam was more important to North Vietnam than it was to the United States. North Vietnam could not capitulate. The U.S. could.

The Vietnam War was the product of geopolitical imperatives, and the outcome was a result of the military reality. The war ended with negotiations that lasted for a very long time. The peace talks were not geopolitical in nature. Rather, they were a matter of engineering a settlement that acknowledged a geopolitical reality in which both sides had to take into account internal political circumstances. The U.S. could not simply admit to total military failure, so it demanded “peace with honor.” The North Vietnamese had to justify the cost of the war to North Vietnam’s public as a heroic defeat of the imperialist power.

The initiation of the war was based on geopolitical necessity. North Vietnam had to unite the entire country under a communist regime. The U.S. had to stop it, not because Vietnam mattered geopolitically but because Washington feared that early capitulation would cause allies to lose confidence in the U.S.-based alliance systems. The stakes were high for both sides, but North Vietnam had more skin in the game. The reality of the negotiations was about what the end would look like and the political image it generated.

Sadly, Trump is right on Ukraine

Alan J. Kuperman

I rarely agree with President Trump, but his latest controversial statements about Ukraine are mostly true. They seem preposterous only because western audiences have been fed a steady diet of disinformation about Ukraine for more than a decade. It is time to set the record straight on three key points that illuminate why Ukrainians and former President Joe Biden — not merely Russian President Vladimir Putin — bear significant responsibility for the outbreak and perpetuation of war in Ukraine.

First, as recently documented by overwhelming forensic evidence, and affirmed even by a Kyiv court, it was Ukrainian right-wing militants who started the violence in 2014 that provoked Russia’s initial invasion of the country’s southeast including Crimea. Back then, Ukraine had a pro-Russia president, Viktor Yanukovych, who had won free and fair elections in 2010 with strong support from ethnic Russians in the country’s southeast.

In 2013, he decided to pursue economic cooperation with Russia rather than Europe as previously planned. Pro-western activists responded with mainly peaceful occupation of the capital’s Maidan square and government offices, until the president eventually offered substantial concessions in mid-February 2014, after which they mainly withdrew.

Is Bioterrorism Really on the Horizon?

Justin Leopold

A January 2025 article published by the American Council on Science and Health detailed the results of a recent red-team activity (simulated security exercise) where a professor and two graduate students were able to manipulate their way through safety regulations and recreate the deadly 1918 Spanish flu virus.

The conclusion of the scenario is that terrorists could easily do the same, and that the American security apparatus needs to take action to prevent a possible wave of bioterrorism before it is too late. But given the knowledge starting point of the scientists, and ease of more proven violent methods, is this a really legitimate concern?

The simulated test was overseen by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and saw the players involved, two Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) graduate students, successfully place orders for DNA fragments of the virus from 36 of 38 providers, despite obvious red flags, like the organization not being one that does lab experiments or the address for delivery not being a laboratory facility. According to MIT Professor Kevin Esvelt, who oversaw the students, they then were able to employ “standard biochemical techniques” to create the deadly virus.

Russia's War of Attrition in Ukraine?

Stephen Blank

My Reply to Anthony Constantini

On March 11 Anthony Constantini, a Fellow at Defense Priorities published an article arguing first that because the Russo-Ukrainian war has become a war of attrition Russia will inevitably prevail due to its manpower advantages over Ukraine. Second, he contends that “America has absolutely no national interest in providing security guarantees” to Ukraine. Instead, our “overriding interest” lies in avoiding war with Russia.

These points are hallmarks of the MAGA movement and have also been made by Vice-President Vance. Unfortunately, despite the loudness and supposed authority with which they are proclaimed, these arguments are not supported by the facts or by history which is a better guide here than superficial political arguments. First, the war has descended into a war of attrition for now in large measure because of the inconstancy of U.S. support for Ukraine under both the Biden and Trump administrations. If Ukraine had received the military assistance it needs on a constant basis, that assistance coupled with the innovative work of Ukraine, e.g. its manufacture of drones that can even hit Moscow, may well have turned this into a war of movement. We should remember that Ukrainian forces have successfully invaded Russian territory in Kursk Oblast, forced the Black Sea into what amounts to hiding in its home port of Novorossiysk, and made Crimea untenable as a military base for Russia. Those are not signs of a permanent war of attrition, quite the opposite.

The Once and Future Transatlantic Alliance

Michael E. O’Hanlon and Paul B. Stares

The transatlantic alliance has weathered many crises over the past 80 years, some of which seemed existential at the time. But the one now roiling the alliance feels different and much more treacherous. Unlike previous episodes of transatlantic discord, which mostly revolved around how the alliance should respond to an external threat of one kind or another, the challenge today comes from within. European leaders are asking themselves whether the United States—the alliance’s founder and steadfast champion for eight decades—is still committed to the security of Europe and the West more generally. Recent statements by U.S. President Donald Trump and his senior advisers suggest that the answer is no.

Many European leaders now believe they have no choice but to declare strategic independence from the United States and launch a crash program to defend their continent alone. But they should not. Aside from the incredible expense of achieving a credible European defense posture without U.S. military support, even voicing such an intent risks hastening a total divorce that would threaten the security of both Europe and North America. Abandoning the alliance now would amount to “committing suicide out of fear of death,” as the nineteenth-century German statesman Otto von Bismarck described preventive war.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 16, 2025

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter and William Runkel

US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated on March 16 that Ukraine will receive unspecified security guarantees in exchange for unspecified territorial concessions.[1] Waltz also stated that the United States is considering "the reality of the situation on the ground" in diplomatic talks when discussing an end to the war in Ukraine.[2] It is not clear exactly what Waltz meant by "the reality of the situation on the ground." Russian officials have frequently used the narrative that any negotiations must consider the "realities on the ground" to refer to the current frontline in Ukraine and their claims of the inevitability of further Russian battlefield gains.[3] Waltz's acknowledgement that Ukraine will receive unspecified security guarantees is a key aspect of achieving US President Donald Trump's stated goal of securing a lasting peace in Ukraine, but stopping hostilities on indefensible lines would limit the effectiveness of security guarantees.

The current frontlines do not provide the strategic depth that Ukraine will need to reliably defend against renewed Russian aggression. Russian forces are just across the Dnipro River from Kherson City, roughly 25 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia City, and 30 kilometers from Kharkiv City. Russian troops on the Dnipro River could use a ceasefire to prepare for the extremely difficult task of conducting an opposed river crossing undisturbed, significantly increasing the likelihood of success in such an endeavor. Stopping a well-prepared, major mechanized offensive cold is extremely rare in war, which means that a renewed Russian assault would likely threaten both Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia cities, as well as key cities in the Donetsk "fortress belt," almost immediately. Russia is constructing a large highway and railway aimed at connecting major cities in occupied Ukraine and Russia, which will reinforce Russia's hold on occupied Ukraine and Russia's ability to transport and supply Russian forces operating in Ukraine in the event of a future Russian offensive in southern Ukraine.[4]

Musk’s Team Evicts Officials at the U.S. Institute of Peace

Aishvarya Kavi

A simmering dispute between the Department of Government Efficiency and an independent agency dedicated to promoting peace broke into an open standoff involving the police on Monday, as Elon Musk’s government cutters marched into the agency’s headquarters and evicted its officials.

The dramatic scene played out in Washington on Monday afternoon as Mr. Musk’s team was rebuffed from the U.S. Institute of Peace, an agency that President Trump has ordered dismantled, then entered it with law enforcement officers. Agency officials say that because the institute is a congressionally chartered nonprofit that is not part of the executive branch, Mr. Trump and Mr. Musk do not have the authority to gut its operations.

“DOGE just came into the building — they’re inside the building — they’re bringing the F.B.I. and brought a bunch of D.C. police,” Sophia Lin, a lawyer for the institute, said by telephone as she and other officials were being escorted out.

George Moose, who was fired as the institute’s acting president last week but is challenging his dismissal, accused Mr. Musk’s team of breaking in. “Our statute is very clear about the status of this building and this institute,” he told reporters. “So what has happened here today is an illegal takeover by elements of the executive branch of a private nonprofit corporation.”