'Killed in front of our eyes': How the Pakistan train hijacking unfolded

Gavin Butler

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Mehboob Hussain was riding the train home on Tuesday when the tracks under the front car exploded.

In the depths of central Pakistan's Bolan Pass, a pocket of wilderness so remote that there is no internet or mobile network coverage, the nine-coach Jaffar Express ground to a halt. Then the bullets started flying.

"I was a passenger on the train that was attacked," Mr Hussain told BBC Urdu.

He, along with some 440 others, had been travelling from Quetta to Peshawar through the heart of the restive Balochistan province when a group of armed militants struck – they bombed the tracks, fired on the train and then stormed the carriages.

The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) quickly claimed responsibility for the siege, and threatened to kill many of those on board if Pakistani authorities did not release Baloch political prisoners within 48 hours.

The group, which many countries have designated a terrorist organisation, has waged a decades-long insurgency to gain independence for Balochistan, accusing Islamabad of exploiting the province's rich mineral resources while also neglecting it.

Chinese nuclear weapons, 2025

Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns & Mackenzie Knight

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Within the past five years, China has significantly expanded its ongoing nuclear modernization program by fielding more types and greater numbers of nuclear weapons than ever before. Since our previous edition on China in May 2024, China has continued to develop its three new missile silo fields for solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), continued the construction of new silos for its liquid-fuel DF-5 ICBMs, has been developing new variants of ICBMs and advanced strategic delivery systems, and has likely produced excess warheads for these systems once they are deployed. China has also further expanded its dual-capable DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile force, which appears to have completely replaced the medium-range DF-21 in the nuclear role. At sea, China has been refitting its Type 094 ballistic missile submarines with the longer-range JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile. In addition, China has recently reassigned an operational nuclear mission to some of its bombers with an air-launched ballistic missile that might have nuclear capability. In all, China’s nuclear expansion is among the largest and most rapid modernization campaigns of the nine nuclear-armed states.

We estimate that China has produced a stockpile of approximately 600 nuclear warheads for delivery by land-based ballistic missiles, sea-based ballistic missiles, and bombers.

The Pentagon reported in 2024 that China’s nuclear stockpile had “surpassed 600 operational warheads as of mid-2024” (US Department of Defense 2024, IX). But Chinese warheads are not “operational” like the US and Russian nuclear warheads deployed on operational missiles and at bomber bases; nearly all Chinese warheads are thought to be stored separate from the launchers. Moreover, we cannot replicate the warhead estimate based on the reported and observable force structure unless we assign warheads to a significant number of China’s new silos.

China’s expanding footprint in geostationary orbit raises security concerns

Andrew Jones

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China is expanding its presence and capabilities in the strategically vital geostationary belt, raising security concerns due to unpredictable satellite movements, according to experts.

Participants in a panel on “A renewed space race” at Chatham House Space Security 2025 conference in London, March 5, identified Chinese spacecraft and behaviors in geostationary orbit that are unpredictable, hard to track, and of concern.

The geostationary orbit belt, or GEO, at 35,786 kilometers above the equator, sees spacecraft orbit at a speed that matches the rotation of the Earth, meaning they stay fixed in position in the sky as seen from the ground. The belt has strategic and commercial importance for communications, intelligence, and military operations.

China has been adding to its fleet of satellites in GEO in recent years with communications and remote sensing satellites, as well as classified spacecraft, described as experimental communications satellites, but with capabilities thought to include proximity maneuvers and satellite inspection, missile early warning, space situational awareness and electronic signals intelligence. Altering their orbit by tens of kilometers above or below the belt allows spacecraft to drift either west or east respectively, changing their position in GEO.

Iran and Russia Pursue Multipolar World Order

Emil Avdaliani

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On January 17, the leaders of Iran and Russia signed a new comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in Moscow, replacing a previous pact from 2001 that has been renewed several times (Al Jazeera, January 17). Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and deteriorating Russia-West relations have transformed Moscow-Tehran ties. Historically, Russia was cautious about sharing sensitive technology with Iran to avoid Western backlash. Russia’s war against Ukraine, however, has pushed Moscow to further pivot toward Asia, with Iran playing a key role in this realignment. Even if the war against Ukraine ends, Russia’s alignment with Iran is likely to continue. As both states face Western sanctions, Moscow increasingly views Tehran as a vital partner, especially for access to the Indian Ocean and East Africa (see EDM, January 11, 2024). Iran, anticipating maximum pressure from Washington, is also keen to expand military and political cooperation with Russia (The White House, February 4).

The official details of the new agreement essentially cover all areas of cooperation, including culture, politics, infrastructure development, and even sanitation (IranGov, January 17). Russia and Iran argue that the two will continue promoting a just and multipolar world. This means cooperation within and expansion of such platforms as BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (see EDM, November 4, 2024). [1] Another area of cooperation is the development of a new payment system to facilitate the reduction of dependence on the U.S. dollar (see EDM, January 11, 2024). There are also intentions to expand the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which runs from Russian ports to Iran and its southern seashore and aims to link Russia with the Middle East, India, and even Africa’s eastern coasts (see EDM, June 7, 2023).

A Better Way to Defend America

Stephen Peter Rosen

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The United States is now engaged in an intense dialogue about the future of its relations with its European and Asian allies. This debate has been emotional, in part because it has been cast as a morality tale. On the one hand, advocates of U.S. President Donald Trump’s “America first” agenda argue that allies have not been grateful for U.S. backing and do not deserve the protection of the United States. They believe these states do not do enough to defend themselves and may not even share American values. On the other hand, those who defend the existing alliance structure argue that the United States must be faithful to its commitments and stand by the heroic people of Ukraine and Europe against a revanchist Russia.

But the United States did not shape the global military posture that it has maintained since World War II around a morality tale. The strategy of containment that remains the basis of current U.S. posture was based on an assessment of how the United States could protect what it valued most. A better way to approach the current debate is to ask whether the assessment that led to that strategy is as valid today as it was 75 years ago. The empirical answer to that question is no. What the United States should do in response can be debated, but its actions should be based on reality.

America’s retreat leaves a leadership void that the free world must fill

Debakant Jena

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A shouting match with the Ukrainian president on live TV; tariffs hammering allies; talk of annexing Canada; NATO, once a pillar of stability, now caught in a storm of doubt; the U.S. standing with Belarus and North Korea in refusing to condemn Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine.

This isn’t just a retreat — it is uncertainty reshaping alliances in real time, and the world is taking note.

The world isn’t just watching America step back. It is watching Washington reshape its role, leaving allies uncertain and adversaries emboldened.

For decades, global stability rested on the singular assumption that America would lead. That assumption no longer holds.

The question now is whether the world waits for Washington to reclaim its role, or builds something stronger in its absence. Maybe that’s exactly what needs to happen. And if democracies do not step in to fill the vacuum, authoritarian states will — if they haven’t already.

America’s next Sputnik moment is already here

Sandra Erwin

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In Washington’s policy circles, warnings about America’s declining space dominance have become a familiar refrain. Yet these concerns are not mere bureaucratic hand-wringing — they reflect a reality that experts believe demands immediate attention.

Nearly seven decades after the Soviet Union’s Sputnik launch jolted America into the space age, the United States finds itself at another critical juncture. This time, however, the wake-up call isn’t a single blinking satellite but a series of escalating challenges that threaten the nation’s long-held supremacy in space.

Recent reports from think tanks paint a sobering picture. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) warns that the United States is “in danger of losing its privileged position in space,” while the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies highlights critical weaknesses in U.S. military space strategy.

Meanwhile, China’s rapid advancement in space technology and Russia’s increasingly aggressive actions — including testing anti-satellite weapons that created dangerous debris fields — signal a new era of space competition. These nations have developed sophisticated capabilities to disable or destroy U.S. space assets through various means, from cyberattacks to direct-ascent missiles.

Getting Out of Forever Wars

Don McGregor

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Introduction

Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has been mired in "forever wars"—prolonged conflicts with no clear victory, draining trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and economic vitality. A 2023 Pew poll shows 54% of Americans favor reducing overseas military commitments, with 83% prioritizing domestic needs—a clear call for change.

The U.S. can no longer afford years of military overreach. A pragmatic strategy emphasizing diplomacy, allied burden-sharing, and strategic restraint is essential to protect national interests without exhausting finite resources.

The Overwhelming Cost of War

The post-9/11 wars have exacted a staggering toll. Brown University’s Costs of War Project estimates the U.S. has spent $8 trillion—38% of 2020’s GDP—on conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria, equating to $24,000 per citizen.

Future interest on this debt could add $2.2 trillion to the national debt by 2050, burdening future generations. Human losses are equally dire: 7,000 service members and 8,000 contractors killed, 55,000 injured, and 940,000 total deaths from direct violence, with 3.6 million more dying indirectly in war zones.

Is the AMOC headed for a tipping point? Interview with Henk Dijkstra

Dan Drollette Jr

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When it comes to tipping points, one of the greatest worries is the status of what is known as the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation, or AMOC—a key player in making the northern part of Europe habitable. The AMOC has been described as a sort of conveyor belt, that uses currents such as the Gulf Stream to circulate saltwater and heat from south to north and back again in a long cycle within the Atlantic Ocean, warming up the land masses it passes on its northward journey in the process—and with effects on the rest of the globe as well.

To very loosely paraphrase the words of one observer, if this heat-transporting mechanism was to go out of business, then raising crops in Great Britain would be like trying to grow potatoes in northern Norway (near the Arctic Circle).

Fortunately, this oceanic circulatory system was generally regarded as more-or-less stable.

But new methods of data-collecting and computer-modelling have revealed that the AMOC has been unstable in the past, and its earlier collapses led to some of the most dramatic and abrupt climate shifts ever known. These days, melting ice in the North Atlantic—caused by increased global warming—has steadily caused more freshwater to be introduced into the system, changing its salinity and further pushing it toward collapse. At some point, this steady diet of change might no longer produce effects in a neat linear fashion but reach that moment of critical mass—an abrupt threshold, or tipping point—beyond which there could be large, accelerating, and possibly irreversible changes in the system and change its salinity and further pushing it toward collapse (or, at least irreversible changes within the span of a human lifetime).

Russia Turns Belarus into Launching Pad for Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles

Alexander Taranov

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On December 6, 2024, during a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State in Minsk, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the deployment of the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) (Kremlin.ru, December 6, 2024). This deployment is planned for the second half of 2025 on Belarusian territory. As in the case of the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, this decision was purportedly made in response to a request from Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka (Belta.by, January 26). Putin justified his decision by referencing Russia’s obligations under the Treaty on Security Guarantees within the Union State, positioning it as a measure to ensure Belarus’s security against potential North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aggression (see EDM, February 12, 13).

In March 2023, Lukashenka mentioned the possibility of Russian strategic missile systems being placed in Belarus. He stated that discussions were ongoing with the Kremlin regarding the potential deployment of Russian strategic nuclear weapons, specifically the RT-2PM2 Topol-M ground-based missile systems (GBMS) (President of the Republic of Belarus, March 31, 2023). In April 2023, Belarusian Armed Forces undertook first measures to restore and modernize Soviet-era infrastructure in Brest oblast, specifically the launch sites for the RT-2PM Topol GBMS (Telegram/@modmilby, April 23, 2023; (Telegram/@Hajun_BY, April 24, 2023).

Memo to the President: How AI, Compute, and Connectivity Shape The Future of American Power

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America’s lead in AI, compute, and connectivity will define this century—but continued leadership is not guaranteed. China has made AI and microelectronics a national priority, deploying state-directed resources, a comprehensive national strategy, intellectual property theft, and aggressive industrial scaling to close the gap.

The AI+ Compute & Connectivity Summit brought together leaders from government, industry, startups, and academia to tackle one fundamental question: What actions must the United States take to secure global leadership in AI, semiconductors, and advanced networks? The answer is clear: removing regulatory restrictions, rebuilding domestic manufacturing, securing critical infrastructure, and incentivizing private-sector investment in the next generation of computing paradigms and advanced networks.

America’s AI Infrastructure: A Race Against Time

Rapid progress in AI continues to drive a frenzied infrastructure buildout, but the U.S. power grid isn’t keeping up. The nation is facing a gap in power production for AI infrastructure in the tens of gigawatts. Data centers are being planned at an unprecedented scale, but permitting delays, grid limitations, and regulatory choke points are slowing the rollout. Meanwhile, Beijing is actively improving compute efficiency to reduce infrastructure demands, as seen in its DeepSeek model, which suggests a new wave of efficiency gains that could change the competitive landscape. If the United States does not act now, it will find itself boxed in—by technology limitations and by its failure to scale domestic infrastructure.

Strategic Snapshot: Consequences of Russia’s War at Home

Souce Link

Russia’s domestic situation continues to deteriorate as it suffers the consequences of its war against Ukraine. Despite the Kremlin’s efforts to project an image of strength, Russia is no longer the superpower it once was. This is particularly evident in the state of the Russian economy. The Kremlin has prioritized bolstering its military-industrial complex at the expense of other sectors of the economy. Russian arms production, however, has experienced minimal growth despite reported increases. The war also has degraded Russian society as the regime attempts to militarize everyday life. School children are trained in patriotic education in an effort to instill pro-war values in Russian youth. Criminal violence is increasing as veterans return from war. The Russian people’s support for the war continues to decline, and President Vladimir Putin is resorting to repressive tactics to maintain the facade of control. These efforts to foster support for the war, however, have not boosted recruitment as fewer Russians want to become cannon fodder. As the Kremlin prolongs the war, these issues will only worsen.

Crumbling Economy and Military Industrial Complex:

• The Russian economy is grappling with serious structural issues, including dwindling economic reserves, labor shortages exacerbated by demographics, heavy war casualties, and mass emigration.
• Russia’s military-industrial complex is not modernizing at the rate of demand, meaning that Russia will not be capable of increasing arms production rates in the long term.
• Russian arms production has experienced minimal growth as government-reported increases construe data by masking it with inflation. Western sanctions hinder domestic production, forcing reliance on allies such as the People’s Republic of China and North Korea.

What Incentives Are There for Russia to Agree to a Ceasefire in Ukraine?

Alexander Baunov

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In his quest for an agreement to stop the war in Ukraine, U.S. President Donald Trump began with the easy part: putting pressure on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who is dependent on U.S. military support. Now it’s time to face the hard part: putting pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Ukraine has agreed to a thirty-day ceasefire without preconditions and in full—not just in the air and at sea, as it had previously proposed. In return, it received what it had been getting until just a few days earlier without any ceasefire: a resumption of intelligence sharing and previously approved U.S. aid. Now, as U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it, “the ball is in Russia’s court.”

Ahead of U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff’s arrival in Moscow on March 13, Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov appeared to reject the ceasefire proposal on the grounds that it would merely provide Ukraine with a temporary respite, enabling it to rally its forces. Indeed, Moscow is unlikely to respond with a simple and honest cessation of hostilities at a time when the Russian army has begun recapturing territory in Russia’s Kursk region that had been seized by Ukrainian troops. It could try to persuade the Americans to give it time to complete the Kursk operation, or to exclude it from the ceasefire agreement, though even Trump would likely have a hard time accepting that: it would imply that Ukraine is a legitimate battlefield while Russia is not. Another option for Moscow is to simply drag out its response in the hope of quickly completing the recapture of the region.

“That Is a Five-Alarm Fire”: Jake Sullivan on the Past and Future of U.S. Foreign Policy

Aaron David Miller

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Aaron David Miller: In this multipolar world with our own domestic house in a fair amount of turmoil, how do you create addition—in terms of people who are willing to associate with you—rather than subtraction?

Jake Sullivan: It’s very difficult to answer that question in a moment of such profound turmoil and upheaval in America’s approach to the world.

But what I can say is the hand we passed on to the Trump administration when we left on January 20 was a hand that involved a growing and dynamic transatlantic alliance, with us adding to NATO two important and capable partners who became allies, Finland and Sweden. It involved a deepening relationship with our Asian allies that we were working with not just on hard security issues, but on technology, on clean energy, on infrastructure, and on so much else. It involved a deepening relationship with India, the world’s largest democracy, if an imperfect democracy. It involved new relationships with countries like Vietnam and Angola.

All of that was built around the basic idea that the United States could bring a value proposition to the world in terms of our capacity to help mobilize countries to solve problems. What I have been struck by is instead of trying to carry forward the momentum of addition, they are pursuing a policy of subtraction, starting with the transatlantic alliance, but also even closer to home, with Canada. That is a source of real concern.

The Periodic Table of States

Parag Khanna

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It may not seem like the best time to publish yet another global ranking of nations. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) have recently come under fire for being vague and biased. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset, a Swedish academic project, touts an advanced methodology blending surveys with supercomputers, yet its results clearly indicate a greater interest in de jure liberalism than de facto democratic practice. Objectivity seems impossible—yet we try.

We should strive to improve rankings because they shape how we evaluate states and how states behave. For example, the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (CGR) series enjoyed decades of success by awakening the competitive spirit among nations seeking to elevate their ranking—knowing full well that investors use the scores in asset allocation.

Today, we have a plethora of indices ranking states according to metrics such as military power, financial wealth, industrial capacity, technological innovation, democracy, economic freedom, sustainability, reputation, and more. But looking at each indicator in isolation doesn’t tell us much about the robustness of the state as a whole. Meaningfully categorizing states requires curating a meta-index of these diverse quantitative and qualitative variables across the strategic, economic, technological, social, and other domains.

Signal no longer cooperating with Ukraine on Russian cyberthreats, official says

Daryna Antoniuk

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The encrypted messaging app Signal has stopped responding to requests from Ukrainian law enforcement regarding Russian cyberthreats, a Ukrainian official claimed, warning that the shift is aiding Moscow’s intelligence efforts.

According to Serhii Demediuk, deputy secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, Signal remains one of the most exploited messaging apps for Russian espionage operations targeting Ukrainian military personnel and government officials.

“With its inaction, Signal is helping Russians gather information, target our soldiers and compromise government officials,” Demediuk said at the Kyiv International Cyber Resilience Forum on Tuesday.

Signal, a U.S.-based nonprofit platform known for its commitment to privacy, did not respond to a request for comment. In a post on social media platform Mastodon following the publication of this story, Signal Foundation President Meredith Whittaker said: "We don't officially work with any gov, Ukraine or otherwise, and we never stopped. We're not sure where this came from or why."

The unexpected knock-on effect of Trump's minerals 'deal of the century

Esme Stallard

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Since taking office, Trump has withdrawn the US from what is considered the most important global climate pact, the Paris Climate Agreement. He has also reportedly prevented US scientists from participating in international climate research and removed national electric vehicle targets.

Plus, he derided his predecessor's attempts to develop new green technology a "green new scam".

And yet despite his history on the issue of climate, Trump has been eager to make a deal with the Ukrainian president on critical minerals. He has also taken a strong interest in Greenland and Canada – both nations rich in critical minerals.

Critical mineral procurement has been a major focus for Trump since he took office. These minerals are crucial in industries including aerospace and defence, but intriguingly, they have another major use too - to manufacture green technology.

So, could Trump's focus on obtaining these minerals have a knock-on effect, and help unlock the US's potential in the green technology sector?

Russia Is Right to Be Proud of Its S-500 Missile Defense System

Maya Carlin

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President Donald Trump had ordered the cessation of U.S. military aid to Ukraine in February, following a heated Oval Office argument with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, before later reversing his decision. This caused quite a stir, since Ukraine depends on deliveries of advanced Western-supplied weapons, including lethal unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles and Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), to penetrate some of Moscow’s most sophisticated surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems like the S-500 “Prometheus.” At the tail end of 2024, Russia’s armed forces formed its first full regiment equipped with these long-range air defense systems, marking a significant milestone for the cutting-edge asset.

An overview of the S-500

The history of the Prometheus SAM is linked directly to the Soviet-era S-300 project. During the Cold War, the Soviet Air Defense Forces required a SAM system capable of defending against air raids and cruise missiles in the U.S. arsenal. Soviet manufacturer NPO Almaz produced the S-300 to fulfill this need in the late 1970s. Over the years, several sub-variants of the S-300 were produced, with the latest being the Antey-2500. With a range of 350km, according to Russian state-run media outlets, the system has “high tactical and technical characteristics that allow it to use it for air defence of the most important administrative, industrial and military facilities, troop groups, coastal infrastructure and naval forces at stationing site.”

There's a New War Game for 'Nerds with a Drive for Violence.' It's Spreading Across the Marine Corps

Drew F. Lawrence

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Capt. Nicholas Royer describes himself and many of his fellow Marines as "nerds with a drive for violence." It's an apt description for disciples of a booming craft in the Corps: war-gaming.

In 2023, about six months into his tenure as II Marine Expeditionary Force's modeling and simulation officer -- or as he puts it, the unit's "pet little mad scientist," Royer was responsible for coordinating training and war-gaming needs for units across Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, at its Battle Simulation Center, the Marine Corps' first purpose-built facility of its kind.

Amid the fancy simulation systems and high demand for laptops, Royer saw that there was not only a frequent "technical burden" to offering Marines a chance to test out battle scenarios, but an accessibility gap. War-gaming was a staple at higher echelons, and other available simulations -- which can be loaned out to or scheduled by troops on a limited basis -- catered to small-unit tactics for motivated junior noncommissioned officers or officers amid their busy schedules.

Royer said "we had a bit of a gap in something that we could do in between those two extremes" and identified a need for a war game that units could easily check out from the center that would still fulfill the immersive quality of the technical simulators, but without the barrier to entry or logistical support.

Maybe Trump Wants to Help Ukraine After All

FRED KAPLAN

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Maybe President Trump isn’t clamoring to push Ukraine under the bus after all.

Tuesday’s meeting in Jeddah, between his top officials and their Ukrainian counterparts, ended with the Americans handing Kyiv a clear advantage—militarily and diplomatically—and putting Moscow in a tight, awkward spot.

According to a joint statement released after several hours of talks, the two countries agreed to a 30-day ceasefire in the Russia–Ukraine war, hopefully to be extended for a longer span, segueing into negotiations toward a permanent peace. The ceasefire deal—which also contains details about a long-term settlement that have not been publicly disclosed—will soon be presented to the Russian government for its acceptance or rejection. Meanwhile, whatever the Russians decide, Ukraine will enjoy an immediate resumption of U.S. military and intelligence assistance, which Trump had suspended after his disastrous Oval Office meeting with President Volodymyr Zelensky on Feb. 28.

The U.S. Should Cut Defense Spending. Here’s How

John Fairlamb, Ph.D.

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The proposed 2025 Department of Defense budget is $850 billion, and when Department of Energy funding for military nuclear programs is factored in, the total tops $895 billion. Yet, the Joint Chiefs of Staff say they can’t meet assigned missions without more money.

Despite this appetite for even greater defense spending, President Donald Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth are doing the right thing as they seek to cut billions from budgets.

Here are five areas they should focus on that can help guide cuts and reshape the military into a more cohesive fighting force with national treasure spent on the capabilities and force structure we need, rather than on what we don’t.

Conduct a comprehensive review of military strategy

Every four years the Department of Defense does a review of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which is billed as a fresh look at current threats and the capabilities needed to defeat them. The last NDS was done in 2022, before Russia invaded Ukraine, demonstrating that the Russian military threat was severely overestimated.

A new NDS is not due until 2026, but the new administration should consider doing one sooner to account for changes in the military postures of both Russia and China, as well as the new administration’s foreign policy changes.

Frontline Innovation and Domestic Production: The Keys to Ukraine’s Journey Toward Defense Self-Reliance

Paul Schwennesen and Olena Kryzhanivska

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“Yes, we build them ourselves. We have no other choice.” Three of us—all American veterans—stood spellbound inside a repurposed potato shed as an elite Ukrainian drone team explained how they hand-make their own explosive payloads for the drones that have been instrumental in forcing the Russian war machine into a grinding slog.

A lanky soldier with dirty fatigues and a curled mustachio grins and explains: “We usually take apart Soviet antitank mines and boil out the explosives. We 3D print our own casings, fill them with explosive charges and shrapnel, then arm them with our own handmade detonators.” He lightheartedly tosses a brick of raw explosive our direction. We cringe and shake our heads.

As American warfighters, we’ve been brought up within a culture of war that views combat operations through a combined arms lens that leans heavily on air supremacy and a logistics system of unparalleled proportions. The idea of frontline units literally building their own weapons is as foreign to us as Cyrillic.

Compass Points - Transformation

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Is military transformation a bad thing?

In testimony yesterday before the Senate Armed Services Committee - Readiness and Management Subcommittee, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps was asked by Senator Sullivan if the Marine Corps today had the ability to throw a combat bridge across a river and keep an assault moving forward. The ACMC was forced to admit the Marine Corps did not have that ability today.

Senator Sullivan is relentlessly focused on the Marine Corps' ability to serve as the Nation's 9-1-1 crisis response force. If over the last five years, the Marine Corps had maintained the same relentless focus that Senator Sullivan has today, then the Marine Corps would still have the units, equipment, and capabilities needed for the Marine Corps to reliably function as the Nation's 9-1-1 force. How did the Marine Corps get where it is today? How did a military transformation that was intended to make the Marine Corps stronger, do so much to decimate the Marine Corps global, combined arms, 9-1-1 crisis response force?

In his article, "Transforming the Marines for an Uncertain Future" Charles Wilhelm explains that the transformation of the Marine Corps over the last five years had its roots in a much more successful transformation that took place several decades ago.

Military Paradigm Swinging Away from Wokeism Toward Meritocracy

Elaine Donnelly

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Commander-in-Chief Donald Trump has issued a series of Executive Orders addressing three over-arching goals: Meritocracy and non-discrimination instead of “equity” for favored groups, common sense definitions of “sex” and respect for sex differences, and elimination of divisive critical race theory (CRT) programs.

This won’t be easy because the weeds of wokeism are deeply rooted in the Defense Department, and they did not spring up overnight. Pentagon ideologues have been cultivating them for years.

In 2011, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission issued a 162-page report titled From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century. MLDC recommendations shifted the military’s cultural priorities away from meritocracy and non-discrimination toward “diversity, equity, and inclusion” (DEI) as paramount goals.

Previously, the armed forces assigned priority to individual merit, performance, and the needs of the military. The MLDC altered that paradigm by rejecting “color-blind” policies and admitting that “fair treatment” was “not about treating everyone the same.”

The Army wants to get the load soldiers carry down to 55 pounds

Patty Nieberg

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The Army wants to reduce the amount of equipment that close combat soldiers, like the infantry, have to carry. The obvious perks are that a lighter soldier can move (and fight) faster, is less likely to injure themselves carrying everything and the kitchen sink, and has less gear to worry about getting in trouble for losing.

“No longer will we hang things on them like we hang things on a Christmas tree,” Brig. Gen. Phil Kiniery, commandant of the Army’s Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, told Task & Purpose in a statement. “In some cases, we’re giving our forces redundant capabilities at the squad level, the platoon level, and the company level. Is that necessary, effective, and efficient? In some cases, the answer will be yes, and in some cases no.”

The average infantry soldier carries or wears more than 80 items. The Army wants to reduce that weight to 55 pounds, or “no more than 30%” of their body weight, Kiniery told contractors at an event earlier this month.

The cuts would impact the Army’s close combat forces, which include infantry, scouts, combat medics, forward observers, combat engineers, and special operations forces.