Indian Strategic Studies: 03/16/25

16 March 2025

Between Critical Raw Materials And Oil, Kazakhstan Is Becoming A Regional Partner – OpEd

Derya Soysal

Critical raw materials play a crucial role in the production of low-carbon energy. This is why the EU is turning towards the use of these minerals and thus importing them from producing countries. Among other things, it is clear that the EU is seeking to find new partners producing raw minerals, among which is Kazakhstan. Moreover, at the end of 2024, in Brussels, several events, round tables, discussions, and meetings have facilitated bilateral exchanges between the EU and Kazakhstan regarding cooperation in terms of raw minerals.

Currently, Kazakhstan, as the world’s largest producer of uranium for commercial use and as a country with a positive image in the fight against nuclear weapons proliferation is experiencing remarkable economic growth and is increasingly getting closer to the European Union.

Furthermore, Kazakh Ministry of Industry and Construction has announced new projects for exploring and extracting rare and rare-earth metals, reported Kazinform. The country has signed strategic agreements with big powers such as the European Union, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan, and China to develop its rare and rare-earth mining and production sector. Moreover, German company HMS Bergbau AG is conducting geological exploration at the Akhmetkino lithium deposit, with an estimated investment of $8 million. The ministry of Industry and Construction in Kazakhstan estimates that the total investment could reach $500 million if reserves are confirmed according to Astana Times.

Japan Appoints First Chief of New Joint Operations Command

Takahashi Kosuke

As the world faces the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II, Japan now has a new joint operations commander who has the authority to unify the three branches of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) from peacetime to times of emergency – especially with a Taiwan contingency in mind.

At a Cabinet meeting on March 11, the Japanese government appointed Lieutenant General Nagumo Kenichiro, vice chief of staff at the Joint Staff of the JSDF, as the first head of the Joint Operations Command.

This new joint operations command is set to be launched on March 24 at the Defense Ministry’s headquarters in Tokyo with a staff of about 240 personnel, a spokesperson at Japan’s Joint Staff told The Diplomat on March 12.

The appointment came after the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Buildup Program, both approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2022, called for reinforcing effectiveness of the joint operational posture of the three JSDF services.

“A Permanent Joint Headquarters will be established in order to build a system capable of seamlessly conducting cross-domain operations at all stages from peacetime to contingency, with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of joint operations among each SDF service,” the Defense Buildup Program stated.

The Case for a Taiwan-US Semiconductor Agreement

Ching-Fu Lin and Han-Wei Liu

On March 3, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) announced, together with U.S. President Donald Trump, its decision to invest massively in the United States. Per TSMC CEO C.C. Wei, this investment will direct $100 billion to the construction of three new fabrication facilities featuring the company’s most advanced process nodes, two advanced packaging plants, and a research and development center in Arizona. The construction process will take place over the coming years, reportedly to counter potential tariffs, ranging from 25 to 100 percent, that the Trump administration might impose on Taiwan. The investment plan will bring TSMC’s critical semiconductor production closer to the company’s U.S. clients.

Commenting on the agreement, Trump declared, “We must be able to build the chips and semiconductors that we need right here. It’s a matter of national security for us.”

This Taiwan-U.S. investment plan aligns with the broader U.S. industrial policy objectives of reshoring vital supply chains and reducing dependency on semiconductor chokepoint economies in Asia. These objectives are especially relevant to Taiwan, given its dominant position in the semiconductor field and escalating tensions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Forceful Taiwan Reunification

Suyash Desai

For nearly a century, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan have largely avoided direct military confrontations across the Taiwan Strait. However, there have been four notable exceptions: the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–55, 1958, 1995–96, and most recently, 2022–23. In the first three instances, the status quo was primarily restored following the crisis. However, recent events suggest worrying trends highlighting that Beijing is preparing for a forceful reunification with Taiwan.

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping has already made reunification with Taiwan a part of his signature China Dream, announced during the 19th Party Congress meeting in 2017. However, this was not the first time Taiwan was featured prominently in speeches by top Chinese leaders. As political scientist Ketian Zhang highlights in her book China’s Gambit: The Calculus of Coercion, annexing Taiwan is considered a core interest of China, with official references to its significance appearing regularly since 2003. The most recent instance was Xi Jinping’s New Year’s speech on December 31, 2024, where he declared, “No one can stop the historical trend of reunification of the motherland” (誰也不能充實祖國統一的歷史大勢).

The US dividing Russia from China? Forget about it

Glenn Chafetz

The Trump administration’s effort to divide Russia from China is doomed to fail. This means that the United States is destroying security relationships based on a delusion.

To succeed, Russia would need to overcome more than a century of hostility and distrust. Both Russia and the US would have to reorient their relationships with allies and adversaries; and the US would need to replace China’s economic support to Russia. Russia would also have to be sure that the US would fully abandon its commitment to democracy and human rights for the long term. None of this will happen.

Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, Keith Kellogg, said at the Munich Security Conference on 15 February that the US would try to break Putin’s alliances, including those with China, Iran and North Korea.

Just nine days later Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping explicitly reaffirmed their ‘no-limits partnership’. That should have come as no surprise: the new US policy does nothing to change the reasons underlying Moscow’s political alignment with Beijing.

These reasons include: a shared commitment to autocracy and opposition to democracy; more than a century of distrust and conflict with the US; historical commitments to partners such as North Korea, Iran and Cuba; and Russia’s economic dependence on China.

Trump must tread lightly with Arab leaders in peace talks

Shady ElGhazaly Harb

If the primary goal of the Trump administration is to quickly address issues in the Middle East and prevent further wars and instability, placing additional pressure on Arab countries might actually backfire.

While these regimes may not fear being overthrown through elections, they have unspoken concerns that are deeply rooted in their history and collective psyche. These fears arise from past experiences in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict when tensions escalate beyond their limits. Resuming the war in Gaza, displacing Palestinian people, or annexing land in the West Bank could significantly destabilize these regimes and threaten their hold on power.

Throughout the Arab world, the Palestinian cause has been used to justify governmental failures and domestic repression, particularly while the conflict remains frozen. This narrative enables leaders to attribute their shortcomings to alleged “Zionist conspiracies.” Notably, brutal dictatorships, such as those led by Saddam Hussein and the Assad dynasty, have positioned themselves as the ultimate defenders of the Palestinian cause and as protectors of the Arab world against perceived Zionist expansionism. Consequently, maintaining a frozen conflict has become convenient for Arab leaders, serving as a foundation for their legitimacy and monopolization of power.

North Sea tanker collision - what we know so far

George Wright

One crew member is missing, presumed dead, while more than 30 people have been rescued after a cargo ship, the Solong, struck an oil tanker, the Stena Immaculate, in the North Sea off the east coast of England on Monday.

It is unclear how much fuel has been released into the sea, but early assessments suggest the impact is limited, with some fuel having burned off and evaporated.

The Solong was still on fire on Wednesday, while the fire on the Stena Immaculate has been extinguished, according to the ship's co-owner. Despite initial fears of potentially devastating environmental damage, air quality tests have registered no toxins so far.

A 59-year-old Russian national - who, according to the Solong's owners, is the ship's captain - was arrested on suspicion of gross negligence manslaughter on Tuesday.

How did the crash happen?

The Portuguese-flagged Solong struck the larger oil tanker in waters off Hull just before 10:00 on Monday.

The Stena Immaculate had been anchored there after making its way to Hull from a Greek port. The US-flagged ship had been transporting jet fuel for the US military.

What’s so special about Ukraine’s minerals? A geologist explains

Munira Raji

Ukraine’s minerals have become central to global geopolitics, with the US president, Donald Trump, seeking a deal with Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky to access them. But what are these minerals exactly and why are they so sought after?

Ukraine is often recognised for its vast agricultural lands and industrial heritage, but beneath its surface lies one of the world’s most remarkable geological formations, the “Ukrainian Shield”.

This massive, exposed crystalline rock formed over 2.5 billion years ago, stretches across much of Ukraine. It represents one of Earth’s oldest and most stable continental blocks. The formation has undergone multiple episodes of mountain building, the formation and movement of magma and other change throughout time.

These geological processes created favourable geological conditions for forming several mineral deposits including lithium, graphite, manganese, titanium and rare earth elements. All these are now critical for modern industries and the global green energy transition.

Ukraine has deposits containing 22 of 34 critical minerals identified by the European Union as essential for energy security. This positions Ukraine among the world’s most resource-rich nations.

Fight Club: Are Israel and Ukraine’s Wars the Same—or Worlds Apart?

Eli Lake and Michael Brendan Dougherty

In May of last year, then-senator J.D. Vance delivered a speech on foreign policy at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. A politician’s speech at a Washington think tank conference is usually best ignored—and, at the time, there was little reason to pay special attention to this one.

But nine months on, Vance’s remarks look less like obscure Beltway pablum, and more like the blueprint for the Trump administration’s foreign policy.

Vance drew a distinction between perhaps the two most important conflicts in the world, arguing that support for Israel was in the U.S. national interest, but backing the fight for Ukraine was not. “It’s sort of weird that this town assumes that Israel and Ukraine are exactly the same,” he remarked. “They’re not, of course, and I think it’s important to analyze them in separate buckets.”

This distinction is now on full display, with President Donald Trump and Vance tearing into Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office, while doubling down on the U.S. commitment to Israel.

But is it coherent to back Israel while opposing aid to Ukraine? Are these two conflicts fundamentally different—or are both about a democracy’s right to defend its sovereignty against existential threats? If Israel is worthy of continued U.S. support against Hamas and Iran, why not Ukraine against Russia?

Why Tariffs Are Good

Michael Lind

Donald Trump is back—and so is the tariff. “It’s a beautiful word, isn’t it?” the president quipped before the joint session of Congress on Tuesday—so beautiful that he referenced tariffs 17 more times in his address. In the short time since his second inauguration on January 20, Trump has imposed—and sometimes walked back or temporarily suspended—tariffs on China, Canada, and Mexico, and declared a policy of tit-for-tat “reciprocity” or retaliation for any foreign tariffs on American exports that are higher than U.S. tariffs on imports. And he has justified tariffs with multiple rationales, ranging from protecting or reshoring defense-critical American industries to pressuring America’s neighbors to take action to reduce the cross-border flow of illegal immigrants and drugs like fentanyl. In fact, he told members of Congress, tariffs were “about protecting the soul of our country.”

The chaotic and inconsistent nature of Trump’s second-term policy to date can be criticized. But when it comes to tariffs as a tool of economic statecraft in general, the gap between establishment rhetoric and actual government practice is big enough to drive a Chinese EV through.

How NATO Without US Stacks Up Against Russia

Ellie Cook

Germany's likely next leader, Friedrich Merz, didn't mince words when he said it was his "absolute priority" to "achieve independence" for Europe from the United States.

The remarks, which stunned many last month, were one of the clearest demonstrations of the shock reverberating through NATO's European members and Canada as U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration turned on their heel, striding away from the continent America has propped up for decades.

Europe and America's northern neighbor are now scrambling to work out how vulnerable the rest of NATO really is, and whether it can take on Russia without the steadfast support the U.S. has always provided to its fellow member states.

The White House has publicly said it is refocusing its attention on the Indo-Pacific, but it has also steered toward a rapprochement with Russia that has left many in NATO horrified.

"On paper, the military strength of European NATO matches up quite well with the Russians across domains, but this on-paper strength is deceptive," said William Freer, research fellow in national security at the United Kingdom-based Council on Geostrategy.

US Shunned by European Allies for Top Security Summit

Maya Mehrara

The U.S. has been shunned by European allies after it was not invited to a top security summit that more than 30 nations are attending in France on Tuesday, an unidentified French official told the Associated Press.

Why It Matters

The security summit in Europe comes as concerns have risen regarding President Donald Trump's alienation of European allies because of rising tensions with Ukraine over peace negotiations with Russia.

The lack of a U.S. invitation could suggest that Europe and other Ukrainian allies no longer have confidence that Washington can effectively mediate negotiations and achieve peace between Moscow and Kyiv.

What To Know

Military officials from nearly all of the 32 NATO member nations will convene in France to discuss creating an international security force for Ukraine on March 11, with the exception of the U.S.

The international security force for Ukraine would be instituted to dissuade Russia from launching another offensive after a ceasefire has been achieved. The idea for the creation of the force came from France and the U.K., which have been spearheading the provision of military and financial aid for Ukraine since tensions have worsened with the U.S.

Trump and Kim, Act Two: Challenges of Engagement in a New Geopolitical Landscape

Jonathan Bak

Introduction

The outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election surprised many, with Donald Trump returning to the White House and promising significant changes in U.S. foreign policies. Among these, U.S. policy towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains a critical question. Trump’s first term marked a bold departure from previous strategies, involving unprecedented direct engagement with DPRK’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un and high-profile summits. While these efforts garnered global attention, they faced challenges in achieving lasting agreements. In contrast, the Biden administration prioritized alliance-building in the Indo-Pacific. While efforts were made to contact the DPRK, they were ultimately rebuffed. Since then, the DPRK has deepened alliances with Russia and China, recalibrating its strategy and complicating the United States’ traditional methods of engagement. As global dynamics shift, the viability of renewed U.S.-DPRK engagement remains uncertain.

North Korea’s Geopolitical Shift and Strategic Alliance

Since Trump’s departure in 2021, the DPRK has undergone significant geopolitical shifts, with its reignited relationship with Russia standing out as the most consequential. In a short amount of time, the bilateral relationship has intensified. Key developments have brought renewed attention to the DPRK’s strategic maneuvers. These include high-level state visits, the ratification of the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty,” and the deployment of DPRK soldiers to Europe in support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, the March 2024 Russian vote against renewing the United Nations’ expert panel tasked with monitoring sanctions targeting the DPRK highlights the growing partnership between the two nations.

Should Ukraine trust Russia, or Trump?

Kenneth Payne

I'm sat at the airport, watching text scroll by on my MacBook. We're about 3/4 of the way through a very large tournament between a bunch of agents, including two AI ones, that are trying to decide how far to trust one another; or whether they can get away with cheating, and so scoop a bigger prize. And while I wait, I'm scrolling the news about Ukraine on my iphone. Will there be a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, brokered by President Trump? How far can the Ukrainians trust President Putin to keep to any deal? How far can they trust President Trump to backstop it?

The two are connected, of course. That's why strategic studies scholars have, over the decades, spent so much time working with game theory. In strategy, you need to understand your enemy, whether that's in a simplified model of bargaining, or in the messier reality of war.

My agents are playing an iterated Prisoners Dilemma. It's a great way of exploring trust. If you only play the game once, cheats can prosper. But if you play it over and over, a reputation forms; and you have to think really carefully about whether and when to cheat - or 'defect' in the lingo.

Pentagon abruptly ends all funding for social science research

Kai Kupferschmidt

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is ending all of its funding for social science research, stopping 91 ongoing studies related to threats such as climate change, extremism, and disinformation. In a press release issued late on Friday, the department wrote that it would “focus on the most impactful technologies” and that research it funds “must address pressing needs to develop and field advanced military capabilities.”

“[DOD] does not do climate change crap,” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth wrote on X on Sunday. “We do training and war fighting.”

The cuts include the entire Minerva Research Initiative, a landmark project established in 2008 “to help DOD better understand and prepare for future challenges.” (ScienceInsider first reported on cuts to Minerva on 2 March.) The initiative’s website, including reports on finished and ongoing projects, has since gone dark.

“The Pentagon’s decision to scrap its social science research portfolio … is short-sighted and harmful to U.S. national security,” says Jason Lyall, a political scientist at Dartmouth College. Many of the canceled projects focused on how new technologies such as artificial intelligence are shaping modern battlefields, Lyall notes. “How do you know what’s ‘impactful’ if you don’t do the research? How do you anticipate countermeasures and consequences of their use?” he asks. “I’m worried that without this portfolio, we lose a critical source of impartial evidence about national security, leaving the Pentagon more susceptible to companies selling ‘revolutionary’ but unproven technologies.”

The United States and NATO at a Crossroads regarding the War in Ukraine

Eldad Shavit & Shimon Stein

President Putin’s decision to annex four regions of Ukraine and his definition of his struggle against the Western elites as an existential struggle, while avowing his determination to defend the annexed territories and making implicit threats about the possibility of using unconventional weapons, significantly increase the risk of escalation. Consequently, the United States and its allies are now at a crossroads. It seems that Russia’s conduct will compel them to formulate a follow-up strategy that will heighten the challenge of supporting Ukraine without getting dragged into war with Russia. Thus far, aside from the threat of a serious and “decisive” response, the United States and NATO have maintained a veiled response to Russia’s potential use of unconventional weapons. The response could be political (cutting off relations) and economic, but a conventional military response cannot be ruled out. The official statement by Israel – which so far has refrained from responding to Ukraine’s request to provide it with military aid – that it will not recognize Russia’s annexation of the Ukrainian regions is a positive step, but insufficient. The Israeli government should stand clearly by Ukraine’s side, including responding to its military requests. In addition, it should unhesitatingly stand by the side of the US in the struggle, which will influence the shaping of the future world order and the leading role of the United States.

Russia Can’t Win A War Of Maneuver In Ukraine—But It Doesn’t Have To

Stavros Atlamazoglou

In a recent intelligence assessment, the British Ministry of Defence referred to the Russian military’s practice of repeated “dismounted infantry attacks.” These attacks often resemble the tactics used in the First World War—namely, mass infantry assaults against fortified defensive lines.

This fixation on dismounted infantry attacks highlights another problem plaguing the Russian military: an inability to properly conduct combined arms operations in the ongoing war.

The Russian Army’s Lack of Sophistication

Combined arms warfare is the fusion of different types of capabilities and forces to achieve superiority over an adversary. The most effective combined arms operations bring together different combat elements—such as artillery, air power, infantry, and armored forces—to complement one another and enhance their combined effect on the battlefield. Under normal circumstances, an infantry charge against a fortified position will likely fail. But such an attack is more likely to succeed if it is accompanied by tactical air support and accurate artillery fire.

Combined arms warfare really shines when a military force has room to maneuver. The German Wehrmacht was the first to show what this type of warfare could do in the modern era when it blitzed its way through France and the Low Countries in May 1940.

Trump’s Russia-Ukraine Reset

Christian Whiton

On Tuesday, U.S. and Ukrainian negotiators reached an agreement in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, that calls for a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine also tacitly accepted a de facto framework in which the Trump administration will negotiate directly with Russia and either offer or impose an agreement on Ukraine.

Much remains undone. Russia has previously opposed a ceasefire that would halt its slow military advance, especially while Ukraine still holds Russian territory. Also, Ukraine has still not signed the minerals agreement that President Donald Trump has requested. However, Secretary of State Marco Rubio extracted a promise from Ukraine to conclude a comprehensive agreement “as soon as possible.” In any case, Russian forces appear set to retake Russian territory in Kursk held by Ukrainian forces.

The recent fast-paced shuttle diplomacy and rapid changes in policy underline even more significant changes taking place in the U.S.-Russia relationship. By ending former President Joe Biden’s Europe-first foreign policy and blank-check support for Ukraine, Trump may induce Moscow to become less of an adversary on issues of great importance to the United States. Crucially, this may include China’s confrontation with America and its Asian allies. Encouraging greater distance between Russia and China could be as big of a “win” for Trump as ending the war in Ukraine.

The Ukraine Ceasefire Question: Russia Has a Big Choice to Make

Andrew A. Michta

Secretary Marco Rubio’s announcement following the US-Ukraine negotiations in Saudi Arabia that Ukraine has agreed to accept a 30-day ceasefire and to enter into negotiations with Russia is a test of the Trump administration’s relations with Moscow going forward.

As part of the Jeddah agreement, Washington will immediately restart intelligence sharing with Kyiv, restore deliveries of weapons and munitions, and work to complete the rare earth minerals deal with Ukraine.

The Ceasefire Question in Ukraine: What Will Russia Do?

This deal now puts the burden on Russia, for as Secretary Rubio said, “the ball is now in their court.”

The details of the agreement, and notwithstanding the fact that it does not address the critical question of security guarantees for Ukraine should a peace deal be negotiated, are not as important as the underlying dynamic of what just happened: For the first time since the Trump administration made ending the war a key pillar of its agenda, Russia is now firmly in the spotlight.

Trump's Shock Therapy Is Working on Europe | Opinion

Daniel R. DePetris

On March 6, during one of his impromptu news conferences in the Oval Office, President Donald Trump was asked whether he was considering any changes to U.S. policy on NATO, the U.S.-led transatlantic alliance that has kept the peace in Europe for more than 75 years. Trump's answer was, in a word, Trumpian—if NATO members wanted America's protection, they better start opening their wallets a little wider and spending more on defense themselves. "Well I've said that to them," Trump said, referencing Washington's European allies. "I said, 'If you're not gonna pay, we're not gonna defend.'"

Trump has voiced similar sentiments in the past, providing no consolation to Europeans, who have felt overwhelming anxiousness after a turbulent two weeks. In that timeframe U.S. officials sat down with Russian diplomats for the first time in years, Trump had a rhetorical boxing match with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on TV, and the Trump administration paused U.S. military and intelligence support to Kyiv. The big question hovering over the entire continent like the darkest of storm clouds can no longer be avoided: is the U.S. still committed to Europe's security?

Europe vs. America – a New Arms Race Begins

Patrick Drennan

An arms race with Europe will dull America’s competitive and manufacturing edge.

On February 27, President Donald Trump asked British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, “Could you take on Russia by yourselves?” Although it may have been a rhetoric question, it dripped with sarcasm. Starmer avoided the question and moved on, but both men know that the majority of arms that have allowed Ukraine to fend off the invading Russians have been American.

The next day, in a fiery meeting with Ukrainian President Top of Form.

Volodymyr Zelensky, President Trump stated, with some justification, “If you didn’t have our military equipment this war would have been over in two weeks.” Not long afterwards President Zelensky was asked to leave the White House. European leaders rushed to text their support for Zelensky.

On March 2, NATO and European leaders announced at a defense summit in London that they intend to greatly increase military aid to Ukraine. On March 3, Trump announced a pause on all military aid to Ukraine.

Germany Is Rethinking Everything Nuclear - Analysis

Thorsten Benner

The incoming German government, rattled by the prospect of U.S. President Donald Trump withdrawing security guarantees, is preparing a fundamental readjustment of its defense posture. The new coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD) has already agreed to push for changes to the debt brake that would pave the way to dramatically higher military spending. Germany’s likely next chancellor, CDU leader Friedrich Merz, stated that “in view of the threats to our freedom and peace on our continent,” the government’s new motto needs to be “whatever it takes.”

A litmus test for how serious these efforts are is whether the new government will pursue a Plan B for a possible end to the U.S. nuclear security umbrella for Germany and Europe. Berlin needs an ambitious nuclear policy rethink that includes a push to recreate nuclear sharing at the European level—with the continent’s nuclear powers, France and the U.K.—to deter Russia and other adversaries. It is also essential for Germany to invest in civilian nuclear research to maintain nuclear latency as a hedge. Fortunately, Merz has signaled willingness to do both.

Britain’s Abusive New Relationship With America

John Kampfner

There’s nothing that upsets the British more than being ignored by the Americans. Or, if I’m being cruel, there’s nothing that upsets them more than not being shown love by the Americans. The special relationship between the two countries is an article of faith. It is desperately sought by one side and conferred with a pat on the head by the other.

For sure, there have been bumps in the road. U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson was infuriated when British Prime Minister Harold Wilson declined to help him with Vietnam in 1967; Prime Minister John Major got on President Bill Clinton’s bad side when the Conservatives in the United Kingdom campaigned for George H.W. Bush in 1992. In 2016, President Barack Obama infuriated the Brexiteers by warning voters that it would put the U.K. at the “back of the queue” for any trade deal if it left European Union. His prediction came true, at least for a while.

What Really Happened With the DDoS Attacks That Took Down X

Lily Hay Newman

The social network X suffered intermittent outages on Monday, a situation owner Elon Musk attributed to a “massive cyberattack.” Musk said in an initial X post that the attack was perpetrated by “either a large, coordinated group and/or a country.” In a post on Telegram, a pro-Palestinian group known as Dark Storm Team took credit for the attacks within a few hours. Later on Monday, though, Musk claimed in an interview on Fox Business Network that the attacks had come from Ukrainian IP addresses.

Web traffic analysis experts who tracked the incident on Monday were quick to emphasize that the type of attacks X seemed to face—distributed denial-of-service, or DDoS, attacks—are launched by a coordinated army of computers, or a “botnet,” pummeling a target with junk traffic in an attempt to overwhelm and take down its systems. Botnets are typically dispersed around the world, generating traffic with geographically diverse IP addresses, and they can include mechanisms that make it harder to determine where they are controlled from.

“It’s important to recognize that IP attribution alone is not conclusive. Attackers frequently use compromised devices, VPNs, or proxy networks to obfuscate their true origin," says Shawn Edwards, chief security officer of the network connectivity firm Zayo.

Army releases Unified Network Plan 2.0, honing in on multi-domain fighting, zero trust

Carley Welch

After months of anticipation, the Army has released the second version of its Unified Network Plan, building off of the 2021 iteration that aimed to collapse its 69 enterprise and tactical networks into a single, shared one by 2027.

The service’s updated plan, also known as AUN 2.0 and released late last week, reiterates the 1.0 version of paving the way for a unified network but creates a clearer focus on preparing the Army for multi-domain operations.

Since the first plan, AUN 2.0 says, “a confluence of emerging technologies and events has transformed the world into a multidomain, persistently contested information environment that demands a far more data-centric approach to harness the power of the Army Network to fight and win.”

It’s an approach previewed by Gen. Jeth Rey, of the Army’s G6 office, in December.

“It’s gonna enable multi-domain operations. That’s gonna be the key basis of what it’s all about. [It will also] chart this road map of where we’re going for the unified networking by 2027, but then it’s also gonna talk about the critical enablers that’s required for that multi-domain operation by Army 2030,” Rey said then at the Army’s technical exchange meeting in Savannah, Ga. (The 1.0 version had aimed for a multi-domain ready force by 2028, a timeline that has since been pushed back.)

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