15 March 2025

“Muska chaska” & F-35: Why concede the game to Trump?

Bharat Karnad

The Indian Prime Minister’s “working visit” with Donald Trump went off script in a major way now and again. As expected, Narendra Modi was publicly manhandled. In a bid to embarrass the visitor, Trump gleefully related to the media the Indian leader’s discomfitted reaction — “No, no, I don’t like that” — when told by the US President he would tariff Indian exports out of the American market if New Delhi failed to comply with his wishes, and made sure Modi would lump it. Whether he was adequately advised by S Jaishankar and his MEA on how to tackle Trump or not, the PM hoped to revive a measure of bonhomie from past years to help redirect the punitive threats. That went for a six and some!

Trump also pushed the F-35 as the priority defence item to peddle despite the lack of any serious Indian interest in it. After all, the Service’s procurement strategy was plain enough to all. Once the 36 Rafale buy went through, it was viewed as the gateway for more Rafales filling the 126 MRFA (multi role fight aircraft) requirement, making the F-35 redundant. Still many senior airmen nurse the view that 2-5 squadrons of F-35 can serve as sort of a bridging solution until the local advanced medium combat aircraft (AMCA) , which reportedly is at the “metal cutting stage”, becomes available a decade or so from now.

The Beatdown of Zelensky: Hard Lessons for Modi & India

Bharat Karnad

The merciless tag-team beatdown of the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky by the US President and Vice President, Donald Trump and JD Vance, in the White House was unprecedented in the annals of history. Such humiliation in another era would have led to war. The new German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, called it “deliberate escalation”. In the present time, when Ukraine cannot fight without American arms, and Europe while showing solidarity with Ukraine cannot do much by way of rescuing Kyiv’s armed forces from backing into a military cul de sac, it is the humiliated Zelensky who has had repeatedly to bow and scrape and say how thankful he is for all the assistance rendered his country by the US. It didn’t work.

US Arms aid was cutoff, leaving the former Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Dmytro Kuleba to wince and write (in the New York Times) that “It is now Europe’s war”. Europe cannot, of course, mobilise its defence industry overnight, but even so war against whom — Russia? Except, Trump followed up the Zelensky encounter by halting all US offensive cyber operations against Russia. If such incentives and his promise of trade and investment and possibly a place for Moscow in the European community induces Russia to detach itself from China, then a very grand strategy is indeed afoot to isolate China, one geared to minimising its influence and power in Eurasia and in the Indo-Pacific. This is all to India’s good — and this is the prospect the Indian government has been offered to get it to commit more forcefully to the Quad. In that situation, NATO serves no useful purpose.

Ship Wars: Confronting China’s Dual-Use Shipbuilding Empire

Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs

China has rapidly established itself as the world’s dominant shipbuilding power, marginalizing the United States and its allies in a strategically important industry. In addition to building massive numbers of commercial ships, many Chinese shipyards also produce warships for the country’s rapidly growing navy. As part of its “military-civil fusion” strategy, China is tapping into the dual-use resources of its commercial shipbuilding empire to support its ongoing naval modernization. Foreign companies are inadvertently helping to propel China’s naval buildup by buying Chinese-made ships and sharing dual-use technologies with Chinese shipyards.

U.S. policymakers need to act quickly in coordination with allies and partners to address the economic and national security threats posed by China’s shipbuilding industry. This report offers a detailed policy roadmap for how Washington can disrupt China’s military-civil fusion strategy, erode China’s market dominance, and increase shipbuilding capacity within the United States and key partner countries.

Was a CCP Influence Operation Behind RedNote’s US Surge?

Rohit Sharma, Nikhil Prashar, and Kashish Kunden

In January 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld U.S. legislation that would effectively ban TikTok, citing national security concerns over its Chinese ownership. This legal ruling set off a wave of uncertainty for the millions of American users who rely on the app for entertainment, connection, and even business. Immediately after President Donald Trump took office, he pushed back the total ban, instead instituting a 75-day probation period, wherein TikTok has to find a U.S.-based buyer and any violations of the terms, particularly relating to data privacy and governance, could lead to another shutdown.

But in the midst of this chaos, another app emerged: RedNote, also known as Xiaohongshu on the mainland. The Chinese platform quickly gained traction among TikTok’s displaced users. However, what appeared to be a natural shift for users was, in fact, a carefully orchestrated relocation backed by an apparent influence campaign, which raises significant concerns about digital privacy, influence, and security.

The TikTok ban was part of a broader effort by the U.S. government to protect national security. Critics argued that the app, owned by the Chinese company ByteDance, could potentially share sensitive user data with the Chinese government. Although this ban only affected the U.S., other countries had already taken similar measures, such as India, which blocked TikTok back in 2020.

Is Social Security a ‘Ponzi Scheme’? - Analysis

Julian E. Zelizer

Presidential advisor Elon Musk recently claimed on Joe Rogan’s podcast that Social Security is “the biggest Ponzi scheme of all time.” In fact, Social Security has been one of the most effective and enduring components of America’s social safety net. It has done more than almost anything else to alleviate the problem of poverty amongst the elderly. While the program has been far from perfect, Congress has continued to improve and strengthen its structure over time when reforms were warranted. The program has become a “third rail” in national politics because it is so central to the lives of families living in states both red and blue.

Until recently, President Donald Trump has known enough to stay away from this issue. He has avoided mentioning cuts to the program, most likely sensitive to the fact that doing so has very little appeal to most of the electorate, including with a lot of the voters who brought him into power.


Dealing with North Korea as It Deepens Military Cooperation with Russia

Naoko Aoki

North Korea's growing friendship with Russia could yield benefits that empower the Kim Jong-un regime to pursue its strategic objectives more aggressively. To prevent that from happening, the United States needs to signal that its commitment to contribute to South Korea's self-defense remains unchanged. The following discussion assesses the current state of military cooperation between North Korea and Russia and considers options for the United States and South Korea to counter the potential benefits of such cooperation.
The State of Military Cooperation

Pyongyang has been deepening its military cooperation with Moscow since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. This cooperation began with North Korean shipments of artillery shells to Russia later that year and expanded to include the signing of a bilateral mutual defense treaty in 2024. North Korea took yet another step to deepen the partnership in late 2024, when the country began sending troops to Russia to help fight the war in Ukraine, marking an unprecedented level of involvement by Pyongyang in an international conflict.

North Korea is likely to benefit from these developments in both tangible and intangible ways. For example, the troop deployment is giving the Korean People's Army combat experience that it has not had in decades. This is the first time since its founding that the country has sent soldiers to a foreign war on a major scale. While suffering heavy losses—the Ukrainian military believes that North Korea has lost roughly half the 11,000 troops it deployed—North Korean soldiers are reportedly motivated, disciplined, and good at using small arms. Most importantly, they are learning ways to fight in the modern battlefield, including the use of unmanned aerial vehicles.

Ukraine Supports 30-Day Cease-Fire as U.S. Says It Will Resume Military Aid

Andrew E. Kramer and Alan Rappeport

Ukraine said it would support a Trump administration proposal for a 30-day cease-fire with Russia, an announcement that followed hours of meetings on Tuesday in Saudi Arabia, where the United States agreed to immediately lift a pause on intelligence sharing with Kyiv and resume military assistance.

The talks in the coastal city of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, brought new momentum to cease-fire negotiations that had faltered after a public confrontation at the White House between the Ukrainian and U.S. presidents.

The Trump administration had suspended all military aid and intelligence sharing in the aftermath of that combative meeting in Washington.

The announcements on Tuesday, in a joint statement, came hours after Russian officials said Ukrainian drones had targeted Moscow in the largest attack of the war on the Russian capital.

In the statement, the United States and Ukraine acknowledged that the terms of any cease-fire would be subject to Russia’s approval. There was no immediate comment on the cease-fire discussion from Moscow, which had no officials at the talks.

Russia-US Negotiations Open the Next Phase Of Restructuring the World

George Friedman

From 1945 until the early 1990s, the global order was based on the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was an order filled with conflict, danger and ideological discord, as all such orders are, but there was at least a system of organization based around the two powers. After the Soviet Union fell, Russia, though intact, was in a state of disarray in no small part because it had lost the satellite states that had insulated it from its enemies in Europe – NATO and the United States. The war in Ukraine was initiated largely to reclaim these buffer states. But it was also undertaken to resurrect the Russian state and rehabilitate it as a global power.

The war has been a failure. Moscow has taken only about 20 percent of Ukrainian territory, thus failing to rebuild a decisive buffer. It has weakened the Russian economy. And it imperiled the regime by sparking unrest and coup attempts, which Moscow successfully suppressed. Russia has done what it does best: It has failed but survived. It must now devise a strategy for the future that is more than just survival.

Russia Increasing Military Buildup Ahead of Negotiations

Richard Arnold

Russia is increasing its military preparedness despite discussions in February about a possible ceasefire after more than three years since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Gazeta.ua.org, February 13). Russian society is discussing the possibility of a second wave of mobilization, even though Moscow has denied this. A member of the State Duma Defense Committee, Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev, claimed, “There are no grounds for a new wave of mobilization … It is only necessary to knock out the fascists who occupied Ukraine from the territory of our subjects” (This News!, February 3). Other indicators suggest that, if not a second wave of conscription, there are at least some new units currently being prepared for battle.

Ataman of the All-Russian Cossack Society Vitaly Kuznetsov announced the formation of the 26th Cossack volunteer battalion, underlining that there are currently 18,500 Cossacks on the line of contact, including over 250 Atamans and 9,000 from the Kuban Cossack army (VSKO.ru, February 6). Cossack units operate under the Combat Army Reserves, or BARS (ะ‘ะพะตะฒะพะน ะั€ะผะตะนัะบะธะน ะ ะตะทะตั€ะฒ ะกั‚ั€ะฐะฝั‹; Boyevoy Armeyskiy Rezerv Strany), and have been involved in some of the fiercest fighting in Moscow’s war against Ukraine (see EDM, October 10, 2023, January 16, September 30, 2024). At the same time, and in line with previously announced funding increases for the Cossacks, the funding for the Kuban Cossacks increased from 1.4 billion to 1.7 billion rubles (~$15.9 million to ~$19.4 million), expanding the potential reach of BARS as well as money devoted to cadet education and other youth outreach (see EDM, October 17, 2022, November 8, 2023, February 27, November 27, 2024; Kavkaz.realii, February 7). Further, in 2024 Cossacks were obliged to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense enlisting them in the “mobilizational reserve” with fewer constraints on being called to war (see EDM, September 16, 2024; Kavkaz.realii, February 7). These actions indirectly increase Russia’s mobilization force even if no formal mobilization is declared.

Putin’s Police State Increasingly a State Without Enough Police

Paul Goble

The Russian Federation faces an increasingly serious shortage of police despite having more police per capita than any other major country—almost twice as many per capita as the European Union and two and a half times more than the United States. More and more officers are leaving the force before retirement, and fewer men are willing to sign up (V Krizis.ru, March 5). This development is particularly worrisome to the Russian people and Russian rulers, both of whom remember how rapidly rising crime can grow into a political threat. Notably, more experts predict a new crime wave as veterans of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine return home (VKrizis.ru, March 30, 2021, March 5, 2023; see EDM, November 29, 2022, January 29, 2024, February 25; Novoye Vremya, March 6).

Russians are taking things into their own hands, arming themselves and forming various kinds of self-defense forces (see EDM April 11, 2017, November 29, 2022; Kavkazii Uzel, July 30, 2024; Window on Eurasia, November 11, 2024). Unsurprisingly, the Kremlin views these as potentially threats and in most cases has worked to repress them. In some cases, however, Russia’s rulers feel they have no choice but to cooperate with them to prevent violent crime from rising any further (Kasparov.ru, March 14, 2024). Putin is now speaking out about the dangers the shortage of police represents, but he has not taken any meaningful steps to address it as doing so would require taking resources, money, and men, away from his invasion of Ukraine (Vkrizis.ru, March 5).

What's Really Happening With Elon Musk and Those ‘Stranded’ Astronauts?

Eric Berger

Over the past month there has been something more than a minor kerfuffle in the space industry over the return of two NASA astronauts from the International Space Station.

The fate of Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams, who launched on the first crewed flight of Boeing's Starliner spacecraft on June 5, 2024, has become a political issue after President Donald Trump and SpaceX founder Elon Musk said the astronauts’ return was held up by the Biden White House.

In February, Trump and Musk appeared on FOX News. During the joint interview, the subject of Wilmore and Williams came up. They remain in space today after NASA decided it would be best they did not fly home in their malfunctioning Starliner spacecraft—but would return in a SpaceX-built Crew Dragon.

"At the president's request, or instruction, we are accelerating the return of the astronauts, which was postponed to a ridiculous degree," Musk said.

"They got left in space," Trump added.

"They were left up there for political reasons, which is not good," Musk concluded.

The Worst 7 Years in Boeing’s History—and the Man Who Won’t Stop Fighting for Answers

Lauren Smiley

On a sticky hot morning in July, Ed Pierson steps into the lobby of a hotel in Washington, DC, completely unwilling to obey the plane-crash life cycle. You’ve seen it: An awful crash dominates the news. The loss of lives is so vastly unjust. Serious investigators look into the causes and issue a report. Regulators and lawmakers hatch reforms. Passengers start to forget. Most of us get back on the plane.

Pierson—a strapping 62-year-old with a shaved head and rocket-launch levels of energy—does not accept any of it. Instead, he is executing the Ed Pierson plan. He perches on a couch in this lobby, to explain the day’s play:

Pierson will walk into a series of federal buildings without an appointment. In front of the security guards (with his wife and me alongside), he will announce that he is a Boeing whistleblower. He’ll spare the guards the very long, personal story of guilt, obsession, and sacrifice that led him here. He won’t have much time to say that, for years, he’s been talking with these agencies about Boeing’s 737 Max. But he’ll explain that the manila envelope he’s pulling from his backpack, the bag embroidered with a little football and a B for Bainbridge High School, holds internal Boeing documents that he wants to deliver right now—in person—to a top dog in the building.

Rethinking the Response to Russian Aggression: Command, Management, and Leadership

Siamak Naficy

Introduction

A persistent argument has resurfaced in Western foreign policy circles—one that suggests Russia’s pattern of aggression in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Ukraine (2022) resulted from Western weakness and appeasement. Advocates of this view assert that stronger, more immediate responses to Russia’s earlier incursions could have deterred future aggression. However, history suggests a more nuanced interpretation, one that aligns well with a framework of command, management, and leadership in addressing different types of problems. Rather than viewing Russian expansionism through a narrow lens of strength and weakness, a more adaptive approach—one informed by the realities of wicked problems—may be necessary.

The conceptual distinction between command, management, and leadership has roots in both military and business traditions. But, its conceptual separation evolved over time through various disciplines, including military strategy, organizational theory, and leadership studies. Command is the oldest of the three, originating in military history. It refers to authority to give orders and enforce obedience. Ancient military theorists like Sun Tzu (The Art of War) and Carl von Clausewitz (On War) emphasized command as the ability to make decisive orders in combat. Leadership in a military context emerged as distinct from command, as effective generals not only commanded but also inspired and led their troops (e.g., Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar). Management in the military developed later with the rise of large bureaucratic armies, particularly in the Napoleonic era and beyond, focusing on logistics, planning, and organization (e.g., Prussian military reforms under Helmuth von Moltke the Elder). The U.S. military and organizations like NATO formalized the distinction between command (authority in structured environments), management (resource allocation and planning), and leadership (inspiring and guiding people).

Interview with David Ochmanek

Octavian Manea

The most recent US national defense strategies and decades of wargames have underscored the obsolescence of the American expeditionary approach to warfare, which marked the post-Cold War era. In light of this, what are some contemporary methods for projecting power in proximity to mature Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) powers to effectively counter aggression in the absence of air, maritime, information or space superiority? This Strategy Debrief examines some of these potential new ways with David Ochmanek, a senior international and defense researcher at RAND, and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development from 2009 to 2014.

Octavian Manea: How would you define the legacy approach to warfare practiced by US in the post-Cold War era?

David Ochmanek: If we think back to Desert Storm and all the interventions we have had since then – against Iraq, Serbia, Afghanistan, Libya – there are parallels across those. What I call the legacy American approach to war, which carried us through the post-Cold War era, was characterised first by its expeditionary approach. The bulk of the force that was required to achieve our objectives had to be deployed to the theatre from elsewhere after the decision to intervene. The second feature of it is that it was sequential. What did we do for the first four days of Desert Storm? It was devoted to gaining dominance over the battle space. We attacked air defenses and military Command and Control (C2) so that we could create an environment where the rest of the joint and combined force could operate – if not with impunity – at least with freedom of action.

How S Korea would respond to Taiwan hostilities

Ju Hyung Kim

Despite being a key US regional ally, questions are rising about whether South Korea would take proactive measures if China were to initiate hostile actions against Taiwan?

Given its deep economic interdependence with China, South Korea finds itself strategically caught between Washington and Beijing.

To examine this issue, this writer conducted interviews last year with South Korean military officials in which I classified China’s potential hostile actions against Taiwan into three scenarios:

(1) gray zone operations, which include actions such as deploying China’s maritime militia and coast guard vessels to harass Taiwanese ships, thereby exerting pressure on Taiwan without directly provoking open conflict; (2) a naval blockade; and (3) a full-scale military invasion.

There was a strong consensus among the officials on how South Korea should respond if China were to initiate (1) gray zone operations, (2) a naval blockade, or (3) a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.

In all three scenarios, they agreed that South Korea should increase its alert level within the US-ROK Combined Forces and reinforce deterrence against potential North Korean provocations.

North Korean Deployment in Kursk: A Window into the DPRK Military

Lorenzo Fedrigo

A deepening North Korea-Russia bilateral relationship

The Kim Jong-un regime, Moscow’s historical ally, has constantly demonstrated its support for Russian expansionism in Ukraine. In 2017, the DPRK recognized Crimea as part and parcel of the Russian Federation, and then endorsed the invasion of February 2022. A few months later, the North Korean regime recognized the sovereignty of self-proclaimed independent republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. The latest significant diplomatic action between the two countries dates back to November 2024, with the ratification of an important military cooperation agreement which includes a mutual protection clause, sealing the strategic agreement we now see in action.

In addition to political support, Pyongyang has provided an ever growing and more relevant military contribution. The first military supplies date from the end of 2022, when it appeared clear to Moscow that the conflict would last beyond its initial forecast, requiring external support in order to compensate for the military production shortfalls of Russia’s defense industry. The first North Korean aid included large deliveries of artillery munitions, but, according to data out of Ukraine, about half of the rounds fired were defective. Pyongyang continues to provide a great amount of its own ammunition production to its Russian ally.

Stimulating Clean Hydrogen Demand: The current Landscape

Rachel Mural, Matt Floyd, Sebastian Berns & Ai Takahashi

Introduction

Hydrogen is expected to play an important role in the global energy transition as a chemical feedstock and fuel; when produced with renewable energy, hydrogen offers a means of decarbonizing hard-to-abate industrial processes and the heavy transportation sector.1 To support market growth, current hydrogen programs aim to expand clean2 (also called “green”) hydrogen production by providing substantial subsidies in the form of supply-side funding and tax incentives. In 2023, global public investments in clean hydrogen reached $308 billion, with the vast bulk of funding allocated to production-side support.3

While worldwide clean hydrogen production targets4 reached 27-35 megatons (Mt) in 2023, demand targets have stalled at just 14 Mt.5 This trend reflects regional asymmetries in production and demand uptake. Under current projections, demand for renewable hydrogen in Europe is expected to hit 8.5 Mt by 2030, far behind the region’s planned 20 Mt of supply.6 Similarly, although the passage of the United States’ (U.S.) Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in 2022 spurred an explosion of announced clean hydrogen projects, project offtake has lagged behind policy ambition. Supply-side incentives alone are insufficient to build robust markets for clean hydrogen; therefore, stakeholders must investigate additional demand-side innovation policies to facilitate market growth and development.

Will the United Nations Survive Trump 2.0?

JAYATI GHOSH

Of all the geopolitical stunts Donald Trump has pulled since returning to the White House, the United States’ votes at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on March 4 stand out as some of the most revealing.

Winning the 5G Race While Building the United States’ Golden Dome

Matt Pearl and Clete Johnson

Since its deployment in 2011, Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system has repeatedly captured the world’s attention for its ability to intercept rockets—over 5,000 and counting—and its impressive success rate—over 90 percent. In recent months, President Trump has made it clear that he is among the many who are impressed by this system, which relies on investments and ingenuity from both the United States and Israel.

On the campaign trail, Trump has cited the Iron Dome, declaring that if elected, the United States would “build . . . a state-of-the-art missile defense shield.” Within weeks of entering office, Trump issued an executive order to accelerate efforts to develop a next-generation missile defense shield against “ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, and other advanced aerial attacks.” President Trump’s goal for an Iron Dome–like missile defense system for the United States has become known as the “Golden Dome.”

Past efforts to build new military technologies launched from innovative, outside-of-the-box thinking. When the first stealth aircraft were developed, for instance, military contractors began by thinking in completely new ways about the design, material, and shape of aircraft. Unfortunately, in Washington’s discussions over how to optimize radio spectrum to guarantee both the military and economic aspects of U.S. national security, some in the defense community are using the bold aspirations of a Golden Dome to short-circuit necessary conversations about mutually beneficial military and commercial technology innovation. Instead, these discussions should focus affirmatively on finding groundbreaking ways to satisfy both of those critical national security goals.

It’s Rescission Time – OpEd

David Stockman

The politicians who run the GOP on Capitol Hill are about ready to rug-pull Elon Musk and his patron in the Oval Office big time. That is, the so-called “clean CR [continuing resolution]” that Speaker Johnson is apparently cooking up will ratify the entirety of the runaway spending in the last Biden budget, thereby cancelling virtually every single dime that the DOGE operation has purportedly saved.

This awful outlook, of course, is a consequence of the stacked institutional mechanics that Elon Musk is just beginning to grasp.

For example, the appropriations authority for every one of the hundreds, if not thousands, of idiotic foreign aid contracts that DOGE has exposed and cancelled must by law be recycled and respent on another contract. And therefore spent on projects perhaps only slightly less stupid but in any case no less unaffordable.

We are referring to the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and the passel of UniParty-appointed Federal district judges waiting to pounce in favor of lawsuits claiming funds are being illegally withheld by the executive.

Trump’s Economic Outlook: Policy Shifts And Early Impact – OpEd

Allen Gindler

After a little more than a month back in the White House in 2025, Donald Trump’s presidency has already left a profound mark on the U.S. economy, reigniting debates over tariffs, inflation, unemployment, and the broader economic trajectory. His return was heralded by promises of revitalizing American industry, curbing inflation, and restoring economic dominance. However, the reality of his first 40 days paints a more complex picture, shaped by inherited challenges, aggressive policy shifts, and a global economy less forgiving than in his previous term.

Trump’s economic agenda kicked off with a swift reimposition of tariffs, particularly targeting neighboring countries and China, in a bid to shrink the trade deficit and protect American jobs. This move echoed his 2018-2019 trade war, which saw the U.S. goods trade deficit with China decrease. However, the overall trade deficit grew as imports shifted to countries like Mexico, Europe, and Taiwan, according to U.S. Census Bureau trade data. In 2025, the stakes are higher, with the U.S. economy already balancing growth and inflation delicately. Early data suggests that while some sectors, such as steel, may benefit from reduced foreign competition, others—like tech and automotive industries reliant on global supply chains—are facing higher input costs. The trade deficit with China might shrink again, but historical patterns indicate this could be offset by increased imports from elsewhere, leaving the broader deficit unchanged or even worse. These tariffs, acting as taxes on imported goods, are rippling through the economy, setting the stage for broader impacts on prices and growth.

Fear and Loathing in the Oval Office

NINA L. KHRUSHCHEVA

US President Donald Trump has swiped another page from the authoritarian playbook. His verbal assault on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky before camera-wielding media in the Oval Office amounted to precisely the kind of ritual humiliation autocrats have long used to elevate and amuse themselves – and intimidate everyone else.

One of history’s most notorious dictators, Joseph Stalin, regularly demeaned my great-grandfather, Nikita Khrushchev, and his politburo colleagues. As Khrushchev recounted much later, Stalin once made him dance the gopak, a Ukrainian folk dance, before some top party officials. “I had to squat down on my haunches and kick out my heels, which frankly wasn’t very easy for me,” he recalled. “But when Stalin says dance, a wise man dances.”

In orchestrating such spectacles, Stalin was surely motivated by the desire to keep his subordinates subordinated. But it was not all politically motivated: as Khrushchev noted, Stalin found others’ humiliation “amusing.” How could a megalomaniacal dictator not relish the sight of his empire’s most powerful men voluntarily debasing themselves to please him – the one figure who towered above them all?

Elon Musk claims ‘massive cyber-attack’ caused X outages

Nick Robins-Early

Elon Musk claimed on Monday afternoon that X was targeted in a “massive cyber-attack” that resulted in the intermittent service outages that had brought down his social network throughout the day. The platform, formerly known as Twitter, had been unresponsive for many users as posts failed to load.

“We get attacked every day, but this was done with a lot of resources,” the platform’s CEO posted. “Either a large, coordinated group and/or a country is involved.”

Downdetector, a website that monitors outages on various sites and platforms, showed thousands of reports of outages that initially spiked at about 5.45am before returning to normal for a few hours. A second surge in reported outages carried on throughout midday, with the majority of them occurring on the company’s mobile app.

Tweets that failed to appear displayed a message that “something went wrong” and told users to try reloading.

The richest man in the world did not provide any evidence for his claims. His post came in response to a cryptocurrency influencer who suggested the outage followed other opposition to Musk’s enterprises. Protests against the so-called “department of government efficiency” initiative Musk leads and vandalism against Tesla dealerships had taken place throughout the previous week.

AI in the Office

AZEEM AZHAR and CHANTAL SMITH

Recent advances in generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) are rapidly reshaping knowledge-based work. Many organizations already use AI to eke out marginal gains in marginal parts of the business (such as customer service). But the leading firms are applying AI in high-value, strategic areas that sit at the core of their business.

Are We Responsible for Our Choices?

PETER SINGER

Since ancient times, thinkers have asked whether we freely choose what we do or if our actions are determined by forces beyond our control. That debate has been given new impetus by scientific discoveries that have advanced our understanding of the causes of our behavior. Robert Sapolsky, a Stanford University neuroscientist and recent guest on the podcast “Lives Well Lived,” which I co-host with the Polish philosopher Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek, is one of these science-based determinists.