11 March 2025

A Controversial Infrastructure for The Asia-Pacific


Executive Summary

In 2013, Beijing launched the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) project, identifying Thailand as a crucial partner for advancing Chinese interests in the Southeast Asia region. This partnership includes the proposed construction of the Kra Canal, a significant maritime infrastructure initiative designed to connect the Gulf of Thailand to the Andaman Sea.

This project aims to ease the so-called “Malacca Dilemma,” which refers to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) excessive dependence on the Straits of Malacca and the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). Considering Malacca Strait’s strategic importance, Beijing has sought to enhance its dialogue with Bangkok, which has been a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) since 1967.

In this geopolitical context, this report aims to investigate the historical evolution of the Kra Canal, its impact on the economies of South East Asian countries and then identify the geopolitical risks associated with this infrastructure project.

China has a message for Trump: the US won’t stop its rise

Simone McCarthy

Chinese leader Xi Jinping arrives at a plenary session of the National People's Congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 8. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images
Beijing, ChinaCNN —

As US President Donald Trump ratcheted up economic pressure on China over the past week, Beijing sent back its own message: Its rise won’t be interrupted.

A major political meeting taking place in the capital was the ideal backdrop for Beijing to respond. The “two sessions” gathering of China’s rubber-stamp legislature and its top political advisory body is where the government reveals its plans and sets the tone for the year ahead.

The top item on its priority list? Boosting consumer demand to ensure China doesn’t need to rely on exports to power its vast but slowing economy. And the next: driving forward leader Xi Jinping’s bid to transform the country into a technological superpower, by ramping up investment and enlisting the private sector.

Beijing is making these moves as it prepares for what could be a protracted economic showdown with the United States. Trump doubled additional tariffs on all Chinese imports to 20% on Tuesday and has threatened more to come – as well as tighter controls on American investment in China.

“We can prevail over any difficulty in pursuing development,” China’s No. 2 official Li Qiang told thousands of delegates seated in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People at the opening meeting of the National People’s Congress Wednesday. The “giant ship of China’s economy” will “sail steadily toward the future,” he said.

A foreign ministry spokesperson was more direct when asked about trade frictions on Tuesday: “If the US insists on waging a tariff war, trade war, or any other kind of war, China will fight till the end,” he told reporters.

China military vows to tighten 'noose' around Taiwan if separatism escalate


BEIJING: China's military said Sunday (Mar 9) it would tighten its "noose" around Taiwan if separatism over the island escalated, warning proponents to step back from the "edge of the cliff" or face a "dead end", state media reported.

Beijing considers the democratically ruled island of Taiwan to be part of its territory and has not ruled out using military force to claim it.

China has increased pressure on Taiwan's authorities in recent years with military drills and frequent dispatches of fighter jets and naval vessels around the island.

"The more rampant 'Taiwan independence' separatists become, the tighter the noose around their necks and the sharper the sword hanging over their heads will be," military spokesman Wu Qian said, Xinhua news agency reported.

"The PLA (People's Liberation Army) is a force of action in countering separatism and promoting reunification," said Wu.

"You've ridden your steed to the edge of the cliff. If you persist in taking the wrong course, you will meet a dead end," he warned.

The comments, made during China's "Two Sessions" annual political gathering, come days after Beijing announced a 7.2 percent increase to its defence budget in 2025.

It is above the government's annual GDP growth target of around five percent.

Calling the increase "limited... reasonable and stable", Wu said the extra cash would be used to develop "combat forces in new fields and with new qualities", and to enhance reconnaissance, joint strike and battlefield support capabilities.

The Cartel Nexus: Mexico’s Drug Cartels, China’s Involvement, and the U.S. Response

Monte Erfourth 

The intersection of Mexican drug cartels, Chinese criminal networks, and the U.S. response to the ongoing drug crisis is one of the most pressing national security threats facing North America today. The illicit drug trade—especially involving fentanyl—has devastated communities across the United States, claiming tens of thousands of lives annually. While Mexico’s cartels continue to exert dominance over the drug trade, China’s role in supplying precursor chemicals and laundering cartel money has exacerbated the crisis. As Washington grapples with solutions, a mix of diplomatic, financial, and potential military strategies has emerged in an attempt to stem the tide of corruption, drug trafficking, and money laundering.

The Mexican Cartels: A Persistent Threat

Mexico’s drug cartels are no longer just criminal organizations; they are sophisticated transnational criminal enterprises wielding immense power and influence. The Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) are the two dominant players responsible for vast networks of drug production, distribution, and financial operations.

These cartels have moved beyond traditional cocaine and heroin trafficking. Today, synthetic drugs—mainly fentanyl—are the backbone of their operations. Fentanyl is highly potent and cheaper to produce than heroin, making it the preferred narcotic of choice for traffickers. The cartels acquire fentanyl precursors primarily from China, manufacture the synthetic opioid in Mexico, and smuggle it into the U.S.

The scale of cartel operations is staggering. In 2022, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reported that the cartels were making an estimated $13 billion annually, up from $500 million in 2018. Beyond drug trafficking, cartels have diversified into human smuggling, weapons trafficking, and even controlling entire swathes of Mexican territory through paramilitary-style forces.


China wants to change the world with disruptive technologies. But what are they?

Victoria Bela

China’s advancements in disruptive technologies are rapidly blurring the lines between science fiction and reality, from humanoid robots and a computer in the brain to encryption-shattering quantum computers and hypersonic aircraft.

Disruptive technology – or innovations that significantly alter established industries and markets – has become a key focus for Beijing as it pushes for dominance in emerging markets ahead of Western powers like the United States.

At the start of last year, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the strengthening of “original and disruptive” scientific and technological innovation and accelerating efforts to achieve sci-tech self-reliance.

The world watched China make major strides in such innovation last year, some of which was outlined last week in the National Development and Reform Commission’s (NDRC) report on economic and social development presented during the annual “the two sessions”.

‘Two sessions’ 2025: key takeaways from Chinese premier’s work report to top legislature

The report released on Wednesday highlighted China’s continued rise in scientific and technological innovation, including in artificial intelligence and 5G technology.
The NDRC also presented its draft plan for national economic and social development for 2025, which indicated that innovation was still a key focus for Beijing, including cultivating “future industries” such as quantum technology and future energy sources.

The report acknowledged the “once-in-a-century changes” unfolding across the world, stating that an increasingly complex external environment could influence scientific innovation.

Here, the Post looks at major disruptive technology innovations in China, and how they could shape the tech race and change the world.

China learned from Trump’s first trade war and changed its tactics when tariffs came again

DIDI TANG

WASHINGTON (AP) — The leaders of both Canada and Mexico got on the phone with President Donald Trump this past week to seek solutions after he slapped tariffs on their countries, but China’s president appears unlikely to make a similar call soon.

Beijing, which unlike America’s close partners and neighbors has been locked in a trade and tech war with the U.S. for years, is taking a different approach to Trump in his second term, making it clear that any negotiations should be conducted on equal footing.

China’s leaders say they are open to talks, but they also made preparations for the higher U.S. tariffs, which have risen 20% since Trump took office seven weeks ago. Intent on not being caught off guard as they were during Trump’s first term, the Chinese were ready with retaliatory measures — imposing their own taxes this past week on key U.S. farm imports and more.

“As Washington escalates the tariff, Beijing doesn’t see other options but to retaliate,” said Sun Yun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center, a Washington-based think tank. “It doesn’t mean Beijing doesn’t want to negotiate, but it cannot be seen as begging for talks or mercy.”

Xi Seeks to Woo Foreign and Domestic Business

Willy Wo-Lap Lam

Xi Jinping giving a speech at the forum for private enterprises in February. (Source: Xinhua)

President Xi Jinping unveiled the “2025 Action Plan to Stabilize Foreign Investment” and met with leading entrepreneurs for the first time in seven years, in an effort to reinvigorate the private sector and court foreign investment.

The plan seeks foreign investment in sectors Beijing sees as strategic, such as biotechnology, telecommunications, education, and healthcare.

Xi’s photo opportunity with industry leaders seems intended to show that the country’s industrial policies are bearing fruit for favored firms who, while nominally private, have deep ties to the party-state.

The leadership of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has taken advantage of U.S. President Donald Trump’s relatively measured approach to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime by announcing moves to resuscitate pro-market policies. Trump has raised the possibility of a spring tรชte-ร -tรชte with his counterpart, CCP General Secretary and commander-in-chief Xi Jinping. Washington also is yet to object to the PRC playing some role in ongoing Ukraine peace talks and to boost its influence in the European Union in general (Reuters, February 20; Associated Press, February 25). Additionally, the new President has slapped only a 10 percent tariff on PRC imports—lower than the 25 percent imposed on goods from Canada and Mexico and well below the “60 percent or higher” omnibus rate for PRC exports to the United States that Trump had threatened while running for office (The White House, February 1; CNN, February 4, 2024; USA Customs Clearance, February 10).

In case we forgot, Typhoon attacks remind us of China’s cyber capability—and intent

James Corera and Elizabeth Buchanan

US President Donald Trump described the launch of Chinese artificial intelligence chatbot, DeepSeek, as a wake-up call for the US tech industry. The Australian government moved quickly to ban DeepSeek from government devices.

This came just weeks after the Biden administration stunningly admitted on its way out of office that Chinese Communist Party hackers were targeting not just political and military systems but also civilian networks such as water and health. The hackers could shut down US ports, power grids and other critical infrastructure.

These incidents remind us that China has the intent, and increasingly the capability, to seriously challenge US and Western technology advantage. Australia will be an obvious target if regional tensions continue to rise. It must be well-prepared.

As ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker highlights, China’s advances in critical technologies have been foreseeable for some time. US and Western confidence is manifesting as complacency.

DeepSeek has emerged as a cheap, open-source AI rival to the seemingly indomitable US models. It could enable Chinese technology to become enmeshed in global systems, perhaps even in critical infrastructure.

Alex Wang on why China can’t be allowed to dominate AI-based warfare


IN THE FAST-CHANGING landscape of warfare, the first nation to fully incorporate artificial intelligence (AI) into military decision-making will shape the history of the 21st century. Humanity is entering a new era of “agentic warfare”, in which we will see some of the world’s strongest armies beaten by rivals that are better at harnessing AI agents—autonomous intelligent systems that can perform a multitude of tasks.

Orenburg and Iran’s Economic Partnership


Executive Summary

The report analyses recent economic and diplomatic activities involving the Orenburg Region of Russia and Iran, focusing on the deepening ties and joint cooperation opportunities. On February 21st-24th, 2025, a delegation representing Russia’s Oregon region, headed by Vice-Governor Ignat Petukhov, took part in the international EURASIA EXPO-2025 exhibition in Tehran.

Orenburg, strategically positioned on the Silk Road, has become a key partner for Tehran, especially after the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the presidents of Russia and Iran in January 2025. The region is leveraging its economic strengths, particularly in agriculture, energy, and industry.

Discussions were taking place with investors regarding the possibility of opening several enterprises in the Orenburg region for processing agricultural products and developing the fuel and energy sector. Additionally, he mentioned efforts to increase the export of products from Orenburg enterprises.

Trump updates: US president says Russia’s Putin wants Ukraine war ‘settled’

Ali Harb

Thank you for joining Al Jazeera for coverage of day 47 of President Donald Trump’s second term.

For more information about Trump’s threats to sanction Russia, check out our coverage here. You can also learn about the president’s negotiations with Iran with this article.

And to explore Trump’s tariffs against the US’s neighbours Mexico and Canada, get the latest here.

We hope to see you again soon.

From left, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, crypto tsar David Sachs and adviser Bo Hines applaud Trump on March 7 [Pool via AP Photo]

United States President Donald Trump has warned Russia on social media that it could face “large scale” sanctions and tariffs for its attacks on Ukraine.

But in an in-person appearance, Trump struck a more conciliatory tone, framing Russia’s overnight aerial attacks on Ukraine’s power and energy infrastructure as normal: “Anybody in that position would be doing that right now.”

Critics have blamed the US’s decision to stop sharing intelligence with Ukraine for limiting its ability to shield against the attack, which wounded at least 10 people.

The US has also “temporarily suspended” Ukraine’s ability to use government-purchased commercial satellite imagery, further weakening its defences.

Trump, meanwhile, accused Ukraine of being “more difficult” to work with than Russia, which initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The Republican leader hosted a cryptocurrency summit at the White House, touting his policy of industry deregulation.

Douglas Murray: How MAGA Lost Its Way on Ukraine

Douglas Murray

How can the right be so wrong? Or at least portions of the right—especially the American right—when it comes to Ukraine? To begin to grapple with this, you have to go way, way back to Donald Trump’s first term in office.

In that time, Ukraine came to the public’s consciousness just twice. The first occasion was when Trump and other Republicans began to make hay over the business dealings of Hunter Biden. Since 2014 the then vice president’s son had been sitting on the board of Ukrainian energy company Burisma. He was earning around $1 million annually to advise a company in a sector about which he had zero expertise. Why might a foreign company want the son of the vice president on their board? Obviously—as all the investigations have shown since—so that the Biden name could bring contracts, grants, and other support to Burisma.

The only other time Ukraine came to the attention of the American right was in 2019, when President Trump had a phone call with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky. Trump’s political opponents claimed that he had used the call to tell Zelensky that American aid to the country could be contingent on Ukraine helping to expose the Biden family’s financial dealings. Trump was impeached over the call but acquitted by the Senate. But these two events started to embed the idea on the right that Ukraine was simply a corrupt country, which had enriched and cooperated with its own political opponents.

With Drones and North Korean Troops, Russia Pushes Back Ukraine’s Offensive

Marc Santora

Russian and North Korean forces have made significant battlefield advances in recent days in the Kursk region of Russia, threatening Ukraine’s supply lines and its hold on a patch of land it hopes to use as a bargaining chip in future negotiations, according to Ukrainian soldiers, Russian military bloggers and military analysts.

Working together, a new influx of North Korean soldiers and well-trained Russian drone units, advancing under the cover of ferocious artillery fire and aerial bombardment, have been able to overwhelm important Ukrainian positions, Ukrainian soldiers said.

“It’s true; we can’t stop them,” said Oleksii, the commander of a Ukrainian communications unit fighting in the area, when reached by phone. “They just sweep us away, advancing in groups of 50 North Koreans while we have only six men on our positions.”

“Decisions are being made here, but I don’t know how effective they will be,” he said.

If Ukrainian forces were cut off or forced to retreat, it would be a significant setback for Kyiv. Not only was the incursion into Kursk a signature operation that boosted morale and embarrassed President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, but holding territory in Russia gave Ukraine a potential bargaining chip in any peace negotiations. Pulling out could weaken its bargaining position at a moment when President Trump is trying to force through settlement talks.

The US’ ‘transactional hegemony'

Huynh Tam Sang

US President Donald Trump’s comeback to the White House in January has ushered in an overly grandiose global vision: He is aiming to construct a new world order centered on his preferred “America First” credo, which places US interests at the forefront of all foreign policy musings.

However, far from having its groundwork based on moral considerations, Trump’s vision has always been anchored in his transactional approach, and those demands have since become more unsettling and malevolent. Trump is pushing his agenda forward by using an amalgam of vindictive rhetoric, tariff-laden measures and political coercion.

The world is now approaching an era of unprecedented uncertainty, marked by the rise of Washington as a “transactional hegemon.” The US’ post-World War II era of maintaining a US-led system of security alliances, and acting as a global guardian of free trade and stability against authoritarian tyranny is on the verge of collapse.

In many respects, the superpower is no longer dedicated to using its power leverage to uphold liberal principles, shoring up the liberal international order and providing international public goods willingly. Rather, the Trump-led US is capitalizing on its outsized economic and military capabilities to acquire trade and investment benefits, and expand US territories overseas.

Nor would Washington be willing to cover the expense of security insurance to longtime allies and partners at no cost. To get the US provision of security and good graces, and mitigate Trump’s flurry of trade measures, countries are anticipated to meet his demands, such as increasing their defense spending, meeting tariff criteria and making “payments,” one of the initial options considered by the Trump administration.


Military power alone is not enough — international aid is vital to US securityby

Anthony Zinni and Laura Richardson

Before he served as President Trump’s first secretary of defense, Gen. James Mattis, as head of U.S. Central Command, testified before Congress in 2013 that “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.”

He was right then, and he is right now.

Mattis recognized that a “peace through strength” foreign policy centered on deterrence demands the most lethal and formidable military in the world. He, like so many of our military leaders, also understands that this strength must go hand-in-glove with the critical tools of international assistance and diplomacy, which help prevent conflict and insecurity from escalating to costly wars that can require American troops.

Trump inherited a complex diplomatic battlefield, with an axis of rivals and competitors — China, Russia, Iran and North Korea — working to undermine U.S. influence, security and economic interests around the world.

It’s no secret that the Chinese Communist Party is on the march, looking to replace America as the preeminent economic driver of the international order. In fact, Beijing has been ramping up its Belt and Road Initiative by 525 percent over the past decade and a half, a long-range strategy focused on influencing countries through non-military development, humanitarian support, financing and political influence. From exploiting critical minerals in Africa and South America to cultivating relationships in southeast Asia, the race is on for partnerships and export markets that will define this century.

From Paris With Love: Extending France's Nuclear Umbrella Over Europe

Fabian Hoffmann

The withdrawal of the United States from European defense has major implications for nuclear deterrence on the continent.

The United States possesses the largest, most diverse, and most capable nuclear arsenal among NATO’s nuclear powers. Since the early Cold War, it has used this arsenal to extend nuclear deterrence over Europe and protect non-nuclear NATO states.

Without the United States, this extended deterrence arrangement ceases to exist in its current form. President Emmanuel Macron has offered to fill that gap by extending France’s nuclear umbrella over European states. In this post, I examine how well France and its nuclear forces can assume this role and the credibility challenges they face.

How the United States has projected extended deterrence

To understand if France can replace the United State’s nuclear umbrella, it is important to understand what the United States was able to offer its European allies in terms of its extended nuclear deterrence “product”.


Creating and Mirroring Monsters: Trump’s America and Europe’s Role in It

Haakon A. Ikonomou

As US Vice President J.D. Vance’s recent speech at the Munich Security Conference made clear, Europe seems to be the new “monster” of the US Presidency – how did this come about? Sometimes it is helpful to engage in a bit of speculative analysis to grasp vast geopolitical changes of baffling complexity, to understand the phenomena in a new way. So, allow me to take you on an alternative journey of what is happening with the United States’ relations to its geopolitical allies and competitors. It is a story of monster creation and monster mirroring, but most importantly how the relationship between the two processes impacts the current US administration.

Creating Monsters

Teratogenesis (the term is borrowed from the medical world, but its Greek components simply means “monster” and “creation/formation of something”) we could imagine as the process through which a state, a group of states, or a complex of polities create a foreign monster “out there”, which it is necessary to mobilise against and fight. It is the discursive construction of a monstrous other – a projection not necessarily strategized into being, but which brings together an image which is rooted both in material interests and historically saturated tropes. It is the combination, that makes it effective.

US Foreign Policy at a Crossroads: Trump’s ‘Donroe’ Doctrine

Bruno S. Sergi and Mona Pearl

U.S. foreign policy is at a crossroads as the world grapples with President Donald Trump’s “Donroe Doctrine” – a reinterpretation of President James Monroe’s 1823 Monroe Doctrine. This twist in U.S. foreign policy has significant implications for international relations, such as handling the Ukrainian crisis at the White House, which led to the support of the UK. The Trumpian version of this concept, which heralds the onset of the “American golden age” and prioritizes domestic interests over multilateral commitments, is poised to redefine how the U.S. interacts with its neighbors and beyond. Could this new doctrine merely reflect an era of heightened tensions, or is it a transformative moment for American diplomacy? The potential for reshaping international relations is a compelling aspect of Trump’s foreign policy.

Trump’s foreign policy demonstrates his assertive approach to international trade relations with his tariff policies, his stark criticism of NATO and global alliances, as evidenced by his stance on the RussiaUkraine war, and his forceful stance toward China. He has consistently criticized international organizations, arguing that they undermine U.S. sovereignty and economic competitiveness. For instance, Trump has criticized NATO for bearing a disproportionate financial burden in defending Europe and has suggested withdrawing US support from NATO if allies fail to meet financial commitments. This policy has raised concerns among European leaders regarding the reliability of the U.S. as a security partner. Analysts argue that such policies could weaken NATO’s deterrence capabilities, though Trump insists they would make the alliance more equitable.

Europe needs both sword and shield to deter Russia

Charlie Edwards

In the coming weeks and months, Russia is likely to intensify its hybrid warfare to sow discord in European capitals and populations via cyberspace, including through digital vandalism, sabotage and influence operations. The situation is increasingly uncertain, not least due to news that the United States Cyber Command has paused offensive cyber operations against Russia. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s orders may have been part of a wider negotiation package to draw Russian President Vladimir Putin into talks on the future of Ukraine. However, the reality is that a halt in cyber operations risks emboldening Russian cyber actors who over the past year have expanded their targeting to include aviation, education, government, law enforcement and military organisations.

In a recent assessment, the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service suggested that ‘Russia may continue its sabotage campaign’ in 2025 in an effort ‘to undermine support for Ukraine’ and that ‘acts of arson, vandalism and destruction may recur across the continent.’ Likewise, in its Military Intelligence Review 2025, the Finnish Defence Forces stated that ‘Russia will likely increase the use of all hybrid methods as it seeks to cause disunity within NATO and the European Union. These methods include cyber and information influencing … [and] effects on energy infrastructure.’ The Danish Defence Intelligence Service also raised the likelihood in January 2025 of the Kremlin authorising a destructive cyber attack.

The trajectory of the Russia–Ukraine war and pressure by Washington have directed Europe’s focus chiefly on increasing defence spending for cutting-edge capabilities and rebuilding stockpiles, munitions and enablers. However, these assessments and recent Russian actions in the digital sphere indicate that Europe’s deterrence will require both sword and shield to avoid disaster.

‘We Are Exhausted, and It’s Still Q1’: Wall Street Is Losing Patience With Trump

Philip Elliott

It’s been a week of searing reversals coming out of the White House, making it difficult to take anything it says at face value. The most conspicuous example of this was the nebulous state of President Donald Trump's tariffs with Canada and Mexico, which seesawed over a matter of days from being unequivocally on, to mostly off, and then maybe, sort of, on again. Amid all that, the President boasted of Elon Musk's free hand to fire thousands of government workers in a speech to Congress that was rife with obfuscations and fabrications. Two days later, after a hastily called Cabinet meeting, Trump announced some new restraints on his fellow billionaire.

But even in a truly head-spinning week in this new era in Washington, one Trump remark stands out in how utterly unbelievable it was. “I’m not even looking at the market,” the President said Thursday in a fib that left even his defenders with little response.

One top aide in Republican Leadership perhaps summed up all of D.C.’s reaction best when he messaged me back on an encrypted app with an eye-roll emoji. A second Republican who worked in Trump’s first administration suggested we had perhaps fallen into a parallel universe: “We are on Earth 10,000.”

This is, after all, a President who spent most of his first term using Wall Street as a proxy for not only the economy’s health, but his overall success as the nation’s leader. “That big Stock Market increase must be credited to me,” Trump insisted in what was then called a tweet in 2019. “If Hillary won - a Big Crash!”

The state we are in – British Army decline

Philip Heath

General Sanders was evidently as blunt as he felt he could be in his valedictory communication when standing down as Chief of the General Staff (CGS). From day 1 of his appointment he was publicly candid about the size of the Army, which did not sit well with the Secretary of State for Defence; it is well known that even exceptional politicians find it difficult to cope with inconvenient truths. Nevertheless, Wallace was considered one of our better politicians. I still wonder why the shining star that was Wallace faded so quickly. I do hope there is not an unedifying explanation.

Sanders’ assessment of British Army decline was as explicit as he dared to be but full of implicit warnings that will be lost on most people. He was absolutely right to make the case to re-arm as fast as we can (a huge challenge given our sclerotic acquisition processes). What was left largely unsaid is the inability of the Army to prepare, deploy and sustain itself in the field.

During the Cold War, when we used to spend around 6% of GDP on Defence, the Army had four deployable Divisions, that exercised as a Corps within NATO. In the same era, ‘Stables’ parades were a feature of unit life whereby vehicles were taken out of their garages and cleaned, repaired and maintained. Detachment, vehicle or Crew Commanders and their associated personnel became very knowledgeable about the state of their vehicles; knew their strengths, weaknesses and idiosyncrasies. Understandably, a bond was formed with the vehicle platform that was to bear these personnel into and/or in battle. Being so in touch with key equipment heightened the chance of success in combat; the like of which has been torpedoed by something called Whole Fleet Management (WFM), arguably one of the most destructive policies ever implemented.

Cutting the Line: Imposed Cost and Measured Effects In Strategic Competition and Deterrence

Maurice "Duc" Duclos

Introduction

Today's great power dynamics resist simple categorization. While U.S. joint doctrine describes a Competition Continuum from cooperation through competition to conflict, the reality is more complex, with relationships existing simultaneously at different points along this spectrum depending on the domain and context. For instance, the United States and China maintain economic cooperation in certain sectors while engaging in intense rivalry over territorial claims in the South China Sea. They may compete for influence in Southeast Asian nations while approaching rivalry in cyber operations. Similarly, U.S.-Russia relations show this multi-layered complexity, with limited cooperation in space operations coexisting alongside sharp rivalry over Ukraine.

This multi-domain nature of modern interstate relations creates unique challenges for measuring success. Different domains require different metrics and approaches—what constitutes success in economic competition may differ substantially from measures of effectiveness in influence operations or cyber rivalry. Therefore, the principle of cost imposition must be understood and applied within specific contextual and domain frameworks.

As Thomas Schelling observed in Arms and Influence, military power's greatest utility often lies not in destruction but in its ability to alter adversaries' strategic calculations. This principle takes on heightened importance in an era when relationships span the spectrum from cooperation to rivalry across multiple domains.


Why Intelligence Agencies Think They Can Finally Build a Common Picture for Warfighters

Shaun Waterman

The defense intelligence community has tried three times in the past decade to build a “common intelligence picture”—a single data stream providing the information that combatant commanders, combined forces air component commanders (CFACCs), and their subordinates need to make decisions about the battlefield.

The first two attempts failed. But Greg Ryckman, deputy director for global integration for the Defense Intelligence Agency, said March 4 at the AFA Warfare Symposium that things are different today: Technology had improved, cultural barriers had eroded to an extent, and there is a new sense of urgency.

“We can’t afford not to do this, right?” Ryckman said, a nod to the looming 2027 deadline that China has set for being ready to invade Taiwan.

CIP vs. COP

A common intelligence picture, or CIP, is not the same as a common operating picture (COP), explained retired Air Force Col. Frederick “Trey” Coleman III, the former commander of the 505th Command and Control Wing.

“The CIP is fusing intelligence sources,” telling the commander everything that’s known about a particular enemy unit, he told Air & Space Forces Magazine on the sidelines of the event. “It is very qualitative.”

Geopolitical Risks and Strateg


Executive Summary

Integrating robotics into economic, military, and technological domains presents significant geopolitical risks and opportunities. Key nations, including the United States, China, and European states, are leveraging robotics to enhance industrial productivity, defence capabilities, and technological sovereignty.

Supply chain vulnerabilities, regulatory shortcomings, and the spread of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) create significant security risks. Global stability requires effective policies, international collaboration, and strategic investment to mitigate risks.

The race to develop advanced robotics and automation technologies has intensified global competition, with leading economies prioritising self-sufficiency in key sectors to reduce vulnerabilities. As the strategic importance of robotics continues to grow, it is imperative to assess its impact on economic structures, military strategies, and international relations.

Drones: One Platoon Commander’s Observations

1stLt Blaine Mainz

In his 2019 Commandant’s Planning Guidance, General Berger stated, “The Marine Corps is not manned, organized, trained, or equipped to compete against near-peer adversaries in the current and future operating environment.” If the USMC were to engage in close combat with one of the forces fighting today’s wars, we would quickly be out cycled and overwhelmed by their use of a crucial technology: small unmanned aerial system (sUAS). We talk about flooding the battlespace with sUAS to observe and orient on the enemy, yet most infantry companies have only a couple of certified and currently qualified sUAS operators. We discuss how sUAS Video Downlink (VDL) can enhance decentralized command and control, but most members inside the company COC are not trained to utilize this capability. We are witnessing the profound impact of platoon-level (and lower) organic precision fires and mesh networking in Ukraine and Gaza, yet we struggle to keep up, even with the groundwork laid for us.

Still, battalions across the Marine Corps struggle to source sUAS platforms to employ these concepts. Despite being aware of the vital roles sUAS will play in future conflicts for over a decade, we have consistently failed to train an adequate number of operators, educate tactical commanders on the employment of sUAS, and acquire enough drones. We empower our small unit leaders to make decisions that can create operational and strategic opportunities, but we are failing to provide them the tools necessary to do so. Six years later, General Berger’s comments continue to ring true, we are not currently manned, equipped, or trained to provide our Marines the undeniable advantage of sUAS on the battlefield.