Indian Strategic Studies: 03/09/25

9 March 2025

Influx from Bangladesh: Should India deal leniently with illegal migrants fleeing religious persecution?

Debraj Deb

Four Bangladeshis were arrested in different parts of Tripura on March 2. This happened soon after 15 Bangladeshi people were arrested in Tripura’s Unakoti district on February 28. A series of arrests and apprehensions of Bangladeshi men, women, and children have been reported in recent months in the northeastern state.

Many of these individuals – Hindus, Buddhists, and Muslims – claimed they were fleeing ‘persecution’ in Bangladesh under Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus’s regime. They come from a wide mix of places including Khagrachari, Chittagong, Moulvibazar, Sunamganj, Netragunj, Netrakona, Barisal and other parts of the neighbouring country.

Though some detained Bangladeshis were in possession of firearms, drugs, and other contraband items, many crossed the border carrying just a few clothes and basic belongings.

Emerging situation

As per a report of the Tripura Police in possession of this correspondent, 816 Bangladeshi nationals, 79 Rohingya persons and two Nigerians were arrested from January 1, 2024 till February 28 this year.

A further breakdown of the data shows that 483 illegal foreigners were arrested since August 5, 2024, when the Sheikh Hasina government fell in Bangladesh. This figure includes 155 Hindus, 20 Buddhists and 308 Muslims.

Is Pakistan’s War On Terror Genuine Or A Farce? – OpEd

Nilesh Kunwar

An Arrest

Islamabad definitely deserves due appreciation for facilitating apprehension of Mohammad Sharifullah, a terrorist commander belonging to the UN proscribed Islamic State Khorasan Province [ISKP] terrorist group who was involved in the deadly August 2021 bombing at Kabul airport that killed nearly 200 people including 13 American soldiers. According to Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s post on X, the “ISKP’s top tier Sharifullah commander” was apprehended by “Pakistan Security Forces… in a successful operation conducted in [the] Pakistan-Afghan border region.”

And, US President Donald Trump did exactly this while announcing Sarifullah’s arrest in his speech to Congress on Tuesday night by thanking the Government of Pakistan “for helping arrest this monster.” Basking in the adulation heaped by the mercurial POTUS, Sharif deftly portrayed this isolated incident based expression of gratitude as comprehensive acknowledgement and appreciation of “Pakistan’s role and support in counter terrorism efforts across the region, in the context of Pakistan Security Forces.”

Not only this, he also went on to claim that “Pakistan has always played a critical role in counter terrorism efforts aimed at denying safe havens to terrorists and militant groups the space to operate against any other country.” Unfortunately, this claim doesn’t stand up to impartial scrutiny. For one, if arrest of ISKP terrorist Sarifullah wanted by the US is a feather in its cap, then isn’t Islamabad’s brazen refusal to hand over Lashkar-e-Taiba co-founder Hafiz Saeed wanted by the US for masterminding the 2008 Mumbai attacks a ‘black-eye’ for Pakistan?

The Great Balochistan Propaganda War

Dilshad Baluch

Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan, the largest and most resource-rich part of the country, remains under military control, facing human rights abuses and a media blackout. Despite its strategic importance, Balochistan’s local population is marginalized, fueling anger over enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, economic exploitation, and what many describe as a “Baloch genocide.”

The Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), a women-led grassroots movement, fights for Baloch rights, while demanding accountability for state abuses. Due to its growing influence, Islamabad is trying to discredit the BYC through a digital disinformation campaign, targeting its leadership and efforts. Yet, the BYC continues to draw global attention to the plight of the Baloch people.

The Big Lie: Associating the BYC With Militancy

The BYC evolved directly in response to a series of atrocities targeting Balochs. In 2020, state-backed death squads killed Malik Naz Baloch and injured her young daughter, Bramsh, in Kech, Balochistan. This led to the formation of the Bramsh Yakjehti Committee, which later evolved into the Baloch Yakjehti Committee after the assassination of Banuk Karima Baloch in Canada, and the shooting of Hayat Baloch by Frontier Corps soldiers.

New products show China’s quest to automate battle

TYE GRAHAM and PETER W. SINGER

The drones that fanned out during a recent People’s Liberation Army exercise were dispatched by the Intelligent Precision Strike System, a new product from Chinese defense giant Norinco that used the UAVs’ real-time data to model the battlefield, track targets, devise strike plans, distribute firing information, and execute follow-up strikes.

According to the video playing in Norinco’s booth at the most recent Zhuhai Air Show, almost all of this was done autonomously except giving the commands to fire. Chinese observers also noted how the system fused battlefield intelligence from multiple sources. It epitomizes how the PLA aims to ensure dominance in the next era of conflict: with autonomous capabilities that blur the line between human oversight and machine execution.

Norinco’s Intelligent Precision Strike System is one of the ways that the nascent PLA Information Support Force is building a “network information system” that uses AI, cloud computing, and big-data techniques to fuse data from operational units and create “dynamic kill networks” across domains. PLA commentators emphasize the network information system’s critical role in modern warfare.

How U.S.-Russia-China Ties Would Impact the Indo-Pacific

Derek Grossman

Improved ties between the United States and its great-power rivals, Russia and China, appear to be imminent. The Trump administration is negotiating directly with the Kremlin in an attempt to end the Russia-Ukraine war, U.S. President Donald Trump may meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the two could perhaps reset the entire bilateral relationship.

Similarly, Trump has said that he would like to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping, possibly in the United States, to resume negotiations on areas of high friction—namely, the substantial trade imbalance. Trump has also said in recent weeks that he has a “great relationship” with Xi and looks forward to “getting along with China.”

The Economy Is Strong, and China Won’t Back Down

David Pierson, Alexandra Stevenson, Chris Buckley and Keith Bradsher

China’s top leaders sought to project confidence in the country’s economy on Wednesday despite sluggish growth, an escalating trade war with the United States and growing geopolitical uncertainty caused by the Trump administration.

The government will aim to expand China’s economy by “around 5 percent” this year, said Premier Li Qiang, China’s highest-ranking official after Xi Jinping, at the opening of the annual session of the country’s rubber-stamp legislature.

Mr. Li acknowledged that the economy faced many challenges and that “arduous efforts” would be needed to meet the targets. But he struck a positive note about the country’s prospects, saying: “The underlying trend of long-term economic growth has not changed and will not change. The giant ship of China’s economy will continue to cleave the waves and sail steadily toward the future.”

Southeast Asia must take the long view to survive US-China AI race

Elina Noor

Within the first few minutes of United States Vice-President J.D. Vance’s address at the Paris AI Action Summit last month, he declared he was not there to talk about AI safety but about AI opportunity.

What he meant, as he went on to make clear, was not only should safety considerations be subordinated to innovation but that the Trump administration would double down on US leadership across the entire artificial intelligence stack – from semiconductors and algorithms to computing power and applications. AI opportunities, as it turns out, should be subject to “America first”.

Vance’s speech should come as no surprise. The US desire to ensure technological primacy has been a feature of different administrations, marked by an increasingly antagonistic stance against China that is threatening to draw in Southeast Asian countries that are loath to choosing sides amid geopolitical polarisation. With countries in the region placing big bets on the AI value chain for economic growth and digital transformation strategies, two areas of concern stand out.

First, Washington’s deprioritisation of AI safety in favour of innovation and free speech reveals a troubling picture of trivialising harm in many parts of the world, including Southeast Asia, which has had painful experiences with unbridled misinformation and disinformation before.

Will Trump's actions force Asian allies to embrace China?

Srinivas Mazumdaru

Since returning to the White House over six weeks ago, President Donald Trump has rapidly and dramatically changed US positions on Russia's war in Ukraine, much to the chagrin of Kyiv and Washington's other European allies.

The stunning showdown between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office on Friday, US statements ruling out Ukraine's entry into the NATO military alliance and the pause of all US military aid to Kyiv this week, among other moves, have been viewed by many as part of Washington's attempts to cooperate with Moscow and put pressure on Kyiv to accept a ceasefire deal on Russia's terms.

European leaders are contemplating a united response — including increased support for Ukraine as well as measures to boost national militaries — in the face of Trump's actions that could put the entire post-1945 security architecture on the continent in jeopardy.

China, America, and the Great Railway Race in Africa

Samuel W. Yankee

The Mukuba Express had been motionless for eight hours, stopped in a small village about 50 miles west of the Tanzania-Zambia border. “We will be going soon,” a mechanic had told me, but the locomotive was derailed and repair equipment was miles away.

I’d been aboard the train for two days, since I boarded the historic Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) express train in the central Zambian town of Kapiri Mposhi. Despite the delay, life went on. Children played football at the side of the tracks, women sold mangoes, and dozens of cheerful passengers ate plates of fried greens and ugali in the restaurant car.

As I watched travelers, locals, and workers carry on around the stranded train, I thought about how railways in Africa have long been shaped by forces far beyond the passengers they serve. From colonial tracks to today’s foreign-funded megaprojects, railways have always been more than just transport; they have been instruments of influence, competition, and control.

The TAZARA is one of many railway projects constructed or financed in eastern Africa in the past 150 years by a foreign power. From the early stages of colonization to the present day, foreign investment has underpinned most rail infrastructure, providing not only well-needed transportation capacity but also a powerful vessel of foreign control. In recent years, non-African governments have poured billions of dollars of financing into African railway projects, competing for access to natural resources, political capital, and economic control.

Is A New Middle East Forming?

Alexander Langlois

A substantial amount of ink and blood has been spilled throughout the many failed attempts to create a “new” Middle East. Yet the region’s response to recent events highlights a new trend in its geopolitics—namely a real shift towards ruthless pragmatism and cooperation. Indeed, even amid a less-than-shadowy war between arch-rivals Iran and Israel, the region’s leaders have largely come to accept that the conflict-infested Middle East of old does not fit into their grand strategies or national interests. This realization is slowly forming a truly new Middle East from within.

This transformation is hardly perfect. As the conflict in Sudan highlights, competition in areas deemed acceptable battlegrounds across the Arab world remains an issue, often at the expense of national sovereignty and its population. This reality was recently or still is the case in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia. Tel Aviv and Tehran have proven adept at creating arenas to compete in, just as Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) continue to fight any semblance of democracy out of fear of Islamist rule.

No one should expect these dynamics to change overnight. Rather, connecting relatively small, isolated moments from the last few years highlights big changes underway. These moments include the end of the blockade of Qatar, Gulf state re-normalization efforts with the former Assad regime, the ceasefire in Yemen between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis, and the Chinese-backed Saudi Arabia-Iran re-normalization agreement. Each moment reflected a pragmatic desire to focus on economic development through cooperation—a focus stemming from the fear produced by the Arab Spring and the lack of individual freedom and opportunity that undergirded it.

The Arab States’ Remarkable Moves to Push Peace in Gaza

Amr Hamzawy

When Arab leaders gathered on Tuesday in Egypt for an extraordinary summit, the stakes could not have been higher for security and peace in the Middle East. Tensions have been rising again between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, as both accuse the other of ceasefire violations. Israeli military operations continue in the southern regions in Syria, as well as sporadic bombardment of Hezbollah’s positions in southern Lebanon. In the United States, the administration of President Donald Trump’s talks of mass displacement plans for Palestinians have quieted but still have the region on edge.

The summit’s unity emphasized the collective political and diplomatic maturing among the Arab countries. The countries’ leaders came together and issued a remarkable pro-peace declaration that displayed solidarity with the Palestinian people while addressing most of Israel’s and the United States’ concerns.

The Leadup

The so-called Palestine Summit was held only a few days after the end of the first phase of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, which Egypt, Qatar, and the United States brokered. Negotiations for the second phase have faced initial difficulties: the Israeli government stopped entry of all humanitarian aid and reconstruction equipment and materials into Gaza, and Hamas rejected a U.S. proposal to extend the first phase for the duration of Ramadan while continuing to release Israeli hostages and Palestinians prisoners.

What’s In The Arab Plan For Gaza?

Burcu Ozcelik

The highly anticipated Egyptian vision for the future of Gaza was announced in Cairo yesterday, broadcasting consensus across the Arab world against U.S. president Donald Trump’s “Riviera” plan for Gaza.

There is little in the Arab draft proposal that has not been floated previously. Unsurprisingly, and where it challenges Trump head on, is that it calls for reconstruction without the displacement of the Gazan population. While the plan displays a readiness to sideline Hamas, its shortcoming is that it leaves too much unsaid about how Hamas can be militarily dismantled, removed, or transformed. With this left unaddressed, it will face stiff resistance from the United States and Israel.

The fact that the emergency Arab summit took place a full month after the Trump plan was announced is just one indication of the complexities inherent to achieving Arab consensus on this point. The Egyptian draft, while significant for its plan to reconstruct war-torn Gaza by 2030, falls short of specifying how Hamas would be removed. At the same time, it proposes the establishment of a body called the “Gaza Administrative Committee” to run the Strip’s affairs in the first six months of the “early recovery” period, made up of independent Palestinian technocrats.

Regional reactions to the transition in Syria

Emile Hokayem

Lebanon: overcoming a tortuous legacy

The Assad regime had an abusive relationship with Lebanon, a country Syria effectively occupied between 1976 and 2005 and whose politics it shaped through coercion and cajolement. It was therefore no surprise that the demise of the Assad regime was welcomed with as much joy on the streets of diverse Beirut and Sunni-dominated Tripoli as on those of Damascus and Homs, and with as much dread on the streets of Shia-dominated Baalbek and Nabatieh as on those of Alawite-heavy Tartous and Jableh.

Regardless of the regime in place in Damascus, Syria and Lebanon have always had intimate yet tortuous relations. The former has resented the latter’s independence and liberalism, seeing itself as the larger, more important country. For its part, Lebanon has always looked down on Syria as the less sophisticated country, politically and economically. This has made for a uniquely unhealthy dynamic.

Above all, Syria has seen Lebanon as part of its sphere of influence, while Lebanese Hizbullah has considered Syria its strategic depth. Scores of Lebanese politicians, journalists and civil actors were killed by Bashar al-Assad’s forces, and Hizbullah spearheaded Assad’s counter-uprising military efforts, killing tens of thousands of Syrians in the process. This bloody legacy colours perceptions, but the concomitant ouster of Assad and the weakening of Hizbullah have also given rise to more positive narratives in both countries.

A Plan for Peace Through Strength in Ukraine

Stephen Hadley, Daniel Fried, and Franklin D. Kramer

There have been recurring strains in the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship under both Trump administrations. The recent Oval Office blow-up between the two presidents is only the most recent example. But such tensions need not derail a push for peace—which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian people clearly want. U.S. President Donald Trump and the American people also want peace, as do U.S. allies in Europe. Whether the same is true of Russian President Vladimir Putin is less clear. Despite enormous economic cost and a shocking level of casualties, his troops are making slow but steady progress, and he clearly thinks he can win.

The outcome that Putin wants would be a Ukraine that is permanently stripped of almost 25 percent of its territory, demilitarized, and barred from joining the EU and NATO. Agreeing to those terms would mean capitulating to Russian aggression and virtually guaranteeing Ukraine’s future absorption into Russia. Trump has often lamented the Biden administration’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan and the weakness it suggested, and he has said that Putin’s willingness to invade Ukraine in 2022 was encouraged by that weakness. Trump should seek to ensure that the outcome in Ukraine does not demonstrate, even implicitly, any comparable weakness. Accepting Russia’s apparent terms for ending the war would not meet this test.

The best path to end the war will instead follow a “peace through strength” approach. Such an approach would substantially enhance Europe’s role in supporting Ukraine militarily and economically, with a limited but important backup role for the United States; accept the current lines of control between Russian and Ukrainian forces, without recognizing Russian annexation or sovereignty over Russian-occupied areas; and prepare the path for a negotiated settlement—all while considering, in the likely event that negotiations fail, how to achieve a cease-fire through unilateral action.

Russia Focusing on Arctic to Divide West and Expand Its Influence and Position in Antarctica

Paul Goble

At the Riyadh talks between Russia and the United States on February 18, U.S. representatives reportedly raised the possibility of expanding U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Arctic (see EDM, March 3; Vedomosti, Meduza, February 27). According to Kirill Dmitriev, head of Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) who was involved in the talks, the two had a “general discussion–maybe joint projects in the Arctic. We specifically discussed the Arctic” (Interfax, TASS, February 19). This is intended by the United States as a “way to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing,” particularly given their deepening partnership since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began (Bloomberg, February 26; Meduza, February 27).

Moscow welcomes cooperation with the United States for two main reasons. First, Russia has been facing problems in attempting to develop the Northern Sea Route (NSR) on the cheap due to sanctions restrictions, which U.S. cooperation may help to resolve (see EDM, May 6, 2021, February 18). Second, activities conducted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Arctic exploit Russia’s financial weaknesses and have created concerns in Moscow that Beijing may attempt to become the dominant power in the region (see EDM, February 18). Moscow may view U.S. cooperation as a mechanism to counter Beijing’s activities in this respect. The Kremlin also views such cooperation as part of its larger effort to deepen the divide between the Trump Administration and European leaders committed to the long-standing idea of keeping the Arctic out of international geoeconomic, geopolitical, and especially military competition (NG.ru, February 27). Additionally, any change in the United States’ approach to the Arctic would likely serve as a precedent for Moscow to seek a transformation to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 (The Antarctic Treaty, 1959 (also available with the British Antarctic Survey, accessed March 6).

Roscosmos’s Director General Exemplifies Inefficiency in Russian Government

Mikael Pir-Budagyan

On February 6, Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Dmitry Bakanov to replace Yuri Borisov as the Director General of Roscosmos, Russia’s state-run space corporation (President of Russia, February 6). Bakanov’s appointment is intended to remedy debilitating challenges at Roscosmos, including financial difficulties, inefficiencies, and the loss of Western partnerships since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

This change in Roscosmos leadership signals a shift in the organization’s commercialization direction. Previous Roscosmos leaders included Dmitry Rogozin and Borisov. Bakanov’s appointment indicates Russia’s priorities in space and follows a series of promotions that have given economists and auditors greater influence than politicians or military leaders over strategic sectors, including defense and space. Bakanov is tasked with addressing long-standing procurement inefficiencies and making the corporation more attractive to private investors. As director general, Bakanov is also required to collaborate closely with Russia’s Ministry of Defense on space-based Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities.

Credibility of Russia’s Red Sea Naval Facility Agreement with Sudan

Andrew McGregor

Russia and the leading faction in Sudan’s ongoing civil war have reportedly finalized an agreement to establish a Russian naval base on the Red Sea coast. Since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, there may be no more strategically important body of water in the world than the Red Sea. Access to the sea, which carries 10 to 12 percent of global trade on its waters, is gained only through the Egyptian-controlled canal to the north and the narrow Bab al-Mandab strait to the south (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed March 4). So far, no state outside of the region has established a naval base between the canal and Bab al-Mandab since the departure of the British from Sudan’s primary Red Sea port, Port Sudan, in 1956. That appeared to change on February 12 with the announcement that an agreement had been reached to construct a Russian naval base in Port Sudan.

The announcement was made by Dr. ‘Ali Yusuf Sharif, appointed in November 2024 as nominal foreign minister by Lieutenant General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, whose faction controls most of Sudan. During a televised press conference in Moscow with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, Sharif said “This is an easy question, there are no obstacles, we are in complete agreement” (Izvestiya, February 12; Al Arabiya; Atalayar, February 13). After the meeting, Lavrov expressed his appreciation for the “balanced and constructive position” taken by Sudan on the situation in Ukraine (TASS, February 12). There has been no confirmation from Moscow of the official signing of this deal.

Trump’s Economy Is Flashing Red

Keith Johnson

Just a few weeks before the 2024 presidential election in the United States, the Economist explained why the country's economy was the “envy of the world,” with low unemployment, inflation under control, and a growth rate unmatched by any advanced economy.

Even so, widespread domestic dissatisfaction with the world’s top-performing economy helped propel Donald Trump to victory. It was also partly due to the prices of grocery staples such as eggs—something Trump promised to lower early on in his second term as president but has yet to fully accomplish.

Gaza truce hangs by a thread as Israel sets new conditions. Here’s what to know

Nadeen Ebrahim, Mick Krever, Ibrahim Dahman and Mike Schwartz

A delicate truce between Israel and Hamas hangs by a thread after Israel blocked humanitarian aid into Gaza, in response to Hamas rejecting a new Israeli proposal to extend the ceasefire without any commitment to end the war or fully withdraw troops.

Hamas has accused Israel of violating the agreement, calling its decision to halt humanitarian aid “cheap blackmail” and a “war crime.”

Fifty-nine hostages remain in Gaza after the return of four bodies last week. Of the 59, 24 are thought to be alive, according to Israeli authorities.

Meanwhile, aid groups and the United Nations have slammed the Israeli announcement to halt aid, with Egypt, a mediator in the ceasefire deal, saying it “unequivocally rejects the politicization of humanitarian aid and its exploitation as a tool of blackmail.”

US President Donald Trump’s Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff plans to return to the Middle East “in the coming days to work out either a way to extend Phase I or advance to Phase II” of the Gaza ceasefire and hostage deal, a US State Department spokesperson said on Monday.

Gaza ceasefire in peril as Israel and Hamas hit impasse

Lyse Doucet

The testing second stage of Gaza's ceasefire was always in doubt; now it seems to be dead at the moment it was meant to start.

Concern is mounting that war will return to this ravaged territory, deepening the profound suffering of Palestinians and threatening the lives of the remaining hostages held by Hamas.

Israel, backed by the United States, says there is a new deal now, after the agreement's first phase ended on Saturday. And it has halted all humanitarian aid to Gaza until Hamas accepts this new version too.

"A flagrant violation," was Cairo's strongly worded response. Egypt as well as Qatar, the two Arab mediators in this process along with the US, have also accused Israel of violating international humanitarian law by "using food as a weapon of war".

Under the terms of the agreement, 600 trucks carrying vital humanitarian aid are meant to enter Gaza daily - and huge numbers crossed through the 42 days of the first phase.

There has also been a loud chorus of criticism from other Arab states, as well as humanitarian leaders.

Great Power Competition and Irregular Warfare

Lawrence Cline

Those of a certain age will remember the issues that the Defense Department and the U.S. Government overall have had with labeling operations short of full-scale conventional war. The plethora of terms used in the past for seemingly similar missions was virtually guaranteed to preclude an intellectual underpinning for analysis and strategic planning. With the adoption of the term irregular warfare (IW) and the ongoing efforts to develop a more sophisticated doctrine, the level of consistency on how to approach these most difficult of operations may show both coherence and further doctrinal progress.

A key issue to be resolved, however, is the ‘boundaries’ of IW. The right boundary is clear: operations short of full-scale war. It is the left boundary that remains problematic. Exactly what constitutes IW as opposed to ‘normal’ diplomatic, information, and military operations? At least in theory, if not in practice, the old chestnut of the acronym MIDLIFE – Military, Information/Intelligence, Diplomatic, Legal, Infrastructure, Finance, Economic – should drive national policy on a routine basis. In practice, of course, actually melding these disparate functions into a coherent whole has very much proven to be the exception rather than the rule. This is why having a conceptualization of multiple strands of effort is so important. Irregular warfare can provide the framework for this.

U.S. and Hamas Hold Direct Talks on Hostages in Gaza, Officials Say

Adam Rasgon, Aaron Boxerman and Ronen Bergman

U.S. and Hamas officials have had talks in Qatar about hostages held in the Gaza Strip, according to two Israeli officials, a Western official and a diplomat briefed on the matter, breaking with a longstanding American policy of refusing to directly engage groups that it has designated as terrorists.

President Trump’s nominee to be special envoy for hostage affairs, Adam Boehler, participated in the talks this week with Hamas officials, the diplomat said. All four officials discussed the meetings on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly about the sensitive diplomacy.

The talks in Doha, Qatar, focused on securing the release of Edan Alexander, the only Israeli American hostage still believed to be alive, and the bodies of four other Israeli Americans who were kidnapped and taken to Gaza in the Hamas-led attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, according to one of the Israeli officials and the Western official.

In 15 months, the Navy fired more air defense missiles than it did in the last 30 years

Jeff Schogol

The U.S. Navy has used more missiles for air defense since combat operations in the Red Sea began in October 2023 than the service used in all the years since Operation Desert Storm in the 1990s, said retired Navy Cmdr. Bryan Clark, of the Hudson Institute.

Over that 15-month-period, which ran from Oct. 19, 2023 to Jan. 19, 2025, the Navy saw the most combat at sea since World War II, Clark told Task & Purpose.

“It’s kind of amazing how the Navy has held up with no losses, but the cost has been pretty enormous,” Clark said. “The estimates are the Navy has used up $1 billion-plus worth of interceptors to shoot down these drone and missile threats.”

For now, the conflict appears to be on pause, possibly due to the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas that was announced on Jan. 19. But the Navy will need years to replenish its supply of missiles, and that puts the service in a bad position if the United States and China went to war today, Clark said.

The Paradox of Trump’s Economic Weapon

Nicholas Mulder

Since returning to the White House, U.S. President Donald Trump has unleashed a whirlwind of policy shifts, territorial claims, and economic threats. In his first few weeks in office, Trump has expressed a desire to bring Canada, Greenland, the Panama Canal, and the Gaza Strip under direct American control. He has also expanded his trade offensive against China to include Canada and Mexico, the United States’ two largest trading partners. In the case of Canada, Trump tied his commercial pressure to the stunning demand that the nation itself go out of existence. “Canada should become our Cherished 51st State. Much lower taxes, and far better military protection for the people of Canada—AND NO TARIFFS!” he wrote on Truth Social. On top of all this, Trump made a dramatic turn against Ukraine, suspending all U.S. aid.

Many commentators have been at once disturbed and baffled by these moves. In January, The Wall Street Journal derided Trump’s threat to impose 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico as the opening salvo of the “The Dumbest Trade War in History.” Yet Trump’s economic coercing and cajoling is not as inexplicable as it seems. Historically, directing economic coercion against allies—rather than adversaries—has been a remarkably successful policy: since the world’s economy integrated during the nineteenth century, tools of economic coercion have frequently become more effective when deployed against diplomatic and economic partners than against hostile states.

Author Of ‘Ethical Hacking’ Contributes Expertise To New Edition Of A Cybersecurity Classic

A University of Virginia researcher has a new book out — and the title will be instantly recognizable in the cybersecurity field.

Daniel G. Graham, assistant professor of computer science in the School of Engineering and Applied Science and a former program manager at Microsoft, joined the authors of the authoritative “Metasploit: The Penetration Tester’s Guide” for the book’s second edition, released in January.

Penetration testing simulates cyberattacks on systems to identify vulnerabilities. Banks, for example, have whole teams dedicated to keeping your money safe.

The book’s namesake comes from the Metasploit Project, a cybersecurity testing architecture that includes an open-source framework. The book serves as a comprehensive, user friendly introduction for cybersecurity professionals.

Students use “Metasploit” in Graham’s Network Security course.

“After my book ‘Ethical Hacking’ (2021) was released, I was invited by the publisher, my editor and other authors to contribute to this edition,” Graham said. “It was a great opportunity to ensure that the cybersecurity field has an up-to-date, go-to resource for high-level security assessment.”