7 March 2025

Building the Future: Empowering India’s Smaller Cities for Climate Action

Raghav Anand

Empowering India’s smaller cities and making them able to weather the worsening effects of climate change will be imperative as CO₂ emissions continue to rise.

India’s urbanization trajectory is set to be historic. With its urban population projected to increase by over 400 million people by 2050 (accounting for thirty-five percent of global urban growth during the same period), the country’s cities will continue to proliferate and swell. Urbanization is a key driver of India’s emissions, which stood at 3.8 billion tons of CO₂ in 2022, making it the third-largest emitter in the world (Global Carbon Atlas, 2023). The sustainability of India’s urban transition is therefore of global relevance, and has the potential to avoid locking-in vast quantities of carbon emissions – particularly in its rapidly growing smaller and medium cities (SMCs), where today’s decisions will establish development pathways for the coming decades.

If these growing cities follow the high-carbon trajectories of their larger counterparts – relying on energy-intensive construction, unregulated sprawl, and fossil-fuel-driven cooling – India’s emissions will surge. Conversely, a well-planned urban transition could lock in low-carbon growth, avoiding as much as one billion tons of CO₂ emissions by 2050 (IEA, 2022). Meanwhile, climate change continues unabated, making these cities extremely prone to its devastating effects. India ranks as the seventh-most vulnerable country to climate change, making a two-pronged approach to climate action – focusing on both mitigation and adaptation – crucial to ensuring this transition balances economic interest with climate considerations.

Empowering India’s Smaller Cities: SMCs

Early headway in urban climate action has occurred predominantly in large-scale metropolises like Mumbai, Bengaluru, and Chennai, leaving India’s SMCs in the lurch. The majority of India’s urban growth and associated emissions will come from these SMCs over the coming decades. The Coalition for Urban Transitions estimates that over half of India’s climate mitigation potential through to 2050 comes from cities with less than one million inhabitants – small cities by Indian standards. The number of cities with over a million people is expected to rise from forty-two in 2014 to sixty-eight by 2030. Places like Indore, Surat, Bhubaneswar, and Kochi are growing at breakneck speed, often absorbing rural migrants displaced by climate change and economic shifts.

The Taliban-US Deal 5 Years Ago Remade Afghanistan. Was It Worth the Cost?

Freshta Jalalzai

The Doha Agreement between the Taliban and the United States was signed on Saturday, February 29, 2020.

I was supposed to be off that day, but I came to work anyway. How could I stay at home? History was unfolding before my eyes. The signing of the Doha Agreement, which set the stage for the complete withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, was the defining event of the day for major media outlets.

As a journalist based at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s headquarters in Prague, I received daily news and information from my reporter colleagues in Afghanistan and broadcasted it to the Afghan public. That day, no update felt more significant than this one.

But it was more than a headline for millions of Afghans, both in the country and across the world; it was a turning point in Afghanistan’s modern history – one that would shape its fate for years to come. The air was thick with unspoken tension, a quiet, collective unease.

As I reached my desk, Mohammad Illyas Dayee was calling the office phone.

What Do Chinese Analysts Think of Trump’s China Policy Thus Far?

Hemant Adlakha

In a recent commentary, Zongyuan Zoe Liu of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations recalled what might be termed the “good old days” of China-U.S. relations – just over a decade ago in time, but seemingly far removed in sentiment. As Liu wrote:

Not long ago, American and Chinese people mostly liked each other. In 2011, polls showed that the majority in each country viewed the other favorably. That same year, the “Kung Fu Panda” series was a hit at the box office for the second time, offering a rare cultural touchpoint both nations shared. Economically, the United States and China seemed inseparable. The term “Chimerica” captured this dynamic: China produced and saved; the United States consumed and borrowed. The relationship was celebrated as the engine of global growth, helping the world recover from the 2007–08 global financial crisis.

Yet in the years since, the anti-China narrative has become lodged in the U.S. psyche. Today, the amiable era of “Chimerica” has been long forgotten, thanks to U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to launch a relentless campaign targeting China with tariff and tech restrictions. The last eight years of Washington-Beijing hostilities have turned the U.S. public consensus against China, and in dramatic fashion. As Liu noted, a 2024 Pew survey showed that 81 percent of Americans viewed China unfavorably, with 42 percent perceiving it as an “enemy” of the United States. Today China is more likely to be depicted as hostile and unfriendly in U.S. popular culture – as seen in the political tv drama thriller series “The Diplomat” (2023) – than be celebrated for its pandas and kung fu.

Just before the U.S. presidential election in November 2020, there was much discussion in China over whether a victory by the Republicans’ Donald Trump or the Democrats’ Kamala Harris would be less disadvantageous for China’s economic and national interests. In spite of the setbacks tariff and tech wars brought to China’s economic and technological growth, it was believed by some that the Trump 1.0 presidency had provided useful opportunities for China’s top leader Xi Jinping and the country’s military establishment. And the shift from Trump to President Joe Biden in 2021 didn’t exactly change the needle on Trump’s China policy.

China's War Plans

Glenn Chafetz

Xi Jinping’s Insecurity, China’s Economic Decline, and the Increasing Danger of War Over Taiwan

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) makes no secret of its ambitions for global hegemony (though it uses the word “leadership” in place of hegemony). China’s quest for worldwide dominance is rooted in the shaky claim to power of Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This might seem like an odd contention to outside observers, including the Trump Administration who see Xi as the unquestioned dictator atop a party-state-economic monolith dominated at all levels by the CCP. Xi, however, does not see his position in that way. He is, in fact, deeply insecure about his power and authority. His insecurity, in turn, feeds his ambitions, which creates more insecurity, and drives him to expand his power both domestically and internationally.

Xi’s insecurity manifests itself in a panoply of policies that include the introduction of a Maoist cult of personality for Xi himself; his personal assumption of leadership of all party internal security institutions, the continuing growth of mass technical and human surveillance both domestically and internationally; the destruction of Hong Kong’s last remnants of democracy; the classification of any internal disagreement as foreign directed; hypersensitivity to criticism from abroad; and a global program of economic espionage, sabotage, and bullying.


Fear of losing power has led Xi and his lieutenants to study the fall of other one-party regimes, like Iraq, Libya, and most especially the collapse of Communist rule in the USSR in 1991. One lesson Xi and the CCP have drawn from the Soviet collapse is the need for absolute control of the military. For Xi, the failure of the Red Army to defend the Communist Party in 1991 led to the party’s collapse. By contrast, the responsiveness of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to CCP orders in 1989 enabled the CCP to preserve its monopoly on power.

China and Canada immediately retaliate against Trump’s tariffs. Mexico is next

Elisabeth Buchwald

President Donald Trump’s blanket 25% tariffs on Mexico and Canada took effect on Tuesday, an extraordinary action aimed at bringing America’s top trading partners to heel. But it threatens to weaken the North American economy, including that of the United States, at a time of significant stress for inflation-weary consumers.

Trump also doubled the tariff on all Chinese imports to 20% from 10%. Those duties sit atop existing tariffs on hundreds of billions in Chinese goods. China and Canada immediately retaliated with tariffs on American goods, threatening to ignite a damaging trade war. Mexico said it would announce retaliatory measures Sunday.

The Trump administration said the tariffs were necessary to stem the flow of fentanyl into the United States.

“While President Trump gave both Canada and Mexico ample opportunity to curb the dangerous cartel activity and influx of lethal drugs flowing into our country, they have failed to adequately address the situation,” according to a statement released by the White House shortly before the tariffs took effect.

But the tariffs come at a time when inflation remains stubbornly high. Americans, and the US economy as a whole, are on shakier ground, as evidenced by recent data.

Trump’s tariffs threaten to raise the prices Americans pay for a wide array of goods that are imported from the three nations, which collectively shipped $1.4 trillion worth of goods to the US last year, according to Commerce Department data. That accounts for more than 40% of the value of all goods the US imported last year.

Containment Can’t Win the U.S.-China Tech Race Alone

Stefanie Kam Li Yee

A man in black pants, a black turtleneck, and a gray blazer stands onstage and gestures with one hand while holding a microphone in another. Company names are displayed English and Chinese text on a large screen behind him; they include OpenAI, ChatGPT, and DeepSeek.Qi Yuan, the director of the Shanghai Academy of AI for Science, speaks during the opening ceremony of the Global Developer Conference in Shanghai on Feb. 22. 

As U.S.-China tech competition heats up, Washington is slowly recognizing that gaining a first-mover advantage in critical technologies may be more vital than protecting its existing edges. At present, the U.S. national strategy aims to slow down its competitors and look to the effectiveness of stronger export controls, stricter enforcement, and measures to block strategic transfers to rivals. Yet as supply chains become more diverse and complex, the range of options to evade such sanctions grows—and the role of third-party intermediaries becomes more critical.

Since 2018, under both the Trump and Biden administrations, the United States has imposed sweeping restrictions on China, including Commerce Department “entity list” designations on certain companies (Huawei, SMIC, etc.); semiconductor export controls (announced in October 2022); and bans on some of the advanced chips needed for artificial intelligence technology, such as Nvidia’s A100 and H100 (imposed in October 2023).

China’s Silicon Valley unveils aggressive push to lead in AI, robotics

Mia Nulimaimaiti

The southern Chinese megacity of Shenzhen has unleashed a barrage of policies aimed at propelling itself to the forefront of the global artificial intelligence and robotics industries, as the metropolis seeks to reaffirm its status as China’s leading technology hub.

In a rare move, the city rolled out three major action plans in a single day on Monday, which outline measures to accelerate its adoption of AI, strengthen its smart computing capacity to support local AI businesses, and establish a global lead in robotics, respectively.
The aggressive push from local cadres comes as other Chinese cities are emerging as rival centres of innovation – most notably the eastern city of Hangzhou, which has attracted huge attention due to the success of local AI start-up DeepSeek and humanoid robot maker Unitree.

The first policy focuses on rapidly growing Shenzhen’s AI terminal industry – a field that includes a wide range of AI-driven devices, from smartphones to smart-home products and industrial systems.

It sets goals of increasing the market value of Shenzhen’s AI terminal industry to 1 trillion yuan (US$137 billion) by 2026, fostering at least 10 leading AI terminal businesses, and raising the output of local AI terminal makers to more than 150 million units.

Another plan issued the same day outlines Shenzhen’s ambition to become a global leader in robotics by 2027.

Gaza Is the Land of No Good Options

Raphael S. Cohen

People sit amid the ruins of a sports stadium in the Bureij refugee camp in central Gaza during a funeral ceremony for Hamas commander Marwan Issa on Feb. 7 2025.People sit amid the ruins of a sports stadium in the Bureij refugee camp in central Gaza during a funeral ceremony for Hamas commander Marwan Issa on Feb. 7 2025. 

Over the last few weeks, a lot of ink has been spilled on the Trump administration’s “day after” plans for Gaza. Less attention, though, has been focused on evaluating what might happen to Gaza if Israel and Hamas were to agree to a deal to end the current war after a final hostages-for-prisoners exchange.

New Armenia-U.S. Partnership On Pause

Onnik James Krikorian

Executive Summary:The Charter of Strategic Partnership between Armenia and the United States, signed in January 2024 under the then-outgoing administration, aligns with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s strategy to reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russia, despite Moscow’s concerns and diplomatic engagements following the signing.

The charter opens pathways for Armenia to modernize its nuclear sector, particularly by securing U.S. technology to replace its Soviet-era reactor by 2036, and strengthening Armenia’s development of artificial intelligence (AI).

U.S. cooperation in border security aims to counter illicit trade and re-exports, potentially reducing Russian influence while increased Armenian control over borders with Iran and Tรผrkiye signals broader geopolitical realignment.

During a visit to Washington, D.C. on February 5, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan claimed that Armenia hopes “to open a new page in relations with the United States” (Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, February 5). This hope was in reference to the Charter of Strategic Partnership between Armenia and the United States signed on January 14 to strengthen bilateral relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 14). The signing of the charter occurred just days before the last administration left the White House.

The areas covered in the charter include economic and energy cooperation, defense and security, democracy and human rights, and cultural and education exchanges. It also came soon after the Biden administration decided to suspend a Strategic Partnership Charter between the United States and Georgia signed in 2009 (Civil Georgia, November 30, 2024). This followed the contested parliamentary elections on October 26, 2024, and ongoing protests in Tbilisi (See EDM, October 17, November 5, 2024, January 13, February 4).

Editing Russia out of the U.S. cyber playbook

Sam Sabin

Under Trump 2.0, everything the cybersecurity industry knew about D.C. is up for debate — even who is considered an adversarial nation.

Why it matters: For decades, U.S. presidents of both parties have viewed China, Russia, Iran and North Korea as the biggest cyber threats. But that list is now in question.

The big picture: President Trump's push to reset diplomatic ties with Russia is likely to upend long-standing cybersecurity norms, with consequences that could play out for years.

Driving the news: The U.S. Cyber Command was recently ordered to pause planning offensive cyber operations against Russia, multiple outlets reported over the weekend.A senior DoD official declined to confirm the order but told Axios, "There is no greater priority to Secretary Hegseth than the safety of the Warfighter in all operations, including the cyber domain."
Meanwhile, Trump is reportedly drafting a plan to ease sanctions on Russia and has sent back Russian cybercriminals in prisoner swaps.
The administration has also reportedly reassigned dozens of FBI officials investigating foreign election interference — which Russia has repeatedly been accused of.
The Kremlin has celebrated these actions, saying yesterday that the new American foreign policy "largely coincides" with its own.

Yes, but: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency said Sunday it is still prioritizing cyber threats from Russia, despite news reports suggesting otherwise."There has been no change in our posture," the agency wrote on X. "Any reporting to the contrary is fake and undermines our national security."

Between the lines: Russia has long been a top cyber threat, hosting ransomware gangs, crypto money launderers, disinformation operations, and elite government hackers.Cyber Command has been a key tool in disrupting Russian cyber operations, from botnet takedowns to supporting Ukraine against Russian cyberattacks.

Strategic Affairs no. 46 What is the Trump Foreign Policy?

Joseph Collins

How should we describe Trump’s Foreign Policy? It’s certainly unusual and atypical. It’s hard to say whom it pleases, or whether it will be successful. He’s off to a rocky start. His policy comes from his gut and not a well-examined policy process.

The guiding light of Trump’s foreign policy is America First. It is a neo-isolationist, mercantilist, fiscally-focused, short-term approach to the pursuit of the national interest. At its heart, it is also neo-imperial in its orientation. Allies should be obedient or sanctioned. The other Great Powers, China and Russia are not enemies, but other powers to be admired or reckoned with.

Some observations:

From the start, the White House has made a habit of picking on our allies and friends. Canada, Mexico, Panama, and Ukraine have all come in for harsh words, usually attributed to some bad behavior which is untrue or exaggerated. The President apparently believes, for example, that if you run a trade surplus with the United States, you are taking advantage of us. Sometimes, the President is reacting to something he heard, like China is running the Panama Canal and Panama is overcharging U.S. vessels.

Another behavior, unusual to say the least, is territorial acquisitiveness. In the past, the United States has been successful as a superpower because, while it sought influence and access to markets, it did not seek ownership or permanent occupation of any new territory. To the contrary, President Trump has talked about retaking the Panama Canal, buying Greenland, incorporating Canada as the 51st state, and somehow owning Gaza to establish a resort, a Riviera in the Middle East.

His approach to Ukraine also has an element of acquisitiveness. To facilitate U.S. involvement, Trump wants an ownership stake in certain minerals in Ukraine. The final deal remains unsigned due to the shoot out in the Oval corral.

Without the US it’s all about us in European defence


The United States has decided that it will no longer underwrite European security. The administration of President Donald Trump has stopped aid to Ukraine and surrendered key positions to Russia in order to achieve a ceasefire in Russia’s war of aggression. It has done so without much regard for European security or for whether there will be a just or lasting solution to the conflict.

For European leaders, debating whether the transatlantic relationship can be repaired, complaining about the US or developing schemes to mollify Trump are distractions. Rather, the task should be to build up European defence capability; decide which technological dependencies on the US in military and civilian domains remain acceptable and which do not; explain to voters the harsh reality of a world in which major powers use economic and military coercion to get their way; and inject additional immediate military and financial assistance into Ukraine. European leaders need to stop focusing on Trump’s choices and instead concentrate on their own.

They could, firstly, decide to give the roughly US$200 billion worth of Russian frozen assets in Europe to Kyiv to provide it with funding for its war effort and humanitarian needs. This would be a real financial boost. As research by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) shows, using Russian frozen financial assets to assist Kyiv is legally sound and politically desirable to show Russian President Vladimir Putin that he will be thwarted.

Secondly, Europeans should go through their military inventories to identify more equipment that can be given to Ukraine and place orders with their defence industries to enable the investments that will unlock greater capability. Defence industry leaders say they can deliver, and European leaders should hold them to this. Rheinmetall has said it is producing more artillery munitions per year than the US and plans to increase this output. The Ukrainian defence-industrial sector itself has notable capabilities and can boost these further, particularly in cooperation with European and other partners. Not everything that the US has provided in the past can be replaced, but a lot can. Just like the arrival of individual weapons systems on the battlefield has never been a silver bullet, the disappearance of some systems will not be a bullet to the head for Ukraine’s sovereignty.

A Photo Op Goes Sideways: Causes And Effects Of The Trump-Zelensky Fracas – OpEd

Robert E. Hamilton

(FPRI) — I’m sitting in Ukraine as I write this. In a case of perhaps the most awkward timing imaginable, I arrived here on the day the Trump-Zelensky Oval Office meeting went off the rails. I was having dinner with Ukrainian colleagues when our phones blew up with the news. In another case of ironic timing, I am here to do research for a book project on US military assistance, a major theme of the Oval Office rumble.

Having now taken a couple of days to process the event, I just read through the transcript of the meeting. There are three reasons it went the way it did. First, the two sides had diverging objectives for the meeting. Although nominally they were there to sign a rare earth minerals deal, the Trump Administration wanted a photo op and a chance to score some political points by disparaging the Biden Administration. Zelensky, on the other hand, wanted to discuss the issue of security guarantees for Ukraine. Normally these diverging objectives would not have been fatal to the photo op and could have been discussed after the media left. Except for the second reason the meeting went sideways: the unprecedented intervention of Vice President JD Vance. In a normal Oval Office photo op, the others in the room are rarely even on camera, much less starting arguments with the visitor. Vance broke that norm and pushed the meeting into the open argument it became. The final reason the meeting went the way it did – and this is less important but not unimportant – was the language barrier. While Zelensky’s English is good, it was not up to the task of a two-on-one verbal sparring match in front of the cameras with his country’s existence on the line. And it was unfair to put him in the position of engaging in such a sparring match in what was supposed to be a photo op. As the argument escalated, the language barrier led to several misunderstandings that further inflamed it.

Vance threw the opening punch. Although it was mostly meant to deprecate the Biden Administration and curry favor with his boss, it came across to Zelensky as admonishing him to let the US find a diplomatic solution to the war. This, naturally, triggered Zelensky’s fears of the US negotiating with Russia over his head (because that is what is happening) and signing a cease fire deal that had no security guarantees for Ukraine. At this point, Zelensky tried to make the point that Russia cannot be trusted to respect anything it signs. To do so, he gave an overview of all the agreements Ukraine has signed in the past with the Kremlin, including several with international support. He correctly made the point that Russia had violated them all, culminating in the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

Trump’s reverse-Nixon manoeuvre He's prising Putin from Beijing

Edward Luttwak

As the world reels from the scenes of the televised boxing match between Zelensky and Trump, with Vance egging the fight on, we are in danger of losing sight of what the encounter reveals about Trump’s priorities. Though it was not explicitly named during the entire undignified episode, it is China and not Russia that is the White House’s main concern these days, and that explains the refusal to subordinate everything to Ukraine’s needs and ambitions.

The first signs emerged back in 2017, during the years of Trump One, when the US for the first time acted very directly against China’s techno-economic rise. Seeing its increasing threat, the Administration cut off access to some of the advanced technology that China really needs, starting with advanced microprocessors, the “chips” of both missiles and smartphones. Tellingly, this was the one Trump policy that Biden did not reverse. Indeed, his Administration tried to strengthen the technology export controls.

Now, as Trump Two kicks off, America is dealing with a distinctly more aggressive China. It has become clear that Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” is not about a richer or a happier nation, but rather a stronger and indeed more warlike one. He has been visiting the different headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army to urge the assembled officers to be ready to fight — to really fight, and win! Further, it seems that defectors have reported that Xi has told members of the Central Military Commission to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.

Before Trump, no one had a plan to bring Ukraine war to a conclusion


In the aftermath of the rather acrimonious meeting in the White House on Friday between President Zelensky of Ukraine and the president and vice president of the United States, it is easy to lose sight of the progress that has been made in the strategic matters and specifically over the Ukraine War in just six weeks since President Trump’s real inauguration. Prior to his return to office, there was no known consideration being given by any party with any standing to bring that very nasty war to a satisfactory conclusion. It has now continued for almost as long as the Korean War and 70 per cent of the length of World War I, and has claimed at least 1.25 million casualties, probably more than half of those deaths. There had not been a peep of serious discussion of peace terms during the Biden administration. The Western policy was to provide enough weapons and munitions to prevent Ukrainian defeat but not permit Ukrainian victory for “as long as it takes,” (until there would no longer be enough live Ukrainians to continue the war). This was not a serious exit strategy.

President Trump’s plan was to leave Russian President Putin with enough of his ill-gotten gains to claim a partial victory and territorial acquests that adequately represent the ancient Russian interest in Ukraine, a country that was never a defined jurisdiction until established by Lenin as a Soviet Republic in 1919, and one which Russia had occupied for over 300 years, where approximately one sixth of the population is Russian-speaking. Mr. Trump calculated that in all of the circumstances, this would be an acceptable arrangement for Ukraine, as its sovereignty would be universally acknowledged and accepted to be legitimate. While the United States was prepared to acquiesce in Russia’s insistence that Ukraine not join NATO, since many NATO countries do not wish it in NATO and that was therefore not a practical option anyway, Ukraine’s security would be amplified in three important respects. There would be long term peacekeeping missions stationed in Ukraine, including British and French forces (both nuclear powers and intimate allies of the United States), and the strategic minerals extraction agreement which had been devised by Zelensky himself, which would put significant numbers of important American personnel durably in Ukraine, and in the event that Russian action caused an exchange of fire with the NATO peacekeepers in Ukraine, the United States would continue to be a subscriber to Article 5 making such action an attack upon all of NATO.

6 silver linings of the Trump-Zelensky showdown

Timothy Ash

The ambush by hired hand U.S. Vice President JD Vance at the White House Oval Office at high noon on Feb. 28 made for great theater, more 24-hour TV than diplomacy. At first, it seemed like an absolute disaster for President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukraine, potentially risking the withdrawal of U.S. military support and even harder days ahead in Ukrainians’ existential fight for survival against Russia.

But after the dust settled on the Oval Office saloon floor, a few silver linings for Ukraine became clear.

First, while the minerals deal hardly seemed worth the paper it was written on for Ukraine — offering zero real commitments, whether security or financial, from the U.S. — it did give Zelensky one thing: time in the White House. A chance to make Ukraine’s case and, in the worst case, to truly assess where the Trump administration stands: with Russia or with Ukraine. If it was the former, at least Ukraine would know and could plan accordingly rather than be left in limbo.

Why is Trump's cryptocurrency reserve plan putting some economists on edge?

Rafi Schwartz

Donald Trump's plans to establish a government stockpile of cryptocurrencies took a notable step forward this past weekend, as the president unveiled the five assets he plans to include in his federal crypto reserve. The U.S. will be the "Crypto Capital of the World," Trump said in a Truth Social post touting relatively low-profile assets like XRP, solana and cardano as the first currencies to join better-known brands bitcoin and ether in a stockpile designed to "elevate this critical industry after years of corrupt attacks by the Biden Administration." Perhaps unsurprisingly, the value of the currencies named has skyrocketed in the wake of Trump's announcement.

At the same time, Trump's crypto-forward plans for the American economy have begun alarming financial experts who warn that crypto's extreme market volatility and susceptibility to manipulation could spell trouble for the country. As Trump continues pushing for a national cryptocurrency stockpile, why are economists raising their red flags, and what — if anything — can they do about it?

What did the commentators say?

Trump's crypto plan has produced a backlash from "conservatives and even ardent crypto backers" who cited concerns over "giveaways to an already wealthy community" and "delegitimizing the digital currency industry," The New York Times said. Some Republicans criticized the plan to use tax dollars to purchase crypto's "risky assets" rather than simply using the money for "paying down the national debt." Other critics pointed out that both Trump and his crypto czar, David Sacks, stand to personally benefit from the boost to the crypto industry.

Dow Drops 1300 Points in Two Days Amid Trump Trade War

Sonam Sheth and Gabe Whisnant

The Dow Jones Industrial Average has dropped 1300 points over the last two days as U.S. President Donald Trump moved forward with tariffs against Mexico, Canada and China, America's most prominent trading partners.
Why It Matters

Global markets are bracing for the effect that Trump's tariffs—and retaliatory tariffs from Canada, China and Mexico—will have on American consumers.
What To Know

The U.S. on Tuesday imposed a 25 percent tariff on goods from Mexico and Canada and increased a 10 percent tariff on China to 20 percent. Canada and China immediately retaliated, while Mexico said it will announce its response later this week.

As a result of the tariffs, the Dow dropped 1.55 percent, or 670 points, adding to a 650-point plummet on Monday. The Nasdaq closed 0.35 percent down and at its lowest was down 2 percent, briefly entering correction territory, which indicates a more than 10 percent drop in the index from its recent peak.

The S&P 500 dropped 1.2 percent and erased its post-election gains. About 80 percent of stocks that make up the index were down for the day. That slip came despite a rebound in major tech stocks like Nvidia and Alphabet.

Retailers Target and Best Buy saw their share prices decline after warning of sales pressures and higher prices for consumers.

The tariffs also negatively impacted trading across different industries, including automakers, banks and other retailers including Ralph Lauren and Williams-Sonoma.

Trump, for his part, has acknowledged that Americans could feel "some pain" associated with tariffs but insisted it would "all be worth the price that must be paid."

The Russia-Ukraine War It Takes a Land Force to Defeat a Land Force

Lt. Col. Amos C. Fox, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired

A Ukrainian soldier pulls security during an antisabotage exercise as part of Rapid Trident 2021 at Combat Training Center-Yavoriv near Yavoriv, Ukraine, on 27 September 2021. Rapid Trident is designed to increase the efficiency of Ukrainian troops and improve compatibility among of the headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the United States, and other NATO members. (Photo by Spc. Preston Hammon, U.S. Army)

While new technologies such as sensors, drones, and long-range fires are excellent complements to contemporary (and future) armed forces, they will have a minimal impact on the future operational environment. If we remove the sensationalism association with the terminology of sensors, drones, precision, and long-range fires, all we are essentially left with is the basic idea of “attacks from above,” which is a challenge that has hampered military forces since at least World War I.1

Today, however, we have the additional problem in the West that most militaries seek to limit the commitment of their own land forces into direct combat with a hostile force while preferring to leverage attacks from above as an adjunct to military victory. Viewed collectively, these two elements (i.e., “attacks from above” and limiting the commitment of one’s land forces to combat) can be referred to as “standoff warfare.”

Today, Western militaries make the case that standoff warfare will be how wars in future operational environments will be won. Multidomain operations doctrine, Project Convergence, and the slew of other sensor, precision, and long-range strike-centric concepts dominating military, academic, and policy discussions make this abundantly clear.2

Nonetheless, the wars of the twenty-first century demonstrate an alternative reality that is likely more realistic than the standoff warfare visions of the future. Wars of the future will remain fought for territory. They will remain fought by armies, or at least amalgamated forces fighting on land, for land. When attacked from the sky, they will seek refuge in the land—whether in bunkers, trenches, or urban areas. Attacks from the sky are empirically proven to be less effective against land forces hiding beneath the surface of the land or in urban terrain. Thus, to defeat a hostile army holding contested terrain, standoff warfare will not be the path to success in future operational environments. To win in future wars, Western militaries will require robust and resilient land forces that can address the unique challenges of land warfare while capitalizing on the technological advantages available to Western military forces. Put in more plain English, it will continue to take a land force to defeat a land force.

Advancing Artificial Intelligence in the U.S. Military

Norm Litterini

The end of the beginning of widespread Artificial Intelligence (AI) adoption has arrived. Instead of seeming like a futuristic scene from a movie, today’s advancements are making a marked difference in processing large data sets.

These advances in capability and reliability demonstrate that AI should have a role in any unified threat intelligence strategy for the U.S. military, because of its incredible potential to accelerate the production of actionable intelligence and decision-advantage workflows.

Unified threat intelligence describes a comprehensive approach to collecting, analyzing and sharing threat information across an organization. While the U.S. military has used the concept for years describing efforts to gather intelligence from multiple sources, introducing AI tools drives operational efficiency and accelerates the response to threats.

The concept includes two tenets: ensuring the joint team has a singular and comprehensive view of the threat landscape and that teams can respond by combining data from cyber, geopolitical and physical intelligence sources into a single, actionable intelligence stream.

Even with the improvements afforded by AI, the two fundamental challenges still exist: an overabundance of data to process and false positive/false negative errors. AI continues to improve and attempts to keep pace with vast amounts of data collected, but the need for humans in the loop has not decreased. The military still requires humans to ensure AI performs well enough to “minimax” type one errors (false positives) and to try to eliminate type two errors (false negatives) altogether.

A European army is no longer optional - Opinion

Max Boot

For Europe, this is a break-glass-in-case-of-emergency moment. The United States, which has guaranteed European security against Russian attack for 80 years, appears to have switched sides under President Donald Trump.

Nothing better symbolizes this disturbing volte-face than the United Nations vote last week on the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United States joined 17 members, including rogue regimes such as those in North Korea, Sudan and Belarus, in voting against a resolution condemning the unprovoked Russian attack. Trump justifies his new policy by claiming that he must show neutrality to negotiate an end to the war. Yet he doesn’t hesitate to harshly condemn Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He has called Zelensky a dictator but not Vladimir Putin.

Even before the shocking collapse of the Trump-Zelensky summit on Friday and Trump’s reprehensible decision on Monday to pause all U.S. aid to Ukraine, Germany’s newly elected chancellor, Friedrich Merz, was already speaking about the need to “strengthen Europe as quickly as possible, so that we achieve independence from the U.S.” Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a former NATO secretary general, agreed, writing in the Economist, “Europe must come to terms with the fact that we are not only existentially vulnerable, but also seemingly alone.”

Europe's military and diplomatic challenge

Lawrence Freedman

Sunday’s gathering at Lancaster House in London had been arranged before Friday’s clashes between Trump, Vance, and Zelensky, in the Oval Office, but it gained added significance because of them. With so much in the air, as new opportunities open up while others close down, it is hard to be sure of its long-term significance. But it felt historic.

For years European states have discussed a possible moment when they will depend far less, or even not at all, on the United States for their security. Some have viewed this prospect with enthusiasm; others with apprehension. None have prepared for it.

Now circumstances have conspired to require that they address the challenges posed right away. This will not be a simple replacement of one security order with another. There are choices to be made on both sides of the Atlantic and any new arrangements will contain elements of the old. The changes will come about not because of careful deliberation but because of the pressure of events, and in particular how to cope with the continuing Russian aggression against Ukraine when the American president not only acts according to his mood but also with a limited grasp of the nature of the conflict.

Ukraine’s True Value

ANASTASSIA FEDYK and EMILIA MARSHALL

Until the Oval Office meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky went off the rails, it appeared that Zelensky was there to sign a deal requiring Ukraine to contribute 50% of future profits from its commodity mining to a fund jointly managed by the United States. Instead, Zelensky’s repeated requests for at least some security guarantees culminated in a verbal assault from Trump and US Vice President J.D. Vance, and Zelensky left empty-handed.

What Ukraine was supposed to gain from the deal was never entirely clear. But whatever the details, Ukraine’s value cannot be reduced to a mineral transaction. The country’s fate could reshape the geopolitical order, potentially shifting the balance of power, in Europe and beyond, for decades to come.

Despite Trump and Vance’s narrow characterization, Ukraine is far more than a small, mineral-rich country fighting off a much larger aggressor. Ukraine was a pillar of Soviet military power during World War II and the Cold War, and it remains a major source of agricultural commodities, skilled labor, and technological innovation.

The Future of World Order

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR.

US President Donald Trump has cast serious doubts on the future of the postwar international order. In recent speeches and United Nations votes, his administration has sided with Russia, an aggressor that launched a war of conquest against its peaceful neighbor, Ukraine. His tariff threats have raised questions about longstanding alliances and the future of the global trading system, and his withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement and the World Health Organization has undercut cooperation on transnational threats.

David vs Goliath: Cost Asymmetry In Warfare

James Black

Low-cost drones have made for cheap and effective attacks against military hardware which is much more expensive to manufacture, giving an edge to non-state actors.

Dramatic images of million-dollar missiles streaking into the air to intercept low-cost drones have filled our television screens for three years, amid fighting in Ukraine, Israel, Gaza, and the Red Sea.

While cost asymmetry has always played a role in tactical warfare, we now face more strategic questions because it is so cheap to attack and so expensive to defend.

U.S., European, and Israeli air and missile defenses have performed remarkably well in these conflicts. However, with the technical sophistication of these systems comes a hefty price tag. Now, the advent of cheap commercial drones has sharply tilted the cost asymmetry towards offence.
A Frugal Method Of Destruction

New threats include so-called kamikaze systems such as the Iranian Shahed, used widely by the Russians and Houthis, as well as modified commercial first-person-view (FPV) drones, many of which are manufactured in China and can be purchased by anyone online.

These are being employed in staggering numbers by both sides in the war on Ukraine. On their own, their capabilities may be crude, especially compared to a traditional fighter aircraft or long-range precision-strike missile. Still, “quantity has a quality all of its own.”

Wielding such new weapons, attackers aim to wear down sophisticated defences. They do so by cluttering and confusing the sensor picture, burning through defenders’ finite stocks of expensive missile interceptors, and forcing high-value assets such as air defense batteries to reveal their positions by illuminating their radars or firing.

This opens defenders up to subsequent attacks or, at the very least, compels them to relocate, creating gaps in the defenses during the move.