Indian Strategic Studies: 03/05/25

5 March 2025

Could The U.S. Really Sell The F-35 To India?

Peter Suciu

Earlier this month, Russia’s United Aircraft Company (UAC) sent a Sukhoi Su-57 (NATO reporting name Felon) to take part in the Aero India 25 air show and exhibition. The Kremlin’s fifth-gen fighter has reportedly returned home after a stopover in Iran to address engine issues.

Even before the air show had kicked off, Russian officials at Rosoboronexport had announced it had officially offered the fifth-generation fighter to New Delhi, and had touted an option for “a joint production and the development of an indigenous variant.”

Though the Su-57 once again impressed attendees with its aerial maneuvers, no deal between Russia and India has materialized in the weeks since the conclusion of the air show.

Instead, there are rumors New Delhi could opt for the other fifth-gen fighter that was presented at Aero India 2025—namely the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, which the White House announced could be officially offered to India.

Could India Actually Get the F-35?

Earlier this month, during a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Washington, U.S. President Donald Trump said the U.S. could increase military sales to India beginning this year. New Delhi has sought to increase the number of fighter squadrons to counter regional rival China, and Trump was ready to provide India with the most cutting-edge multirole aircraft in service today.

Myanmar: A Nation Drowning In Drugs Crisis – Analysis

Windia Soe

The country has become a major hub for methamphetamine production, exacerbated by political instability and economic collapse. This crisis is destabilizing entire regions, with widespread drug addiction affecting families and overburdening fragile healthcare systems. This article explores the origins of Myanmar’s drug scourge, reflects on past failed interventions, and considers potential pathways toward a more hopeful future.

How did Myanmar go from opium fields to a heroin hub?

The history of narcotics in Myanmar is tragically intertwined with the nation’s past. Opium poppies were introduced to northeastern Myanmar by Chinese traders centuries ago, but it was during British colonial rule (1824-1948) that opium cultivation significantly expanded. Driven by Chinese demand, the British established a lucrative monopoly, making opium a key part of Myanmar’s economy. By the late 19th century, regions like Kokang and Wa became synonymous with opium production, solidifying Myanmar’s role in the global opium trade.

Independence in 1948 brought little relief, as ethnic insurgencies erupted, with many rebel groups turning to opium cultivation for funding—creating a cycle where the drug trade fueled insurgency, which in turn protected and expanded the drug trade. By the 1970s, Myanmar had become a major heroin producer, with heroin refined in border areas—particularly under the control of Kuomintang-linked groups. Its legacy highlights the ongoing challenges Myanmar faces in combating narcotics today.

Is There an Axis of Autocracy?

Bonnie Girard

From cautious concern to doomsday predictions, the U.S.-China Security and Review Commission (USCC) heard testimony on February 20 that broadly addressed one question: Is China a partner in an “Axis of Autocracy,” alongside the other major autocratic countries of Iran, North Korea, and Russia?

Interestingly, the scope of the Commission’s hearing was limited to addressing the relationships between only four of the world’s autocracies. Yet, multiple sources state that, in fact, the population of the world is far more governed by autocracies than not. Indeed, a map of autocracies around the world shows that the nations of the African continent are led far more by autocrats than by any other political system – yet none of these governments were included in the USCC’s “axis.”

By not encouraging comment and debate on the rest of the autocratic world, largely found in Africa and the Middle East, an opportunity is missed. In diving deeper into other autocracies’ links with the “big four” and among themselves, we would gain a more profound understanding of the power of autocratic societies and their consequential and complex relationships.

PRC Dominance Over Global Port Infrastructure

Jacob Mardell

On February 2, President Murillo of Panama announced that his government will not renew the memorandum of understanding on the Maritime Silk Road signed in 2017 with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). At a press conference that followed shortly after a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Murillo said that Panama is going to study “the possibility of whether it can be completed sooner or not. I think it is due for renewal in one or two years,” he explained (X/ECOtvPanamá, February 2). [1] The Maritime Silk Road refers to the maritime portion of the PRC’s One Belt One Road (一带一路) initiative. The PRC was quick to respond. Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Zhao Zhiyuan (赵志远) made solemn representations to the Panamanian government, saying that his country “deeply regrets” (对此深表遗憾) the announcement, and warning that Panama would be running counter to the expectations of the Chinese and Panamanian peoples by “‘driving backwards’ and sailing against the wind on ‘One Belt One Road’” (在“一带一路”上“开倒车”、行逆风船违逆中巴人民期待) (FMPRC, February 8).

The flashpoint around the Panama Canal centers on Hutchison Port Holdings (和記港口), a private firm headquartered in Hong Kong that has operated the two of the canal’s five ports since 1997. While this does not equate to U.S. President Donald Trump’s assertion that the PRC controls the Panama Canal, the evolution of the PRC’s maritime strategy in recent decades and Hutchison’s moves to closer align with Beijing in the last few years reflect longstanding and valid concerns in the United States about Beijing’s strategic investments in global port infrastructure (White House, January 20; The Wire China, February 9). Already, Panama’s supreme court has agreed to consider a request filed by a lawyer to nullify the contract to CK (AFP, February 22).

The United Nations, Ukraine, and the Crumbling Pillars of Global Order

Dr. Hasim Turker

On February 24, 2025, the United Nations General Assembly witnessed an event that sent shockwaves through diplomatic circles worldwide. A resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine passed with 93 votes in favor, 18 against, and 65 abstentions. Yet, it was not the overall result that captured global attention—it was the fact that the United States, long considered Ukraine’s staunchest supporter, voted against the resolution alongside Russia. In parallel, the UN Security Council adopted a US-drafted resolution that called for a “swift end” to the conflict but conspicuously omitted any attribution of blame to Moscow. The resolution, supported by Russia and China, stood in stark contrast to previous UN votes that had unequivocally condemned Russia’s actions.

These votes were not just procedural moments in international diplomacy. They signaled a tectonic shift in US foreign policy —one that moves away from the moral and strategic certainties of the past and toward a transactional, interest-driven realignment. The implications of this shift are profound, not just for Ukraine but for the entire fabric of global alliances, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, where long-standing US security commitments are now being scrutinized with heightened concern.

From moral clarity to strategic ambiguity: The US position at the UN

Historically, the United States has used the UN as a platform to advance its vision of a rules-based international order, frequently rallying allies to uphold democratic values and deter authoritarian aggression. The UN votes on Ukraine, however, revealed a stunning reversal of this long-held strategy. By opposing a resolution that explicitly condemned Russia’s invasion, Washington abandoned its traditional role as a guarantor of Ukraine’s sovereignty. As for the US-drafted UNSC resolution, the abstentions from key European allies—France, the UK, Denmark, Greece, and Slovenia—further underscored the growing transatlantic rift regarding how to handle the conflict.

The Real Threat of Chinese AI

Jared Dunnmon

In the two months since a little-known Chinese company called DeepSeek released a powerful new open-source AI model, the breakthrough has already begun to transform the global AI market. DeepSeek-V3, as the company’s open large language model (LLM) is called, boasts performance that rivals that of models from top U.S. labs, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT, Anthropic’s Claude, and Meta’s Llama—but at a tiny fraction of the cost. This has given developers and users around the world access to leading-edge AI at minimal expense. In January, the company released a second model, DeepSeek-R1, that shows

Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 Drone Won World Fame by Force

Maya Carlin

The popularizing presence of drones in modern warfare indicates how lethal unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will shape conflicts in the future. Beginning with the 2021 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the use of lethal drones by state and non-state actors alike has become vastly more prevalent. Today, Iran and its terror affiliates in the Middle East ranging from Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen frequently deploy armed drones to further the regime’s regional aims. The ongoing Russian-Ukraine war has similarly highlighted the prominent use of UAVs in modern conflict, as each side has deployed frequent barrages to the front lines of the conflict. Ukraine fields a versatile UAV arsenal of mostly domestic and Western-delivered aerial weapons. However, one notable drone series often used by Ukrainian forces and not in these categories is the Turkish-designed Bayraktar TB2 series.

Initially acquired by Kyiv in 2019 as part of its military modernization program, these lethal UAVs were especially instrumental in Ukraine’s defensive efforts to thwart Russian advances at the beginning of the war. The privately owned Turkish manufacturer Baykar Marina sold six TB2 drones to Kyiv in its first export. This nearly $70 million contract also involved the purchase of ammunition for the armed variant of the UAV. When the Russian invasion commenced in February 2022, the Kremlin expressed discontent toward its Turkish ally for supplying Kyiv with such a valuable UAV. In response, Ankara emphasized that any prewar exports were carried out in the private sector.

US’ rapid weapon integration milestone bolsters F-16 attack with Harpoon missile

Bojan Stojkovski

The U.S. Air Force is exploring the use of the Harpoon anti-ship missile on its F-16s, signaling a potential shift in its approach to naval warfare.

The 53rd Test and Evaluation Group’s Detachment 3 demonstrated the crucial ability to rapidly integrate new weapons by conducting an operational taxi test with a U.S. Navy Harpoon missile on an F-16 Fighting Falcon at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.

Gateway system enables missile integration

Instead of taking years, this test proved that weapons integration can be accelerated without costly aircraft modifications, allowing leaders to rapidly deploy advanced weaponry, outpace adversaries, and enhance operational flexibility across multiple platforms.

The test team employed a gateway system to link the Harpoon missile with the F-16, enabling seamless communication without modifying either platform. Acting as a translator, the system allowed the jet to recognize the missile and transmit commands. This approach streamlined integration and reduced the time needed to equip the aircraft with new weapon capabilities.

Hegseth orders Cyber Command to stand down on Russia planning

Martin Matishak

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth last week ordered U.S. Cyber Command to stand down from all planning against Russia, including offensive digital actions, according to three people familiar with the matter.

Hegseth gave the instruction to Cyber Command chief Gen. Timothy Haugh, who then informed the organization's outgoing director of operations, Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Ryan Heritage, of the new guidance, according to these people, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the matter’s sensitivity.

The order does not apply to the National Security Agency, which Haugh also leads, or its signals intelligence work targeting Russia, the sources said.

While the full scope of Hegseth’s directive to the command remains unclear, it is more evidence of the White House’s efforts to normalize ties with Moscow after the U.S. and international allies worked to isolate the Kremlin over its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

President Donald Trump has made a series of false statements and demands that align him with Russian President Vladimir Putin, including blaming Ukraine for the war and calling the country’s leader a dictator.

Profiles in intelligence: an interview with the 17th Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon

Eldad Ben Aharon

Introduction

Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon, born in Haifa, Israel, on 24 June 1950, held numerous positions within the nation’s security, intelligence, and political establishments. He served for thirty-seven years in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), including as Deputy Chief of Staff, 17th Chief of Staff, and Chief of Military Intelligence Directorate (AMAN).Footnote1 Ya’alon also held the roles of Minister of Defense, Minister of Strategic Affairs, and Vice Prime Minister (PM). He also served as a Member of Parliament (MP) from 2009 until 2016 and again from 2019 until 2022. During the interim between his military and political roles in 2007, Ya’alon was a distinguished visiting fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.Footnote2 Over the last two decades, Ya’alon has been one of the foremost authorities in the field of Israel’s national security. His name and face have become synonymous with Israel’s security, intelligence, and political landscape. Given his prominence and influence, a Shin Bet statement revealed that Ya’alon was the target of a Hezbollah assassination attempt.Footnote3 The assassination attempt, which involved an explosive device attached to a remote detonation system, was foiled by the Shin Bet in September 2023.Footnote4

The impact of artificial intelligence on the officer corps

Tamir Libel

Introduction

West and Allen (Citation2018) define artificial intelligence (AI) as “machines that operate in an intentional, intelligent, and adaptive manner” and “have the ability to learn and adapt as they make decisions” (West and Allen Citation2018, 2–3). It comes as no surprise that integrating AI into the military and security domain remains a top priority for many countries (Machi Citation2021; Rouleau Citation2020; Stanley-Lockman and Christie Citation2021). Given the unprecedented complexity of AI capabilities, however, nations must work together with private technology companies (Hudson Citation2020), and their militaries must recruit and retain the young and rare AI talent.

Researchers have pointed to a number of potential issues with the increased use of AI in the military (Hachey, Libel, and Partington Citation2020): ethical dilemmas (West and Allen Citation2018), questions of responsibility and accountability (Fenwick and Edwards Citation2016; Wasilow and Thorpe Citation2019; West and Allen Citation2018), changes to the identity of the combat soldier (ElMasry Citation2018; Kim, Cheon, and Eom Citation2019), new requirements for soldiers in battle (Singer Citation2009), changing physical and mental qualities (Winkler et al. Citation2019), the effect of AI on militaries’ diversity and inclusion initiatives (Nourri Citation2021), and the effect of automated methods of warfare on the professional ideals of the military (Kepe Citation2020; Vallor Citation2013).

Four Takeaways From The Disaster In The Oval Office – Analysis

Steve Gutterman

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s White House visit had a lot of potential. It could have produced a mineral-resources deal that would have roped Ukraine and the United States together, at least on paper, and given U.S. President Donald Trump more incentive to support Kyiv in its defense against the Russian onslaught. It could have brought some clarity on what kind of security guarantees, if any, Washington is prepared to offer Kyiv in the event of a cease-fire or peace deal with Russia. And if nothing else, Zelenskyy and Trump could have buried the hatchet after a remarkable exchange of criticism last week.

Instead, the hatchet came out again, sharper than ever. Zelenskyy departed the White House early – the minerals deal left without signature and a joint press conference canceled — after being berated by Trump and Vice President JD Vance in what was by many accounts an unprecedentedly acrimonious meeting before journalists in the Oval Office.

The remarkable exchange did not just raise doubts about the fate of the natural-resources pact. It added to already towering uncertainty over the future of U.S. aid to Ukraine and over the prospects for any kind of a deal that would halt or end Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Trump, Vance, and the New New World Order

Stephen Soukup

This past week, the venerable Martin Wolf, chief economics commentator for The Financial Times, used his column to declare the Trump administration and, by extension, the United States “the enemy of the West.” “Today,” Wolf wrote, “autocracies [are] increasingly confident,” and “the United States is moving to their side.” According to the subhead on the column, “Washington has decided to abandon…its postwar role in the world.” Meanwhile, Wolf cites the (in his estimation) august Franklin Roosevelt, as he complains that the United States “has decided instead to become just another great power, indifferent to anything but its short-term interests.”

The ironies here—as well as the historical ignorance—abound.

To start, one would imagine that Wolf, an educated man with two degrees from Oxford, might know that it was his countryman (and two-time Prime Minister), Henry John Temple (i.e. Lord Palmerston), who declared in a speech in the House of Commons that “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” Wolf might also be expected to know that this statement was repeated—more famously and more pithily—by Henry Kissinger, perhaps the quintessential American diplomat in the supposedly vaunted postwar order. Kissinger, like Palmerston and Trump (apparently) understood that a nation that pursues anything other than its interests is foolish, faithless, and, in time, doomed.

The Real Reason Trump Berated Zelensky

Jonathan Chait

Of the many bizarre and uncomfortable moments during today’s Oval Office meeting between Donald Trump, J. D. Vance, and Volodymyr Zelensky—during which Trump finally shattered the American alliance with Ukraine—one was particularly revealing: What, a reporter asked, would happen if the cease-fire Trump is trying to negotiate were to be violated by Russia? “What if anything? What if a bomb drops on your head right now?” Trump spat back, as if Russia violating a neighbor’s sovereignty were the wildest and most unlikely possibility, rather than a frequently recurring event.

Then Trump explained just why he deemed such an event so unlikely. “They respect me,” he thundered. “Let me tell you, Putin went through a hell of a lot with me. He went through a phony witch hunt, where they used him and Russia. Russia, Russia, Russia, you ever hear of that deal? … It was a phony Democrat scam. He had to go through it. And he did go through it.”

Trump seems to genuinely feel that he and Vladimir Putin forged a personal bond through the shared trauma of being persecuted by the Democratic Party. Trump is known for his cold-eyed, transactional approach, and yet here he was, displaying affection and loyalty. (At another point, Trump complained that Zelensky has “tremendous hatred” toward Putin and insisted, “It’s very tough for me to make a deal with that kind of hate.”) He was not explaining why a deal with Russia would advance America’s interests, or why honoring it would advance Russia’s. He was defending Russia’s integrity by vouching for Putin’s character.

Special Edition: Rupture (February 28, 2025)

Richard Haass

It could not have gone worse if Vladimir Putin had scripted it himself. A meeting meant to produce a rapprochement between Ukraine’s leadership and the new administration in Washington instead produced a rupture. The question now is whether that rupture is irrevocable and, more fundamentally, what U.S.-Ukraine relations look like going forward, and in turn what this means for the war between Russia and Ukraine.

It is difficult to discern what was intended as opposed to what happened spontaneously, and to what extent the president and vice president were spoiling for a fight. Whatever their intent, they got one. President Trump began with the odd formulation that the United States was aligned with the world rather than with Ukraine. While he may think such neutrality is a precondition of being a successful diplomat, history suggests otherwise. In the Middle East, for example, it was the United States’ continued and public alignment with Israel that facilitated the historic agreements between Israel and the Arab states as well as the more recent ceasefire in Gaza. Indeed, it was U.S. closeness to Israel that gave it the confidence it needed to compromise while signaling to other regional actors that compromise brokered by the United States was their least bad option.

Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia

Ian Brzezinski and Ryan Arick

Russia is “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” So states the NATO Strategic Concept promulgated at the Alliance’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, just four months after Russia’s massive escalation of its invasion of Ukraine.1 The concept and NATO declarations not only underscore the illegality and brutality of that ongoing attack but also highlight Moscow’s use of nuclear and conventional military aggression, annexation, subversion, sabotage, and other forms of coercion and violence against NATO allies and partners.

Ever since its invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia’s aggression against the Alliance has steadily intensified. This led NATO leaders at their 2024 Washington Summit to task the development of “recommendations on NATO’s strategic approach to Russia, taking into account the changing security environment.”2 The Alliance’s “Russia strategy” is due for consideration at NATO’s next summit at The Hague in June 2025.3 This issue brief reviews Moscow’s actions affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and presents the enduring realities, objectives, and actions that should constitute the core of an effective NATO strategy to counter the threat posed by Russia.

Intensified and globalized Russian aggression

Russia’s objectives go far beyond the subordination of Ukraine. Moscow seeks to reassert hegemony and control over the space of the former Soviet Union, diminish the power of the democratic community of nations, and delegitimize the international rules-based order. Moscow aims to subjugate its neighbors and to weaken—if not shatter—NATO, the key impediment to its European ambitions.

Two steps backward

Lawrence Freedman

‘This is going to make great television.’ Trump’s assessment of the bad-tempered encounter with Ukraine’s President Zelensky in the Oval Office, was a telling remark after what appeared to be a setback for his efforts to mastermind a peace deal to end the Russo-Ukraine War. In front of the cameras Zelensky offered Trump insufficient respect and gratitude and for that he was shown the White House door, with a prepared deal on raw materials left unsigned and a scheduled press conference abandoned.

What happens next depends on whether it suits Trump to restore relations with Zelensky, or whether he has been cast out never to return. If Trump really craves a deal and an end to the bloodshed then Zelensky will be back. Much depends on the degree of dramatic tension that best suits his purposes.

The Trump administration is a soap opera. The president is the producer and the star, responsible for the plot lines, the script, and the cast (all of whom are chosen to look the part). If a plot line works, such as a drive for a Nobel-Prize winning peace deal, then it will be developed and might run for many episodes. Otherwise it will be quietly dropped, or may just peter out. The purpose of every episode is to demonstrate the star’s brilliance. The reason why this story has yet to run its course is the main theme of the Trump soap opera: that the star is especially brilliant when it comes to making deals.

Rise of the Gutless Air Force Colonel

Tony Carr

I think of all the past versions of myself as ghosts, whispering to me the insight essential to improved judgment and decision making as I (hopefully) grow older. You’ll have to ask those in my personal circle whether it’s actually working.

But some of these interactions are exceptionally enlightening. Someone reminded me of an old article I wrote, and after re-reading it, I had to thank my ghost.

Below, I will share the words I wrote seven years ago. I still agree with them, unfortunately. But my ghost tells me to get beyond reacting to the outwardly exhibited behavior of the system I’m critiquing and pull apart why it continues to decay.

Which leads me to share three thoughts as a preamble.

Any system of any kind, no matter how ingeniously constructed, is dying from the moment it is born. The better the design, the more naturally durable it will be. But only via watchful and proactive remediation can its decay be slowed and its useful life extended. This goes for governments and institutions, organizations, and processes of all kinds. The article below unpacks how Air Force colonels have gone from comprising the vanguard of combat aviation to acting as glorified day care attendants whose loss of influence is inversely relative to their need for official approval. The reason I return to the issue after seven years to find it in worse condition is that nothing has been done in the interim to arrest the decay.

If colonels are generally gutless, it’s because the Air Force wants them to be. Every colonel started as an open-slate Lieutenant, responding to organizational incentives to build a career and a body of work defining their professional identity. If being operationally obsessed and driven by taking care of airmen got colonels promoted, everyone would exhibit such qualities. Since the Air Force incentivizes fawning minionism, everyone figures out what is politically fashionable and then notoriously flies the approved banner. One way to understand the unfolding DEI backlash is from the perspective of airmen who have been shuttled from pillar to post for 30 years, herded constantly to the next social shaping project. This reflects how military life has become a mirror for the constantly shifting faddishness of electoral politics. The services shift emphasis to maintain political approval, but will dependably go too far, flogging key messages until they collapse as a dead horse, then bludgeoning the horse. Colonels were once the umbrella shielding airmen from as much bullshit as possible. Now, they’re chain-feeding the bullshit cannons trained on the rank-and-file.

Dennis Blair: Pentagon purge a sign of dangerous times ahead

Dennis Blair

Former commander in chief of the US Pacific Command, Dennis Blair, delivers a speech at a conference of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF) in Tokyo on April 13, 2015.

The Trump administration’s recent Department of Defense leadership changes are unprecedented in their scale and riskiness. Far from bringing fresh and smart perspectives to national security, they are most likely to weaken the combat effectiveness of the armed forces at a dangerous time for the United States.

A diverse officer corps at all ranks produces higher combat effectiveness because it is drawn from a wider and deeper talent pool. The armed forces have learned over the years that not all the best military leaders are white males, and that we need to draw from the best leadership talent in the 35 percent of Americans who are not white and the 50 percent who are not male.

The armed forces bring in the best people they can attract at the start of the very competitive merit-based “up or out” promotion system. The larger the talent pool from which the entrants are drawn at the bottom, the better will be the leaders at all levels through the very top four-star positions.

Trump’s Missile Defense Initiative: A Strategic Imperative for the United States

Casey Christie

President Donald Trump has signed an executive order directing his Secretary of Defense to develop a missile defense system for the United States. He has given the Pentagon 60 days to draft a plan. Predictably, the announcement has sparked debate, with some questioning its feasibility, others drawing comparisons to past initiatives like Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or “Star Wars,” and some suggesting it mirrors Israel’s Iron Dome. But none of these comparisons fully capture the reality of what is needed. This initiative is not a resurrection of SDI, nor is it an attempt to replicate Israel’s Iron Dome. Instead, it represents a hybrid approach suited to contemporary threats – one that integrates emerging technologies with existing capabilities to fill a critical gap in US defense strategy.

Much of the initial criticism of the plan is reflexive rather than analytical. Historically, missile defense has been dismissed as unworkable – until it wasn’t. When Israel first announced its intent to develop Iron Dome, many experts said it was impractical, too expensive, or unnecessary and doomed to fail. Yet today, Iron Dome has intercepted thousands of rockets and fundamentally reshaped the battlefield. Had Israel heeded early skepticism, it would be far more vulnerable to Hezbollah and Hamas barrages.

The broader issue is not just about whether the US should develop this system, but why it hasn’t done so already.

But this is not about copying Iron Dome. The threats facing the United States are different. Unlike Israel, which contends with short-range rocket attacks, the US must defend against ICBMs, hypersonic missiles, and long-range strategic strikes. Hypersonic weapons, in particular, present an immense challenge. Moving at speeds beyond Mach 5, they are difficult to track and intercept. Unlike conventional ballistic missiles, which follow predictable trajectories, hypersonic glide vehicles can maneuver mid-flight, evading current defense systems. While the US military is already researching potential countermeasures – including directed energy weapons and next-generation interceptors – it still lacks a comprehensive defense against these emerging threats. Meanwhile, China and Russia are already deploying operational hypersonic capabilities.

The Geography of American Power

Michael Pezzullo

The United States is a secure power. Situated in a hemispheric citadel, and protected by wide oceans, the U.S. could comfortably withdraw from being the arbiter of the geopolitical fate of Eurasia and still enjoy a significant margin of security. Such a U.S. could still project power around the globe. However, it would do so selectively, in the pursuit of narrowly defined interests and objectives. It would need few, if any, allies. It would remain a powerful global economic actor—fuelled by a massive domestic market, deep private wealth, leading edge innovation, and high population growth.

A locationally withdrawn U.S. would have to be willing to accept the risk of the likely emergence of a hegemonic power in Eurasia. Such a hegemon would be able to establish strategic and military dominion over the population, resources, markets, infrastructure, and polities of Eurasia – from Vladivostok in Pacific Russia to Lisbon in Portugal, and from Nordkapp in Norway to Cape Town in South Africa. It could do so by way of intimidation, coercion, and leverage, where this was necessary. However, such sharp strategies would not be necessarily needed in significant measure. Many nations of Eurasia would probably resign themselves to a new strategic reality, as they came to accept, over time, the reality of economic and military overlordship.

Such a hegemon would become the leading global power. The goal of ‘making America great again’ would ring hollow in a world where a Eurasian hegemon dominated the heartland of the world, and where it could almost always deliver a ‘better deal’ to nations under its dominion—whether or not they were pleased with the terms of the deal.

Inside The Ukraine-US Minerals Deal (It’s Not What You Might Think) – Analysis

Mike Eckel

Think the deal announced between Kyiv and Washington regarding Ukraine’s valuable rare minerals is a big deal?

Read between the lines. Or the fine print. Or both.

The agreement — technically a framework for a deal, not an actual legally binding contract — was hailed by U.S. President Donald Trump as a “very big deal,” and he said it would “recoup” some of the billions of dollars of weaponry and aid Washington has provided Ukraine in its defense against Russia’s all-out invasion.

For his part, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who was scheduled to be in Washington on February 28 to sign the papers, described it as “framework agreement” and said it would help ensure U.S. support for Ukraine’s continued fight.

“This deal could be a great success, or it could pass quietly,” Zelenskyy told a news conference on February 26. “And big success depends on our conversation with President Trump.”

Busting the top myths about AI and energy efficiency 

Josh Parker

The rapid growth of AI in recent years has sparked an unprecedented rush of investment in data centers worldwide to develop the next generation of algorithms, fueling concerns that running these systems will push the world toward an energy crisis.

However, to determine the true impact of AI on global energy consumption, consider the full picture: 

AI computing still makes up a tiny slice of the world’s energy consumption. Data centers accounted for about 2 percent of energy-related carbon emissions in 2022, according to the International Energy Agency—and today, not all data centers run AI.
AI, powered by rapidly advancing accelerated computing technology, is becoming much more energy efficient every year.
AI delivers insights and results that can increase energy efficiency in the domains that use energy the most—including energy generation, manufacturing, transportation, and residential heating and cooling.

Recent advancements in AI and accelerated computing have enabled developers to harness more computational capabilities while using less energy. Some—in climate science, financial services, and healthcare—already are. But to achieve widespread adoption, it’s critical to separate misconceptions from reality. 

Hybrid AI and Human Red Teams: Critical to Preventing Policies from Exploitation by Adversaries

David Bray

Red Cell

Despite the widespread belief among policymakers that geopolitical considerations alone are sufficient when developing technology policies and export controls, this view overlooks three crucial vulnerabilities that pose substantial risks to U.S. national security.

First, the accelerating pace of technological advancement has outpaced traditional geopolitical analysis frameworks. Just as the advent of steam engines created opportunities for new types of crime, like train robberies, today’s technology policies, intended to protect U.S. technologies from exploitation, can be weaponized by adversaries—creating vulnerabilities more severe than the original threats they aimed to address.

Second, rigorous analysis of adversaries’ capabilities in the formation of tech policies—a capability that was once a cornerstone of national security decisionmaking—has eroded. During the Cold War, the National Security Council (NSC) ultimately excelled at anticipating how adversaries might exploit U.S. tech policies, but recent decisions suggest this critical perspective is no longer a high priority—leaving the United States increasingly vulnerable to unintended consequences.

Relearning the Timeless Lessons of Land Operations in Asia

Rick Blank and Tyler Patterson

In June 2024, our unit—2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment—had a unique opportunity: we were directed to execute the first combat training center rotation forward in the Indo-Pacific. Not long ago, this would have been impossible—the Army’s premier training environments were only found at sprawling, fixed sites in California, Louisiana, and Germany. But the creation of the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center–Exportable, a capability that enables realistic training in theater, opens the door for Army, joint, and partner forces to test themselves against the particular challenges of the Pacific region. Those challenges are manifold, but we discovered important historical continuities.

As we captured our lessons learned it became clear these were the same things battalions learned during key periods of World War II—like the seizure of Luzon in 1945—and even farther back during the Spanish-American War. The experience reinforced the value of this training, not only in the strategic and operational imperatives it achieves, but in the way that it reacquaints our ground troops with the timeless challenges of land war in Asia.

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