4 March 2025

Taiwan Faces China Threats From Sea and Cyber


While much of the world’s attention in recent weeks has been on Europe, and the U.S. tilt to Russia in its pursuit for an end to the war in Ukraine, tensions remain high in a hotspot on the other side of the globe: Taiwan.

Officials in China and Taiwan are tracking the situation in Ukraine with a focus on how the Trump administration’s approach there might signal a U.S. response in the event of a conflict with China. But in many ways, the self-governing island, which is claimed by Beijing, is feeling the heat right now. Taiwan’s defense ministry said Wednesday that China’s People’s Liberation Army had begun unannounced life-fire naval drills off Taiwan’s southwestern coast. The ministry said the “shooting drills” – just 40 nautical miles from the Taiwanese municipality of Kaohsiung – endanger commercial aviation and shipping, and “present an open provocation to regional security and stability.”

The Taiwan Fixation

Jennifer Kavanagh and Stephen 

The fate of Taiwan keeps American policymakers up at night, and it should. A Chinese invasion of the island would confront the United States with one of its gravest foreign policy choices ever. Letting Taiwan fall to Beijing would dent Washington’s credibility and create new challenges for U.S. military forces in Asia. But the benefits of keeping Taiwan free would have to be weighed against the costs of waging the first armed conflict between great powers since 1945. Even if the United States prevailed—and it might well lose—an outright war with China would likely kill more Americans and destroy more wealth than any conflict since the Vietnam War and perhaps since World War II. Nuclear and cyber weapons could make it worse, bringing destruction on the U.S. homeland. These would be catastrophic consequences for the United States.

As terrible as a U.S.-Chinese war would be, an American president would face immense pressure to fight for Taipei. Many U.S. policymakers are convinced that Taiwan, a prosperous democracy in a vital region, is worth protecting despite the daunting price of doing so. Political calculations may also push a U.S. president into war. By staying out, the president could expect to be blamed not only for permitting the economic meltdown that China’s invasion would trigger but also for losing Taiwan after a decades-long battle of wills between Washington and Beijing over the island’s future. That would doom a president’s legacy. Against such a certainty, any chance of salvaging the situation could look like a better bet—and by opting to fight China to protect Taiwan, the president would preserve the possibility of going down in history as a great wartime victor. In the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson faced a choice between ramping up a U.S. military campaign in Vietnam and allowing the Communists to take over the country. He doubted that a war was necessary or winnable. But he sent American soldiers all the same.

China's Economy Is in Deep Trouble | Opinion

Gordon G. Chang

"Growing pains."

That's how Harvard scholar Keyu Jin describes the problems afflicting the world's second-largest economy. "China's economic woes," she writes in Nikkei Asia, "are less a sign of stagnation and more akin to growing pains—inevitable hurdles on the path of transformation."

Yes, every economy faces difficulties, especially developing ones. But China's are intractable. Because Xi Jinping is determined to take the country in an unsustainable direction, China is entering, as some call it, a "doom loop."

"China's economy is confronting a crisis unlike any it has experienced since it opened its economy to the world more than four decades ago," the New York Times reported in September.

Why is the crisis so severe? For starters, China is currently having its 2008 downturn.

In 2008, China's President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao decided they would not allow the economy to suffer, so they embarked on perhaps the biggest stimulus program in history.

The result was historic overbuilding, and the country now has too much of almost everything. For instance, He Keng, a former senior statistics official, in 2023 publicly revealed that China had enough vacant apartments to house the entire population of 1.4 billion people. He noted that some believed that empty homes could hold three billion.

China versus America on global trade

Roland Rajah & Ahmed Albayrak

The impact of tariffs

Limited growth in China’s imports also highlights that its deepening trade relationships largely reflect China’s growing dominance as a source of imports for other economies, rather than as a source of demand for other economies’ exports. Almost 80 per cent of economies imported more from China than from the United States in 2023. Conversely, the United States has become an even more important source of demand for other economies’ exports, reflecting a strong US economy but also the impact of its tariff hikes on China, which has led the United States to import a lot more from other economies instead, especially Mexico and Vietnam. Based on the latest data, the United States remains a larger export destination than China for more than half of all economies.

However, the impact of tariffs on trading relationships and US–China economic competition is complex. In one sense, tariffs have strengthened America’s importance as an export destination. In another sense, the tariffs also mean China is exporting more to other economies, both as alternative markets and as an indirect way of exporting to the United States via parts and components going into products ultimately destined for America.

Deterring Chinese Aggression: Theoretical Approaches for the South China Sea

Nathan Jennings

Introduction

The requirement for the United States and its allies to deter Chinese territorial aggression in the South China Sea region remains an enduring feature of the strategic environment. While this imperative emerges from the clear necessity to safeguard political stability in an area of global economic interest, it also incurs the risk that miscalculations, misinterpretations, or missteps could catalyze catastrophic military outcomes between nuclear powers. Given the potential cost of escalation associated with more direct military interventions, US leaders should employ theoretical concepts relating to coercive deterrence, indirect approaches, and sea power strategies to understand how to influence Chinese behavior in ways that accommodate the reality of the strategic environment while allowing avenues for negotiation and de-escalation.

This integration of theoretical concepts, so long as they remain practical and relevant, offers opportunity to better understand both the problem of Chinese aggression and potential solutions. As argued by the Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz in his seminal treatise, On War, “the primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and entangled.” In this sense, US and coalition leaders can employ abstract theories to conceptualize and refine military strategies in order to apply graduated deterrence that avoids uncontrolled escalation. This requirement, which occurs within a commercial context where conflict could have global ramifications, becomes critical concerning the threat to Taiwanese autonomy and Japanese and Filipino offshore sovereignty.

China’s use of export controls

Meia Nouwens, Maria Shagina & Erik Green

Against the backdrop of intensifying United States–China competition over technology, China has over the last six months shifted its strategy from using informal trade bans and symbolic legal and regulatory changes to actively imposing export controls. In doing so, Beijing is signaling that it has spent considerable time identifying its national economic strengths, weaknesses and exposure to US sanctions, and now is more confident in itself as an equal competitor against the US. While elements of China’s approach can be seen as emulating the United States’ export controls against Chinese technology companies, there are unique aspects to China’s strategy too – such as the creation of an economic early-warning system.

These moves should be understood within the wider context of China’s attempts to both enhance its national resilience and self-reliance in sectors that are central to economic growth and US–China competition as well as bolster its ability to use offensive tools against its adversaries. For now, this strategy looks to be directed mostly at the US as China seeks to rebuild its relationship with Europe while transatlantic relations are fracturing in the background. However, the extraterritorial nature of Chinese export controls means collateral damage is possible and US allies could also find themselves in the crosshairs of China’s new strategy.

It’s not just Salt Typhoon: All China-backed attack groups are showcasing specialized offensive skills

Matt Kapko

Cyberattacks carried out by China-backed nation-state actors surged last year, showcasing technical advancements and specialized targeting in a broader escalation of the country’s ability to infiltrate global critical infrastructure, CrowdStrike said in an annual threat report released Thursday.

“After decades of investment into China’s offensive capabilities, they’re now on par with other world powers,” Adam Meyers, senior vice president of counter adversary operations at CrowdStrike, said during a media briefing.

China-linked intrusions jumped a “terrifying” 150% across all sectors in 2024 compared to 2023, Meyers said. The most significant increases were in financial services, media, manufacturing, industrials and engineering, sectors that experienced triple or quadruple the amount of China-related intrusions compared to the previous year.

CrowdStrike observed significant growth in China’s offensive cyber capabilities last year, with more nation-state-backed threat groups using specialized skills to target specific industries and technologies unique to those sectors.

Israel’s Peace With Egypt Is Starting to Crack

Steven A. Cook

In this extended moment of history, events that were once unimaginable now regularly come to pass—and another item may soon join the list. Middle East analysts have started to ask whether the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty is durable. The last 16 months of war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip have added new tension to a relationship that has often been under public strain.

During previous dust-ups between Egypt and Israel, officials in both countries went to great lengths to ensure the integrity of the treaty. That could be changing.

The New Space Race Is Here — And America Needs a Strategy

George Landrith

As America’s adversaries make significant strides in their space programs, it has become abundantly clear that the United States needs a reliable space strategy to maintain its leadership on the global stage.

Without a coherent plan, its national security — both through military and diplomatic power — could be placed at severe risk.
China’s Stunning Progress

China’s steady march toward space supremacy is becoming a major concern for the US.

A recently published New York Times report highlighted the incredible advancements of China’s space program.

While other nations’ spaceflight plans have faced years of delays, it noted, China completed the assembly in orbit of its Tiangong space station “only 22 months later than planned.”

US Space Force staff director Lt. General Nina Armagno described this progress as “stunning – stunningly fast.”

More alarmingly, the 2022 State of the Space Industrial Base report warned that China could become the dominant nation in space as early as 2045.

Only Credible Deterrence Can Assure Lasting Peace

Mike Cotรฉ

One of the major themes of the 2024 Trump presidential campaign was his focus on ending the global conflicts that had characterized the Biden administration. For Trump’s campaign, labeling Biden as a pro-war president was a serious point of distinction, as voters favorably compared the general overseas calm of the first Trump term with the chaos of the Biden years. From 2016 onward, Trump’s purported dealmaking acumen as a successful businessman has been one of his primary selling points, especially in the realm of foreign affairs. He promised to bring this skill to bear on the wars raging in Eastern Europe and the Middle East during the election, and electorally it seems to have worked. Now that Trump is back in the Oval Office, these peacemaking promises will be put to the test. Peace sounds good, but the question remains: at what cost?

Ending wars is good. It immediately saves lives and ends catastrophic destruction, allowing for some semblance of normalcy to return. But peace can be temporary, as well as counterproductive, especially if it sets the stage for further conflict in the future or gives up overwhelming concessions along the way. A bad peace that does not sufficiently deter future conflict will, over the long run, only precipitate future violence as our foes come to see us as a paper tiger, all too ready to abandon our allies for momentary political gain. It is far better to have a more drawn-out conflict that ends in a lasting peace than a shorter one that will simply resume in a few years.

How Might the United States Engage with China on AI Security Without Diffusing Technology?

Karson Elmgren

Given the transnational risks posed by AI, the safety of AI systems, wherever they are developed and deployed, is of concern to the United States. Since China develops and deploys some of the world's most advanced AI systems, engagement with this U.S. competitor is especially important.

The U.S. AI Safety Institute (AISI)—a new government body dedicated to promoting the science and technology of AI safety—is pursuing a strategy that includes the creation of a global network of similar institutions to ensure AI safety best practices are “globally adopted to the greatest extent possible.”

As with cooperation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War on permissive action links (PALs), a technology for ensuring control over nuclear weapons, the United States may again wish to keep its competitors safer to assure its own safety. The PALs case also shows how a track record of engagement between subject matter experts can be critical to enabling cooperation later. However, as with PALs, care must be taken to make sure that in helping make Chinese AI safer, the United States does not also help it advance its AI capabilities. For this purpose, the safer bet may be avoiding cooperation on technical matters and focusing instead on topics such as risk management protocols or incident reporting.

Big Ideas and Big Money: Think Tank Funding in America

Ben Freeman and Nick Cleveland-Stout

Introduction

Think tanks play an enormous role in influencing U.S. public opinion and public policy. Think tank scholars are often the subject matter experts you see on television, hear on the radio, and see quoted in the nation’s top print media outlets. Largely outside of public view, they advise Congress and the executive branch on pending legislation, write questions for congressional hearings, testify at those hearings, and even help draft legislation. While think tank scholars can play an important role as independent researchers, some think tank work more closely resembles public relations and lobbying than research.

Think tanks are increasingly reliant on special interests and governments — both the U.S. and foreign governments — for funding. A growing body of evidence suggests that funding often comes with strings attached, leading to censorship, perspective filtering and, in rare cases, even outright pay-for-research arrangements with donors. Donors are often aware of these benefits. As one internal report from a foreign government noted: “Funding powerful think tanks is one way to gain such access, and some think tanks in Washington are openly conveying that they can service only those foreign governments that provide funding.”1

Palantir Publishes “The Defense Reformation” - A Blueprint for the Resurrection of the American Industrial Base

Shyam Sankar

Around 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, China militarized the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, and Iran was allowed to pursue the bomb. A decade later, we have had more than 300 attacks on U.S. bases by Iran, 1,200 people slaughtered in a pogrom in Israel, an estimated 1 million casualties in brutal combat in Ukraine, and an unprecedented tempo of CCP phase zero operations in the Taiwan Straits.

This is a hot Cold War II. The West has empirically lost deterrence. We must respond to this emergency to regain it.

We have a peer adversary: China. “Near-Peer” is a shibboleth, a euphemism to avoid the embarrassment of acknowledging we have peers when we were once peerless. In World War II, America was the best at mass production. Today that distinction belongs to our adversary. America’s national security requires a robust industrial base, or it will lose the next war and plunge the world into darkness under authoritarian regimes. In the current environment, American industries can’t produce a minimum line of ships, subs, munitions, aircraft, and more. It takes a decade or two to deliver new major weapon systems at scale. If we’re in a hot war, we would only have days worth of ammunition and weapons on hand. Even more alarming is our lack of capacity and capability to rapidly repair and regenerate our weapon systems.

Israel's military failed to protect civilians, first report on 7 October attack says

Paul Adams

Israel's military has published its first official account of the mistakes that led to its failures during Hamas's 7 October 2023 attack, which triggered the Gaza war.

The report concludes that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) "failed in its mission to protect Israeli civilians".

The 19-page report contains much that is already known about what led to catastrophic loss of about 1,200 lives when approximately 5,000 gunmen from Hamas and other Palestinian groups stormed into Israel, also taking 251 hostages in the process.

There are no dramatic revelations, but it is still sobering to see the military's conclusions about how it misjudged Hamas's intentions and underestimated its capabilities laid out in black and white.
The report says the military regarded Gaza as a secondary security threat, with priority given to Iran and Hezbollah. Its policy towards Gaza, it says, was "paradoxical: Hamas was illegitimate, yet there was no effort to develop an alternative".

The military had chosen a "conflict management" approach to dealing with Gaza, it says. And had assumed that Hamas was "neither interested [in] nor preparing for a large-scale war" - a perception reinforced by Hamas's own deception tactics.

Could Ukraine Minerals Deal Help US Escape China's Chokehold?

Micah McCartney

President Donald Trump is set to meet Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky in Washington, D.C., on Friday to sign a new deal on critical minerals, an effort to reduce U.S. reliance on China for key resources.

The agreement will see Ukraine and the U.S. jointly develop Ukraine's vast reserves of strategic materials, with 50 percent of the revenue from critical minerals, oil, natural gas, and other resources flowing into a U.S. fund.

While Trump has framed the deal as repayment for the military and humanitarian aid provided to Ukraine since 2022, Zelensky has pushed back on that idea, saying that Kyiv will not accept even "10 cents of debt repayment."

The U.S. Eyes Ukraine's Resource Wealth

The U.S. heavily depends on imports for materials essential to defense, energy, and high-tech industries, making a steady supply from a friendly partner such as Ukraine an attractive alternative to China. Washington has long viewed China's dominance in global minerals markets as a national security threat and has in recent years worked toward diversifying its supply chains.

The Uncertainty Surrounding Russia’s War in Ukraine, Three Years In

Eric Ciaramella, Michael Kofman, Aaron David Miller, Alexandra Prokopenko, and Andrew S. Weiss

Aaron David Miller: If you were briefing [Trump administration officials], what do they need to know about Putin’s and Zelensky’s strategies and mindset as we enter the fourth year of the war?

Andrew Weiss: From my standpoint, the administration needs to understand that there are two big drivers of Russian actions in Ukraine.

At the time the war began, Putin was being an opportunist and really thought that he could replicate the Taliban’s success and engineer a takeover of Ukraine where the government would be decapitated, the military wouldn’t fight, and the world would have to adjust to new facts on the ground. That clearly didn’t happen. And since then, the Russians haven’t totally given up on those goals. But in the meantime, they’ve been trying to grind down Ukraine and wait out the United States and our Western partners.

And there’s been a sense of confidence on the Russian side for the past twelve-plus months that things are cutting their way. There’s been political transformation in the United States. There’s been questions of whether the war is sustainable for the United States and Europe, practically, in terms of the kinds of unbelievable military support we’ve provided to the Ukrainians, to the tune of tens of billions of dollars. And there’s dynamics on the ground, where Russia, just by leveraging mass and singularity of purpose, has been able to show that time is not necessarily on Ukraine’s side.

Trump signals more firings of military leaders

Paul McLeary

President Donald Trump, in a continued effort to replace Pentagon officials, hinted his administration would fire the military leaders involved in the American withdrawal from Afghanistan.

“They’re going to be largely gone,” he said Wednesday during his first cabinet meeting, with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth by his side. “I’m not going to tell this man what to do,” he said, turning to Hegseth. “But I will say that if I had his place, I’d fire every single one of them.”


Former President Joe Biden ordered the American military to quickly evacuate in August 2021 after the Taliban overran the Afghan army and poured into the capital, Kabul. Dozens of U.S. military transport planes ferried panicked Afghan allies out. A suicide bomb killed 13 service members and about 170 Afghan civilians, only making the chaotic scene at the airport worse.

The withdrawal was the culmination of plans to reduce the military’s presence in Afghanistan, which the first Trump administration launched after negotiations with the Taliban.

The Pentagon’s joint requirements process must go

Bill Greenwalt and Dan Patt 

A wave of efficiency talk has arrived in Washington, epitomized by the Department of Government Efficiency now roaming the halls of the Pentagon. But as policymakers examine how government actually functions, it’s becoming clear that the goal shouldn’t merely be cost savings, but higher competence.

One glaring example stands ready for immediate action: the Pentagon’s sclerotic joint requirements process. In a new Hudson Institute report, “Required to Fail,” we outline the need to immediately put this process out of its misery.

For over two decades, the Defense Department has labored under a bureaucratic ritual known as JCIDS — the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. Created with noble intentions, this process has devolved into a crushing administrative burden that actively impedes America’s military modernization. Far from ensuring strategic alignment or joint warfighting capabilities, JCIDS has become a bureaucratic priesthood fixated on formatting, enthralled by committees, and divorced from tangible warfighting needs.

The numbers tell a damning story. It takes over two years just to get a military requirement approved through this system. During that time, technology evolves, threats advance, and opportunities evaporate. While China rapidly fields new capabilities, and commercial technology cycles span mere months, America’s military remains trapped in endless document reviews and formatting refinements.

Hezbollah’s Defeat and Hamas’s Dogged Resistance: Israel’s Two-Front War and the Perils of Prewar Assumptions

Harrison Morgan

“We have only to kick in the door, and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.” Hitler’s famous declaration prior to invading the Soviet Union illustrates how reality can shatter prewar expectations. But coming on the heels of the German Army’s blitzkrieg into Paris and the sudden collapse of the French Army after six weeks of fighting, why would he doubt Germany’s ability to defeat Stalin’s forces given Russia’s humiliating withdrawal in World War I, the devastation of Stalin’s purges, and the Red Army’s poor performance in the 1939 Winter War against Finland? He evidently did not. Yet, despite massive early losses, the Soviet Union not only survived but would demolish Hitler’s army and emerge as one of the world’s two superpowers by the war’s end.

Similarly, Israel’s two-pronged war against Hamas and Hezbollah has produced outcomes few expected. Before the conflict, Israeli military leaders assessed Hezbollah as the greater strategic threat. The group fielded an estimated forty to fifty thousand active fighters, with another forty thousand in reserve, and possessed as many as two hundred thousand rockets, including long-range precision missiles capable of striking deep into Israel. Hezbollah also had extensive combat experience in Syria, where its fighters spent years battling rebel forces to support the regime of Bashar al-Assad. In contrast, Hamas had a smaller force of approximately twenty-five thousand fighters, an arsenal of between eighteen and thirty thousand mostly short-range rockets, and significantly less battlefield experience.
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Europe Has To Choose: Maintain An Abusive Relationship Or Break With US – OpEd

John Feffer

Donald Trump has always presented himself as a master builder, a successful real estate developer who erected office buildings and resorts and curated golf courses all around the world. In reality, Trump was never a good businessman, declaring bankruptcy six times over his career and producing a string of failed enterprises from Trump Airlines to Trump University.

It turns out that Trump’s singular talent is not construction, but destruction. Now in his second term as US president and no longer constrained by the team of “adults” he answered to in 2017, Trump is taking a sledgehammer to everything in sight. He has put into practice the slogan of Silicon Valley, eagerly embraced by his close friend Elon Musk: “move fast and break things”. Yet this is not the “creative destruction” of an evolving capitalism. More often than not, Trump engages in uncreative destruction, breaking things and leaving them broken, as he is currently doing with the US government.

Now, he is threatening to do the same to the rules-based international order, beginning with the transatlantic alliance with Europe the United States has maintained for over 75 years. If Trump gets his way, NATO will lie in ruins, Ukraine and a number of former Soviet states will be once again satellites of Moscow, and the European Union will have come apart at the seams, thanks to Trump’s encouragement of far-right allies like the Alternative fรผr Deutschland in Germany, Fidesz in Hungary, and the National Rally in France. The geopolitical gloves are off.

RFE/RL Obtains Copy Of US-Ukraine Minerals Deal

Ray Furlong 

The text of the deal begins by noting that Washington “has provided significant financial and material support to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion.”

But it makes no mention of Washington’s demand for a right to $500 billion in potential revenue from accessing Ukraine’s mineral wealth that was seen in an earlier draft of the deal.

This was a point that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeatedly said was unacceptable.

No Security Guarantees for Ukraine

The agreement does not include firm U.S. security pledges. But it does say that the United States “supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees.”

It also says that Washington “will maintain a long-term financial commitment to the development of a stable and economically prosperous Ukraine.”

Beyond these general statements, the main body of the agreement concerns the establishment of a jointly owned Reconstruction Investment Fund. Ukraine has agreed to put 50 percent of future revenues from its government-owned natural resources into the fund.

Why Have ‘Rare Earths’ Become A Critical Issue In Bid To End Russian-Ukrainian War? – Analysis

P. K. Balachandran

Trumps needs Ukrainian and Russian rare earths to make American industries grow in competition with China’s.

Certain elements known as “rare earths” have become critical in the search for a way to end the Russo-Ukrainian war that has been going on for three years without an end in sight.

The unconventional US President, Donald Trump, had thought of a unique way of ending the war – by doing a deal with Ukraine and Russia that would benefit all three parties- Ukraine, Russia and the United States.

Under the deal, the US would be given access to rare earth deposits in Ukraine and Russia in return for trade and economic cooperation that would boost all three economies and, in the process, bring the curtains down on the war, that has been adversely affecting all three countries.

Both Ukraine and Russia have given their nod to discuss the deal. But both have unresolved security issues to be addressed. Trump has not shared his ideas on these security issues so far, though his top officials have indicated what they might be. The officials endorse Russia’s stand which Ukraine has rejected.

Russia Fears Losing Its T-14 Armata Tank in Ukraine

Maya Carlin

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine commenced back in February 2022, both Kyiv and Moscow have deployed a range of main battle tanks (MBTs) including Soviet-era designs and even World War II relics. While neither country’s fleet of armored vehicles has fared well throughout the war, Russia’s tank stockpile has notably dwindled. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Moscow is losing tanks so quickly that it could completely deplete its supply by the end of 2026. The think tank estimated that Russian forces lost roughly 1,400 tanks in 2024, although Ukrainian officials put this number much higher. In addition to its decreasing tank fleet, Moscow has also lost a vast array of infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. Considering these abysmal numbers, some analysts have questioned why the Kremlin has not put forth its self-proclaimed top-tier T-14 Armata MBT series.

In the early days of its invasion, Russia lost hundreds of tanks in its attempts to capture Kyiv. Within six months, Moscow turned to its aging stocks of Cold War-era MBTs to make up for these shortcomings. From the WWII-era T-55 to the Soviet-made T-62, T-72, and T-80 armored vehicles, these outdated tanks showcase just how much the Russian armor corps has been forced to devolve back to the 1980s. Ukraine has received countless deliveries of Western ammo and anti-tank systems from the United States and its NATO allies since the start of the war. With these in tow, Russia’s tank fleet has been virtually decimated. These Cold War-era relics simply cannot stand a chance against HIMARS, Javelins, and ATACMS frequently deployed by Kyiv.


Guarding the Frontier: Options for a Post-Conflict Security Force in Ukraine

Benjamin Jensen

Whatever the outcome of the range of bilateral and multilateral talks surrounding Ukraine, one thing is clear: any lasting peace will require a demilitarized zone (DMZ) backed by an international military force. This zone could stretch over thousands of kilometers, traversing complex and hazardous terrain, including bombed-out cities and mine-laden fields. To ensure security, this force must not only act as a deterrent but also have the warfighting capability to counter potential Russian fait accompli attacks along the frontier. And the international force would need to be large enough to support ongoing military training missions integrating Ukraine deeper into the transatlantic security architecture.

Based on analyzing past military missions, the number of foreign troops required to support Ukrainian sovereignty, and security could range from a tripwire force of a battalion to a more doctrinal-sized force of over 100,000 soldiers. And this force will require additional air, naval, and space assets to cover air and maritime corridors Russia could use to launch a future preemptive attack. The security force required to truly safeguard the peace in Ukraine could be as large as the entire military of either Greece or Spain. In other words, peacekeeping in Ukraine has the potential to eclipse previous NATO missions in the Balkans in both its size and complexity.

A STANDALONE OSINT AGENCY FOR STRONGER NATIONAL SECURITY

DAVID GAUTHIER


WHAT IS OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE OR OSINT?

Intelligence Community definition. The recently released Intelligence Community (IC) OSINT Strategy states, “OSINT is intelligence derived exclusively from publicly or commercially available information that addresses specific intelligence priorities, requirements, or gaps.”1 
  • Generally, open-source intelligence (OSINT) can refer to a wide-range of information and sources that are free, public, and legal to access, including information obtained from the media, such as newspapers, television, and blogs, as well as from professional and academic records, and public government data – for example, government reports. 
  • OSINT purposefully excludes any data that requires privileged or classified access to government systems. 
History of OSINT in the IC. While the IC has historically gathered OSINT from foreign publications, its primary focus before 9/11 was on acquiring classified state secrets. Since these secrets were not publicly available online, the IC placed limited value on analyzing ‘open source’ information. It was only in 2005 that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) opened the Open-Source Center (OSC) in response to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations to improve the integration of information gleaned from both open and clandestine sources.2 Since then, the OSC has been generating unique value for intelligence reporting, and in 2015, it was moved into the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Directorate of Digital Innovation as the Open-Source Enterprise.