Indian Strategic Studies: 02/26/25

26 February 2025

Finding a Way Out of Festering Conflict in India’s Manipur

Introduction

Eight states comprise India’s north east, sharing more than 5,000km of borders with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, the Tibet Autonomous Region and Myanmar. While Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya, Sikkim, Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur are tiny compared to other Indian states, both in terms of size and population, they are rich in diversity, being home to more than 200 ethnic groups, most of them recognised as tribes under the Indian constitution. The region’s tribal composition sets it apart from the rest of India, as does its dominant religion: most of the population is Christian, having been converted by missionaries over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries.

This cultural and ethnic mosaic also led to the emergence of dozens of separatist insurgencies, many of which date back to the 1950s, in the immediate wake of India’s independence.1 Over the years, the Indian government has largely managed to contain these insurrections, at times through brutal means. Its use of military force to maintain control of these distant borderlands has created a groundswell of popular resentment of the centre.

Today, a separate homeland, the goal espoused by most of these insurgencies, seems a distant prospect. But many of the conflicts remain unresolved, making durable peace elusive. After wearing them down through military force, the Indian state has been pushing the rebel groups toward seeking compromise with New Delhi via democratic politics. The weaker ones have either signed peace agreements or remained dormant, while the more robust ones have been locked in prolonged negotiations with New Delhi. Even so, the spectre of insurgency continues to stalk the region, and violence can flare at the slightest provocation.

It's time to upgrade the EU-India relationship

Anunita Chandrasekar

India is clearly on the agenda of the new EU team. Ursula von der Leyen’s announcement on January 21st that the first trip of her new term would be to India, accompanied by the full college of Commissioners, builds on her 2022 statement that the relationship with India was one of the Union’s “most important for the coming decade”. This was echoed earlier this month by European Council President, António Costa, when he described India as one of the EU’s main global partners and said it was time to boost relations and “engage in a new strategic agenda”. Additionally, in her confirmation hearing, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas told the European Parliament that the EU’s relations with India had “so much unexplored potential”.

But despite the warm rhetoric, the EU-India relationship is currently much thinner than it could be. India has seen the EU as a trade bloc rather than a political actor, and has focused on developing bilateral relations with member-states, whilst senior EU officials, speaking privately, have acknowledged that “Europe knows too little about India”. In 2018 the EU released an embryonic strategy, ‘Elements for an EU strategy on India’. However, this lacked the strategic clarity of the EU’s 2019 joint communication on China, with its triptych of ‘partner, competitor, systemic rival’, and the Commission’s call for a more joined-up European approach remains unanswered. EU-India relations are currently governed by a 'roadmap' which, though broad, contains little that is operational and is due to be renegotiated in 2025. Shared concerns about dependencies on China and an increasingly polarised world should, however, push both parties to try to overcome the obstacles to closer co-operation.

Rebuilding Myanmar: A Needs-Based Approach To Post-Conflict Transformation – Analysis

Harry Myo Lin

As Myanmar likely will move toward a post-coup transition in 2025, rebuilding the nation requires a comprehensive and strategic approach. The country’s deep-seated divisions, economic instability, and social fragmentation call for a framework that addresses immediate humanitarian concerns and long-term peacebuilding.

By applying Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs to conflict transformation, this article provides policymakers and stakeholders with a structured understanding of how unmet needs fuel conflict and how fulfilling them can foster reconciliation and stability. Drawing from successful post-conflict examples in Aceh, South Africa, and Colombia, we outline practical applications that can guide Myanmar’s path to sustainable peace. From economic justice and governance reforms to interfaith dialogue and trauma healing, this article highlights how a needs-based approach can rebuild trust, empower communities, and ensure a democratic and inclusive Myanmar.

Lessons for Taiwan from the Russo-Ukrainian War

Taiwan has faced threats from China for decades, but the risk of invasion has grown significantly since Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has reshaped global geopolitics, offering valuable lessons for Taiwan’s national security. These lessons, however, must be adapted to Taiwan’s unique conditions, writes guest author Dr. Jyh-Shyang Sheu, Institute for National Defence and Security Research, in this HCSS paper.

Taiwan is actively reforming its military, civil defence, and technological capabilities. While progress has been made, gaps remain in addressing the threats posed by China. Effective deterrence and international cooperation, particularly with the United States, are critical. Yet, Taiwan’s geography poses challenges, including limited access to foreign aid during wartime and the need to counter peacetime grey-zone harassment.

Emerging technologies, such as unmanned vehicles, offer potential advantages but require tailored strategies and integration into Taiwan’s defence systems. Strengthening strategic communication with like-minded nations is also vital to counter China’s grey-zone tactics and deter a potential full-scale invasion. Overcoming these challenges swiftly is essential to safeguarding Taiwan’s security and stability in the region.

This paper is part of a series of guest contributions on the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, applicable to Taiwan. The research was made possible through a grant from the Taipei Representative Office in the Netherlands to the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS).

Taiwan’s Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry and Its Role in the International Supply Chain

Introduction

Semiconductor products have emerged as the cornerstone of modern technology. The world’s critical dependence on semiconductors was highlighted during the shortage following the COVID-19 pandemic. Semiconductors are the materials and substances that are the foundation of microchips, also known as integrated circuits (ICs). Without ICs, industries could not supply the demand for the technology that modern society is dependent on, such as phones, cars, household appliances, defense technology, and medical devices. ICs are of varying sizes, measured in nanometers (nm), which equip devices with different capacities. For instance, 40nm chips can be applied to central processing units (CPUs), graphic processors, and hard disk drives while 3nm chips have been utilized in MacBooks, iPhone 15 Pro, and iPad Pro models. These individual ICs are derived from a wafer. A wafer is a disc thinly sliced from a silicon rod mainly made of silicon extracted from sand.

This backgrounder aims to provide an overview of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, including its development and current role in the international semiconductor supply chain.

Trump, China, Russia: How Geopolitical Tensions Increase Cyber Risk

Phil Muncaster

The world’s business leaders are worried. Donald Trump’s return to power and the growing hostility of China and Russia are upending 80 years of international rules-based order. In its place is emerging a more chaotic and volatile world, where conflict is commonplace and state actor aggression online continues to escalate.

This is a challenging time to be a CISO. The risk of state-backed cyber-attacks and those of nationalist hacktivists and opportunistic cybercriminals continues to rise.

As does the potential for collateral damage.

Corporate security leaders will need to adapt rapidly to these changing circumstances, or risk being exposed by a ruthless new era of geopolitical tension.

Rising Global Tensions Spill into Cyber

Geopolitics runs throughout the 2025 assessment from the World Economic Forum (WEF), which produces an annual report on global risks devised from interviews with thousands of business leaders and risk experts.

According to the paper, the risk “most likely to present a material crisis on a global scale in 2025” is a “state-based armed conflict.”

American Tariff Wars Worsen Global Economic Prospects – OpEd

Dan Steinbock

US tariff wars have begun, broadening from US’s biggest trade partners to huge industry sectors, the EU and the entire world. The stakes are now global.

After the first Trump tariffs targeted the big US trade partners – Mexico, Canada and China – tariff threats are shifting from steel and aluminum to computer chips and pharmaceuticals, the European Union; even the world.

The US also has a major trade deficit with multiple trading economies, including Germany, Japan, South Korea and Vietnam, which are likely to be next in the firing line.

Tariff is a tax levied on imported goods and services. Yet, the Trump administration has shuffled aside concerns about these levies fostering inflation or snarling global supply chains. That’s a serious mistake. In the US, wholesale prices are already rising on higher food and energy costs, adding to the growing pile of bad inflation news ahead of more US tariffs. Internationally, these risks are real, costly, and huge.

China’s stabilizing economy

As the tariff wars begin, China’s economy has showed progressive signs of stabilization since the fourth quarter of 2024, as the impact of the November stimulus measures has kicked in. In the period, growth accelerated from 4.6% to 5.4% with annualized 5.0% last year. Hence, too, the recent upgrade of China’s GDP growth by the International Monetary Fund.

Beyond the Nuclear Balance: A Strategic Forces Net Assessment

Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.

INTRODUCTION

This net assessment addresses the balance of strategic forces between the United States and its two principal rivals, the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or “China”), and the Russian Federation (“Russia”). The assessment examines both the current balance and trends that will influence how the balance might shift over the planning horizon, defined here as the 2035–40 time frame. It also explores how the United States might improve its competitive position.

As Andrew W. Marshall, its originator, defined it, net assessment “is a careful comparison of U.S. weapon systems, forces, and policies in relation to those of other countries. . . . [It] is intended to be diagnostic. It will highlight . . . areas of comparative advantage with respect to our rivals.”5

What This Assessment Is Not

Marshall took pains to emphasize that net assessments are “not intended to provide recommendations as to force levels or force structures as an output.”6 Thus, for example, readers seeking detailed proposals of US strategic force levels will be disappointed. To employ a medical analogy, net assessments are intended to provide senior defense policymakers and military leaders with a diagnosis of the competitive environment as it exists today and as it may shift over time. As in the medical profession, arriving at an accurate diagnosis is essential to identifying the proper prescription with respect to force levels, mix, and posture as well as defense policy and program priorities.

Focus on the New Economy, Not the Old: Why China's Economic Slowdown Understates Gains

Gerard DiPippo

Today, one hears two narratives about China's economy. One is about economic decline, and the other is about China's growing economic and technological power.

China's economy has slowed substantially. Local governments are straining under debt burdens. The property sector has nearly collapsed. Consumer confidence is poor. External demand is a brittle support beam, as Western governments consider protectionist measures. China's GDP is no longer catching up to the United States.

China is also the top global manufacturer, leading exports of many goods, investing heavily in high-tech sectors, and innovating rapidly, with DeepSeek being just the latest example.

Although these narratives appear contradictory, both are true.

China's high-tech industries are only a small share of its total economy. Those high-tech sectors shaping the “new economy” are indeed growing, but they aren't large enough to offset overall weakness in the “old economy” weighing down key indicators like GDP growth.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping likely bears some of the blame for the macro slowdown. Beijing's plan to tackle property-sector debt was poorly signaled and didn't account for local fiscal impacts. Stimulus has been cautious. And the government's support for investors and entrepreneurs has been inconsistent.

Samuel Huntington Is Getting His Revenge

Nils Gilman

We stand at the cusp of a reordering moment in international relations as significant as 1989, 1945, or 1919—a generational event. As with these previous episodes, the end of the liberal international order that coalesced in the 1990s is a moment fraught in equal measure with hope and fear, as old certainties both bad and good evaporate. Such pivotal moments are ones where charismatic opportunists rather than competent operators shine.

At each of those previous inflection points, the old order had been going bankrupt slowly, before collapsing all at once. Though it wasn’t always clear to contemporaries, in retrospect we can see that the new order that would succeed in each case had long been in the works. In 1919, for example, the outlawing of war and the establishment of a parliament of nations had been on the table for decades; in 1918, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson had proposed “national self-determination” as the basis of qualification for a state (albeit only for white-led nations). In 1945, the idea of a reformed League of Nations with an effective security council had been planned from 1942 onwards—though the advent of nuclear weapons at the end of the war would change the calculus, ushering in the Cold War. And before 1989, the idea of a universal “liberal” or “rules-based” international order as an alternative to East/West and North/South power struggles had been proposed as far back as the 1970s.

Three Years On, What’s Next for Ukraine and Europe?

Daniel Fried, Ulrich Speck, Agathe Demarais, Nathalie Tocci, Garvan Walshe, C. Raja Mohan, Jo Inge Bekkevold, Mick Ryan, Keir Giles, and Stefan Theil

On the eve of the anniversary of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the United States has entered talks with Russia to settle the war—without Kyiv’s involvement or consent. This week, it became increasingly apparent that U.S. President Donald Trump seeks a deal largely on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s terms.

Trump also seems to have aligned with many of the Kremlin’s views—not just on Ukraine and its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, but also on Europe’s future security order. What’s more, Washington seems to be making common cause with Moscow by boosting the same illiberal European political movements and attacking the same European governments, most notably with the support U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance and social media titan Elon Musk have been giving the pro-Russian Alternative for Germany ahead of that country’s election on Sunday.

Where Does the U.S.-Ukraine Rare-Earth Deal Stand?

Christina Lu

The fate of a potential U.S.-Ukraine rare-earth deal looks increasingly uncertain after Kyiv balked last weekend at Washington’s draft proposal to exchange continued U.S. military support for half of Ukraine’s mineral resources.

U.S. policymakers care about rare-earth elements and other critical minerals and metals, such as titanium and gallium, because they underpin everything from advanced weapons systems to clean energy technologies. Yet China overwhelmingly commands the global supply chains for many of these resources, sparking a race in Washington to diversify away from Beijing’s grip.

Apple pulls data protection tool after UK government security row

Zoe Kleinman

Apple is taking the unprecedented step of removing its highest level data security tool from customers in the UK, after the government demanded access to user data.

Advanced Data Protection (ADP) means only account holders can view items such as photos or documents they have stored online through a process known as end-to-end encryption.

But earlier this month the UK government asked for the right to see the data, which currently not even Apple can access.

Apple did not comment at the time but has consistently opposed creating a "backdoor" in its encryption service, arguing that if it did so, it would only be a matter of time before bad actors also found a way in.

Now the tech giant has decided it will no longer be possible to activate ADP in the UK.

It means eventually not all UK customer data stored on iCloud - Apple's cloud storage service - will be fully encrypted.

Data with standard encryption is accessible by Apple and shareable with law enforcement, if they have a warrant.

Russia’s AI-Powered Cyberattacks Threaten to Outpace Western Defenses

Annie Fixler

Russia is increasingly leveraging artificial intelligence to refine its cyber espionage and enhance attack precision, warned Western officials at the Munich Security Conference this past weekend. Ihor Malchenyuk of Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection (SSSCIP) reported that Russia has also been using AI to process the vast amounts of data on Ukraine’s military and ordinary citizens — data that its hackers have stolen over the past few years. Russia’s use of AI as part of its cyberattacks on Ukraine likely indicates what the United States and its partners will face in the coming years.

Russia’s Evolving Cyberattacks on Ukraine

Cyberattacks have long been a feature of Russia’s war in Ukraine. In December 2024, for example, Russian cyberattacks on Ukraine’s state registries disrupted essential services for weeks. Last year, Ukrainian cyber defenders identified and mitigated 1,042 cyber incidents targeting government agencies and critical infrastructure. These operations continue to include espionage, psychological warfare, and financial theft. What is novel is that Russian hackers are increasingly targeting digital spaces critical to the success of their military operations, the SSSCIP reports. Previous reports, such as a July 2022 assessment from the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, noted a convergence in the timeline of cyber and kinetic attacks, but SSSCIP’s assessment is that there is also a convergence of mission. Russian hackers have also figured out how to compromise supposedly secure communication channels. Google researchers revealed on February 19 that Russian military intelligence cyber operatives have infiltrated Signal messenger accounts used by Ukrainian troops, including by working with Russian frontline military personnel to exploit captured devices, allowing them to monitor battlefield communications. Signal is widely regarded as a gold standard for secure messaging because of its end-to-end encryption and minimal data collection. Yet Russian hackers discovered workarounds. Google warned that the tactics Russia used to target Signal will likely “grow in prevalence in the near-term and proliferate to additional threat actors and regions outside the Ukrainian theater of war.”

Why No One Is Winning in Ukraine

Mick Ryan

Very few people predicted that a long, high-intensity war in Europe was possible in the twenty-first century. But for three bloody years, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has delivered exactly that. Hundreds of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians have died in the fighting. Many more have been injured. Entire towns have been reduced to ruin or cut apart by trenches, in a grim callback to World War I.

Now, the war in Ukraine has reached an apparent stasis. Russia continues to take small parcels of territory along the eastern front, but only by incurring unsustainably high casualties.

The breakdown of the CIA Agents can't cope with danger

Edward Luttwak

John Ratcliffe, Trump’s appointee as CIA director, says that he wants officers who are “willing to go to places no one else can go and do things that no one else can do”. This, one might have thought, is a straightforward enough description of any intelligence operative worth his keep, just as country analysts in Langley must be really fluent in foreign languages to do their jobs effectively. Certainly, Ratcliffe seems keen to employ only the best at the CIA, and has offered eight months of pay and benefits to those who prefer to leave.

Yet barely had Ratcliffe opened his mouth than he faced furious attack. The CIA’s carefully cultivated friends in the press — media relations, Hollywood included, are the agency’s outstanding skill — assailed the director and the White House for a dangerous misstep. “He might be right that a leaner CIA could be meaner,” proclaimed David Ignatius in The Washington Post. “But how can he be sure the buyouts aren’t paring more muscle than fat?” Actually one must hope that many, very many, will take their chance to leave. The sad truth, confirmed by my extended work for one CIA director and many encounters in the field, is that it lost its way years ago — and now increasingly relies on secrecy to conceal its decay.

Dealing with the World We Are In: Guidance for a Way Ahead

Robbin Laird

We are publishing four books this year which provide detailed assessments of the question of how did we get where we find ourselves today.

In addition, we are publishing assessments as well of aspects of shaping a way ahead, which provide a partial answer to how we leverage what we have in order to achieve what Western leaders determine we need to do in response to the rise of the multi-polar authoritarian dynamic.

There is one book which we are publishing that does both, even though it is rooted in explaining how we got to where we are in terms of the U.S. force structure.

That book is entitled: America, Global Military Competition, and Opportunities Lost: Reflections on the Work of Michael W. Wynne.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the West believed in the ascendency of liberal democracies. The United States became the sole superpower or hyper power and Western Europe celebrated a “peace dividend” and dismantled much of their defense capability.

Trump ‘Very Frustrated’ With Zelenskyy, US National Security Adviser Says

Merhat Sharipzhan and Ray Furlong

The White House national security adviser said that U.S. President Donald Trump is “obviously very frustrated” with Volodymyr Zelenskyy and urged the Ukrainian president to reach an agreement soon granting the United States access to Ukraine’s critical minerals.

The remarks from Michael Waltz came after Zelenskyy and Trump traded sharp criticism in recent days, with Trump calling Zelenskyy a “dictator” and suggesting he started the war with Russia — comments that caused concern in Ukraine and Europe and prompted pushback from some senior U.S. Republican lawmakers.

A day earlier, Zelenskyy rejected a proposal that would reportedly hand the United States $500 billion in mineral wealth, including rare-earth elements, as a form of payment for U.S. military and financial support for Kyiv’s defense against Russia’s full-scale invasion, which enters its fourth year next week.

“He needs to come back to the table,” Waltz said at a press conference at the White House on February 20.

Zelenskyy has pointed out that U.S. wartime aid so far was far less than that amount and that the U.S. proposal did not offer concrete security guarantees.

Endgame in Ukraine: Time for a Real Strategy

Siamak Naficy

Introduction

In recent weeks, President Donald Trump has actively engaged with multiple global crises, including brokering a ceasefire in Gaza, initiating talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and advocating for an end to the war in Ukraine. While some of his proposals, such as forcibly relocating Palestinians from Gaza or suggesting Canada join the U.S. as its 51st state, have been dismissed as unrealistic, his proactive approach raises a key question: Why has the Biden administration been so reluctant to pursue diplomatic solutions in Gaza and Ukraine, allowing Trump to position himself—rightly or wrongly—as a candidate for peace?

While there is no certainty that Trump’s diplomatic efforts will succeed—his plans for Gaza could further destabilize the region, and his outreach to Putin may not lead to concrete outcomes—the critical issue is not whether his initiatives will work, but that he is offering an alternative path. In contrast, the Biden administration has emphasized strengthening multilateral ties with allies like Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, while also leaning on figures with a history of interventionist policies. This has created a reluctance to push for an end to conflicts that have devastated civilians and destabilized entire regions.

Lessons Learned from the War in Ukraine Applicable to Taiwan: The Land Domain

The war in Ukraine has revived interstate warfare in the current strategic practice. This war illustrates the use of various old and new techniques in warfighting, employing both Western cutting-edge and Soviet-era equipment. Different innovations and adaptations have been witnessed across domains. Each war is unique, but it can provide some distilled lessons for learning about the ongoing trends in warfighting and the employment of new and old equipment. Although the experiences of the war in Ukraine are universal, each country selects a set of lessons suitable for their distinctive geopolitical location and strategic situation. This guest paper by Dr Viktoriya Fedorchak explores the lessons that can be learned from the land domain, focusing on the relevance for the potential Taiwan–China conflict.

Taking into consideration modern trends in warfighting, the Ukrainian experience of building fighting power in the land-centric war, asymmetric characteristics of the potential conflict between Taiwan and China and the distinctive features of Taiwanese military geography and military capabilities, this paper arrived at five primary points for consideration. This is not an exhaustive list. However, these considerations provide opportunities to strengthen one’s readiness and resilience of fighting power in various warfighting scenarios.

Securing Space: A Plan for U.S. Action

Nina M. Armagno and Jane Harman, Co-chairs

1. Make space a top national priority.

The U.S. president should demonstrate this commitment by convening a space summit in the first year of his administration and reassessing priorities to include whether to declare key space systems to be “critical infrastructure.” At a space summit, the United States should bring together signatories of the Artemis Accords, leading space companies, scientists, and other participants to reinforce the United States as the foremost spacefaring country. These efforts could emphasize the Trump administration’s commitment to secure space for national defense and global stability by protecting and enhancing U.S. assets in space, ground control centers, launch locations, and receiver nodes.

Regarding critical infrastructure, the Trump administration should bring together industry, experts, and policymakers to address this issue. An April 2024 National Security Memorandum stated, “Critical infrastructure comprises the physical and virtual assets and systems so vital to the Nation that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, or national public health or safety.”43 But despite the recommendation of the Department of Homeland Security, space was not included among the sixteen sectors deemed “critical” in the Biden administration’s 2024 policy review.44

A Self-Imposed AI Brain Drain

Kevin Frazier

Among the Trump administration’s designs to dismantle much of the federal government is a reported decision to fire all probationary employees at National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), including experts working on the implementation of the CHIPS and Science Act. Such a move would conflict with the president’s aspiration to “solidify our position as the global leader in AI.” China’s AI advancements and the EU’s AI investments threaten the U.S.’s lead in AI development and diffusion. Soon-to-be former NIST staff played a big role in building that initial lead. Their departure may hinder the nation’s ability to identify and seize the next opportunities to accelerate AI’s progress.

An Existing Talent Shortage

A dearth of AI talent among the federal workforce has long been cited as a barrier to AI policy development. Former Deputy U.S. Chief Technology Officer Lynne Parker, who contributed to AI policy development under the first Trump administration, warned of a talent “shortage” and lamented that many experts are lured to private labs by much higher wages. The Bipartisan Senate AI Working Group called for recruiting and retaining AI experts through the U.S. Digital Service (later co-opted by the so-called Department of Government Efficiency [DOGE] and rebranded as the U.S. DOGE Service) and other offices. Similarly, the Bipartisan House Task Force on Artificial Intelligence encouraged the development of more pathways for AI experts to join the government and supported more frequent upskilling opportunities for existing employees to develop AI knowledge. President Biden initiated an AI Talent Surge to try to make up for the broadly recognized lack of data scientists, software engineers, and computer scientists. The AI and Tech Talent Task Force responsible for overseeing that surge announced plans to hire more than 500 such experts between September 2024 and September 2025. As of October 2024, the White House reported having hired 250 AI practitioners.

Responsible AI and Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict

Daniel R. Mahanty & Kailee Hilt

Introduction

In the last annual report (2023) on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, the UN Secretary-General described the situation for civilians in armed conflict in the previous year as “resoundingly grim.” Over the course of 2022, thousands of civilians died and millions more suffered from the impact of wars.2 By the time of the report’s release in the spring of 2023, it appeared that the scope and severity of civilian harm in 2024 would be even worse. The report also arrived amid a growing crisis of public confidence in international humanitarian law, caused by the pervasive and wanton disregard for its principles exhibited by some states and the tepid compliance modelled by others — with a dearth of meaningful accountability on both sides. All the while, disparate levels of concern among Western states for civilians in Gaza, Sudan and Ukraine had led to charges of double standards and hypocrisy.

Against this backdrop (a mere six days after the release of the report), the United States published an updated version of its Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, replete with an expanded list of supporting states (US Department of State 2023). While the political declaration makes only one explicit reference to the goal of protecting civilians (and that made only in the context of the use of AI and autonomy), several of its elements serve that goal. By committing to use AI in adherence with international law, the declaration’s signatories agree to abide by those obligations under international humanitarian law serving to protect civilians (for example, distinction, proportionality and necessity), along with the relevant tenets of human rights law. With its reference to avoiding unintended bias, the declaration also infers the PoC from harm resulting from the biased interpretation of data (for instance, when distinguishing civilian or civilian objects from legitimate targets in military attacks).

New CLTC White Paper Explores the Impacts of Open RAN

Jon Metzler

“Radio access network (RAN) equipment refers to equipment in a wireless telecommunications system that provides the wireless access link with the customer handset (e.g., smartphones), and also manages radio resources,” Metzler explains in the report’s introduction. “The high levels of concentration in the RAN supplier market led network operators in multiple regions around the world to investigate Open RAN as a means of nurturing alternatives to current suppliers.”

Metzler’s paper on Open RAN was inspired in part by the April 2023 release of the National Security Council’s “Principles for 6G,” which stated that the 6G standard should be “open and resilient by design.” Additionally, Metzler observed that the 5G standard had reached widespread adoption (suggesting that 6G would be forthcoming), the U.S. Government was promoting broadband access and increasing RAN supplier diversity, and the National Telecommunications and Information Agency published an Open RAN Security Report. “In aggregate, these developments indicated that a robust assessment of Open RAN was timely— for network operators, for policymakers, and for network equipment suppliers themselves,” Metzler writes.

The geopolitical minefield of cyber warfare

Nikita Alexander

The digital realm has become a new battleground. No longer are geopolitical tensions confined to traditional warfare; they now spill over into cyberspace with increasing frequency and ferocity. Nation-state cyber threats, once a shadowy concern, have emerged as a significant and persistent risk, impacting businesses, critical infrastructure, and even democratic processes across the globe, particularly within the US, UK, and EU. This evolving landscape demands a heightened awareness and a proactive approach to cybersecurity.

A shifting paradigm, from espionage to disruption:

Historically, nation-state cyber activities were primarily focused on espionage – stealing sensitive information for strategic advantage. While this remains a concern, the focus has broadened significantly. We now see a rise in disruptive and destructive attacks aimed at causing chaos, undermining trust, and exerting political pressure. This shift is driven by several factors:

Increased interconnectedness: Our reliance on digital technologies has created a vast attack surface. From critical infrastructure like power grids and hospitals to financial systems and government networks, everything is potentially vulnerable. This interconnectedness means that an attack in one sector can have cascading effects across multiple sectors, amplifying the impact.
Lower barrier to entry: While sophisticated attacks require significant resources, the barrier to entry for less complex attacks has lowered. Nation-states can leverage readily available tools and even outsource some operations to hacktivist groups or criminal organizations, making attribution more difficult and adding a layer of deniability.
Geopolitical tensions: Rising geopolitical tensions, whether between established powers or regional rivals, often manifest in cyberspace. Cyberattacks offer a way to inflict damage without crossing the threshold of conventional warfare, making them an attractive tool for state actors.

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