25 February 2025

Bridging Continents: The Future Trajectory of India-EU Relations

Calvin Nixon

Introduction

The 2024 Indian elections were supposed to see Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi return to power with a large parliamentary majority for his ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). In the run-up to the election, pollsters and media outlets speculated only about the size of the BJP’s majority, as it ran on the slogan “Abki baar, 400 par” 1 (This time surpassing 400). Some pundits echoed Modi’s goal of breaching the mark of 400-seats2 , and exit polls after the last phase of voting closed predicted a landslide BJP victory. Forecasted majorities ranged from 350 to 400 seats for the BJP.3 While the BJP remained by far the largest party after the elections, it did not secure a majority of seats in the Indian lower house of parliament – the Lok Sabha. Instead, it lost 63 seats, scoring 240 seats, and is now dependent on its coalition partners within the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) to govern India. The NDA now stands at 293 seats in the Lok Sabha – 21 seats more than needed for a majority – compared to 353 seats after the 2019 elections.

Proving pollsters and large parts of the Indian media wrong, the opposition coalition bloc Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA) scored a surprisingly large number of seats by winning 205 seats.5 Led by the Indian National Congress (INC) which won 99 seats – up from 52 seats in 2019 – the INDIA alliance managed to secure seats with the help of regionalist forces such as the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh or the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) in Tamil Nadu.6 The success of the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh sounded a crushing defeat for the BJP in their own so-called “HindiHeartland”. The success of the opposition remains however fragile – after all it still lost the elections. Due to the widely expected landslide win for the BJP, the results remain however an emotional win for the Indian opposition, showcasing that the democratic spirit within India is alive.

Pakistan steps up arrests of Afghans without papers. Kabul says it’s a move to expel all refugees

MUNIR AHMED

Authorities have stepped up arrests of Afghan citizens in Pakistan’s capital and a nearby city in an effort that the Afghan Embassy in Islamabad described on Wednesday as a push to force the expulsion of all Afghan refugees from the country.

Pakistan’s foreign ministry promptly dismissed the allegation, saying that the authorities were only trying to facilitate conditions for the swift return of Afghans to their home country.

Pakistan has long threatened to deport Afghans living in the country illegally.

Separately, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif last month approved a March 31 deadline to deport those awaiting relocation to third countries unless their cases are swiftly processed by the governments that have agreed to take them, according to a document obtained by The Associated Press.

More than 800,000 Afghans have returned home or have been expelled by force from Pakistan since 2023, according to the International Organization for Migration, a U.N. agency that tracks migrations.

The Autonomous Arsenal in Defense of Taiwan: Technology, Law, and Policy of the Replicator Initiative

Eric Rosenbach, Ethan Lee & Bethany Russell

Introduction

Strategies of Disruption

The United States and China are locked in an economic and security competition. Since the mid-1990s, Beijing has invested the equivalent of hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars to expand the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).2 It has expanded the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) into the world’s largest by ship count, built the largest aviation force in Asia, and established an extensive network of overlapping air defense and long-range artillery systems.3 Beijing is also increasing Chinese military strength through investments in artificial intelligence and quantum computing, which will likely improve the PLA’s ability to track and strike adversaries.4 These new military capabilities are not just for show; the PLA has intensified its military activities around Taiwan since August 2022, rehearsing blockades and long-range strikes, conducting regular violations of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, sailing vessels near Taiwan’s waters, and allegedly launching cyberattacks against Taiwan’s digital infrastructure.5

While the United States still holds an overall advantage in military technology and capabilities, China does not need to execute its actions perfectly or simultaneously to undermine key elements of U.S. strategy and level the playing field.6 Wargames suggest that in a conflict over Taiwan today, Washington could lose dozens of ships—including its forward-deployed aircraft carriers in the region—and run out of long-range munitions within the first week.7 A “fair fight” often means barely coming out ahead, a dangerous prospect given China’s proximity to key U.S. allies and Washington’s competing interests in Europe and the Middle East.8

The Real China Trump Card

Stephen G. Brooks and Ben A. Vagle

The geopolitical competition between China and the United States is the defining issue in international politics. It is a contest between the world’s largest economies. It pits two dramatically different political systems—one democratic, the other authoritarian—against each other. And it is taking place in almost every region.

According to most American analysts, this competition will be close. Although the pace of China’s rise has slowed, the conventional view in Washington is that China is already a peer, or at least a near peer, in economic power. “If we don’t get moving, [the Chinese] are going to eat our lunch,” quipped former U.S. President Joe Biden soon after his 2021 inauguration. In the same year, Elbridge Colby, whom current U.S. President Donald Trump nominated to be undersecretary of defense for policy, warned that “China’s economy is almost as large [as] or perhaps larger than America’s already.”

Yet the view that China is close to leveling the balance of economic power is incorrect. Chinese government statistics may indicate that the country is almost an equal of the United States. But if the economic power of the two countries is measured correctly, the United States still has a commanding and durable advantage. Its GDP is around twice as large as China’s. Its firms and the firms of its allies dominate global commerce and own or control much of China’s output, especially when it comes to advanced technologies. As a result, the United States has enormous leverage over Beijing. With that leverage, Washington could carry out a broad economic cutoff alongside its allies—in practice, a rapid decoupling—that would devastate China while doing far less short-term damage and almost no long-term damage to itself.

Averting AI Armageddon

Jacob Stokes, Colin H. Kahl, Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker

Introduction

The nuclear order among major powers has fundamentally changed over the last few years. In particular, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is building up its nuclear arsenal to make it numerically larger and technologically more sophisticated. As a result, the bipolar nuclear order—led by the United States and Russia—has given way to a more volatile tripolar one.1

The same period has also seen the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications.2 AI breakthroughs have led many commentators to compare and contrast the technology’s current state with the advent of nuclear weapons and the field of nuclear arms control.3 Beyond those comparisons, though, the two areas overlap at what this report calls the AI-nuclear nexus. Understanding the nexus requires an assessment of each of the three countries and their militaries, their respective nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure, and potential military applications of artificial intelligence, as well as their effects on the global security environment.

Understanding the nexus requires an assessment of each of the three countries and their militaries, their respective nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure, and potential military applications of artificial intelligence, as well as their effects on the global security environment.

Killing With Kindness: Why Putin Is Proving So Amenable to Trump

Alexander Baunov

The release last week of Marc Fogel, a U.S. citizen detained in Russia on dubious drug charges, was obviously meant to put U.S. President Donald Trump in a good mood and serve as a respectable reason for him to talk to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. After all, calling to thank someone for showing mercy to an unfortunate compatriot needs little explanation.

Putin seeks to exploit Trump’s desire to be seen as swift and decisive. Therefore, resuming communication to hand him his first success was a logical step, especially since it was so easy. All Putin had to do was arrest an American citizen, then release him.

Putin is ready to hand Trump the same kind of win with respect to Ukraine: he started the war and will stop it if certain conditions are met and the right words are spoken.

Throughout his quarter century in power, Putin has proposed that Russia and the United States work together to defeat a common enemy, from Islamic terrorists and Somali pirates to COVID-19 and even global warming. He believed that such a victory would bring the two countries closer, transcending political and ideological barriers, differences between changeable and unchangeable power, and even Russian domestic repression, as Stalin and Roosevelt managed to do in the 1940s.

The US and Europe are at a crossroads. A new world order is emerging

Christopher S Chivvis

Over the past week, the foundations of US-European relations shifted dramatically.

In a series of highly controversial interventions, Donald Trump’s administration outlined a new US approach to Europe. It revolves around negotiating a rapid end to the war between Ukraine and Russia, handing Europe the lead responsibility for its own defense, and forging a new transatlantic alliance of populist forces on the right. After 25 years of working on transatlantic relations, I am aware of the tendency of crisis moments like this to fade and relationships to trend back toward historical norms. But this time is different.

At the Munich Security Conference, Trump officials hurled a series of rhetorical bombs at their European counterparts. As the electricity crackled through the cramped rooms of Munich’s Bayerischer Hof hotel over the weekend, the historic stakes were clear. Would Europe manage, after years of talk, to pull together and defend itself or would it simply be a pawn in the US and Russia’s larger game? Would Ukraine avoid being overrun by the Russian army and emerge with its sovereignty intact? For the rest of the world, what would it mean for the west to truly fracture, Russia to be rehabilitated, and the war in Ukraine to end?

The reverberations began last Wednesday when the US president announced that he and Vladimir Putin had made a plan to negotiate an end to the war. Europe and Ukraine were frightened to the bone that the future of their security would be decided without them.

The Death of the World America Made

Stewart Patrick

On February 4, 2025, President Donald Trump signed a sweeping executive order with the potential to upend decades of American global engagement. The directive mandates a comprehensive review within 180 days of all current multilateral organizations of which the United States is a member and all international treaties to which it is party. The explicit purpose of this exercise is to determine whether such support should be withdrawn. The clock is thus ticking on a distinctive and momentous aspect of post-1945 American internationalism: the strategic decision by successive Republican and Democratic administrations to embed U.S. power in multilateral institutions designed to support a peaceful, prosperous, and just world and to facilitate cooperation on shared global problems.

The immediate targets are narrow and unsurprising. The order declares that the United States will withdraw from the UN Human Rights Council, as it did during Trump’s first term; reconsider membership in UNESCO, a long-standing target of Republicans; and cease all funding for the UN relief agency for Palestinian refugees.

Of far greater import is the order’s decree that the secretary of state shall review “all international organizations” of which the United States is a member and “all conventions and treaties” to which it is party, to determine whether these “are contrary to the interests of the United States and whether [they] can be reformed.” The secretary will then recommend to the president “whether the United States should withdraw” from those commitments. In principle, the directive could lead to a U.S. abrogation of thousands of treaties and a departure from hundreds of multilateral organizations.

Russia Has Retaken Two-Thirds of Its Territory in Kursk From Ukraine, General Says

Adam Morrow

Russia has retaken more than 300 square miles of territory in Kursk since Ukraine carried out a cross-border offensive into the Russian border region in summer 2024, a top Russian general has said.

Speaking to Russia’s Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, Russian Col. Gen. Sergei Rudskoi said on Feb. 20 that the retaken territory accounts for 64 percent of all land initially captured by Ukraine in its cross-border offensive.

Kyiv has yet to comment on the general’s assertions, which The Epoch Times could not independently verify.

In August 2024, Kyiv launched a surprise cross-border offensive into Kursk, which shares a lengthy border with Ukraine’s northeastern Sumy region.

Ukrainian troops initially captured several hundred square miles of Russian territory in Kursk, which Kyiv had hoped to use as a bargaining chip in eventual cease-fire talks.

Despite fierce Russian counterattacks, Ukrainian forces have continued to hold a significant—but steadily dwindling—swath of Russian territory near the border.

Trump-Putin: logic and perspectives of a negotiation on Ukraine

Dimitri MINIC

After rejecting the proposals put forward by the new US administration in December 2024 – de facto acceptance of annexations, creation of a demilitarized zone guarded by European peacekeeping forces, renunciation of Ukraine's entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) within 15-20 years – Putin announced on February 12 that he accepted the opening of negotiations with the United States. In the meantime, in January, Trump showed signs of irritation, which were expressed in undiplomatic language and even threats (sanctions, customs duties, use of frozen Russian assets) against Moscow, to which Putin was clever in responding with flattery. Have the terms of the equation changed between December 2024 and February 2025? It seems that D. Trump has agreed to give in on the weak proposal he made to V. Putin (and already unacceptable to Moscow, which was predictable). Thus, since February 12, 2025, there is no longer any question of delaying Ukraine's accession to NATO by 15 to 20 years, but of closing the file - it is probably in this nuance that the real concession to Russia lies. In addition, Washington confirms that it wants to leave to the Europeans the responsibility - if they wish - to create a force to guarantee security for Ukraine - which seems unlikely, both because Moscow will categorically refuse it and because the pusillanimity of the Europeans will prevent them from acting without American cover. Moreover, the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, and the European leaders, with whom Russia has long wanted to meet face to face (without their American protector), seem excluded from the negotiations. The absence among the American negotiators of Washington's special envoy for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, probably considered "unfriendly" by the Kremlin, is also revealing.

Could Ukraine Have Avoided War with Russia?

Daniel Davis

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is, according to a President Donald J. Trump social media post on Wednesday, a “dictator without elections”! Sen. Richard Blumenthal said Trump’s statement was “utterly despicable.” Is the Senator’s anger justified – or was Trump’s criticism valid? Emotions aside, evidence suggests Trump is more right than is commonly understood.
Zelensky vs. Trump and the Ukraine War

The Washington Post conveyed its shock and astonishment at Trump on Wednesday, posting this alarming headline “Echoing Kremlin, Trump blames Zelensky for war.” Trump’s sin, as it turns out, was to challenge the Western narrative on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky by revealing the truth that he indeed bears a portion of the blame for the start – and continuation – of the Russia-Ukraine War.

The Washington Post, echoing the consensus view of mainstream foreign policy views in the West, didn’t merely report what Trump had said the night before during a Mar-a-Lago press conference but prefaced, in large print bold headlines, that Trump had been “Echoing Kremlin” in what he said. They willfully sought to discredit his words by tarring him from the outset, tying his words to what many in the West consider an enemy.

The ceasefires that aren’t in Gaza, Lebanon

Daniel Williams

The Israel-Hamas ceasefire in the Gaza Strip war is slowly disintegrating with daily small-scale breaches in the battered coastal enclave. Should the currently low-intensity warfare boil over, it would jeopardize a three-pronged peace plan announced this month by US President Donald Trump.

The ceasefire is designed first to facilitate the freeing of numerous Israeli hostages held in Gaza by Hamas, the Islamic terrorist group, in exchange for scores of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli custody.

Those initial exchanges, now underway, are meant to lead next month to full exchanges of captives and a withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza, to be later followed by a permanent truce and talks to end the war entirely.

But the violence, though much reduced in comparison to the months of warfare that began on October 7, 2023, alarms United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres.

“We must avoid at all costs the resumption of hostilities in Gaza that would lead to an immense tragedy,” Guterres warned on the social media platform X. “Both sides must fully abide by their commitments in the ceasefire agreement and resume serious negotiations.”

Britain Is A Failed State

Liz Truss

The Britain I grew up in is gone. Things are getting worse, and nobody wants to avert course. People are banged up for posts on Facebook, but Keir Starmer refuses to root out complicity and corruption by those in authority over the horrific rape gangs. Postmasters and postmistresses are driven to suicide because a rogue algorithm ruined their reputations, but the government can pay billions to hand over the Chagos Islands to China-aligned Mauritius. Economic stagnation and money-printing galore, but the Treasury and Bank of England manage to remain immune from criticism. Our country approaches South Africa-style blackouts, but Ed Miliband wants to build more windmills. Our prison system is bursting, but the Home Secretary is set to import more criminals. These are the most obvious examples that spring to mind, but, everywhere we look, the British state is failing – from contracting, to infrastructure, to welfare. What on Earth has gone wrong?

It would be tempting to blame Keir Starmer and Rachel Reeves, and it is certainly true that they are guilty of an arrogant belief in technocracy for which they are now being punished. But the problem is deeper and older than those two stooges. We have a very powerful and unaccountable bureaucracy, quangocracy, and judiciary, all of which have been captured by left-wing ideology and work only to ensure their own job security. The “impartial” civil service and “independent” bodies that were variously brought in to stop corruption and outsource decisions to experts have now become the masters, not the servants. Democracy is being undermined – so much so that what we call democracy in this country is being rejected by increasing numbers of young people.

Houthis Emerge from Red Sea Shipping Crisis Unscathed

Paulo Aguiar

Since stepping into the Israel-Hamas conflict in late 2023, the Houthis have steadily gained military strength and political leverage. The war has fueled their recruitment, increasing their forces from an estimated 220,000 in 2022 to around 350,000 by late 2024. Their foothold in northern Yemen has only grown stronger, drawing in local tribes and political groups that align with their anti-Israel stance. The group’s ability to leverage regional conflicts for political and military gain has raised concerns over Yemen’s internal stability and broader regional security.

An increasingly sophisticated military player in the Red Sea region

The Houthis’ military power has expanded with significant support from Iran, which has provided them with advanced missile and drone technology. Their arsenal now includes the Hatem-2 missile, the Asif anti-ship missile, and Iranian-made drones, enabling them to strike targets at long distances, including Israel, US and UK warships, and critical maritime trade routes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The group’s military doctrine has evolved beyond traditional guerrilla tactics, adopting strategies similar to Iran’s other regional proxies, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. This evolution includes the use of swarm drone warfare, precision-guided missile strikes, and a growing reliance on electronic warfare tactics to counter air and missile defense systems. The Houthis have also developed sophisticated deployment strategies, utilizing mobile launch platforms, coastal areas, and deeply buried underground storage facilities.

The Two-State Solution Died With Ariel and Kfir Bibas | Opinion

Casey Babb

From the running "Napalm Girl" of the Vietnam War to Anne Frank and the Holocaust, children often come to symbolize the worst of human pain and suffering. The Bibas brothers—4-year-old Ariel and 9-month-old Kfir—two red-headed boys who were kidnapped along with their parents on Oct. 7, 2023, must now be added to this list.

For more than 500 days, Israelis, Jews in the diaspora, and decent people around the world have anxiously prayed for their safe return—only to find out that they were likely killed many months ago—their remains along with the body of their mother Shiri returned to Israel on Feb. 20by Hamas. And while shockwaves of grief reverberate around the globe, this loss may have an impact on Israel and the broader Middle East that is felt forever. Indeed, it is likely that the "two-state solution" hasn't just been paused—it died with the Bibas brothers and their mother in the tunnels of Gaza.

For Israel—where the country's once vibrant peacenik community has rapidly dissolved since Oct. 7—the killing of the Bibas boys is likely the nail in the coffin. Even before their deaths were confirmed, some Israelis had already expressed there was "...no peace on the horizon," while others stated more explicitly they no longer believe peace with the Palestinians is attainable. Underscoring the dwindling prospect of an end to the conflict, a recent survey found that nearly 90 percent of Israelis don't believe Palestinians can be trusted. Now, with confirmation that the Bibas boys are dead, Israeli society will no doubt harden even further, making any idea of reconciliation and peace with the Palestinians all the more unpalatable.

Russian state hackers spy on Ukrainian military through Signal app

Daryna Antoniuk

Russian state-backed hackers are increasingly targeting Signal messenger accounts — including those used by Ukrainian military personnel and government officials — in an effort to access sensitive information that could aid Moscow’s war effort, researchers warn.

Google’s security team said in a report on Wednesday that Signal’s popularity among military personnel, politicians, journalists and activists has made it a prime target for espionage operations. However, other messaging apps, such as WhatsApp and Telegram, have also been targeted by pro-Russian hackers for similar purposes.

Ukrainian state cybersecurity officials have previously warned that Russian hacker groups actively exploit Signal to attack government and defense officials. In these attacks, hackers typically use phishing messages to infect targeted devices with spying malware.

Google has observed similar techniques used by Russian threat actors in attacks on Ukrainian Signal users.

The most novel and widely used technique, according to Google, involves abusing Signal’s legitimate “linked devices” feature, which allows the app to be used on multiple devices simultaneously.

Trump’s Abrupt Turn to Russia—and Whether a U.S.-Russia Team Could Gain Any Sway in South and Southeast Asia

Joshua Kurlantzick

In recent days, President Trump and his administration have released a radical new geopolitical strategy, one in which the White House seems to be turning against traditional European allies and building closer ties to Vladimir Putin’s Russia. It appears that part of this interest in building closer links to Russia, including by disdaining Ukraine, blaming the war on Ukraine (Russia invaded Ukraine), and Trump himself lavishly praising Putin, is the idea that the United States can use Russia alongside Washington as a tool together against China. In some ways, this would vaguely resemble a reverse Kissinger—Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon had courted China, which was already splitting with the Soviet Union, to build a U.S.-China front against Moscow. Here, the White House and its China super hawks seem to believe that they can work with Russia to isolate China from the world and damage its increasing global presence.

One can debate whether this radical shift, besides the wisdom of disdaining longtime U.S. allies and throwing a high amount of uncertainty into global politics, would work against China, or if it makes any sense at all in promoting U.S. interests and U.S. leadership. China and Russia already have been building very close strategic and economic links, and the two are allied in trying to reduce the dominance of the dollar as a reserve currency and prime currency of trade, promote alternative institutions to the post-WWII order, and back up a growing network of linked authoritarian states around the world, from Venezuela to Vietnam.

In many respects, given China’s extreme closeness with Russia and the fact that China has insulated itself well against U.S. tariffs, trade pressure, and other types of pressure, China is better positioned to ally with Russia in a more formal way against the United States.

The Trump card: What could US abandonment of Europe look like?

Giuseppe Spatafora

According to a recent survey of European experts, withdrawal from Europe by the United States would be as destabilising for the EU as a nuclear attack by Russia(1). With the return of President Donald Trump, their concerns could soon become a reality. The new administration’s initial policies – negotiating with Russia without involving Ukraine or EU allies, expecting European countries to enforce a future agreement without US backing, and attacking the EU on trade, technology and freedom of speech – raise concerns about the reliability of the US as an ally.

However, abandonment of Europe could still entail multiple scenarios. On the one hand, Trump may see abandonment as a policy goal: the US should shift focus to the defence of the US homeland and the challenge posed by China. This would result in the progressive reduction of US forces in Europe.

On the other hand, Trump could use the threat of abandonment as a bargaining chip to force allies to spend more on US weapons, or to gain concessions in other areas such as trade and technology standards. This could result in the bilateralisation and fragmentation of defence ties between Washington and European capitals.

This Brief presents the two scenarios outlined above and their policy implications. It argues that the reality will likely include elements of both scenarios, and that the EU should be prepared for both. The best way to do so is to invest in a strong European deterrent force.

Microsoft-DARPA collaboration yields possible quantum chip breakthrough

PATRICK TUCKER

Researchers at Microsoft, with support from DARPA, say they’ve designed a quantum computer chip that could lead to artificial-intelligence tools that use far fewer computer resources and energy.

According to a Microsoft blog on the announcement and their accompanying paper, the team has developed a new way to check the state of a quantum computation without disrupting the delicate information underlying it. This technique, called interferometric single-shot parity measurement, was tested using a special combination of indium arsenide and aluminum, or InAs–Al. They’ve used that to create a chip, the Majorana 1, which Microsoft described as “the world’s first Quantum Processing Unit, QPU, powered by a topological core, designed to scale to a million qubits on a single chip.

In simple terms, the method allows scientists to determine whether two quantum bits (qubits) are in the same state or different states—kind of like checking if two spinning coins landed on the same side—without looking at them directly. This is important because traditional ways of measuring qubits can disturb them, simply because observing or measuring processes at the quantum level can change the process or phenomenon being observed. making quantum calculations less reliable.

Powerful quantum computers in years not decades, says Microsoft

Chris Vallance

Microsoft has unveiled a new chip called Majorana 1 that it says will enable the creation of quantum computers able to solve "meaningful, industrial-scale problems in years, not decades".

It is the latest development in quantum computing - tech which uses principles of particle physics to create a new type of computer able to solve problems ordinary computers cannot.

Creating quantum computers powerful enough to solve important real-world problems is very challenging - and some experts believe them to be decades away.

Microsoft says this timetable can now be sped up because of the "transformative" progress it has made in developing the new chip involving a "topological conductor", based on a new material it has produced.

The firm believes its top oconductor has the potential to be as revolutionary as the semiconductor was in the history of computing.

But experts have told the BBC more data is needed before the significance of the new research - and its effect on quantum computing - can be fully assessed.

Jensen Huang - boss of the leading chip firm, Nvidia - said in January he believed "very useful" quantum computing would come in 20 years.

AI and Cyber: Could the War of the Robots be the Next War in the Wires?

Tom Johansmeyer

Fears around AI have begun to change cyber security. The influence of uncertainty and anxiety on security strategy only stands to gain momentum. With the recent release of Chinese AI model DeepSeek, Vatican warnings about ‘the shadow of evil’, and the lack of consensus on appropriate uses for AI in conflict, public concerns will only grow. However, none of these threats are nearly as powerful as the fear associated with them. The premature securitisation of AI could even lead to unnecessary escalation, especially if deterrence is perceived as the preferred strategy, a mistake already made with cyber.

We’ve seen all this before. AI is following a threat perception and escalation path trodden by cyber war, with premature securitisation following fear of the unknown and an extrapolation of threats dislocated from empirically verifiable evidence and experience. As with cyber war, AI isn’t the cyber security threat – hyperbole is. And if we don’t manage AI-related cyber security fears now, they could grow out of control quickly.

Exaggerating the AI threat to cyber security adds another perceived security problem that competes for attention and resources with the real problems that affect people today, including the potential assertiveness of Russia beyond Ukraine, food security, natural disasters, climate change, and disinformation. The best policy intervention now would be to examine the tangible scenarios and attendant effects regarding AI and cyber security, particularly with the cyber war trajectory as a reference point. The relative de-securitisation of AI within cyber security may be exactly what the cyber domain needs.

Assessing National Information Ecosystems

Alicia Wanless, Samantha Lai, and John Hicks

Introduction

Often driven by misunderstanding, fears abound over how new technologies will change an information ecosystem.1 They might, and they might not. Either way, it’s extremely difficult to know what those changes will be without first understanding what an ecosystem was like before the introduction of those new technologies. In other words, to know how a system has changed, one must first know what constitutes the system and its prior state. This paper proffers factors that can constitute baselines for assessing national information ecosystems that can be measured across decades, geographies, and cultures. Assessing these factors over time and comparing them among countries can foster understanding of the impacts of new regulations, conflicts, and technologies. Perhaps more importantly, such an approach offers an objective analysis of information ecosystems, which is much needed in these politically charged times. The framework can also be used to identify existing gaps in knowledge, guiding policymakers and researchers on funding and research priorities to establish baselines of national information ecosystems. As those baselines are established and maintained, comparative analysis between ecosystems can generate insights on policy interventions to redress threats within them.

Rocks vs. Chips

Isaac B. Kardon and Milo McBride

As the United States and China careen toward intensified economic decoupling and geopolitical rivalry, trends in the semiconductor and minerals sectors will define their strategic competition. Both great powers aim to consolidate competitive advantages by hampering the other’s technological development and hammering their trading partners. Both are doing so using increasingly damaging measures—but from opposite ends of tech supply chains. The American position remains strongest in advanced technologies, an edge that the Joe Biden administration sought to preserve and extend through an unprecedented series of export controls. China, meanwhile, is just beginning to implement a parallel export control regime that leverages its dominant market share in critical minerals as well as niche but strategic industries. The efficacy of both strategies will depend not only on each party’s execution, but also on their ability to sway middle countries toward cooperation.

Recent tit-for-tat actions mark a troubling new level of severity in this escalating struggle for technological advantage. On December 3, 2024, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) imposed its first outright ban on the export of certain “dual-use” critical minerals to the United States. This export control went into force for germanium, gallium, superhard minerals like synthetic diamonds, and imposed additional licensing restrictions on graphite exports. In adopting this ambitious new measure, China was retaliating against U.S. semiconductor chip and manufacturing equipment export controls unveiled only the day prior. On February 4, 2025, in response to new U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods, MOFCOM announced restrictions on additional minerals including tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, indium, and products that include molybdenum. In initiating these outright bans, Beijing has aimed to mirror U.S. long-arm jurisdiction by, likewise, seeking to enforce its export controls extraterritorially in third countries, which could re-export the restricted goods to America.

A New Way of Thinking About Naval Power

Gary Anderson

For the United States to credibly deter China from war, ships are needed now, not decades from now. The lack of available ships in the Navy’s fleet has eroded the deterrent effect of America’s sea power and unless current plans and policies are radically altered, China’s power will remain unchecked and undeterred.

The abysmal state of our maritime industrial base makes the goal of a 380 ship Navy seem like fantasy and the idea of scrapping existing ships to build new destroyers and a new frigate perverse.

Two retired Naval Service officers have proposed a solution that is doable, affordable, and common sense in the near term. Colonel TX Hammes Captain R. Robinson Harris writing in the Naval Institute’s Proceedings have proposed putting missiles and lethal reconnaissance drones aboard converted commercial ships in launch containers. This makes eminent sense for several reasons.

First, the hulls already exist. This would go a long way to easing the Navy's shipbuilding woes until the industrial base problem gets solved.

Second, because merchant vessels are highly automated, the need for additional manning would be minimal and can be tasked to the merchant mariners being a purely defensive weapon, thus leaving the Navy to focus on reaching their goals of readiness and lethality.

Next iteration of Army’s ‘transforming-in-contact’ will focus on autonomy

Mark Pomerleau

The next stage of the Army’s experimental effort to inform how it procures equipment and organizes formations will focus more on robotics and autonomy.

Transforming-in-contact, as the initiative is known, is a top priority for Army and Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George that aims to change the way the service buys, trains and employs technology, focusing on commercial-off-the-shelf gear.

For iteration 1.0, 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division was the last of three light infantry brigades to test the gear during various combat training center rotations — the most realistic combat scenarios the Army can create for units to train — in the swamps of Louisiana, the dense foliage archipelagos of Hawaii and frigid European climates.

Transforming-in-contact 2.0 was announced last October but few details were provided regarding what specific units would be involved, just that it would scale up to divisions and expand to Stryker and armored brigades. When it comes to tech, officials explained that it would likely begin to focus more on autonomy.