14 February 2025

In Washington, Trump and Modi Could Build on Rapport - Analysis

Sumit Ganguly

On the campaign trail last year, U.S. President Donald Trump referred to India as a “big abuser” of trade ties, despite the bonhomie that he seemed to enjoy with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his first term. So it’s hardly surprising that in his first phone call with Modi since returning to office, Trump brought up the issue of the U.S. trade deficit with India, which stands at around $32 billion. When asked by a reporter about undocumented Indian immigrants in the United States, Trump said that Modi agreed to do “what is right.”

Though the White House characterized the phone call as “productive,” the only positive note that emerged from the readout was that Trump invited Modi to Washington. The Indian leader will meet with Trump at the White House next week.

Aero India will showcase IAF’s leap toward self-reliance & inspire the young

Chethan Kumar

Aero India, which began in 1996 with 12 countries, 100 foreign and 50 Indian companies, and 25,000-30,000 visitors daily, is in its 15th edition this year and its growth story — it’s now Asia’s largest airshow — is incomplete without the Indian Air Force (IAF). Air Marshal Nagesh Kapoor, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C) of IAF’s Training Command, whose Airforce Station (AFS) Yelahanka has been hosting Aero India since its inception, in an exclusive interview to TOI’s Chethan Kumar, spoke about the preparations for the show, what the show means, and more.Aero India will showcase IAF’s leap toward self-reliance & inspire the young

The AFS has continually enhanced its infrastructure to support the expanding scale of Aero India. The airbase has upgraded its runway, taxiways, and apron areas to accommodate a wider range of aircraft, from fighter jets to large transport planes.

The venue has seen a significant increase in exhibition space, with dedicated zones for static displays, chalets, and business pavilions, ensuring a seamless experience for participants and visitors. We have also integrated advanced air traffic control systems, security measures, and surveillance capabilities to manage the high volume of aircraft movements during the event.

Facilities such as improved access roads, enhanced visitor amenities, and expanded media centres have been developed to support the growing number of exhibitors, officials, and attendees. These enhancements have ensured that Air Force Station Yelahanka continues to provide a world-class platform for Aero India, reinforcing its status as a premier aerospace and defence exhibition.

Indian Navy modernisation riddled with binaries. Maritime strategy is directionless - Opinion

Swasti Rao

India’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region require a strong naval presence across both its Western and Eastern flanks. Ideally, this would mean operating three aircraft carriers—two actively deployed while the third undergoes maintenance or upgrades. This has long been the Indian Navy’s vision for achieving true blue-water capability.

Within naval circles, aircraft carrier command is often seen as the pinnacle of naval leadership, fuelling an ongoing rivalry between proponents of carrier-based power projection and those advocating for submarine dominance. However, financial and operational constraints have forced the Navy to scale back its ambitions, with only two carriers in service for the foreseeable future. The third carrier—the size of INS Vikrant, when commissioned, will likely serve as a replacement for the ageing INS Vikramaditya rather than expanding the fleet. While the long-term goal remains three carriers, this reality is unlikely to change for at least a decade or more.

The government’s recent decision on carrier acquisition has sparked intense debate over whether it signifies a fundamental shift in India’s naval doctrine or simply a pragmatic adjustment by focusing on more nuclear-powered submarines, or SSNs. However, the evolving strategic landscape suggests that rigid binary perspectives may no longer be sufficient to understand India’s maritime security challenges.

What the West can do now in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan

Hameed Hakimi

Following the re-election of President Donald Trump in November last year, Afghanistan’s Taliban leadership expressed hopes of opening ‘a new chapter’ in relations with the US. Afghanistan has not featured strongly in the Trump administration’s policy announcements – but the signs so far are not promising.

In the final hours of the Biden presidency, the Taliban exchanged two American citizens for a Taliban member jailed in the US. But the new Trump administration has already taken a much more aggressive stance: Secretary of State Marco Rubio said bounties could be placed on Taliban leaders to force the release of any remaining US hostages. Meanwhile, Trump has talked about retrieving weapons left behind during America’s military withdrawal from Afghanistan (a demand that Taliban spokesmen have dismissed). The 90-day halting of US international aid is already impacting humanitarian efforts in the country.

The US government has remained the biggest aid donor by far even since its military withdrawal, providing $3.63 billion between October 2021 and December 2024. If Trump’s ‘America First’ policies lead to a permanent halt of assistance, it will undoubtedly deepen Afghanistan’s multi-layered humanitarian crises.


Resistance Lessons from Myanmar

Robert S. Burrell

Introduction

Ignoring localized security black spots can have global repercussions if left unchecked. Until 2024, for instance, the United States and its Western partners paid little attention to the Iranian-sponsored Houthis in Yemen…until this belligerent power disturbed global shipping patterns and completely shut down the Red Sea. Elsewhere, in North Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Sahel, a vast trend in rampant irregular warfare has emerged with global implications – largely unaddressed today by the West until they become a pressing and immediate crisis.

Like with the aforementioned regions, little international attention is being paid to Myanmar (Burma), which has been embroiled in a pervasive conflict since 2021. This is an important contest for regional states, including China, which have vested interests. While preparation for large-scale combat operations against a peer adversary remains critical for countries like Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, irregular warfare and proxy warfare along the periphery in fragile states remain the likely future battleground of competition.

Take one look at Figure 1 from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, which compares state-on-state conflict (dark blue) with intrastate conflict (teal) and intrastate conflict supported by external states in yellow. Instances of intrastate conflict (and states taking sides in intrastate conflict) is soaring, while occurrences of state-on-state conflict remains small. The picture that emerges shows that if the trend continues, then academic efforts within international security should prioritize the study and resolution of intra-state conflicts.

Bangladesh Turns Vandal Nation – OpEd

Subir Bhaumik

Since Feb 5, Bangladesh has plunged into absolute lawlessness with mobs of radical Islamists descending on residences of lawmakers , party officials and ministers of the ousted Awami League to demolish the buildings.

They vandalised and set on fire the Bangabandhu Memorial Museum in Dhaka, where Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who led Bangladesh’s struggle for independence, lived until his assassination with much of his family in the 15 August 1975 coup.

Popular as ‘Bangabandhu ‘ (friend of Bengalis), Mujib’s legacy was synonymous with the spirit of the 1971 Liberation War. The large-hearted leader had told officials engaged in rehabilitation of tens of thousands of Bengali women raped by Pakistani soldiers that if none owned them up, he would be father to them and their permanent address would be 32, Dhanmondi.

This Museum has been vandalised once before immediately after the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina (Mujib’s one of two surviving children) on August 5 last year. But the fresh attack on Wednesday followed the announcement of a program of political agitation by Hasina, now in exile in India, that spanned the entire of February, a month of enormous emotional significance due to the 1952 Bengali language movement .

Vietnam Builds Islands In South China Sea Amid Tension, Challenges


Vietnam’s island reclamation activities in the South China Sea made headlines in 2024 with a record area of land created and several airstrips planned on the new islands.

The Washington-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, or AMTI, said that between November 2023 and June 2024, Hanoi created 280 hectares (692 acres) of new land across 10 of 27 features it occupies in the Spratly archipelago.

AMTI also reported that three to four runways might be planned for different features.

“Three years from when it first began, Vietnam is still surprising observers with the ever-increasing scope of its dredging and landfill in the Spratly Islands,” the think tank said.

Hanoi’s island building program stemmed from a Communist Party resolution in 2007 on maritime strategy toward the year 2020, according to Carlyle Thayer, a Vietnam expert at the University of New South Wales in Australia.

The resolution set out an integrated strategy to develop coastal areas, an exclusive economic zone, and 27 land features in the South China Sea with the objective that this area would contribute between 53% and 55% of the gross domestic product by 2020, Thayer said.


DeepSeek Sent Silicon Valley Reeling. In China, It’s a Different Story.

Tanner Brown

While major tech players in the West evaluate the level of disruption to come from the breakout performance of Chinese AI platform DeepSeek, with its supposed high performance and low cost, a different narrative is unraveling in China—among the government, media, rival tech firms, and the country’s rapidly expanding AI user base.

“It’s thrilling,” said Cai Minghan, a Taiwan-based tech analyst. He told Barron’s the Chinese AI scene had been set into a frenzy, as in the U.S., but that the nature of it was different.

The start-up claimed its new version matches global leader OpenAI’s best model at a fraction of the cost and without access to the most advanced semiconductor chips. Based in Hangzhou, China, where Alibaba Group Holding has its headquarters, DeepSeek also made its models open source, allowing anyone to harness and alter the product for their own use.

“Competitors are racing to show that they also have cutting-edge models, but their stocks have risen, and their forecasts have brightened,” he said. That elation is in large part due to the as-yet unproven assertion that DeepSeek used less advanced Nvidia chips and spent a mere $6 million in its final training round. Given that, and the opportunity to harness DeepSeek’s open-source framework, Chinese firms’ outlooks have only improved, Cai said.

America’s Fight for Digital Security: Why Strong US Tech Infrastructure Is Critical

Richard Weitz

The breathtaking scope of China’s Salt Typhoon telecommunications hack underscores that the United States is engaged in a geo-tech war with Beijing.

This incident was one of the most devastating telecom breaches in US history: Chinese hackers penetrated critical US national security networks, vacuuming up sensitive data from millions of users and accessing wiretap systems that potentially compromised investigations.

This “all-out assault on US communications systems” has exposed fundamental vulnerabilities in US digital infrastructure, highlighting how gaps in our secure infrastructure and technology have left us more open to foreign threats.

US computer and telecom networks will be a prime battlefield in any future war with China. In a sense, that conflict has already arrived.

The Core Tech Sector: Critical Battleground

Salt Typhoon is part of a broader pattern of China’s activity directed at critical infrastructure, with a slew of cyberattacks apparently enabled by China-based TP-Link.

TP-Link is the bestselling router on Amazon and widely used, including by federal national security agencies. The Defense, Justice, and Commerce Departments have opened probes into the company following calls to ban the sale of TP-Link routers in the US.

Tariffs Overlook Gray Zone Threats Posed by China

Dave Pitts

The recent tariffs against China are obviously getting a lot of attention. China is a major trading partner, so the idea of an escalating tariff or trade war raises legitimate economic concerns. Beyond the potential impact to American business and consumers, it’s an honest question if tariffs can actually result in a meaningful change in Chinese behavior toward the U.S. I leave that part of the debate to others.

China likely prefers this focus on a war of tariffs with the United States. That attention deflects from what China continues to do every day in the gray zone of competition to violate U.S. sovereignty, undermine U.S. national security, and diminish U.S. global influence.

For those unfamiliar with the term, we might describe “gray zone” as the geopolitical space between peace and war where nations conduct activities to advance their national interests and weaken their adversaries, without triggering a military response. Gray-zone activities may set the conditions for a future war, but remain below a threshold that would provoke an immediate military response.

China is probably willing to make some concessions in a tariff or trade war with the U.S. in order to meet more strategic objectives. If China can keep its gray-zone attacks against the United States in the background, overshadowed by the ebb and flow of tariffs and trade disputes, then it avoids having to acknowledge those ongoing attacks and it avoids any accountability for its actions. That outcome would be a win for China.

We’re In for a Rude Awakening on Cybersecurity

Corbin K. Barthold

It’s a crisis that almost no one is talking about. The Chinese Communist Party is now the world’s preeminent practitioner of cyber warfare. Once notoriously loud and clumsy, the CCP’s hackers have become stealthy and sophisticated. They’re intercepting the calls and texts of our leaders and infiltrating servers at our ports, power plants, and water-treatment facilities. Yet hardly anyone seems to care. When Congress held hearings on cybersecurity late last year, only a handful of journalists bothered to cover them.

In September, the Wall Street Journal revealed to the public a Chinese hacking operation known to American authorities (thanks to the naming conventions of wonks at Microsoft) as Salt Typhoon. Since mid-2023, if not earlier, the group has been assaulting our telecom firms, compromising at least nine of them. It has focused on breaking into wireless networks in and around Washington, D.C. The campaign has won the CCP access to revealing data, such as call, text, and IP logs, on more than 1 million targets. Beijing appears, at minimum, to have gained a thorough understanding of when and how senior American officials communicate with each other, but in many instances, it has obtained the content of calls or texts, as well. The haul likely includes conversations featuring Donald Trump, J. D. Vance, top congressional staffers, and members of the intelligence agencies.

To stop the bleeding, the FBI has instructed federal employees to use end-to-end encrypted apps such as Signal, an abrupt and ironic about-face from an agency that has long pressed for backdoor access to such services. It will be some time before FBI officials can again argue for more backdoors with a straight face—especially given that Salt Typhoon has also exploited existing ones that our government uses for domestic snooping. The flaws in these wiretap systems have presumably gifted the CCP invaluable insights into which of its spies we know about and which we don’t.

Taking on the World’s Factory: A Path to Contain China on Legacy Chips

Andrew Lee

Challenge and Opportunity

The intelligent and autonomous functioning of physical machinery is one of the key societal developments of the 21st century, changing and assisting in the way we live our lives. In this context, semiconductors, once a niche good, now form the physical backbone of automated and intelligent systems. The supply chain disruptions of 2020 laid bare the vulnerability of the global economy in the face of a chip shortage, which created scarcity and inflation in everything from smartphones to automobiles. In an even more extreme case, a lack of chips could impact critical infrastructure, such as squeezing the supply of medical devices necessary for many modern procedures.

The deployment of partially- or fully-automated warfighting further means that the deployment of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems now has direct and inescapable impacts on national security. With great power conflict opening on the horizon, threats toward and emanating from the semiconductor supply chain have become even more evident.

In this context, the crucial role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in chip production represents a clear and present danger to global security. Although the PRC currently trails in the production of cutting-edge sub-16 nm chips used for the development of AI models, the country’s market dominance in the field of so-called “trailing edge chips” of 28 nm or above has a much wider impact due to their ubiquity in all traditional use cases outside of AI.

China And The Story Of Supply And Demand – OpEd

Dean Baker

Sometimes things are in fact more complicated than they seem, but sometimes they actually are much simpler. The story of China’s weak economy falls into the latter category.

Insofar as the world’s largest economy (that’s China folks) is suffering from economic problems right now it is primarily a story of inadequate demand. This means that it is capable of producing far more than households and businesses in China are buying. That is why they are looking to export so much to the rest of the world.

Like most economists, I think China can best remedy this situation by increasing domestic demand. This is in fact not hard to do if the government wants to. To my mind, they would be best off spending money improving their Social Security and health care systems, bringing both up to rich country standards. That would make a huge difference in the lives of hundreds of millions of Chinese.

But there are other ways to increase demand. As I’ve written before, they could send out $2,000 checks to every person in China. And if President Xi has a sense of humor, he could put Donald Trump’s name on them.

Becoming Multidomain Practitioners Tactical Training for Multidomain Operations at Echelon

Maj. Gen. David S. Doyle, Col. Charles M. Knoll & Col. Daniel R. Leard

In 2020, the XVIII Airborne Corps initiated a series of joint exercises named Scarlet Dragon. The commanding general at the time, Lt. Gen. Erik Kurilla, recognized that despite the near-constant discussion of the need for artificial intelligence and machine learning to aid decision-making and full integration of joint and multidomain effects in the next war, there was almost no practical integration of these tools into tactical exercises. Project Maven, the Department of Defense’s initial effort to use machine learning algorithms to assist intelligence analysts, had existed for several years and even seen some success in joint special operations targeting efforts in Afghanistan. However, the units that would be decisive in large-scale combat operations (LSCO)—corps, divisions, and brigades—had little to show for the early efforts. The implementation of these critical technologies and the practice of layering multidomain effects was long overdue, and thus, XVIII Airborne Corps created Scarlet Dragon.

With multidomain operations (MDO) moving beyond future concepts and into our doctrine with the update to Field Manual 3-0, Operations, we must determine what the practice of MDO means for units at echelon and for our tactical headquarters. We must find cost-effective, high-payoff methods to develop best practices iteratively, inform refinements to nascent doctrine, and identify gaps in capability development efforts.1 It is time to become multidomain practitioners. Corps, division, and brigade commanders are ideally positioned in experience, resources, and staff proficiency to take on echelon-appropriate components of this task. To be clear, there is no shortage of talent and initiative across the force. Fort Liberty is not the only installation where leaders are striving to push beyond the status quo.

How wars end… and why Ukraine’s may drag on

Uwe Parpart

Steve Bannon, no longer in Donald Trump’s inner circle, but no less politically savvy for it, remarked recently, “If we aren’t careful, it [Ukraine] will turn into Trump’s Vietnam. That’s what happened to Richard Nixon. He ended up owning the war and it went down as his war, not Lyndon Johnson’s.”

Bannon reacted to President Trump’s tasking of his Special Envoy for Russia and Ukraine, retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, with ending the Ukraine war in 100 days … 99 days later than candidate Trump had bragged. To Bannon, that’s an ominous delay that will only heighten the risk of the US being pulled deeper into a war he believes is unwinnable and isn’t in America’s national interest.

I agree. Failure to act swiftly on a ceasefire, and failure to make a clean break with the neocon Ukraine/Russia strategy candidate Trump promised brings back into play the tired old peace-through-strength fantasies and magical sanctions (“ruble to rubble”) of the Biden administration; strategies that failed for Johnson in Vietnam with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, for George W Bush with the January 2007 surge in US forces in Iraq, and for Barack Obama with the 2010 surge in Afghanistan.

Russia — More Than a Local Difficulty

Stephen Blank and Philip Wasielewski

It is a mistake commonly made to argue that Russia presents only a localized threat. It is wrong and it needs to be squashed because the Kremlin’s menace is not limited, it affects the whole planet. This is key to understanding the modern world and denying it would cause serious repercussions.

Of the four members of the “Axis of Upheaval”, Russia is the most active agent of malign disruption. Experts acknowledge Russia as an “architect of destabilization and chaos.” It wages a war of aggression in Ukraine, supports frozen conflicts, helps Houthis target commercial and Israeli shipping in the Red Sea, supports a civil war in Sudan, and generally undermines Middle Eastern and African stability for commercial and strategic gain.

To understand the sources of Russia’s conduct, we must recognize that the ideology of Russian imperialism drives its foreign policy, stimulating its ambition to recreate an empire of subservient states. To achieve security in Europe, we must therefore defeat Russian imperialism. Only then can Russia’s imperial drive be redirected to more useful purposes, something every other former European colonial power accepted decades ago.

Imperialism, extending a state’s dominion by direct territorial acquisition or by gaining political and economic control of other polities by coercion, supposedly ended after the post-World War Two decolonization of the British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese overseas empires.

Battered but defiant - what will happen to Hezbollah's weapons?

Hugo Bachega

On 26 January, thousands of displaced Lebanese, who had been living across the country, tried to return to their homes in southern Lebanon.

They travelled in convoys, played revolutionary songs and waved, proudly, the yellow Hezbollah flag. Many found out that, aer more than a year of war, there were no homes to return to. They mourned what had been lost and, in the rubble of destroyed buildings, put up posters remembering the group's late leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

The date marked the end of a deadline for the withdrawal of Israeli troops, part of a ceasefire brokered by the US and France, that required Hezbollah to remove its weapons and fighters from the south. The deal would also see the deployment of thousands of Lebanese soldiers in the area. But Israel said Lebanon had not fully implemented the deal and, as a result, not all invading forces pulled out. Lebanon also accused Israel of procrastination.

Unsurprisingly, there was violence. In some areas, Israeli soldiers opened fire and 24 people, including a Lebanese soldier, were killed. Still, for Hezbollah, which has been the dominant force in southern Lebanon for decades, the occasion was an opportunity to project strength, after being battered in the conflict with Israel. But can the group survive a wave of changes in Lebanon, and the re-shaping of power in the Middle East?

Trump’s Tariff Storm: How The EU Can Weather The Economic Fallout – OpEd

Simon Hutagalung

The re-election of President Donald Trump in 2024 has reignited concerns within the European Union (EU) regarding potential trade conflicts, tariff escalations, and economic disruptions. Given Trump’s historical stance on trade imbalances, his administration’s renewed focus on tariffs as a corrective measure signals a new of wave economic friction between the U.S. and the EU. This essay critically examines the challenges the EU faces in navigating its economic relationship with the United States under Trump’s renewed leadership focusing on broader the economic implications of proposed tariffs and strategic responses.

A key aspect of Trump’s trade policy is the emphasis on addressing U.S. deficit trade with the EU which stood at €155. 8 billion in 2023. The administration has framed the imbalance as a consequence of unfair trading practices and has proposed imposing tariffs ranging from 10% to 20% imports on from the EU to rectify it. However, this interpretation oversimplifies the economic dynamics at play. Both the U .S and the EU maintain comparable tariff levels yet trade imbalances persist due to differences in domestic demand production and consumption. The U.S. economy is structured around levels high of consumption often outpacing domestic production resulting in an increased reliance on imports. Contrast the EU’s more moderate consumption patterns coupled with a weaker economic recovery post-pandemic have led to relatively lower import dependency. Thus the deficit more is reflective of economic structural differences rather than deliberate trade manipulation.

Trump: Israel To Hand Gaza Over To US When War With Hamas Ends


U.S. President Donald Trump on Thursday said that Israel would turn the Gaza Strip over to the United States after the war with Hamas ends and that no U.S. soldiers would be needed there.

Trump, who has called for U.S. ownership of the narrow territory along the Mediterranean Sea, issued the statement on Truth Social. Under his plan, he said, more than 2 million Palestinians now inhabiting the war-ravaged land “would have already been resettled in far safer and more beautiful communities, with new and modern homes, in the region.”

He did not say whether he meant in Gaza or other countries that, as yet, have not agreed to accept them.

“They would actually have a chance to be happy, safe, and free,” the U.S. leader wrote.

Meanwhile, Hamas on Thursday called on all Palestinian factions to unite against Trump’s proposed Gaza takeover.

Trump earlier this week said he could envision sending U.S. troops to Gaza to ease the American takeover but said in his new posting that with the Israeli handover of the land, “No soldiers by the U.S. would be needed! Stability for the region would reign!!!”

A Multistakeholder Model of Cyber Peace

Jean-Marie Guรฉhenno, Olivia Grinberg & Jason Healey

The Russian NotPetya cyberattack of 2017 not only wiped 10 percent of all computers in Ukraine—where it was targeted—but also indiscriminately cascaded around the world, causing approximately $10 billion in damage. Another Russian attack, just one hour before their troops rolled across the Ukrainian border in 2022, disrupted the Viasat satellite communication network, taking offline “more than 5,800 wind turbines belonging to the German energy company Enercon” and internet service in France, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom.

These cases illustrate that disruptive cyber campaigns are spilling out of conflict zones to affect everyone, even those far from the fighting. Would-be cyber peacekeepers have no effective way to protect civilians in these situations, unlike in traditional conflict. To deal with the nature of cyber conflict, the world needs a new, multistakeholder model for cyber peace.

In traditional, physical wars, only multilateral institutions like the United Nations have the legitimacy to organize peacemaking and peacekeeping missions, and only states have the military capability to conduct these operations. Military forces contributed by states have the needed guns (and bulldozers) to limit the impact to civilians, keep the war from affecting neighbors, or separate combatants.

Securing Tomorrow: Top 10 Trends Homeland Security Leaders Need to Watch in 2025

Robin Champ and Mark Bills 

Introduction

The evolving landscape of homeland security is driven by rapid advancements in technology, shifting societal dynamics, and global challenges. Drawing from the emerging trends and foresight articles explored over the past year, here are the top ten trends shaping the future of homeland security and what they mean for government leaders as they prepare for 2025.

Top 10 Trends

1. Quantum Technologies Revolutionize Security

Advances in quantum encryption and quantum computing are transforming cybersecurity and infrastructure protection, offering enhanced tools for securing critical systems against increasingly sophisticated threats.

2. Blockchain for Trust and Transparency

Blockchain is being integrated into everything from election security to supply chain transparency, enhancing accountability while creating challenges in scaling and regulatory compliance.

3. AI-Driven Predictive Systems

Artificial intelligence continues to revolutionize predictive analytics, enabling better decision-making in border security, disaster preparedness, and cybersecurity. These systems can forecast threats and allocate resources more effectively.

It Didn’t Take Long – AI Leveraged to Support for State Interests

Emilio Iasiello

According to a recent report by Google, there were more than 50 threat actors tied to China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia that the company observed using artificial intelligence (AI) technology powered by Google’s Gemini to facilitate their nefarious cyber and information-enabled operations. These actors leveraged the technology to support different phases of the cyber attack cycle, and activities ranged from malicious coding to payload development, to information collection against targets, vulnerability research, and assisting threat actors evade detection after compromising a victim. Despite the worrisome aspects of these revelations, Google noted that many of these activities were still in experimentation mode with the actors not developing new capabilities. It appears that threat actors are still figuring out ways to maximize generative AI to their benefit, as most of the incidents related in the report revealed how generative AI facilitates faster more efficient operations rather than focusing on pure disruption. While this may offer temporary relief, this will undoubtedly change soon.

Per its report, Google observed Chinese threat actors using Gemini for target research and reconnaissance; vulnerability research; scripting and development; and translation and explanation. Particularly significant was that Chinese threat actors used Gemini to “work through scripting and development tasks,” with the intent to facilitate a more robust access into a victim network. Given China’s longstanding history of cyber espionage, and now interest in gaining and sustaining access into critical infrastructure networks, it appears that these actors are turning to generative AI to glean solutions to challenges they may have encountered in the past. While some attempts were unsuccessful (e.g., reverse engineering endpoint solution of a well-known vendor), they do reveal that the actors are looking to exploit generative AI capabilities in a variety of ways, new territory that is eagerly being explored.

What Google’s return to defense AI means

PATRICK TUCKER

Google has discarded its self-imposed ban on using AI in weapons, a step that simultaneously drew praise and criticism, marked a new entrant in a hot field, and underscored how the Pentagon—not any single company—must act as the primary regulator on how the U.S. military uses AI in combat.

On Tuesday, Google defended its decision to strip its AI-ethics principles of a 2018 prohibition against using AI in ways that might cause harm.

“There’s a global competition taking place for AI leadership within an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape. We believe democracies should lead in AI development, guided by core values like freedom, equality, and respect for human rights,” it reads.

The move is a long-overdue correction to an overcorrection, one person familiar with the company’s decision-making process told Defense One.

That “overcorrection” was Google’s 2018 decision not to renew its contract to work on the AIr Force’s Maven project. At the time, Maven was the Pentagon’s flagship AI effort: a tool that vastly reduced the time needed to find useful intelligence in hours and hours of drone-video footage. Within defense circles, the program wasn’t controversial at all. Military officials describing the program always said Maven’s primary purpose was to enable human operators, especially in performing time-sensitive tasks under enormous cognitive burdens to understand large data volumes. Many praised the effort as pointing the way toward other AI-powered decision aids.

Reconnaissance and Transformation in Large-Scale Combat Operations: Lessons from the Light Brigade Combat Team

Garrett S. O'Keefe and Donald W. Castelow

Modern large-scale combat operations demand a new level of precision and adaptability from military forces. Among the emerging units tailored to meet these demands is the light brigade combat team (LBCT). Designed for rapid deployment and high mobility, the LBCT capitalizes on speed and flexibility—but faces vulnerabilities stemming from its light armor and limited firepower. Reconnaissance, therefore, is not merely a tactical asset but a fundamental requirement for the LBCT’s survival and operational success.

The LBCT’s unique characteristics require tailored reconnaissance support, and implementing effective reconnaissance in resource-constrained environments will pose new challenges for units like the LBCT. This means that innovative methods must be employed to overcome these challenges. In large-scale combat operations, reconnaissance is a critical enabler for maneuver forces, and through initiatives like transformation in contact, we can identify the best way to deliver reconnaissance capabilities to units like the LBCT, ensuring they remain agile and informed in complex combat scenarios.

Reconnaissance: The Foundation of LBCT Operations

Reconnaissance is the systematic collection and analysis of information about enemy forces, terrain, and potential threats. It enables commanders to anticipate challenges, make informed decisions, and execute operations with precision. For the LBCT, reconnaissance is particularly vital. Unlike heavily armored units, the LBCT relies on speed and adaptability, attributes that can leave it vulnerable to ambushes, improvised explosive devices, and sustained enemy fire. Reconnaissance mitigates these risks by providing real-time information, enabling the LBCT to avoid threats and exploit opportunities.

What Do Drones Mean For Nuclear Deterrence?

Lawrence J. Korb, and Stephen Cimbala

Drones and other autonomous vehicle technologies have already significantly influenced the conduct of war. The technology has evolved from simple reconnaissance tools to versatile platforms capable of conducting surveillance, targeted strikes, and electronic warfare. Their low cost, flexibility, and ability to operate without putting human pilots at risk have made them increasingly valuable in conventional military conflicts. The development of more advanced drones, capable of carrying out precision strikes with a high degree of autonomy, has prompted their consideration in strategic scenarios involving nuclear deterrence and warfare.

With their precision targeting ability, drones can also be integrated into nuclear deterrence strategies. For instance, they could also ensure the survival of a country’s nuclear forces by providing continuous surveillance and early warning against potential nuclear threats. Drones can also support a more viable “second-strike” capability, potentially increasing the credibility of nuclear deterrence by ensuring that a country retains a means to retaliate even after a nuclear first strike.

Deterrence and Escalation

The use of drones in situations where nuclear escalation is a possibility could lead to unintended consequences. The increasing autonomy of drones raises the risk of misinterpretation, as drones could be perceived as a precursor to a more severe attack, even when only conducting reconnaissance. This could trigger a preemptive nuclear strike by an adversary, leading to an inadvertent escalation into full-scale nuclear war. Cold War and subsequent histories show that the danger of inadvertent nuclear escalation is not trivial.