13 February 2025

It’s Time for a U.S.-India Trade Deal

Kenneth I. Juster and Mark Linscott

Ignore the conventional wisdom in Washington and New Delhi that the U.S.-India trade relationship is likely to deteriorate during U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term: The two countries in fact have a huge opportunity to expand trade and a realistic path forward for doing so.

Though U.S.-India economic ties have grown steadily in the 21st century, this cooperation has underperformed relative to the extraordinary advances in virtually every other aspect of the bilateral relationship. Over the years, the United States has accumulated a growing trade deficit in goods and services with India, reaching more than $45 billion in 2022. India’s high barriers to trade led Trump to label the country the “king” of tariffs. Indeed, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has used high tariffs to protect domestic industries, attract foreign investment, and promote his “Make in India” policy.

As Trump proclaims his own fondness for tariffs, skepticism has set in among U.S.-India experts about the prospects for bilateral trade. Trump has promised to impose a 10 to 20 percent tariff on all imports and to hit a select group of countries—including India—with even higher tariffs. If he goes forward with this pledge, some might respond with retaliatory tariffs. These circumstances might make one question whether the United States and India can negotiate a substantial trade agreement—something that they have never done before—in Trump’s second term.

Myanmar: The Arakan Army Battles For Legitimacy – Analysis

Htet Hlaing Win

On 20 December 2024, the Arakan Army (AA) announced that it had captured the headquarters of the Myanmar junta’s Western Command — one of 14 similar commands scattered throughout the country. The Western Command was the second to fall into rebel hands, the first being the Northeastern Command, which was taken by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army in August 2024. The AA holds 13 of the 17 townships in Rakhine State and declared in October 2024 that it would transform the whole state into a junta-free zone.

The AA is attempting to govern the territories it has captured by establishing infrastructure and providing public services, like levying taxes, initiating a vaccine program and introducing a judicial program. But despite significant military advances in 2024, the AA faces considerable obstacles in achieving liberation from Burmese domination, as formulated in their doctrine, ‘The Way of Rakhita’. It emphasises the right of Rakhine people to create their own destiny, free from external influence. Having captured a large swath of territory and enjoying popular support from Arakanese people, the AA has begun portraying itself as the legitimate government of Arakan by creating so-called ‘departments’ to implement policies and provide public services.

Harnessing Hydropower, Sparking Tensions: PRC Mega-Dam and India’s Water Security Fears

Genevieve Donnellon-May

At the end of December 2024, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) approved for construction of a 60-gigawatt (GW) hydropower dam. The project is planned for the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo river (雅鲁藏布; known as upper Brahmaputra in India) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (Tibet) (Xinhua, December 25, 2024). An ambitious project, it reflects the PRC’s broader efforts to bolster infrastructure capabilities and harness the immense hydropower potential of the Yarlung Zangbo (The Paper, November 28, 2020).

The hydropower dam is described in the Xinhua report as a “security project that adheres to ecology as the priority (坚持生态优先的安全工程).” Beyond enhancing the PRC’s energy security and commitment to addressing climate change, it is also aimed at the “high-quality development (高质量发展)” of the region, with the intention of driving the growth of local industries such as logistics (Xinhua, December 25, 2024).

Recent estimates suggest that the cost of the new hydropower dam could exceed renminbi (RMB) 1 trillion ($137 billion), with an anticipated annual production of nearly 300 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity (The Paper, November 28, 2020; South China Morning Post, December 26, 2024). This would far surpass the country’s renowned Three Gorges Dam, which cost over RMB 250 billion ($35 billion) and generates over 88 billion kilowatt-hours annually (State Council, July 11, 2023; Zaobao, December 26, 2024).

Star Hostage: TSMC, China’s Drive to Conquer Taiwan, and the Race to Win AI Superiority

Matthew Brazil & Matthew Gabriel Cazel Brazil

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), one of the most important firms globally, is evolving. In a quarterly earnings call last summer, the company announced a shift to a new “Foundry 2.0” model. This will see the company expand from its traditional wheelhouse of fabricating semiconductors to encompass packaging, testing, mask-making, and other parts of the value chain (TSMC, July 18, 2024). This shift comes with risks, as it is not guaranteed to be executed successfully.

The need to evolve was made clear on January 27, when U.S. President Donald Trump suggested imposing tariffs on imported chips to force manufacturing to return to the United States (C-SPAN, January 27). In response, Taiwan’s government stated that the current situation was “a win-win business model for Taiwan and U.S. industries” (Reuters, January 28; CNA, January 28).

TSMC has already begun diversifying, setting up plants in the United States and elsewhere. Much of this has less to do with the United States than with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the PRC has insisted on a path of potentially violent unification with Taiwan, which could jeopardize the company’s ability to operate. Therefore, TSMC has pursued diversification as a hedging strategy, a course of action that is also encouraged by its primary customers.

Xi Fires Warning Shot at Trump

Micah McCartney

China's export controls on strategic metals, a riposte to President Donald Trump's tariff hike, are being seen less as an economic blow and more as a warning shot to bring the United States to the negotiating table.

Newsweek has reached out to the Chinese foreign ministry by email with a request for comment.

Why It Matters

Last weekend, Trump escalated the trade war he initially launched during his first term, raising trade duties on Chinese goods by an additional 10 percent, citing the need to curb the flow of precursors fueling the U.S. fentanyl crisis.

The U.S.'s third-largest trade partner hit back Tuesday by restricting exports of tungsten, bismuth, indium, molybdenum and tellurium. It was the third time in less than three months Beijing has leveraged its resource dominance.

What To Know

Among these metals, tungsten poses the greatest strategic vulnerability. China accounts for 80 percent of global supply and supplies 45 percent of U.S. imports of tungsten content, according to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).

Why the West Can’t Defeat the Houthis Without Securing Yemen’s Ports

Michael Rubin

The Port of Hudaydah [Hodeida] has long been a lifeline for Yemen’s Houthi rebels. While the Houthis also receive Iranian weaponry via smuggling routes through Oman, the most sophisticated Iranian weaponry enters through Hudaydah.

Houthis know the port is their lifeline, and work proactively to ensure it remains in their hands. As the Saudis and Emiratis ramped up their campaign in support of the Internationally Recognized Government against the Houthis, Houthi propaganda went into overdrive, amplified by Qatari outlets like Al Jazeera that, at the time, prioritized Qatar’s anti-Saudi, anti-Emirati animus over the truth. Progressives in both the Democratic Party, European leftists, and most within the humanitarian community accepted at face value their line that the cost of extricating the Houthis from Hudaydah would be too great to bear, especially if it paused port operations and delivery of humanitarian aid.

Enter the United Nations which sought to engage the various parties to the conflict in dialogue to alleviate humanitarian suffering. This process culminated in December 2018 in the so-called Stockholm Agreement that, among other provisions, required the Houthis to allow a neutral third party to manage the port, and then use revenues from the port to pay public sector salaries. The Houthis failed from the beginning to adhere to the agreement. They demanded the port maintain their own personnel, effectively creating a situation in which the UN pays Houthi salaries.

How Turkey Is Pulling the Strings in Syria

Ali Rizk

Turkey has taken complete charge of the situation in Syria following the downfall of former president Bashar al-Assad, per comments made from the ground to The American Conservative. While many of the disclosures should not necessarily be a cause of worry for the United States and its allies, some pertaining to ISIS do warrant concern. It remains to be seen whether president Donald Trump is willing to adapt a policy which thus far appears to have given a stamp of approval to an outsized Turkish role in Syria.

According to a well-informed source, who spoke to TAC on condition of anonymity, Turkey has become the ultimate decision-maker in Damascus. The source says that Turkish intelligence has effectively established a major hub in the heart of the Syrian capital, where it is overseeing and even intervening in the daily functions of the post-Assad Syrian state.

“The fourth floor of the Four Seasons hotel in Damascus is now in the hands of the Turkish intelligence,” he said. “They have transformed it into a major base for them in Damascus”.

Turkish agents, the source explained, were even involved in the day to day activities of president Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abou Mohammad al-Jolani, who had previously led the Al Qaeda–affiliated Nusra Front and has close ties with Turkey.

Rising Tensions Could Push Iran and Trump Toward a New Deal or Conflict

James Durso

Regional Setbacks: Iran's influence in the Middle East suffered major blows. Israel attacked its embassy in Damascus, and key allies Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and the Assad regime in Syria faced defeats, weakening Iran's "Axis of Resistance." (Hamas, though, has regrouped, taking some of the sting out of that setback.)

Economic Crisis: Iran's economy continued to deteriorate, with the Iranian rial plunging to its lowest historical value. The economic crisis was exacerbated by renewed U.S. sanctions and continued corruption and mismanagement.

Political Isolation: Diplomatically, Iran faced isolation as Hezbollah agreed to a cease-fire with Israel, mandating the withdrawal of Hezbollah’s troops from southern Lebanon, stripping Iran of a key avenue for military influence.

Leadership Crisis: The sudden death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash created a power vacuum and intensified factional disputes within the regime.

Domestic Unrest: Public dissatisfaction with the government grew due to economic hardship, political repression, and complaints about the cost of foreign proxies. Protests and large-scale demonstrations highlighted the growing disconnect between the state and its citizens.

These challenges collectively placed the Iranian regime in a vulnerable position, with growing internal and external pressures, including one named Donald J. Trump.

In 2025, the pressure on Iran won’t ease.

A Paradigm Shift for the Middle East

Elliott Abrams

The Middle East that U.S. President Donald Trump faces today features dangers and opportunities that were not present when he first took office, eight years ago. The greatest dangers are Iran’s advances toward nuclear weapons and the close relationships that the Islamic Republic has forged with Russia and China. The best opportunities have emerged from Israel’s decimation of Hezbollah and Hamas, its successful attacks on Iran, and the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.

The dangers are unquestionably grave. But on balance, the potential upsides outweigh the possible downsides. Indeed, it has been a long time since the Middle East has offered an environment so favorable to American interests.

A year and a half ago, Iran’s foreign policy could possibly have been considered enormously successful. The country’s nuclear weapons program was steadily producing enriched uranium; by 2024, it had enough for several bombs. Washington was largely not enforcing its sanctions on Iran. China was purchasing about 90 percent of Iran’s oil, greatly improving the regime’s finances. Political and military relations with China and Russia were growing closer; Iran had secured their protection against action in the UN Security Council and had earned money and gratitude from weapons shipments to Moscow. And the “ring of fire” of Iranian proxies and allies—Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen—seemed to be a problem Israel could not solve.

Kellogg Rejects Report That Trump’s Ukraine Peace Plan Will Be Revealed Next Week


U.S. President Donald Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, Keith Kellogg, has confirmed that he will take part next week in the Munich Security Conference but rejected a report that he will reveal the White House’s peace proposal while in Germany.

Kellogg said he looks forward to speaking at the annual conference and discussing “Trump’s goal to end the bloody and costly war in Ukraine,” and that he also plans to “meet with America’s allies who are ready to work with us.”

Since Kellogg revealed that he will speak at the conference, which is scheduled to take place February 14-16, there has been speculation that he will unveil Trump’s plan to end the war. Bloomberg news on February 5 quoted unidentified sources as saying that Kellogg would present the plan during the conference.

Kellogg flatly rejected the report in an interview with the news outlet Newsmax, saying “No we’re not.”

“The person that’s going to present the peace plan is the president of the United States, not Keith Kellogg. That (presenting the peace plan) is not going to happen next week at all.”

Unorthodox US Policies On Detention And Deportation – Analysis

P. K. Balachandran

The United States is a land of immigrants. And yet there has been strong resistance to immigrants, especially of low skilled non-White people from the Global South.

Being the land of opportunity in a world that is generally impoverished and racked by conflict, people from poorer and politically unstable countries try to enter the US by fair means or foul.

Although the anti-immigrant rhetoric in the US is now identified with the two Trump Presidencies, successive US Presidents have also deported illegal immigrants, predominantly low-skilled non-Whites. These immigrants could not gel with the local culture or were taking away jobs from poor White Americans.

However, it is President Trump who is pioneering a policy of deporting illegal immigrants and hardened American criminals to another country which has not been a significant source of immigration. This country is El Salvador in Central America. Interestingly, El Salvador had offered to take the detainees including hardened criminals and American citizens.

Thus, El Salvador is set to emerge on the world map as a “penal settlement” which characterised the Colonial era. In the Colonial-era, Australia was a penal settlement for the British. So was the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean, or Siberia in the days of the Soviet Union. The UK had recently planned to send illegal immigrants to Ruwanda in East Africa, but was thwarted by a court order.

Trump's Gaza vision would be US counterinsurgency failure 2025

Steve Deal

In his 1971 classic “Every War Must End,” Fred Charles Iklé painfully reminded every would-be commander and statesman of the wrenching tragedies that result from confusing military means with political ends.

Thus, from Vietnam to Afghanistan, any U.S. veteran counterinsurgent listening to President Trump’s press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Tuesday evening had to measure clearly the spoken words against such warnings and shudder.

"The U.S. will take over the Gaza Strip, and we will do a job with it, too. We'll own it and be responsible for dismantling all of the dangerous unexploded bombs and other weapons on the site. Level the site and get rid of the destroyed buildings. Level it out," the president said. "Create an economic development that will supply unlimited numbers of jobs and housing for the people of the area," he added. "Do a real job. Do something different."

These are the terms of a successful real estate developer and epoch-changing politician. They are filled with similar emotions raised by others who have also sat in the same office, especially next to a needful friend and flush with an electoral victory from which he believes he has a powerful mandate to bend the arc of history.

Tulsi Gabbard, the Smear Machine, and the Battle for America’s Intelligence Integrity

Charlton Allen

In a time of growing distrust in institutions and blatant political double standards, the nomination of Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has exposed the festering rot in America’s political and intelligence establishment.

Gabbard is a decorated combat veteran and former congresswoman. Once hailed as a rising star in the Democrat party, she has since been relentlessly smeared—from being labeled a “Russian asset” to even being placed on a terrorist watchlist during the Biden-Harris administration. These attacks aren’t just absurd; they expose how deeply politicized the intelligence community has become.

As DNI, Gabbard would oversee 18 intelligence agencies with a $70 billion budget. Her pending Senate confirmation—where Republicans hold the majority—reignited the predictable chorus of partisan attacks. But the real issue isn’t her qualifications, it’s that Washington fears what her leadership represents: independence, accountability, and a return to intelligence gathering as a national security mission—not a political weapon.

Trump’s Gaza Plan Has Many Pitfalls, Hamas Among the Biggest

Steven Erlanger

President Trump took the world aback with his declaration that the United States was going to “own” Gaza and move out the Palestinians there to build “the Riviera of the Middle East.” As unrealistic and bizarre as it may seem, Mr. Trump was pointing to a serious challenge: the future of Gaza as a secure, peaceful, even prosperous place.

A former French ambassador to Washington, Gérard Araud, put the dilemma neatly. “Trump’s proposal for Gaza is met with disbelief, opposition and sarcasm, but as he often does, in his brutal and clumsy way, he raises a real question: What to do when two million civilians find themselves in a field of ruins, full of explosives and corpses?”

That is an issue Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has always dodged. He has refused to engage on the question of who will rule Gaza after the conflict, largely because it would undermine his governing coalition, which depends on far-right parties that want to resettle Gaza with Israelis.

What Trump’s Gaza Plan Means for the World - Analysis

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, Matthew Duss, Khaled Elgindy, Dalia Hatuqa, Sara Khorshid, Aaron David Miller, Yousef Munayyer, Robert A. Pape, Hala Rharrit, and Dennis Ross

On the evening of Feb. 4, U.S. President Donald Trump shocked the world—including many lawmakers in his own party—by announcing that the United States will “take over” the Gaza Strip. “We’ll own it and be responsible for dismantling all of the dangerous unexploded bombs and other weapons on the site, level the site and get rid of the destroyed buildings, level it out,” he said.

As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stood beside him, Trump went on to promise that Gaza would become “the Riviera of the Middle East” and implied that Egypt and Jordan would eventually agree to take in displaced Palestinians. Netanyahu, visibly pleased, thanked Trump for his “willingness to think outside the box with fresh ideas.”

Trump Has the Whole Global Trade System in His Sights - Analysis

Bob Davis

U.S. President Donald Trump’s second-term trade war officially began on Tuesday with fresh tariffs on China and retaliation from Beijing, but that’s only a small sample of what lies ahead.

In his first term, the self-declared “tariff man” levied tariffs on a scale unseen since the 1930s, though he had fairly narrow goals: protect some favored industries like steel; focus on China, the U.S.’s biggest rival; and pressure allies to line up with U.S. political goals. His first sallies this time followed part of that playbook when he threatened tariffs against Canada, Mexico, and China over what he said were their lax policies on immigration and drug traffic.

Trump’s Gaza Plan Is Not in America’s Interests

Amr Hamzawy

The past few weeks have been bewildering for Palestinians in Gaza, their Arab neighbors, and much of the world. U.S. President Donald Trump’s comments on Gaza have sparked outrage across the region and the world. The deal-obsessed president must realize that there is no potential for a bargain here—only two choices.

One is to ally with the Israeli far right, continue to promote the displacement of Palestinians in Gaza, endorse Israel’s plans to annex the West Bank, and lose the United States’ Arab allies. The other is to disengage with the Israeli government and any displacement and annexation plans, collaborate with Arab and European partners on the ceasefire and reconstruction, and work with the Arabs to revive peace and normalization talks in the Middle East. Only the latter is in the U.S.’s national and security interests.

Weeks of Whiplash

At a press conference on Tuesday with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump renewed global outrage by calling for the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza. This time, he suggested that the United States should assume direct control over the Gaza Strip and develop it to become the “Riviera of the Middle East” open to “the peoples of the world” to live in.

Inside Trump’s Hastily Written Proposal to ‘Own’ Gaza

Jonathan Swan and Maggie Haberman

When President Trump announced his proposal for the United States to take ownership of Gaza on Tuesday, he shocked even senior members of his own White House and government.

While his announcement looked formal and thought-out — he read the plan from a sheet of paper — his administration had not done even the most basic planning to examine the feasibility of the idea, according to four people with knowledge of the discussions, who were not authorized to speak publicly.

It wasn’t only the Americans who were scrambling; the announcement came as just as much of a surprise to Mr. Trump’s Israeli visitors. Soon before they walked out for their joint news conference on Tuesday, Mr. Trump surprised Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel by telling him he planned to announce the Gaza ownership idea, according to two people briefed on their interactions.

Inside the U.S. government, there had been no meetings with the State Department or Pentagon, as would normally occur for any serious foreign policy proposal, let alone one of such magnitude. There had been no working groups. The Defense Department had produced no estimates of the troop numbers required, or cost estimates, or even an outline of how it might work.

'Trump's announcement of a 'Riviera' in Gaza, would be laughable if the situation wasn't so grave'

Alain Frachon

What's touching about Donald Trump is his loyalty to his original profession. It's true that real estate development solves many problems. After all, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a matter of land distribution: Two peoples for the same land, what can be done?

Since the late 1970s, his predecessors in the White House have worked on the issue. An Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat (1918-1981), and an Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin (1922-1995), lost their lives in the process. Nothing ever came of it, observed Trump in his astonishing press conference on Tuesday, February 4. Both sides – Americans, Israelis and Palestinians – have floated the idea of going back to the partition of Mandatory Palestine voted by the United Nations in November 1947: one state for the Jews, another for the Arabs. But it didn't work.

No doubt all those who tackled the issue lacked imagination. Or were they intimidated by the small-mindedness of international law experts, by the petty constraints of UN resolutions or by the difficulty people have in forgetting the history that haunts them? Or were Trump's predecessors unable or unwilling to twist the arms of the parties concerned and impose peace? Or perhaps the time was not right, the Arab environment not ready and public opinion hostile. To list the causes of the failure of half a century of peace would be long and tedious – and everyone would have to take the blame.

Inside Elon Musk’s War on Washington

Simon Shuster and Brian Bennett

The standoff at 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue was not much of a spectacle. On the first day of February, a handful of men working for Elon Musk had come to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), a few blocks from the White House, demanding full access to its headquarters. The agency’s staff refused. No guns were drawn. No punches thrown. Nobody involved the police. But in these early days of the Trump Administration, perhaps no other scene revealed more clearly the forces reshaping America’s government.

On one side stood an institution with a 64-year history, a $35 billion budget, and a mission enshrined in federal law. On the other stood Musk’s political wrecking crew. They identified themselves as members of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a collection of temporary staffers with no charter, no website, and no clear legal authority. Its power derives from Musk, the wealthiest person on the planet, who has been deputized to dismantle vast swaths of the federal bureaucracy—slashing budgets, gutting the civil service, and stripping independent agencies of the ability to impede the President’s objectives.

USAID leadership had allowed Musk’s team, a group of his young and eager followers, to spend several days inside their headquarters at the end of January. “The DOGE kids,” as some of the staffers called them in private, walked the halls with clipboards in their hands, examining desks and questioning managers, according to several USAID officials who described the events to TIME. But as the weekend arrived, their demands—including access to sensitive facilities designed to store classified information—went too far for the agency’s heads of security. The men from DOGE threatened to call the U.S. Marshals and have them clear the building. They also informed Musk about the problem. “USAID is a criminal organization,” Musk wrote to his 215 million followers on his social media platform, X, soon after. “Time for it to die.”

UK demands access to Apple users' encrypted data

Zoe Kleinman

The UK government has demanded to be able to access encrypted data stored by Apple users worldwide in its cloud service.

Currently only the Apple account holder can access data stored in this way - the tech giant itself cannot view it.

The demand has been served by the Home Office under the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA), which compels firms to provide information to law enforcement agencies.

Apple declined to comment, but says on its website that it views privacy as a "fundamental human right".

Under the law, the demand cannot be made public.

The news was first reported by the Washington Post quoting sources familiar with the matter, and the BBC has spoken to similar contacts.

The Home Office said: "We do not comment on operational matters, including for example confirming or denying the existence of any such notices."

Privacy International called it an "unprecedented attack" on the private data of individuals.

Russia Ramps Up Cybersecurity Systems

Luke Rodeheffer

The Russian Communications Authority (RosKomNadZor) announced that it has gotten authorization from the Russian Ministry on Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media to use automated systems to monitor and identify improperly secured personally identifiable information by online services and companies (Vedomosti, January 17). This is another step in Russia’s national cyber defense system to identify vulnerabilities that hackers can exploit. Internet censorship in Russia is a well-known challenge, especially since the adoption of the “Sovereign Internet” law in 2019 (Russian Duma, April 4, 2019; see EDM September 3, November 25, 2024). In addition to cracking down on civilian internet encryption and creating a local network of servers to facilitate internet traffic via the “RuNet” project, the Russian state is moving forward with creating a unified internet security system that aims to incorporate all commercial organizations in the country.

Anton Nemkin, a member of the Russian State Duma’s Committee on Information Policy, Information Technology, and Communications, announced late last year that all businesses would soon be required to connect to unified cyber-defense systems (Interfax, November 8, 2024). The Federal Security Service (FSB) is preparing legislation for this initiative (Vedomosti, November 8, 2024). Nemkin justified the move by citing recent statistics showing that the country’s cyber infrastructure suffered 355,000 DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) attacks in the first half of 2024, a 16 percent increase from 2023 (Interfax, November 8, 2024)

The US Government Is Not a Startup

Brian Barrett

It feels like no one should have to say this, and yet we are in a situation where it needs to be said, very loudly and clearly, before it’s too late to do anything about it: The United States is not a startup. If you run it like one, it will break.

The onslaught of news about Elon Musk’s takeover of the federal government’s core institutions is altogether too much—in volume, in magnitude, in the sheer chaotic absurdity of a 19-year-old who goes by “Big Balls” helping the world’s richest man consolidate power. There’s an easy way to process it, though.

Donald Trump may be the president of the United States, but Musk has made himself its CEO.

This is bad on its face. Musk was not elected to any office, has billions of dollars of government contracts, and has radicalized others and himself by elevating conspiratorial X accounts with handles like @redpillsigma420. His allies control the US government’s human resources and information technology departments, and he has deployed a strike force of eager former interns to poke and prod at the data and code bases that are effectively the gears of democracy. None of this should be happening.

It is, though. And while this takeover is unprecedented for the government, it’s standard operating procedure for Musk. It maps almost too neatly to his acquisition of Twitter in 2022: Get rid of most of the workforce. Install loyalists. Rip up safeguards. Remake in your own image.

AI’s Efficiency Wars Have Begun - Analysis

Sarosh Nagar and David Eaves

The rapid release of DeepSeek-R1—one of the newest models by Chinese AI firm DeepSeek—sent the world into a frenzy and the Nasdaq into a dramatic plunge. The reason is simple— DeepSeek-R1, a type of artificial intelligence reasoning model that takes time to “think” before it answers questions, is up to 50 times cheaper to run than many U.S. AI models. Distilled versions of it can also run on the computing power of a laptop, while other models require several of Nvidia’s most expensive chips. But what has really turned heads is DeepSeek’s claim that it only spent about $6 million to finally train its model—much less than OpenAI’s o1. While this figure is misleading and does not include the substantial costs of prior research, refinement, and more, even partial cost reductions and efficiency gains may have significant geopolitical implications.

So, why is DeepSeek-R1 so much cheaper to train, run, and use? The answer lies in several computational efficiency improvements made to the R1 model. First, R1 used a different machine learning architecture called “mixture of experts,” which divides a larger AI model into smaller subnetworks, or “experts.” This approach means that when given a prompt, RI only needs to activate the experts relevant to a given task, greatly decreasing its computational costs.

Three Decades Of Baltic Military Cooperation And The Way Ahead – Analysis

Māris Andžāns

It is well known that the three Baltic States, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, are distinct yet share many similarities. They are comparable in size and have similar social, political, and economic development. They are situated in similar geostrategic positions within the same military operational theatre. For this reason, questions have often been raised about whether military cooperation among Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania has been sufficient. The Center for Geopolitical Studies Riga aimed to answer this question in its study, Three Decades of Baltic Military Cooperation and the Way Ahead, by Māris Andžāns and Jānis Kažociņš.

From the Past to the Present Baltic Trilateral Cooperation

Baltic trilateral military cooperation is noteworthy both within NATO and on a global scale. Unlike many advanced bilateral partnerships and multilateral alliances, this case is unique. Since the early 1990s, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have actively pursued deep trilateral military integration. Their cooperative initiatives include the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET), and the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL).