10 February 2025

Guillain-Barre syndrome: India faces outbreak of creeping paralysis

Soutik Biswas

Last month, a school teacher in the western Indian city of Pune found her six-year-old son upset about homework.

"I had erased some words and asked him to write them. I assumed he was angry and that's why he was not holding the pencil properly," she told the Indian Express newspaper.

She never imagined his struggle to hold a pencil was the first sign of Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS), a rare disorder where the immune system attacks nerve cells, causing muscle weakness and paralysis.

Within days, the boy was in intensive care, unable to move his arms or legs. As his condition worsened, he lost the ability to swallow, speak, and eventually breathe, requiring ventilator support. He is now recovering.

The boy is among around 160 reported cases of GBS since early January in Pune, an education and IT hub, ringed by industrial towns and villages. There have been five suspected deaths. Currently, 48 patients are in intensive care, 21 on ventilator, and 38 have been discharged, according to official figures.


China Has Proved It Can Blockade Taiwan

Brandon J. Weichert

At an undisclosed United States Air Force base in the American Midwest, the airmen on duty have a patch with the number “2027” emblazoned upon it. That patch rests prominently on their uniforms. The number represents the year 2027, and it is worn as a literal reminder that, two years from now, the United States military believes the People’s Republic of China will be in a strong position to invade its democratic neighbor of Taiwan. For the staff on this base, the year 2027 is a framing tool for preparing themselves and their equipment for the possibility of a great power war erupting.

Indeed, the year 2027 might be inaccurate. The Chinese have repeatedly demonstrated over the last 18 months that if their political leaders choose to follow through, the Chinese military can conduct a sustained military operation against Taiwan—all while negating the power projection abilities of the United States military and its regional allies.

A Blockade, Not an Invasion

Conveying this message was the point of China’s military exercises that took place between December 6-12 at the end of last year. By most estimates, the Chinese military drills last December were the largest military exercise the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ever conducted. It involved three of the major PLA military commands, operating jointly to command a force of 134 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) warplanes, 60 PLAN warships, 30 Chinese Coast Guard vessels, and many thousands of Chinese troops.

China Counters Trump’s Tariffs As Talks Remain in Limbo

Ana Swanson and Chris Buckley

Beijing responded swiftly on Tuesday to the tariffs President Trump had promised, announcing a fusillade of countermeasures targeting American companies and imports of critical products.

Mr. Trump’s 10 percent tariff on all Chinese products went into effect at 12:01 a.m. Tuesday, the result of an executive order issued over the weekend aimed at pressuring Beijing to crack down on fentanyl shipments into the United States.

The Chinese government came back with a series of retaliatory steps, including additional tariffs on liquefied natural gas, coal, farm machinery and other products from the United States, which will take effect next Monday. It also immediately implemented restrictions on the export of certain critical minerals, many of which are used in the production of high-tech products.

In addition, Chinese market regulators said they had launched an antimonopoly investigation into Google. Google is blocked from China’s internet, but the move may disrupt the company’s dealings with Chinese companies.

Wendy Cutler, a former U.S. trade negotiator, said the various measures were a signal from China of the range of options it has to respond to Mr. Trump’s trade actions. “This menu approach is not surprising,” she said. “Beijing has been building its toolbox for some time.”

A General Overview of the Chinese Military

Victoria Herczegh and Andrew Davidson

The modernization of China’s military over the past few years has raised justifiable questions over whether Beijing can someday challenge the U.S.-led international order. But the answer to that question depends on what China intends to do – and is capable of doing – with its growing military capabilities.

China boasts the world’s largest standing military with more than 2 million active-duty soldiers and another 500,000 reserves. It is rapidly expanding its navy, which it intends to use in places like the South China Sea to secure maritime trade routes. The construction of a fourth aircraft carrier (and plans for a fifth) enhances this naval presence. Even so, its military as constituted today doesn’t pose much of an offensive threat in the region, let alone the world. The military should be seen primarily as a deterrent against threats that can, in time, project power regionally. China is currently more concerned about internal issues and national defense. Border security is vital in this regard – in the south for political stability and in the west for economic security.

What DeepSeek Revealed About the Future of U.S.-China Competition

Matt Sheehan and Scott Singer

The Chinese start-up DeepSeek stunned the world and roiled stock markets last week with its release of DeepSeek-R1, an open-source generative artificial intelligence model that rivals the most advanced offerings from U.S.-based OpenAI—and does so for a fraction of the cost. Influential tech investor Marc Andreessen called the model “one of the most amazing and impressive breakthroughs” he’d ever seen. U.S. President Donald Trump said it was a “wake-up call.”

DeepSeek’s extraordinary success has sparked fears in the U.S. national security community that the United States’ most advanced AI products may no longer be able to compete against cheaper Chinese alternatives. If that fear bears out, China would be better equipped to spread models that undermine free speech and censor inconvenient truths that threaten its leaders’ political goals, on topics such as Tiananmen Square and Taiwan. As these systems grow more powerful, they have the potential to redraw global power in ways we’ve scarcely begun to imagine. Whichever country builds the best and most widely used models will reap the rewards for its economy, national security, and global influence.

Christians in Syria—Beyond the Assad Regime's Narrative | Opinion

Nuri Kino

Today marks the start of the International Religious Freedom Summit in Washington, D.C. Human rights advocates from across the world will convene to discuss how to combat the rising threat of religious and ethnic persecution. ADFA (A Demand For Action), a partner of the summit, will rally U.S. lawmakers to press for Indigenous rights and equal rights for religious and ethnic minorities under Syria's new regime. We will be joined by Patriarch Mor Ignatius Aphrem II of the Syriac Orthodox Church, who will travel from Damascus to lend his support.

Two months ago, on December 2, 2024, ADFA celebrated its 10-year anniversary in Södertälje, Sweden, home to a large Christian Middle Eastern diaspora. The day was marked by mixed emotions as two of our volunteers, Samuel and Harut, learned that Syrian towns had fallen to insurgents after Bashar al-Assad's exit. These men, who had fled Syria to escape conscription into Assad's army, were heartbroken as their families in Syria fled to mountains, fearing for their lives. Many Christians across Syria were uncertain about their future under insurgent rule, given the radical history of groups like HTS and their ties to ISIS and al-Qaeda.

Weeks later, the insurgents promised "equal rights," but many were skeptical. Samuel and Harut's families returned to their homes, celebrating Christmas with a mix of joy and fear, knowing they could not escape the uncertainty of their future. The situation was complex—jihadist factions in Syria had fractured, and former terrorist-controlled areas like Idlib had now seen a temporary, forced relaxation of their religious restrictions—Christmas trees and church masses were allowed.

Terrorism Resilience: Why Killing Their Leaders Doesn’t End the Threat

Albert Hadi

Introduction

In recent years, the United States has adopted a targeted military approach, particularly decapitation strikes, as a key tactic to counter regional terrorist organizations. This strategy, aimed at dismantling these groups by eliminating their leadership, seeks to disrupt their operational capabilities and prevent further threats to US interests. While such strikes may offer temporary tactical victories, they have proven ineffective in achieving lasting peace or stability. The persistence of these terror organizations, despite the loss of key leaders, highlights the shortcomings of relying solely on military force. This article will argue that US over-reliance on military targeting fails to address the underlying sociopolitical and geopolitical drivers that sustain regional terrorist organizations, particularly in the context of Iran’s influence. The article will analyze the limitations of this approach, using Iran as a case study to illustrate how the manipulation of local grievances, coupled with a robust proxy network, continues to perpetuate instability. It will conclude with recommendations for more comprehensive strategies that address these foundational issues.

Iran as a Case Study

Iran’s strategic interest and influence in the Middle East has been a key factor in the persistence of regional terrorism. By skillfully exploiting sociopolitical grievances within local populations, Iran has been able to insert itself into the fabric of various societies across the region. This has been particularly evident in countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, where Iran has capitalized on sectarian divisions, political disenfranchisement, and socioeconomic instability. The Iranian regime has strategically cultivated relationships with its proxies by providing financial, military, and ideological support while manipulating existing frameworks to establish a durable foothold. This strategy is underscored by a 2018 US State Department report, which disclosed that since 2012, Iran has allocated $16 billion to bolster the Assad regime and support its partners and proxies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

How Hezbollah Ends

Hanin Ghaddar

For Hezbollah, these are trying times. After decades of being Lebanon’s predominant political and military organization, the group is reeling. During a yearlong war with Israel, it lost much of its military infrastructure. Its leadership ranks were decimated. Battered by conflict, in November, it signed a cease-fire agreement with Israel and pulled its forces from Lebanon’s south—Hezbollah’s traditional domain. Not long after, Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in Syria, severing supply lines between the organization and Iran, its primary patron. Now Hezbollah is also at risk of losing the support of Lebanese Shiites, who make up its domestic base.

As is usually the case, Hezbollah’s loss is Lebanon’s gain. In fact, the group’s deterioration is giving Lebanese officials a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to reassert their presence and restore their failed state. At least some of Lebanon’s leaders seem ready to take advantage. Newly elected President Joseph Aoun, the former commander of the Lebanese armed forces, has said that government troops will move back into southern towns. He has promised that Hezbollah will finally disarm, becoming a normal political party rather than a shadow state with a full-blown military. The parliament’s newly elected prime minister, Nawaf Salam, has also promised to disarm Hezbollah and reestablish the Lebanese state’s authority. Together, Aoun and Salam could usher in a new era for their country and its long-suffering residents.

Iran Conducts Cyberattacks to Terrorize Israelis

Johanna Yang & Ari Ben Am

The Iranian hacking group Handala last week breached an Israeli electronics firm that operates panic button systems in schools, causing red alert sirens to trigger in at least 20 kindergartens across Israel and terrorizing children. Such sirens are normally used to alert students and teachers to incoming rocket and missile fire. While Iran is often considered a second-tier cyber actor, its hackers regularly use influence operations to incite terror and panic.

Israel’s National Cyber Directorate confirmed the latest hack and warned that Handala also sent threatening text messages to tens of thousands of Israelis. Over the past 10 months, Handala has launched 50 operations against Israeli and international targets. The organization, which brands itself as pro-Palestinian, is one of many purportedly independent hacking groups that Iran uses to conduct cyber operations and psychological warfare against Israel. While the scale and frequency of Iran’s operations are concerning, Israel’s significant cyber defense capabilities usually mitigate the disruptive impacts. These defenses, however, do not stop Iranian bluster about their successes.

Dangerous but Exaggerated Operations

Purported Iranian hacks are often exaggerated or completely fictional. Earlier this week, Handala also claimed that it pilfered the personal information of police officers and firefighters from Israeli government systems and that it broke into the command-and-control systems of the Ministry of National Security (IMNS). IMNS and the Israel National Cyber Directorate, however, found no unusual activity in the ministry’s systems.

Trump’s Gaza Plan Is Unworkable, Analysts Say. Does He Really Mean It?

Patrick Kingsley

President Trump’s plan to place Gaza under American occupation and transfer its two million Palestinian residents has delighted the Israeli right, horrified Palestinians, shocked America’s Arab allies and confounded regional analysts who saw it as unworkable.

For some experts, the idea felt so unlikely — would Mr. Trump really risk American troops in another intractable battle against militant Islamists in the Middle East? — that they wondered if it was simply the opening bid in a new round of negotiations over Gaza’s future.

To the Israeli right, Mr. Trump’s plan unraveled decades of unwelcome orthodoxy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, raising the possibility of negating the militant threat in Gaza without the need to create a Palestinian state. In particular, settler leaders hailed it as a route by which they might ultimately resettle Gaza with Jewish civilians — a long-held desire.

To Palestinians, the proposal would constitute ethnic cleansing on a more terrifying scale than any displacement they have experienced since 1948, when roughly 800,000 Arabs were expelled or fled during the wars surrounding the creation of the Jewish state.

“Outrageous,” said Prof. Mkhaimar Abusada, a Palestinian political analyst from Gaza who was displaced from his home during the war. “Palestinians would rather live in tents next to their destroyed homes rather than relocate to another place.”

The Madness of Donald Trump

David Remnick

More than five hundred years ago, Machiavelli, the philosopher of political practice and modern republicanism, suggested, in “Discourses on Livy,” that “at times it is a very wise thing to simulate madness.” Richard Nixon, according to his chief of staff H. R. Haldeman, apparently arrived at a similar conclusion, saying, “I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that, ‘for God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about communism. We can’t restrain him when he’s angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button’—and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.”

On Tuesday, President Trump appeared alongside the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, in the East Room at the White House, and declared that the two million Palestinians in Gaza should be forced out of the Strip. The United States would “take over” Gaza and “own” it. The Palestinians, after having suffered tens of thousands of deaths and the destruction of countless homes, schools, mosques, hospitals, and other infrastructure, would, it appears, have nothing to say about any of this and would be sent . . . elsewhere. Egypt. Jordan. Whatever. It hardly seemed to matter to Trump that such a policy represents ethnic cleansing. Morality is of no interest when there is a real-estate deal to be made.

“We have an opportunity to do something that could be phenomenal, and I don’t want to be cute, I don’t want to be a wise guy, but the Riviera of the Middle East—this could be something that could be so—this could be so magnificent,” Trump said. (The Riviera: “A sunny place for shady people,” as W. Somerset Maugham put it.) “We’ll make sure that it’s done world-class,” Trump went on, building on the real-estate pitch. As he’d noted earlier in the day, “It doesn’t have to be one area, but you take certain areas and you build really good-quality housing, like a beautiful town, like someplace where they can live and not die, because Gaza is a guarantee that they’re going to end up dying.”

What IR Theory Predicts About Trump 2.0

Stephen M. Walt

I swear: My plan was to write about something other than U.S. President Donald Trump this week, but the torrent of bad policies emanating from the White House is impossible to ignore. I’m supposed to write about things that are important, and the foreign policy of the world’s most powerful country is surely one of them, especially when it makes a sudden and far-reaching lurch into the bizarre. So I hope you’ll forgive me if I remain focused on the foreign-policy revolution the Trump administration is attempting to implement.

The key issue is the impact that Trump’s imposition of tariffs, his withdrawal from the World Health Organization, and his other recent initiatives are going to have on American lives. And part of the answer to that question depends on how the rest of the world reacts to Trump’s heavy-handed attempts to browbeat and bully them—starting with some of our closest allies. I wrote about this issue a few weeks ago, but today I want to explore the broader conceptual and theoretical issues that underpin it.

Safer, Stronger and More Prosperous

Glenn Corn

In his first official message to the Department of State’s (DoS) workforce, Secretary of State Marco Rubio made it clear that all the employees will focus on three questions when assessing U.S. foreign policy decisions - How does the action proposed by the employee make the United States “stronger, safer or more prosperous.” For many, this practical approach to handling foreign relations is a welcome shift from what appeared, for the last four years, to be the DoS’ emphasis on everything but America’s interests.

Unfortunately, the previous Administration was never able to effectively articulate how U.S. support met Secretary Rubio’s test for validity. In my own experience, speaking about the issue of support for Ukraine to audiences across the U.S., many Americans expressed sympathy for the Ukrainians in their fight to protect their independence and sovereignty, but asked how giving financial assistance and supplying weapons to Kyiv benefited the U.S., which is a fair question given that it is the American people who have been funding aid to Ukraine with their tax dollars. Thus, those advocating for continued support for must answer the Secretary’s very practical questions.

Prior to Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin was working hard to challenge and undermine U.S. influence and interests worldwide. In Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014), and Syria (2015), Putin demonstrated his willingness to use military force to extend Moscow’s reach. Private Military Companies (PMC) and Russian trolls actively threatened U.S. interests and the Russian Armed Forces frequently tried to intimidate and embarrass their U.S. counterparts, at times coming dangerously close to provoking a direct conflict between Washington and Moscow. 

Tariffs Using Emergency Economic Powers Risk Undermining U.S. Economic Security

Navin Girishankar and Philip Luck

Talk has finally turned into action and the first shots of the 2025 trade war have been fired. President Trump has used the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to place 25 percent tariffs on products from Mexico and Canada (10 percent on Canadian “energy resources”) and 10 percent on all products from China. For all three countries, the rationale for these measures is to motivate action to address the fentanyl crisis in the United States—a pressing economic security priority that deserves immediate attention. However, counter to their intended goal, the tariffs on Mexico and Canada (which have since been delayed by one month) in particular risk undermining U.S. economic security by their direct economic repercussions; their inadequacy in motivating policy change by our partners, and their likelihood of degrading partnerships essential to countering global threats, in particular from China.
Direct Economic Impacts

Over several decades, as a result of the USMCA, signed by President Trump, and NAFTA before it, the North American economy has evolved into a deeply interconnected network, fostering economic integration and prosperity for all three countries. This integration has led to the development of complex, cross-border production processes, particularly evident in industries such as automotive manufacturing, electronics, and agriculture.

American Leadership Is Good for the Global South

Jorge G. Castañeda

The return of Donald Trump to the White House has been cast by many observers as the end of an era. The U.S.-led order, variously described as the rules-based order or the liberal international order, which rose to its feet after World War II and strode triumphantly around the world after the end of the Cold War, is no more. Indeed, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described that order as “obsolete” during his confirmation hearings in January. A stark vision of the world has emerged in its absence: one in which national interest alone governs international

US reasserting their role as the primary superpower with breathtaking speed

Ralph Schoellhammer

As I have written elsewhere, I have always been suspicious of the idea of an emerging multipolar world order. This does not mean that it will never happen, but there is a difference between inevitable and imminent. At the time of writing the United States are reasserting their role as the primary superpower with breathtaking speed, and instead of counterbalancing US power by the rest of the world we see acquiescing to the demands of Washington. It all began just a few days ago with Colombian President Gustavo Petro refusing to accept deportees from the United States. Going on social media during a game of golf, Trump announced a massive tariff increase on Colombian imports as well as visa restrictions on government officials, forcing Bogota to back down within hours.

The next countries on Trump’s list were Canada and Mexico. There have been long time claims that Canadian authorities are too lenient in issuing visas which can then be used to travel to the United States, something that runs counter to the new administration’s tough stance on immigration. Also, unbeknownst to many, Canada has become as crucial transit country for the fentanyl trade. “If we are your biggest trading partner, show us the respect,” Howard Lutnick, the commerce secretary nominee, said in his confirmation hearings last week. “Shut your border and end fentanyl coming into this country.” The perceived unwillingness by the current Canadian government led to the imposition of a series of tariffs, which the government in Ottawa vowed to reciprocate.

Deterrence is Integrated in Theory, but not in Practice

Matthew Costlow

Introduction

Deterring a strategic attack on the United States or its allies in the atomic age has always been a defense-wide mission, meaning that U.S. officials issued such deterrence threats knowing that crises could escalate into conventional conflicts, and conventional conflicts could escalate into nuclear war.[1] Deterrence, therefore, involved a wide range of military capabilities for each circumstance. Nuclear-armed states cannot completely separate conventional deterrence from nuclear deterrence conceptually because conventional deterrence may or may not function based on the adversary’s willingness to submit to nuclear deterrence. Indeed, as the scholar of strategy Colin Gray wrote, “There is an essential unity to military posture. If we choose to emphasize one element of the posture, particularly at the lower level of potential conflict, we virtually invite adversary escalation to a level where he has an advantage.”[2] Deterrence is integrated in theory, in this sense, because conflict is a continuum; the United States seeks credible deterrence threats, and the military forces that support those threats, to function at each point of a potential conflict.

In practice, however, scholars and practitioners of deterrence have created a host of distinctions that have often served to confuse as much as they clarify: conventional versus nuclear deterrence; deterrence by punishment versus deterrence by denial; offensive weapons versus defensive weapons. These distinctions, whatever their merit in other circumstances, have contributed however unintentionally to a degraded understanding of how and why deterrence functions as a unified whole. The U.S. government practice of issuing separate policy documents largely based on these distinctions (i.e., the National Defense Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review, and Missile Defense Review) only serves to promote the idea that these are separable areas of policy with only minimal reference to, much less substantive strategic dependence on, each other.

Hypersonic Overhype

Shawn Rostker

The United States has been exploring research and development of hypersonic weapons technologies for decades. Historically, such funding has been relatively modest, but in recent years the Department of Defense (DoD) has grown more vocal in its desire to accelerate development and deployment of these systems. Arguments calling for increased funding for hypersonic weapons are gaining traction with lawmakers, based on illusory assumptions about adversaries’ capabilities and despite the absence of a compelling technical or strategic rationale for their need. Before rushing to pour additional money into these platforms, the Pentagon must make the case that hypersonics do more than simply materially match our international counterparts, but in fact further the strategic interests of the United States. Thus far, the case hasn’t been made.

Hypersonic weapons, often collectively referred to as hypersonics, are typically divided into two primary categories: hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs)—of which there are long-range and theater-range—and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs). HGVs are launched from rocket boosters into space and then reenter the atmosphere, gliding unpowered to their targets. Long-range HGVs are designed for strategic global strike missions and can operate at speeds exceeding Mach 15. In contrast, theater-range hypersonic weapons are designed for shorter-range regional missions. These systems typically operate at lower speeds, around Mach 5-10, and are intended to overcome regional missile defenses. Alternatively, HCMs are also launched from rocket boosters and are powered during part of their flight by scramjet engines that draw in air from the atmosphere to burn their fuel. They are built to operate within the Mach 5-10 range.

Ukraine war briefing: Trump demands rare earths from Kyiv in exchange for aid


President Donald Trump says he wants to negotiate an agreement with Ukraine in which Kyiv guarantees supplies of rare earth metals, key elements used in electronics, in exchange for aid. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had floated such an idea last October as part of his “victory plan” for ending the war with Russia. “We’re telling Ukraine they have very valuable rare earths,” Trump said on Monday. “We’re looking to do a deal with Ukraine where they’re going to secure what we’re giving them with their rare earths and other things.” Trump, speaking to reporters at the White House, said Ukraine was willing, adding that he wants “equalisation” from Ukraine for Washington’s “close to $300bn” in support.

German chancellor Olaf Scholz criticised Trump’s demand for quid pro quo, saying “it would be very selfish, very self-centred”. Such resources would be better used for the country’s reconstruction after the war, Scholz said after meeting with fellow EU leaders in Brussels.

US shipments of weapons into Ukraine were briefly paused in recent days before resuming over the weekend as the Trump administration debated its policy towards Kyiv, Reuters reports, citing four people briefed on the matter. Shipments restarted after the White House pulled back on its initial assessment to stop all aid to Ukraine, two of the sources said. Halting the flow of US weapons would hinder Kyiv’s ability to fight, and put it in a less advantaged negotiation position in peace talks. The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Ukrainian troops losing ground to Russia as Trump talks of ending war

SAMYA KULLAB, VASILISA STEPANENKO AND EVGENIY MALOLETKA

A dire shortage of infantry troops and supply routes coming under Russian drone attacks are conspiring against Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk, where decisive battles in the nearly three-year war are playing out — and time is running short.

Ukrainian troops are losing ground around the crucial supply hub, which lies at the confluence of multiple highways leading to key cities in the eastern Donetsk region as well as an important railway station.

Moscow is set on capturing as much territory as possible as the Trump administration is pushing for negotiations to end the war and recently froze foreign aid to Ukraine, a move that has shocked Ukrainian officials already apprehensive about the intentions of the new U.S. president, their most important ally. Military aid has not stopped, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said.

Ukrainian soldiers in Pokrovsk said that Russian forces switched tactics in recent weeks, attacking their flanks instead of going head-on to form a pincer movement around the city. With Russians in control of dominant heights, Ukrainian supply routes are now within their range. Heavy fog in recent days prevented Ukrainian soldiers from effectively using surveillance drones, allowing Russians to consolidate and take more territory.

Dominating Conflict’s Leading Edge: Five Principles for an Assertive Irregular Warfare Doctrine

Brandon Kirch

A new US president took office on January 20th, and will confront a dangerous national security environment shaped by Irregular Warfare (IW) challenges. From cyber warfare and gray zone conflicts to terrorism and insurgency, these challenges demand immediate, actionable solutions. As 2024 came to a close, the Irregular Warfare Initiative invited readers to contribute fresh, pragmatic, and non-partisan policy recommendations to help shape the next administration’s approach to these threats. In our third article, Brandon Kirch presents the five key pillars to a new irregular warfare strategy.

Over the course of one week in late October, North Korean troops appeared in Ukraine, Israel launched retaliatory air strikes against Iran, and news broke that Russia provided targeting data to the Houthis in support of their effort to disrupt global shipping. These events occurred less than a month after Israel invaded Lebanon, and only two weeks before a US presidential election. More recently, Syria’s Assad Regime collapsed entirely and was replaced by a new government rife with terrorist affiliations. As a tepid ceasefire in Lebanon approaches its expiration date, the time and space between international escalation cycles is decreasing. The Trump administration has taken office amidst a volatile geopolitical environment that will likely demand a majority of their bandwidth for the term’s first 100 days, if not longer. A layered irregular warfare strategy will be essential if the US wishes to avoid further destabilization and reverse the ever-increasing risk of direct involvement in a broader war. Though specifics will depend on the events which unfold during the term, here are five principles that should be applied to develop an irregular warfare (IW) strategy to manage the gray zone’s current challenges.


Will Donald Trump’s tariffs hurt US consumers

Ben Chu

Donald Trump has imposed new tariffs on goods entering the US from Canada, Mexico and China.

The US president signed an executive order putting a 25% tariff - or tax on imports - on all goods coming from Canada and Mexico, to get both countries to crack down on illegal immigration and drug trafficking.

Goods coming from China will also be hit with a 10% tariff "above any additional tariffs" until it cuts fentanyl smuggling. He has already pledged to target the country with a 60% rate, and has mulled a 200% tax on some car imports.

Tariffs are a central part of Trump's economic vision - he sees them as a way of growing the US economy, protecting jobs and raising tax revenue.

During his election campaign, he told voters that the taxes were "not going to be a cost to you, it’s a cost to another country".

That was almost universally regarded by economists as misleading.

America’s Sixth Socio-Economic Cycle

George Friedman

In my books “The Next 100 Years” and “The Storm Before the Calm,” I introduced a model of U.S. history consisting of political cycles and socio-economic cycles – the former tracking presidential elections, the latter explaining a 50-year process that coincides with the election of new presidents. These cycles included broad social, economic and geopolitical evolutions. I will now lay out the sixth cycle expectation for the next 50 years. Its purpose is to link the evolution of U.S. politics to the general social and economic patterns we anticipate.

In the United States, a new socio-economic cycle shows its hand, its flaws and its power over time as a president, sometimes heedless of the emerging reality, manages the political system that will govern it and, in turn, be reshaped by it.

It’s important to remember that the president of the United States presides. He does not rule. His power rests in a profound awareness of the spirit of the nation and the forces that will shape it, ranging from the domestic economy to global interests. It is these forces and the president’s grasp of them that define the presidency, but the forces – be it technological innovation or unforeseen economic calamity – are not of the president’s own making. He presides over and facilitates the necessity that emerges and faces the inevitable. President Ronald Reagan politically engineered the financial foundation of our current cycle by creating a climate to increase investment capital and oversaw the founding of a new financial and social order following one of the models that new presidents employ on taking office: the ruthless and even reckless overthrow of the old.

DeepSeek’s Latest Breakthrough Is Redefining AI Race

Yasir Atalan

On January 20, contrary to what export controls promised, Chinese researchers at DeepSeek released a high-performance large language model (LLM)—R1—at a small fraction of OpenAI’s costs, showing how rapidly Beijing can innovate around U.S. hardware restrictions. This launch was not an isolated event. Ahead of the Lunar New Year, three other Chinese labs announced AI models they claimed could match—even surpass—OpenAI’s o1 performance on key benchmarks. These simultaneous releases, likely to be orchestrated by the Chinese government, signaled a potential shift in the global AI landscape, raising questions about the U.S. competitive edge in the AI race. If Washington doesn’t adapt to this new reality, the next Chinese breakthrough could indeed become the Sputnik moment some fear.

News of this breakthrough rattled markets, causing NVIDIA’s stock to dip 17 percent on January 27 amid fears that demand for its high-performance graphics processing units (GPUs)—until now considered essential for training advanced AI—could falter. The performance of these models and coordination of these releases led observers to liken the situation to a “Sputnik moment,” drawing comparisons to the 1957 Soviet satellite launch that shocked the United States due to fears of falling behind.

Until recently, conventional wisdom held that Washington enjoyed a decisive advantage in cutting-edge LLMs in part because U.S. firms could afford massive compute budgets, powered by NVIDIA’s high-performance GPUs. To maintain its edge in the race, the Biden administration implemented export controls to prevent China from acquiring these advanced GPU processors. The release of DeepSeek’s R1, however, calls that assumption into question: Despite limited access to top-tier U.S. chips, Chinese labs appear to be finding new efficiencies that let them produce powerful AI models at lower cost.

‘This happens more frequently than people realize’: Arup chief on the lessons learned from a $25m deepfake crime

David Elliott

Early in 2024, an employee of UK engineering firm Arup made a seemingly routine transfer of millions of company dollars, following a video call with senior management.

Except, it turned out, the employee hadn’t been talking to Arup managers at all, but to deepfakes created by artificial intelligence. The employee had been tricked into sending $25 million to criminals.

This wasn't a traditional cyberattack, the kind that compromises a company’s digital systems. This attack used psychology and sophisticated deepfake technology to gain the employee’s confidence.

It's an example of how cybercrime is evolving. At the time, Arup’s Chief Information Officer, Rob Greig, said the company had seen the number of cyberattacks rise sharply, along with their sophistication.

This trend is underscored in a World Economic Forum report titled Unpacking Cyber Resilience, which aims to help companies become more cyber resilient.

Here, Greig – who was previously director of the UK’s Parliamentary Digital Service – talks about what the company learned from its deepfake attack, and what organizations can do to protect themselves.