How is War Fought in the Gray Zone?

Beth Sanner

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In talks to business groups about geopolitics in recent months, I’ve been asking whether they believe we are at war. Most in the audience have voted yes. But if you asked the National Security Adviser, I’m fairly certain he would disagree, at least in the technical sense. This is in part political, because only Congress has the authority to formally declare war and, as hard as it is to believe, they haven’t done so since World War II.

The assimilationist turn in Tibet policy in the Xi Jinping era

Matthew Akester

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After the People’s Republic of China (PRC) annexed Tibet by military invasion between 1949 and 1951, it initially pursued a policy of accommodation with Tibetan elites, promising national autonomy based on the Soviet model. By the mid-1950s, having secured greater military and administrative control of the plateau, and international quiescence regarding its occupation, ‘socialist reforms’ were introduced in the ‘Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures’ (TAPs) of eastern Tibet, sparking resistance that was crushed brutally. The spread of resistance to central Tibet – the domain of the Lhasa government, later designated as the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) – led to the ight of the Dalai Lama in March 1959, and imposition of ‘reforms’ throughout. Between 1959 and 1979, Tibet’s traditional social order, dominated by the monastic system, was almost entirely destroyed. Most educated Tibetans were killed or imprisoned, and much of the population reduced to poverty under the commune system.

In the post-Mao era, under the 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, the ‘national autonomy’ system was reinstated in Tibet, nominally allowing for political representation as well as the tolerance of Tibetan language, religion and culture. Although the cadre force became Tibetanised to some extent, few Tibetans achieved positions of real power – there has never been an ethnic Tibetan secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party Committee, which is part of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, monasteries were restored under state oversight, Tibetan language education was permitted, and restrictions on immigration from the PRC were imposed. Following nationalist unrest in Lhasa between 1987 and 1989, these liberalised policies were curtailed. Immigration controls were removed, leading to an inux of Han Chinese settlers, and a state-subsidised infrastructure and urbanisation boom transformed the plateau landscape. The ‘national autonomy’ system remained in place nominally, but severe restrictions were imposed on religious life. Other expressions of Tibetan identity and aspirations were identied as dissent by an increasingly securitised state.

Wrestling with Complexity: How the PLA Assesses Combat Capability

Kevin McCauley

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INTRODUCTION

PLA-affiliated researchers discuss multiple methods for conducting a combat capability assessment with varying levels of accuracy. Some PLA researchers consider their assessment efforts to be relatively outdated, compared to some foreign militaries’, such as the United States.’ The PLA’s research on this topic frequently references gaps in its approach, preventing it from adopting more standardized and rigorous methods, such as insufficient basic theoretical research, a lack of understanding of various evaluation methods, and a failure to develop combat capability assessments that can accurately evaluate complex nonlinear systems such as the system of systems operational theory that is the foundation for PLA transformation efforts. Many PLA theorists have advocated for the development of new and improved methods that incorporate more qualitative and accurate analytic methods to improve assessment accuracy, suggesting that improvements may be underway. Researchers also recommend incorporating evaluations of the operational environment (OE) and lessons learned from opposing force training, which would enhance the accuracy, complexity, and flexibility of assessment methods. PLA researchers believe evaluations during the period of mechanized warfare were relatively simple since they primarily used standardized quantitative analytic methods. The vastly greater level of complexity envisioned in future warfare operational concepts that incorporate informationized technologies and increasingly intelligent technologies greatly complicates evaluations. The PLA’s requirements for victory are geared toward the realities of future conflict, but its development of a system of systems operational approach integrating forces, weapons, and equipment, creating synergy between individual systems and modular forces, makes traditional quantitative modeling and analysis difficult. Additionally, incorporating analysis of terrain, weather, enemy forces, and other OE factors increases the layers of complexity in the evaluation process.

Charting China’s Export Controls

Emma M. Rafaelof, Taylore Roth, Mykael SooTho, and John VerWey

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In December 2024 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced an outright ban of gallium, germanium, and antimony exports to the United States.1 The prohibition followed U.S. controls to stem the PRC’s development of advanced semiconductors, with both actions representing a significant escalation in U.S.-China trade tensions. Steady adjustments to PRC export control regulations and legal mechanisms over the last few years have diversified the country’s toolkit for engaging in strategic competition with the United States. The December 2024 ban was the next level of escalation from a July 2023 announcement that first developed controls on gallium and germanium. While U.S. export controls limiting PRC access to semiconductors have received substantial coverage in recent years, this action to unilaterally control several relatively obscure materials initially received limited attention. However, PRC controls on these critical materials, which are used in everything from wind turbine magnets to semiconductors, were followed later in the year by additional controls on high-end graphite and rare earth element permanent magnet manufacturing technologies. Notably, since PRC export controls on gallium were announced in July 2023, there have been zero recorded PRC-origin exports to any firm in the United States or the Netherlands, according to trade data available in September 2024.

U.S. and allied export control actions restricting PRC access to semiconductor technologies have raised the ire of PRC policymakers, and these seemingly retaliatory actions raise the possibility of future tit-for-tat exchanges. Taken together, changes in PRC export controls throughout 2023 represent a noteworthy shift in the country’s economic statecraft: for the first time, the PRC government systematically employed its formal export control system to retaliate in response to U.S. and partner export controls it deems “unfair.”

Peace Through Edge

Bilal Y. Saab, and Natasha Ahmed

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Tech cooperation with China is not necessarily accommodationist and can deliver competitive benefits to the United States.

Unmanaged, the U.S.-China competition in artificial intelligence (AI) could create dangerous fissures between these two great powers that could lead to military conflict. For all the talk of decoupling between the United States and China, they are still economically interconnected in more ways than one. Neither side would benefit from a costly war.

Washington’s ultimate challenge in this competition, which is somewhat similar to the one it experienced with the Soviet Union, is to preserve the peace with Beijing while not being shy about maintaining and leveraging its technological edge. It is an approach based on a modified form of Reagan’s mantra, “peace through strength, which can be called “Peace Through Edge.” There is plenty of room for pragmatic cooperation in this competition, including frameworks to manage the responsible development and deployment of AI.

Rather than viewing the competition as a zero-sum game, Washington and Beijing can foster conditions where their respective innovations drive economic growth and technological leadership while avoiding destabilizing actions that threaten long-term prosperity. Strategic rivalry in AI can be a powerful driver for progress if guided by market-driven frameworks that reward innovation and penalize unsafe or irresponsible behavior.

Is DeepSeek Really a Threat?

AMAR BHIDÉ

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Thomas Edison, the autodidactic telegraph operator turned entrepreneur, is often considered the greatest inventor of all time, while Nikola Tesla, who worked for an Edison company in Paris before emigrating to the United States, is barely remembered, except through Elon Musk’s electric-vehicle company. Yet it was Tesla’s breakthrough with alternating current (AC), not Edison’s direct current (DC) technology, that made mass electrification affordable. The prohibitive costs of DC would have kept Edison’s urban electrification a plaything of the rich, like many of his other inventions.

Could the Chinese investor Liang Wenfeng’s DeepSeek AI models represent a similar breakthrough in AI, or are they scams like cold fusion and room-temperature superconductivity? And if they are confirmed, should the US treat them as a mortal threat, or as a gift to the world?

Like many transformative technologies, AI had evolved over many decades before OpenAI’s release of ChatGPT in late 2022 triggered the current mania. Better algorithms, complementary devices such as mobile phones, and cheaper, more powerful cloud computing had made the technology’s use widespread but barely noticed. Trial and error had shown where AI could or could not outperform human effort and judgment.

How Would Iranian Nuclear Forces Be Deployed?

Alex Scheers

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Introduction

The Islamic Republic stated Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, “has absolutely no intention of utilizing its nuclear capabilities for military purposes.” He goes on to cite ideological and religious beliefs as the rationale for not seeking weaponization. However, religious persuasions do not provide a credible explanation for the leadership’s decision not to weaponize the Iranian nuclear program.

With the international security landscape changing rapidly and becoming increasingly uncertain and dangerous, it is imperative for the US national security establishment to consider how Iran would deploy its nuclear forces, should it ever exercise the political will to weaponize its nuclear program. In this article, I highlight that the impetus to develop a nuclear weapon depends on Iranian domestic political dynamics and argue that a nuclear Iran would adopt a deterrence-by-punishment posture, using its nuclear forces as a strategic deterrent.

Iranian Nuclear Behavior and Domestic Politics

Iran is a destabilizing actor in the Middle East. Its constant attempts to attack Israel and threaten regional Arab powers are emblematic of Iranian belligerence. Equally, Iran continually poses a threat to American security and interests, both regionally and internationally.

Expert Q&A: The AI Challenge for the U.S. Military

Lt. Gen. Michael Groen (US Marine Corps, Ret.)

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Chinese AI startup DeepSeek shook the U.S. tech and business communities this week, with its launch of a free AI chatbot that it said could compete with major American competitors at a fraction of the cost. The DeepSeek assistant overtook ChatGPT in downloads on Apple’s app store on Monday, prompting a market frenzy that saw a tumble in the shares of major U.S. AI leaders, including Nvidia, Microsoft and Alphabet. On Wednesday, Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba released a new version of its AI model, claiming it surpasses DeepSeek’s release.

The DeepSeek and Alibaba models suggest that China has worked around U.S. measures to restrict Chinese access to American-manufactured chips, and the disruption has prompted scrutiny by U.S. tech leaders — Microsoft and OpenAI are both investigating whether DeepSeek harvested data in an unauthorized manner from OpenAI’s technology, as well as the U.S. government. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said the National Security Council is “looking into” potential national security implications from DeepSeek.

All these developments raise questions about the role of AI in the tech race between the U.S. and China. The Cipher Brief spoke recently – before the DeepSeek story broke – with Retired Lieutenant General Michael Groen, to discuss the impact and development of AI, particularly the China questions, and AI’s applications in the military and national security space. Lt. Gen. Groen, who served as Director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center at the Department of Defense, told us he worries less about the technical challenges in AI development than the need for the U.S. military to think about integration, practical applications, and the cultural change he believes is needed for adopting AI.

Could Trump’s Iron Dome work? Only if Canada attacks Detroit - Opinion

Max Boot

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In 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced he was launching a Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as “Star Wars,” with the goal of rendering nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” He imagined lasers in space shooting down Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, effectively creating a space shield to save America from nuclear Armageddon.

More than 40 years and hundreds of billions of dollars in missile-defense spending later, the United States has not come close to achieving Reagan’s lofty aspirations. Space lasers did not prove practical. Neither did a madcap scheme known as Brilliant Pebbles for lofting thousands of interceptors into space. The Airborne Laser — a Boeing 747 equipped with a laser — got to the testing phase before being canceled as too impractical.

The United States did develop and deploy effective defenses, such as the Patriot battery and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, for use against short- and medium-range missiles. But attempts to stop a nuclear missile strike on the United States have never advanced much beyond President George W. Bush’s deployment in 2004 of 44 ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California. This system was designed to defend against a few missiles launched by a rogue state, not a massive nuclear attack from Russia or China. And it isn’t clear the system could achieve even that objective: In tests, the interceptors hit their targets only 50 percent of the time.

The Case for Reglobalization

Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., and Maximilian F. Hippold

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After years of promoting globalization and free trade agreements, in the past decade, U.S. policymakers have coalesced around an economic agenda that emphasizes industrial policy and supply chain security. This pivot was in large part a reaction to the downsides of economic interdependence. Although the overall economic benefits of globalization are undisputed, they have been unevenly distributed. In many parts of the United States, unfettered international trade brought a decline of domestic industry and the loss of well-paid manufacturing jobs. Entire regions, especially rural and predominantly industrial ones, were left behind. The supply chain issues that emerged during the

An evergreen assessment

Matt Armstrong

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I had no intention of posting anything today or this week, but I just read a passage I feel compelled to share. It is a true example of an evergreen analysis. For those who may not be aware, Evergreen refers to something that remains popular or relevant over time. In this case, it’s not popular, just relevant. Here is the passage: It is my own conviction that Americans too often give this ‘organizational problem’ a priority which it does not deserve. Americans are prone to believe that if they can find an apt name and draw up an imposing organizational chart, then matters will more or less take care of themselves.

Ha! This applies to seemingly countless national security topics today, not the least of which has been in my sights for literally decades: the chant of “bring back USIA.” The author above wrote long before Field of Dreams came out and long before the book it was based on came out (1989 and 1982, respectively, for those who want to feel old).1

What was the “organizational problem”? Directly preceding the above, which appeared on page 244 of his book, were the questions, “Who is going to conduct such operations as I have been discussing? Who, in the sense not of particularly individuals, but of agencies or organizations?” The operations were countering, preemptively and reactively, Russian “political-subversive warfare.”

The Need for a Taxonomy of Hybrid Warfare: Population-Centric vs. Enemy-Centric Approaches

Dr. Tarik Solmaz

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Since Russia’s ambiguous intervention in Ukraine in 2014, the concept of hybrid warfare has gained attention in Western academic, defense policy, military practitioner, and media circles. Despite its rising popularity, the concept hybrid warfare is analytically problematic. One of the reasons for this is that the existing conceptualization of hybrid warfare is too broad for theoretical analysis and defense policymaking. Hybrid warfare is commonly described as a way of attaining strategic goals by using a mixture of kinetic and non-kinetic instruments while remaining below conventional armed conflict. With this understanding, the hybrid mode of warfare may take a wide variety of shapes and be practiced in different ways.

The examples of case studies that have been labeled as hybrid warfare span from Russia’s operations in Crimea and the Donbas region, to China’s intimidatory activities against Taiwan, to Iran’s destabilizing behavior around the Middle East, to North Korea’s hostile and provocative actions towards South Korea. Apart from perhaps being categorized under the single term hybrid warfare, there is little evidence to suggest a strong connection between them.

Given that hybrid warfare is an umbrella term encompassing a broad range of activities, creating a taxonomy to facilitate a more nuanced understanding of its diverse manifestations would be helpful. In this sense, this paper proposes applying David Kilcullen’s famous taxonomy, originally used in counterinsurgency, to differentiate between population-centric and enemy-centric approaches to the hybrid warfare model. Before that, however, let us briefly explain what Kilcullen means by population-centric and enemy-centric approaches within the context of counterinsurgency.

Army University PressMilitary Review, January-February 2025, v. 105, no. 1

Cyber Considerations of a Resistance Operating Concept: The Subversive Potential of Persuasive Technology

Lessons in Reconstitution from the Russia-Ukraine War: Gaining Asymmetric Advantage through Transformative Reconstitution

Meeting Expectations: Failure in Ukraine Will Not Change the Russian Aerospace Defense Force

Classical Methods of Influence Applied to Contemporary Military Leadership

Toward a Leadership Theory for Mission Command

Reconstituting Partner Forces in Conflict: A Global Unity of Effort

Black on Ammunition, Green on Forecasting: Ammunition Lessons Learned from a DIVARTY in a Division Warfighter Exercise

Achieving Decision Dominance: The Arduous Pursuit of Operationalized Data

Operating in a Multidomain Environment: Combat Support Training Exercise 86-24-02

The Problem with Convergence: Dispelling the Illusion Surrounding the Tactical Application of Offensive Space and Cyberspace Capabilities

Homeland Joint Interagency Task Force: Can It Better Deliver Planning, Coordination, and Information Sharing Protocols to Counter Transnational Criminal Threats?

Can the President Federalize the National Guard?

Preparing for Hot Conflicts: Army Training and Operations in a Warming World

Flowers On His Grave [Poem]

The U.S. Military Risks Mineral Shortages in a U.S.-China War: Lessons from World War I, World War II, and the Korean War

How to Win the Global South’s Energy Race

Timothy Ray, and Ramon Marks

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The United States has a comparative advantage over China as an energy provider; it should make the most of it.

China is the world’s largest trading partner. Across Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America, it wields its economic heft, building influence and diplomatic soft power in the Global South. Beijing is also a founding member of BRICS+, a rising coalition of countries that includes Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Two dozen more have applied for membership. BRICS+ already comprises more than a quarter of the global economy and almost half of the world’s population.

Unlike the Soviet Bloc during the Cold War, China is fully integrated into the global market economy, making it a formidable competitor for Washington and Western democracies in a shifting global order where economic factors are just as paramount for influence and power as traditional political and military considerations. Over the last few years, Washington has only begun to grapple with this emerging reality, realizing that hard military and political power will no longer be enough to safeguard a prosperous global free market order underpinned by democratic values.

U.S. Energy Strategy: Prioritizing Peace Through Strength

David Gattie

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Energy policy is national security—America must act accordingly.

“The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function.” It’s an oft-referenced quote, particularly when issues become sufficiently complex and entangled, and direct, simple solutions are out of reach and inappropriate. But it speaks of a highly-valued, if not requisite, cognitive capacity for someone engaged in geopolitics, diplomacy, and statecraft—particularly when it impacts a country’s energy security.

Post-WWII U.S. strategists exhibited this unique cognitive capacity. While the world’s other major powers had been decimated in economic and military power, America occupied a commanding position economically, militarily, and industrially. Rather than retreat to isolationism, the United States made the strategic decision to project its national power globally and promote democratic values, human rights, individual liberty, and free market trade. A strategic objective was to contain the spread of communism by maintaining U.S. competitive advantage as a deterrent to illiberal designs the USSR might have for the world.

With Stargate, will the US win the AI race?

Charlie Edwards

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Donald Trump launched his second presidential term with the announcement of a US$500 billion initiative to build the physical and virtual infrastructure needed to support developments in artificial intelligence (AI). The Stargate initiative has attracted much attention, including questions over its financing, but its goal is more prosaic. The initiative is Donald Trump’s attempt to unify the private and public sectors in a common mission and reduce the political hurdles and infrastructure bottlenecks that stymied progress under his predecessor.

The AI ambitions of the United States, China and the European Union are constrained by insufficient underlying infrastructure, including old national energy grids; inadequate data centres; and unreliable and unsustainable energy supplies. But the competition for AI dominance may increasingly come to be defined by states’ sovereign AI capabilities and their ability to export them.

Gridlock

A key determinant of becoming a global leader in AI is the ability to build an efficient, sustainable and resilient infrastructure that ensures energy is available, reliable and constant. The state of national power grids in China, the EU, and the US remains a significant barrier. China’s creaking grid represents a major constraint to progress and the government is planning to invest more than US$800bn over the next six years. The investment will support Beijing’s Eastern Data, Western Computing initiative, which aims to tap into China’s energy resources in the west and transfer computing power to economic hubs along the coast.

US Air Force 2050: rethinking next-gen air power

Douglas Barrie

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The problem facing the United States, and by inference also some of its closest allies, is as broad as it is long: what kind of air (and space) power will the US require to prevail against a peer competitor in the middle of this century? It is a question that Frank Kendall, the now former secretary of the US Air Force (USAF), grappled with in the ‘The Department of the Air Force in 2050’ Congressional Committee report.

The report starkly projects the extent of the likely challenge from China, which, by 2050, the Department of the Air Force (DAF) sees as a peer competitor on a global scale. ‘Today, the United States is in a race for military technological superiority with China’, the report contends. This competition will shape fundamentally any confrontation in the air and space domains, as well as the types of platforms, capabilities and personnel needed to win.

Wheel brake applied

The report further illuminates Kendall’s July 2024 decision to re-examine the assumptions underpinning the crewed combat element of the USAF’s Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) programme. While the report only mentions NGAD twice, the text serves in part as an unclassified explanation of Kendall’s thinking and concerns.

What’s Wrong With Germany’s Economy?

MICHAEL SPENCE

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Once labeled the “sick man of Europe,” Germany is ailing again. Its economy is slowing more sharply than in the rest of Europe, and may well be in recession. Can it recover anytime soon?

It's Time for a Trump Doctrine in Foreign Policy | Opinion

Anthony J. Constantini

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President Donald Trump returned to the White House on a promise to reform America's foreign policy, transitioning away from the idea of "spreading democracy" and refocusing on the country's national interest.

A major impediment to fulfilling this promise, however, is the collection of treaties, international agreements, and institutions that comprise the "international world order." Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in his confirmation hearing, highlighted this Gordian knot as a major threat, saying America had replaced "a foreign policy that served the national interest" with "one that served the 'liberal world order.'" But, he added, that "postwar global order is not just obsolete; it is now a weapon being used against us."

America can reorient its foreign policy to prepare for the future by slowly leaving treaties that do not serve its interests, but this process would be cumbersome and somewhat scattershot.

Or it could take an alternative path: Instead of untying the Gordian knot, America could slice through it via a new presidential doctrine. Such doctrines—statements indicating a new direction for American foreign policy—have been a staple of American politics since President James Monroe announced the Monroe Doctrine, which declared European powers should stay out of the Americas. Recently, they have become rare. The only president to issue one this century was George W. Bush; the "Bush Doctrine," as Bush defined it in his memoir Decision Points, espoused preemptive war and democracy promotion. This lack of vision is reflective of the past 30 years of uninventive and disastrous foreign policymaking.

The Price of Trump’s Power Politics

Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay

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Pax Americana is gone. Born with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the U.S.-led international rules-based order died with the second inauguration of Donald J. Trump. The president has long maintained that this order disadvantages the United States by saddling it with the burden of policing the globe and enabling its allies to play it for a sucker. “The postwar global order is not just obsolete,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared in his Senate confirmation hearing. “It is now a weapon being used against us.”

Germany’s far right crashes through the firewall

John Kampfner

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Germany has fallen into a deep funk. Friedrich Merz — the man set to become the next chancellor — has fallen into a deep hole. And the country’s democratic credentials have been damaged.

In a week that saw the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, politicians in Berlin have descended into panic and fury, all caused by a toxic cocktail of recent terror attacks, immigration policies and populism. The problem may not be of Merz’s own making, but he’s been spooked by U.S. President Donald Trump into doing what mainstream politicians have vowed never to do — break Germany’s so-called “firewall” and pander to the far right.

Question is, did Merz fall into a trap? Or is he forcing other mainstream parties to confront what many regard as the new reality — a harder, less welcoming Germany?

Germany was rocked by two terror attacks this winter: In December, a clinical psychologist rammed his car into a Christmas market in the eastern city of Magdeburg, killing six and injuring nearly 300. And in January, a man ran amok in the Bavarian town of Aschaffenburg, stabbing two people to death, including a 2-year-old boy. Both perpetrators were migrants.

How to be great again: Europe’s right-wing must form a cohesive vision

Ralph Schoellhammer

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Barely a week goes by where there is not another “Make Europe Great Again” event somewhere on the old continent. I just recently participated in one taking place in the European Parliament in Brussels, and yet another one is coming up in Madrid in just a few days. I am generally sympathetic to these gatherings, and I enjoy the vibe shift spilling over from the US as much as any right-of-centre commentator on this side of the Atlantic. But vibes alone will not make Europe great or, for that matter, save it. Donald Trump was elected to be president of the United States, and while he has a soft spot for some European leaders like Italy’s Giorgia Meloni or Hungary’s Viktor Orbán his priority is and will remain America first. The hopes that Donald Trump will save Europe from itself are misguided, and while he certainly would like a strong partner he is not going to do our work for us.

Europe’s right-wing movements need to come to bold decisions about what they want the EU and future relations between European states to look like, and despite the occasional regional victory in Italy, Austria, Hungary, or the Czech Republic there is still a dearth of a cohesive right-wing vision. To be clear, by right-wing I do not meant the lukewarm conservatism of the European People’s Party and their faux conservative leaders like Manfred Weber or Ursula von der Leyen. These people share more in common with the Greens than genuine conservatives, and they have carried out every left-wing lunacy from “Green Deals” to open borders. Yes, yes, in recent weeks there has been some back peddling: The Green Deal should be postponed and maybe borders are not such a bad idea after all. It only took a prolonged economic recession and weekly stabbings by illegal immigrants in Germany.

What DeepSeek Knows About You — And Why It Matters

Christianna Silva

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DeepSeek, a Chinese AI chatbot similar to OpenAI's ChatGPT, is the most downloaded free app in the U.S. — but its swift rise to the top of the app store charts has raised potent privacy concerns at a time when the U.S. is banning TikTok over its ties to the Chinese government.

Like most apps, DeepSeek requires you to agree to its privacy policy when you sign up to access it — but you probably don't read it.

In summary, "DeepSeek’s privacy policy, which can be found in English, makes it clear: user data, including conversations and generated responses, is stored on servers in China," Adrianus Warmenhoven, a cybersecurity expert at NordVPN, said in a statement. "This raises concerns because of data collection outlined — ranging from user-shared information to data from external sources — which falls under the potential risks associated with storing such data in a jurisdiction with different privacy and security standards."

Here's the TL;DR from DeepSeek's privacy policy:

1. It collects "Information You Provide" 

• Profile information like date of birth, username, email address, telephone number, password
• The text, audio, prompt, feedback, chat history, uploaded files, and other content you provide to DeepSeek
• Information when you contact them, like proof of identity or age and feedback or inquiries

How DeepSeek changed the future of AI—and what that means for national security

PATRICK TUCKER

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Days after China’s DeepSeek detailed an approach to generative AI that needs just a fraction of the computing power used to build prominent U.S. tools, the global conversation around AI and national security—from how the Pentagon buys and uses AI to how foreign powers might disrupt American life, including privacy—is changing.

DeepSeek’s announcement drew a collective wail from the White House, Wall Street and Silicon Valley. In Washington, D.C., President Trump called it a “wake-up for our industries that we need to be laser focused on competing” against China. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said the National Security Council is currently reviewing the app. The Navy has already banned it. On Wall Street, chip maker Nvidia’s stock tumbled. OpenAI, DeepSeek’s closest U.S. competitor, is crying foul and claiming the app essentially distills their own model.

If you believe the United States “must win the AI competition that is intensifying strategic competition with China,” as former Google chairman Eric Schmidt and former Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work wrote in 2021, then DeepSeek is a big deal.

Why is DeepSeek so significant? For one thing, it’s much more open-source than other models. But the defining technical innovation lies in the model’s ability to distill advanced reasoning capabilities from massive models into smaller, more efficient counterparts. One DeepSeek model often outperforms larger open-source alternatives, setting a new standard (or at least a very public one) for compact AI performance.

Human-Machine Interaction and Human Agency in the Military Domain

Ingvild Bode

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Introduction

The proliferation of AI technologies in military decision-making processes around targeting seems to be increasing. At first, the incorporation of AI in the military domain was predominantly examined in relation to weapon systems, frequently referred to as autonomous weapon systems (AWS) that can identify, track and attack targets without further human intervention (International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] 2021). Militaries worldwide already employ weapon systems, including some loitering munitions, which incorporate AI technologies to facilitate target recognition, generally depending on computer vision techniques (Boulanin and Verbruggen 2017; Bode and Watts 2023). Although usually operated with human approval, loitering munitions appear to have the potential to dynamically apply force without human intervention. Indeed, various reports from Russia’s war in Ukraine have indicated that the Ukrainian army uses loitering munitions that release force without human approval in the terminal stage of operation (Hambling 2023, 2024). These developments firmly underline longstanding and growing concerns about the extent to which the role that humans play in use-of-force decision making when using AI-based systems is diminishing.

However, weapon systems are just one of numerous areas of application where AI is used in the military setting. AI technologies are typically considered to improve the effective and rapid analysis of vast quantities of data, making them an appealing choice for a range of military decision-making tasks pertaining to varying levels of risk, such as logistics, recruitment, intelligence and targeting (Grand-Clément 2023). In the military domain, such systems are commonly referred to as AIbased decision support systems (DSS) that “assist decision-makers situated at different levels in the chain of command to solve semi-structured and unstructured decision tasks” (Susnea 2012, 132–33; Nadibaidze, Bode and Zhang 2024).