Indian Strategic Studies: 01/26/25

26 January 2025

India’s Limited Options Against China: Strategic And Diplomatic Dilemmas – OpEd

K.S. Venkatachalam

Three recent developments involving China are raising alarms in South Asia, with serious implications for the geopolitical landscape, particularly for India. These developments are:

China’s plan to build a $137 billion Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet, which could generate 40,000 megawatts of electricity annually. This dam, located in Medog County, could potentially be used as a weapon to control and divert the flow of water to India, leading to flooding risks.
China’s refusal to withdraw troops from areas they intruded upon in 2020, coupled with military drills in Eastern Ladakh to prepare for possible future conflicts with India.
China restricting the export of critical equipment to India, especially for manufacturing solar panels, electric vehicles, and electronics.

These actions indicate that China is unlikely to mend ties with India anytime soon. There’s a growing sentiment that China is determined to prevent India from emerging as a dominant power in Asia.

First, The Yarlung Tsangpo dam project, which will be the world’s largest hydroelectric project, has raised serious concerns. While China claims that the dam is a “run-of-the-river” project meant solely for hydroelectric power, India worries that China could use the dam to control the water flow of the Yarlung Zangbo river, which flows from Tibet to India’s Arunachal Pradesh and then to Bangladesh. If China were to divert or block the flow of water, millions of people downstream in India and Bangladesh could be affected.

BRICS: Concern For West? – OpEd

Patial RC

The Concern: Original BRICS members are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The so-far 10-member BRICS+ grouping already comprises nearly half of the world’s population and over a third of the global economy. It also has more than 25 per cent of the world’s landmass, produces more than 30 per cent of the world’s oil output. In the 21st Century, with the rise of Asia, and economies like China, India, Russia, Indonesia, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and others, the world has become much more multi-polar, instead of being bipolar. Brazil in South America and South Africa in Africa were also rising global economies. BRICS and is on track to surge ahead of the G7 economies in less than 20 years. Though the BRICS group was created in 2009. However, the renewed interest saw its membership double within one year. Lately Indonesia became a full member of BRICS group.

President Trump is after the BRICS+ and is threatening to impose 100 per cent tariffs on member countries if it tries to replace the US dollar for international trade. The US feels threatened by the grouping ,because it can actually make the US dollar vulnerable. “If the BRICS nations want to do that (replace the US dollar), that’s okay, but we’re going to put at least a 100 per cent tariff on the business they do with the United States,” President Trump told the international media shortly after his presidential inauguration. Naturally the West led by the US seem genuinely concerned about the challenge to its existing ‘World Order’, the West-made international system.

Carrots and Sticks? Taiwan and Semiconductor Supply Chains Under Trump 2.0

Ming-Yen Ho and Chiang Min-yen

The decisive Republican victory in the 2024 U.S. election has handed President Donald Trump a full mandate to implement his economic agenda. His plans for punitive global tariffs and extended corporate tax cuts are clear. However, the future of Biden-era policies, such as the CHIPS and Science Act (often shortened to the CHIPS Act) and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), remains uncertain.

Taiwanese firms face two key concerns under the second Trump administration. The first is the sustainability of U.S. commitments to support Taiwanese manufacturing under the CHIPS Act and related incentives. Will federal and state-level agreements reached in the Biden era be honored? If new subsidies arise, Taiwanese firms need a level playing field with U.S. competitors. Taiwanese companies must stress their critical role in bolstering the U.S. supply chain – a network vital for allied countries. Favoring U.S. manufacturers alone risks inefficiency, higher costs for U.S. customers, and misallocation of resources essential for competing with China.

The second issue involves potential tariffs and trade barriers targeting Taiwanese semiconductor and electronics supply chains. Trump’s past suggestion that he would use tariffs to coerce investments remains salient. Historical precedent from the Japan-U.S. trade conflict shows this strategy could pressure Taiwanese firms, especially in sectors with U.S. competitors. Preemptive investment in the U.S. may mitigate this risk while expanding business opportunities.

Why India’s Fence Along its Bangladesh Border Riles Dhaka

Sudha Ramachandran

India’s fencing of its border with Bangladesh has emerged as the latest sore spot between the two neighbors.

On January 12, Bangladesh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Indian high commissioner in Dhaka to convey to him Bangladesh’s “deep concern” over the “unauthorized attempts to construct barbed wire fencing and the related operational actions” by India’s Border Security Force (BSF), which “have caused tensions and disturbances along the border.”

The following day, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) informed Bangladesh’s interim high commissioner in New Delhi that India had “observed all protocols and agreements between the two governments” and between the BSF and Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) in erecting the fencing.

The latest bilateral border spat erupted on January 8, when India resumed fencing work along its border with Bangladesh. According to reports, BGB personnel objected to BSF fence construction activity at several places. There were violent clashes too between Indian and Bangladeshi civilians living near the border. Importantly, Bangladesh accused the BSF of shooting dead a Bangladeshi citizen and injuring several others.

India and Bangladesh share a 4,096.7 kilometer-long border. India began fencing it in 1986 amid rising concerns over Bangladeshi migration into India’s Northeast, which fueled a powerful anti-foreigner movement and an armed insurgency.

Will Recent US Sanctions on Russian Oil Trigger an Oil Crisis in India?

Rushali Saha

In his final days in office, former U.S. President Joe Biden announced what is being described as the “most significant sanctions yet” hitting Russia’s oil and gas revenue. The sanctions target some of Russia’s largest producers, Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, along with their subsidiaries, and ship insurance providers Ingosstrakh and Alfastrakhovanie, as well as 183 vessels that have shipped Russian oil. In an unprecedented move, six Russian oil tankers still under construction were included in the sanctions, as was Shandong Port Group, a China-based oil terminal operator, and two Indian ship management companies for their alleged involvement in the transportation of Russian oil and gas.

As the largest buyers of Russian crude oil between December 5, 2022, and December 31, 2024, China and India are expected to be hit hard by the sanctions.

Shandong Port has already banned U.S.-sanctioned vessels from calling at its ports, and Indian refineries have halted trade with sanctioned tankers and entities. Indian government-owned banks such as the State Bank of India and Punjab National Bank are exercising extreme caution and withholding payments to Russian exporters.

In India, there is growing uncertainty over the future of the India-Russia oil supply deal signed between Reliance and Rosneft last month, after Rosnefteflot, a subsidiary of Rosneft, was hit with sanctions.

Delusion of de-escalation on the China-India border - OPINION

MUHAMMAD BURHAN

In late October 2024, India and China began implementing what was touted as a landmark pact to de-escalate tensions along their disputed Himalayan border, a region known as the Line of Actual Control, or LAC.

The agreement, forged ahead of a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, marking the leaders’ first formal talks in five years, included provisions for troop pullbacks, dismantlement of temporary infrastructure and a return to 2020 patrolling patterns in contested areas such as Depsang and Demchok in eastern Ladakh.

Though touted at the time as the biggest thaw in relations since deadly high-mountain clashes in the Galwan Valley in 2020, months later, the agreement is proving more symbolic than substantive in addressing entrenched issues and ensuring meaningful implementation.

Beneath the surface of this diplomatic facade lies a glaring contradiction where, on one hand, both sides publicly advocate peace, and on the other hand, their actions reveal a steadfast commitment to military preparedness and geopolitical rivalry.

India To Take Back 18,000 Citizens Illegally in America as Even Mexico Acquiesces to Trump Immigration Policies

JOSEPH CURL

India is also playing ball because it wants to hold on to the legal channels for immigration that Indians now enjoy.

With a new sheriff in town — and a possible trade war looming — India on Tuesday declared it will help President Trump identify its citizens residing illegally in America and then take them back.

So far the two countries have already identified more than 18,000 Indians who entered America illegally, but officials say they aren’t sure that’s the total number, Bloomberg reported.

On Inauguration Day, Mr. Trump vowed to round up and deport foreigners who have entered the country illegally. The threat packs more punch as the nations facing tariffs seek to avoid them by cooperating with the new administration on other issues.

India is also playing ball because it wants to hold on to the legal channels for immigration that Indians now enjoy, including student visas and the H-1B program, which allows American employers to hire foreign laborers for specialized occupations, such as in the tech industry.

Before taking office, Mr. Trump expressed support for the H-1B program saying, “I’ve always liked the visas… I’ve been a believer in H-1B. It’s a great program.” That was a departure from his stance during his first term, when his administration tightened restrictions on the program, saying it was replacing American laborers with lower-paid foreign ones.

Sheikh Hasina: From Refugee To Prime Minister To Fugitive In Half A Century – Analysis

Raju Mansukhani

The dramatic life of Bangladesh former Prime Minister’s continues to unfold, mirroring the roller-coaster ride of South Asia’s political dynasties since 1947

While the past invariably catches up in unexpected ways, and revolutions promising social-political liberation often devour its own heroes and children, the unfolding history of Bangladesh is yet another testimony of the traumas unleashed by the Partition of 1947 which divided the vast subcontinent into India, Pakistan and East Pakistan. Sheikh Hasina’s dramatic flight from Dhaka on 5 August 2024 will remain a defining though traumatic moment in south-east Asian politics when a once-loved and highly respected Prime Minister had to flee for her life as the opposition rose against her, with religious leaders, students and citizens taking to the streets against her dictatorial regime.

As Bangladesh’s longest-serving Prime Minister, who shaped the destiny of a new liberated country for twenty eventful years (from 1996 to 2001, and then 2009 to 2024), life and politics seem to have come a full circle for Sheikh Hasina. In 1975 after the assassination of her father ‘Bangabandhu’ Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the President of Bangladesh, she had taken shelter in India from 1981 to 1986. Now almost four decades later, the bespectacled, dignified South Asian leader, is said to be seeking asylum not just in India, but UAE or Saudi Arabia among others.

Why Is China Succeeding As A Peace Broker? – Analysis

P. K. Balachandran

China’s efforts in peace-brokering are based on a mix of economic interest, conscious and transparent neutrality and chutzpah.

Given its rapid rise as an economic giant, China has been wanting to foster world peace by a variety of means, including brokering peace between warring parties, whether sovereign countries or no-State actors.

China’s venture is based on observing neutrality between the contesting or warring parties; non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign countries; laying stress on infrastructural development; and fostering global schemes such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Civilizational Initiatives (GCI).

China has so far played a constructive role in bringing about transitions in the perpetually disturbed Afghanistan; it has helped warring Iran and Saudi Arabia strike a deal; and has initiated ceasefires agreements in war-torn Myanmar.

In all this, the bottom line has been a combination of China’s self-interest (mainly economic) and the long term and sustainable interest of the parties in conflict.

Trump, China, and the Truth about the Panama Canal

Carla Martínez Machain, Michael A. Allen, and Michael E. Flynn

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has in recent days repeatedly denounced what he sees as China’s outsized influence on the Panama Canal – the crucial maritime passageway linking the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

On December 25, 2024, Trump falsely claimed that Chinese soldiers were “operating” the Panama Canal, wishing them a “merry Christmas.”

Trump has also directly challenged the Panamanian government, arguing that the U.S. was paying too much in fees to use the canal. He added that if his demands on the management of the canal were not met, the United States would seek the asset to be “returned to us, in full, and without question.” He even mulled the idea of using military force to acquire the canal.

Much of what Trump says on the Panama Canal is false, as authorities in the country have been quick to note. Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino stated that there was no Chinese control or participation in managing the canal. Meanwhile, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson disputed Trump’s claims while reiterating the canal’s neutrality.

But beyond the political rhetoric, what is the state of Chinese and U.S. influence in Panama? As experts in U.S. security cooperation, we carried out fieldwork in Panama for a recent book on U.S. overseas military deployments. This included interviews in 2018 with Panamanian government officials and journalists, as well as U.S. military and diplomatic personnel stationed in Panama.

How quickly could Iran build its first nuclear weapon? Look at China

Hui Zhang

The first Trump administration left the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—also known as the Iran nuclear deal—in May 2018, significantly reducing the constraints on and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program. Since mid-2019, Iran has significantly shortened its “breakout time”—the amount of time needed to produce enough weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) to build a nuclear weapon to mere days.

How quickly could Iran make an atomic bomb once it has acquired enough weapons-grade uranium? Some nuclear experts argue it would take Iran anywhere between several months to up to a year. But China’s experience shows that Tehran could build a bomb much faster—in as little as three to five weeks.[1]

Weaponization and fissile materials production. Aside from acquiring the necessary fissile materials, making a nuclear warhead involves several crucial steps. These include converting uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) to metallic form and then casting and machining the metal into the core of a bomb. Other non-nuclear components would also need to be ready before a warhead could be assembled. Such non-nuclear components include a weapon design, a neutron initiator, a detonation wave focusing system, high explosives, detonators, and an arming, fusing, and firing system. The experience of other nuclear weapon states shows that these non-nuclear components can be built in parallel with the production of nuclear weapons fuel. This means that they don’t require additional time.

Does China 'operate' Panama Canal, as Trump says?

Shawn Yuan

During his inaugural address, President Donald Trump doubled down on his assertion that China runs the Panama Canal.

"China is operating the Panama Canal and we didn't give it to China. We gave it to Panama and we're taking it back," he said.

The 51-mile (82km) Panama Canal cuts across the Central American nation and is the main link between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

Up to 14,000 ships use it each year as a shortcut to a journey which, before the canal was built, would have taken them on a lengthy and costly trip around the tip of South America.

What has Trump said about the canal?

The mention of Panama in his inaugural speech is not the first time he has focused on the Central American nation and its transoceanic canal.

On Christmas Day, Trump posted on social media that the "wonderful soldiers of China" were "lovingly, but illegally, operating the Panama Canal" - a claim which was swiftly denied by officials in Panama City and Beijing.

How Weakened Is Iran, Actually? - Analysis

John Haltiwanger

In farewell remarks to the State Department last week, then-U.S. President Joe Biden declared that Iran “is weaker than it’s been in decades.”

Biden’s comments typified current assessments on Iran from the United States and Israel, and there are growing signs that the latter is considering exploiting Tehran’s tenuous position with strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. This comes as more hawkish figures in the Iranian government have called for modifying the country’s nuclear doctrine in the event of an existential threat—publicly flirting with the prospect of weaponization.

Drones on the Homefront

Brandon Valeriano, Steven Ochoa, Maximillian Otto, and Qing Leasure

The reality is drones are here, they are common, and they are now a fact of daily life. 

It starts with the distant buzz and hum, the sense that something is above. The realization quickly comes: It is not a bee or a plane; rather, it is a drone hovering above. This is the modern reality of war, and it also comes to the homefront. Our lives are irrevocably altered by unmanned vehicles, and our general inability to process this development has led to mass hysteria over drones in New Jersey.   

Now that the excitement has died down, it’s time to reflect on drones over New Jersey. The news cycle has moved on with most focusing on the fires in Los Angeles and the inauguration. Incoming President Donald Trump himself still doubts conventional wisdom that nothing nefarious is afoot, stating, “I’m going to give you a report on drones about one day into the administration. Because I think it’s ridiculous that they are not telling you about what is going on with the drones.”

President Trump will find nothing to report. Drones are commonly available at the corner store. As of October 2024, there are a total of 791,597 registered drones in the U.S., with 396,746 of those registered for recreational use with more going unregistered. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires that drones over 250g be registered and imposes strict penalties on those who operate unregistered drones over this weight. A substantial portion of recreational drones available for purchase are below 250g, with some being specifically marketed as 249g.  

Will Casualties in Ukraine Lead to Change in North Korea?

Karl Anthony Borg

In early November 2024, rumors of troop deployments to Russia started spreading among the residents of the North Korean city of Hyesan, on the border with China. Families feared that their own sons would have to fight in Ukraine, but without any official news from Pyongyang, they could not verify the claims. In a few days, the rumors spread from Hyesan to other regions through local merchants’ trade networks and border officials.

The rumors proved to be correct.

An agreement between Russia and North Korea, finalized in November 2024, saw the latter sending a reported 11,000 troops to the frontlines in Ukraine, with Russia providing them with supplies and a generous salary. While attention has been focused on the possibility of the North Korean regime acquiring new military and nuclear technologies, the domestic implications of such a deployment remain largely unexplored.

North Korean forces are suffering severe casualties in Ukraine, specifically around the Kursk region where most of them have been deployed on the frontlines. Ukraine and South Korea both have estimated that as much as 3,000, out of the initial 11,000, have already been reported dead or wounded.

Memo to Trump: Five reasons to act on climate

Jessica McKenzie

Mr. President:

Where to begin? As soon as you regained the highest political office in the United States, you began the process to withdraw the country from the Paris Agreement, joining the exalted ranks of Iran, Libya, and Yemen—the only other countries not party to the agreement.

You proclaimed Alaska “open for business” for all kinds of resource extraction, from mining to timber, with special attention paid to liquified natural gas and other energy projects.

You declared a national energy emergency, even though the United States currently produces more oil and gas than any other country. You commanded federal agencies to “exercise any lawful emergency authorities available to them” to facilitate the production of domestic energy resources—but not wind! “We aren’t going to do the wind thing,” you said.

The editorial brief for this memo was “advice for the incoming president that he might actually take.” Does such a thing exist within the climate arena, Mr. President? I polled some Bulletin contributors to see what they would suggest.

Consider the real estate. “My $0.02 for the incoming president would be that if left unchecked, climate change will certainly impact golf courses and real estate values in Florida,” writes Toby Ault, the director of Graduate Studies for Atmospheric Sciences at Cornell University. Researchers have estimated that US real estate is overvalued by $121 to $237 billion because of flood risk alone—and that figure doesn’t even take into account the risks from wildfire or other climate-related disasters. This creates a giant property bubble that could spell disaster for the US financial system, if and when it pops.

It’s Donald Trump’s world now to win or lose

Mark Toth and Jonathan Sweet

Like it or not, we are not in Kansas anymore.

President Trump is taking the country down a very different geopolitical path. The yet-to-be-determined future of the Land of Oz lies ahead, especially in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific.

One thing is abundantly clear. Globally-speaking, it is Trump’s world now. The self-defeating passivity of the Biden Administration is gone, and the 47th president, for better or worse, is forcefully asserting himself on the global stage.

We saw hints of what is likely to come on Trump’s first day in office. While signing a series of executive orders in the Oval Office, Trump strikingly put Russian President Vladimir Putin on notice.

Essentially, Trump told Putin he is losing in Ukraine. Commenting that “he isn’t doing so well,” he observed that Putin is “grinding it out.”

Trump then twisted the knife, noting that “most people thought that war would have been over in about one week and now you are into three years.” He continued claiming that “we have numbers that almost 1 million Russian soldiers have been killed.”

Second Trump Term Means a New Chapter for Ukraine | Opinion

Steve Cortes

With the overwhelming election of President Donald Trump to a second term, America welcomes an opportunity to reorient its foreign policy in a manner that prioritizes the security of the American homeland. The collapse in border sovereignty plus horrific recent attacks like the New Orleans massacre convince Americans that the meddling globalism of Joe Biden and the Washington foreign policy establishment has not served America's strategic or economic interests.

As part of this policy reckoning, President Trump promises to bring an end to the disastrous Russia-Ukraine war. This war of Russian aggression brought untold misery to both Russia and Ukraine, plus massive debt-financed expenditures from American taxpayers.

But now, with Trump back in office and the promise of negotiations renewed, a new chapter can unfold for both Washington and Kyiv. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was supposed to submit to voters last year at the end of his five-year presidential term. He used the war to postpone elections. Of course, America has held elections during every war in its long democratic history, including during our own bloody Civil War, but nonetheless, most of the Western world excused this Zelensky postponement.

The Cold War Putin Wants

Andrei Kolesnikov

Three years after launching his “special military operation” in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin faces a looming choice. In public, he exudes optimism. He has pulled his country back from the abyss and, with military means, defended its sovereignty, or rather what he calls sovereignty. Had he not done so, he asserts, Russia would have ceased to exist. Meanwhile, Russia’s GDP is growing—it increased by around four percent in 2024, according to official figures—and wages are not only rising but also apparently keeping up with prices despite an annual inflation rate now running at more than nine percent. Behind this façade, the military budget has doubled in three years and growth is overwhelmingly being driven by the military economy; the consumer sector, where inflation is even higher, is stagnant.

Yet so far it all seems tolerable to ordinary Russians. The Kremlin has gained further control over society, even as it allows several aspects of private life to continue undisturbed. And the war, although its costs keep going up, is apparently going Russia’s way: by Putin’s telling, Russian forces “liberated” at least 189 settlements in Ukraine in 2024, and Western air defenses have no chance against Russia’s newest missile. The population shows signs of war fatigue, but in general all the happy reports of military successes are taken for granted: according to survey data from the independent Levada Center, performative or genuine support for the special operation has plateaued at around 75 percent of the population, including 45 percent who say they are definitely in favor of military action and 30 percent somewhat in favor. (Although more than a third of Russians also say that the return to the White House of Donald Trump, who has vowed to quickly end the war, might be good for Russia, even more think it will make no difference.)

Desperate for peace, Ukraine embraces Trump

Zoya Sheftalovich

Only months ago, Kyiv was terrified a second Donald Trump presidency would force Ukraine to capitulate to Vladimir Putin. Today, it’s pinning its hopes on Trump finally ending three years of carnage.

Gathering in Davos this week for the annual World Economic Forum, Ukrainians and their backers see the newly inaugurated United States president as a circuit-breaker who could force Putin to the negotiating table and offer Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy an off-ramp as well.

“It’s real optimism,” Kurt Volker, who served during Trump’s first term as the U.S. special representative for Ukraine, told POLITICO. “2024 felt like a year of waiting. We have elections, we have distractions, the Biden administration would say no, then they’d say yes … 2025 is looking like a year of action. We are finally moving.”

Kyiv is under no illusions: The obstacle to peace is not the occupant of the White House, it’s the one in the Kremlin. But when faced with the continuity of the Biden era versus the disruption of Trump, Ukrainians seem ready to see where the wild ride will take them.

To Fix Deterrence, Rethink Goldwater-Nichols and Boost the Budget

John A. Tirpak

“Unintended consequences” from the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and lagging defense spending have weakened America’s ability to deter its adversaries and need to be addressed, researchers with AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies argue in a new paper.

“U.S. deterrence is wavering,” Mitchell Institute Dean retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula warned in a Jan. 21 event rolling out the paper.

China’s military growth, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, North Korea’s and Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and Iran’s support of terrorism “reflect critical gaps in America’s military to deter assaults on U.S. vital interests,” Deptula added.

Retired Gen. T. Michael Moseley, former Air Force chief of staff; retired Maj. Gen. Larry Stutzreim, Mitchell’s director of research; and Richard B. Andres, a non-resident senior fellow at Mitchell, co-authored the new report, which recommends significant growth in defense spending better matched to the threat, and reforms to restore “competition” between the services and in industry, the authors said.

The paper also calls for a “new NSC-68″—a reference to the then-secret policy paper drawn up by Paul Nitze in 1950, which called for sharply increased defense spending, development of new nuclear weapons, containment of the Soviet Union and preparations for economic and strategic conflict.

Why Donald Trump Must Protect S-Band Radar Spectrum for U.S. Defense

Rebecca Grant

Donald Trump Must Guard Spectrum for Radars to Defend the USA: No, the U.S. military cannot share a critical piece of S-band radar spectrum with commercial 5G wireless providers. Not if the new Trump administration wants to improve defenses against mystery drones and guard against threats of missiles from China and Russia.

“President Trump has talked about an Iron Dome for America,” incoming National Security Mike Waltz told CBS News, referring to Israel’s missile defense system. “That needs to include drones as well, not just adversarial actions like hypersonic missiles,” Waltz said.

The priority is clear. However, if the new Trump administration is serious about missile defense for the United States, or any improvements at all, the new team will have to engage on the priority of keeping S-band spectrum clear for military radars that track those missiles and drones.

The U.S. military relies on a slew of S-band radars to carry out critical missile tracking. During the Biden years, an idea took shape that the military might be able to share the S-band spectrum with commercial 5G wireless companies in order to meet growing consumer demand.

The demand for more wireless spectrum is beyond dispute. Social media apps and videos account for up to 80% of the demand for wireless data usage and are soaring in popularity. For example, Americans consumed 100 trillion megabytes of wireless in 2023, so the wireless industry wants Congress to “restore the FCC’s auction authority and create a pipeline of much-needed mid-band spectrum,” according to Meredith Attwell Baker, CTIA President and CEO. 5G commercial operators began eyeing the 3100–3450 MHz slice of the S-band spectrum to accommodate growth.

The Quad Foreign Ministers Joint Statement: Short and Sweet

Euan Graham

Today’s joint statement from the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting in Washington is short and sweet, particularly for those who have been arguing that the grouping should overtly embrace security cooperation.

The statement’s emphasis on ‘security in all domains’ is a noteworthy and welcome shift from the previous, awkward position that the Quad was not a security partnership, despite working together in health security, cybersecurity and maritime security.

This inherent contradiction was unnecessarily self-limiting and confusing but persisted because Quad members, including Australia, saw this self-constraint as necessary to assuage Southeast Asian sensitivities about counterbalancing or containing China.

The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade should update its official description of the Quad, which is currently a ‘a diplomatic, not security, partnership’.

Also absent from the statement is any reference to ‘ASEAN centrality’. This is notable because past Quad statements have all dutifully replicated this diplomatic deference to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This ellipsis is an early indication that the Trump administration does not intend to pursue cooperation through the Quad only at a pace that is comfortable for Southeast Asian countries. In fact, ASEAN doesn’t appear to register at all as a policy concern among some members of Trump’s cabinet line-up.

The Fall of Assad Could Be a Turning Point for the Axis of U.S. Adversaries

Michelle Grisé and Mark Cozad

The Ukraine war has often been characterized as a precipitating factor in the growing alignment of the United States' key adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—and it is true that the conflict in Ukraine has incentivized greater cooperation between the members of this quartet. The fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria may bring America's four most dangerous antagonists closer together still, at least for now.

The growing alignment of these four countries has been driven by a shared perception that the United States and its allies have historically acted to undermine their sovereignty, weaken their influence, and cut off their access to markets. In Moscow and Tehran, as well as in Beijing and Pyongyang, the fall of Assad is likely to be seen through this prism, as yet another data point suggesting that the West will do anything to undermine their survival.

The overnight collapse of the Syrian regime could heighten fears of domestic upheaval, particularly in Moscow and Tehran. As part of the growing military cooperation between the two countries, Russia has already shared advanced surveillance technologies with Iran, but the recent events in Syria could incentivize greater cooperation and knowledge sharing on surveillance and mechanisms for internal control. Assad's downfall will reinforce once again a key lesson for authoritarian regimes across the globe about the cost of failing to stamp out internal threats to their continued rule. As a result, other countries may decide to pursue greater alignment with Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea if they view the risk of regime change as greater than the costs of cooperation with U.S. adversaries.

The Space Enterprise and Integrated Deterrence

Michael J. Mazarr, Krista Langeland, Anthony Atler, Alexis A. Blanc, Daniel Burkhart, Jordan Logue, Jonathan Tran & Brett Zakheim

All elements of U.S. national power can play important roles in deterring conflict — and resilient, effective, credible aerospace capabilities are arguably the essential enabler for the other military components to do their job. The importance of the space enterprise to integrated deterrence emerges in a variety of specific capabilities and missions, from sensing and reconnaissance to targeting to communications.

In this paper, the authors examine in what ways space capabilities and vulnerabilities shape deterrence outcomes, specifically those laid out by the concept of integrated deterrence, and provide insight into the role that the space community plays in this national security objective.

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