China-Pakistan relations are souring, but will muddle along - Opinion

Derek Grossman

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For decades, China and Pakistan have maintained an "all-weather" strategic partnership designed to endure any hardship. This relationship was borne out of a mutual desire to counter India within South Asia and, more recently, to help Beijing manage the challenge of rising Islamic extremism and to offer Islamabad an alternative economic and defense partner in the face of its rockier ties with the U.S.

Philippine Missile Crisis And Taiwan Contingency – Analysis

Lucio Blanco Pitlo III

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The indefinite deployment of a powerful U.S. weapon system in the northern Philippines and Beijing’s strong reaction to it has the makings of a new missile crisis.

Manila wants to acquire a Typhon mid-range capability (MRC), but Beijing warned this would trigger a dangerous arms race. Manila argues that its procurement decision is driven by its own security calculus. But the cost, sophistication, and nature of this capability and the timing fuel doubts, adding to the boiling cross-Strait flashpoint.

South China Sea or Taiwan Strait?

Typhon MRC was installed in Laoag in northern Luzon during a joint Philippines-United States exercise last April and has stayed since, much to China’s chagrin. Laoag City is the capital of Ilocos Norte province, the stronghold of the powerful Marcos family. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. served as vice governor, governor, and representative of the province’s second district. His late father, strongman Ferdinand Sr., also served as a representative before becoming a senator and, eventually, president. Hence, stationing Typhon in the city suggests it has the nod from the highest official in the land. Choosing Laoag may be both strategic and expedient, given its location and buy-in of national and local leadership. Other provinces, like neighboring Cagayan, have aired unease about increased U.S. military presence, worried this may affect Chinese investments and put them directly in harm’s way should hostilities break out.

American Naval Policy and China

George Friedman

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Though U.S.-China naval tensions are by no means a new development, they are vital to any understanding of American behavior on the global stage.

Partly this is because the United States is one of the most well-protected countries in the world. It is situated firmly in the middle of North America – a vast landmass buttressed by oceans – and, as such, cannot be readily attacked from the ground. The northern approach to the United States is from Canada, and the southern approach is from Mexico. Neither has the social or military power to invade the United States. The biggest threats to America have always come from the seas. U.S. intervention in both world wars was designed to block Germany from building a fleet that could threaten U.S. maritime power (as the U-boats had in both conflicts). During World War II, the naval effort dwarfed the ground effort until the war was well underway. But the invasion of Europe and the isolation of Japan were both naval actions.

Industry launches $100B AI-infrastructure effort to keep ahead of China

PATRICK TUCKER

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Oracle, OpenAI, and investors in Japan and the UAE have launched a $100 billion effort to build data centers to run AI applications, an indication of how the U.S.-China race for artificial intelligence is beginning to turn on sheer computing power instead of clever programming.

Oracle has already begun building 10 data centers in Texas of a half-million square feet apiece for the project, dubbed Stargate, CEO Larry Ellison said Tuesday at a White House press conference.

“That will expand to 20, and other locations,” Ellison said.

The venture is being operated by generative AI company OpenAI, which will be the primary user of the data centers, a person familiar with the deal told Defense One.

“I think this will be the most important project of this era,” OpenAI founder Sam Altman said at the press conference. “For [artificial general intelligence] to get built here, to create hundreds of thousands of jobs, to create a new industry centered here.”

The primary investors are private companies, including Japanese holding company SoftBank and United Arab Emirates-based MGX. Their initial investment will be $100 billion; Stargate aims to draw $500 billion within five years.

China Has Raised the Cyber Stakes

Adam Segal

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Over the last few months, U.S. government officials have revealed details about a sophisticated Chinese cyber-operation called “Salt Typhoon.” The campaign, which U.S. investigators believe is connected to China’s Ministry of State Security, has targeted at least nine telecommunications and infrastructure firms in the United States, as well as other targets in dozens of other countries. Over the past year or two—investigators have not yet been able to determine the exact duration of the operation—the hackers geolocated and recorded the calls of millions of Americans and gained access to the texts and phone calls of a more select group of high-level officials and politicians, including now U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance, according to Politico. Chinese-sponsored cyber-espionage is not new, but Salt Typhoon was unprecedented in its breadth. The full extent of the breach, and the degree to which hackers still have access to that information, remains unknown, but the vice chair of the Select Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Mark Warner, has called the attack “the worst telecom hack in our nation’s history.”

Senior lawmakers and U.S. officials have begun using encrypted apps to make cellphone calls and send texts. The Biden administration issued guidance to infrastructure operators on how to mitigate the threats, banned Chinese telecommunications firms from operating in the United States, and convened discussions with U.S. telecom CEOs and cybersecurity firms. In his last week in office, U.S. President Joe Biden issued an executive order that, among other things, requires companies selling software to the federal government to prove publicly that they have met cybersecurity standards. A more sustained policy response, however, will fall to Trump. Many of his staff will be familiar with the threat that Chinese hackers present, but they will be less familiar with how sophisticated and technologically capable their adversary has truly become.

Ukraine is much better at combined arms operations than Russia

Stavros Atlamazoglou

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The war in Ukraine is the first large-scale conflict in which unmanned aerial systems play a significant role. Although drones are not new by any means—the U.S. Intelligence Community and military pioneered their use back in the 1990s—Ukraine is the first war in which drones are used profusely on all levels of fighting.

Both sides use drones, artillery, missiles, mechanized assets, infantry, and electronic warfare (EW) among others to achieve their battlefields. But one side has a clear superiority when it comes to combining them for maximum effect: Ukraine.

The Ukrainian forces recently launched several counterattacks in Kursk Oblast, inside Russia. (The Russian forces have been trying to eradicate the Ukrainian salient since it was first created in August.)

In its most recent counterattacks, the Ukrainian military displayed robust combined arms capabilities. For example, in support of their mechanized formations, the Ukrainians deployed electronic warfare measures, thus creating a “bubble” around their forces and denying access to Russian drones. Unmanned aerial systems can either be shot down via physical means or “commandeered” via electronic warfare systems. At a point in time when drones are everywhere on the battlefield, potent electronic warfare capabilities are that much more important.

First female Coast Guard commandant ousted

Ellen Mitchell

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U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Linda Fagan, who made history as the first female uniformed leader of a U.S. military branch, was unexpectedly ousted by President Trump less than 24 hours into his second term.

In a message sent to all Coast Guard members on Tuesday morning, acting Secretary of Homeland Security Benjamine Huffman said he had relieved Fagan of her duties.

“She served a long and illustrious career, and I thank her for her service to our nation,” Huffman said, offering no further explanation for her abrupt ouster.

But in a lengthy Department of Homeland Security (DHS) statement released Tuesday, the department outlined five major reasons for her removal, many of which center on the Trump administration’s vow to refocus U.S. military operations on readiness and lethality, in part by eradicating diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) initiatives.

Fagan, 61, was terminated “because of her leadership deficiencies, operational failures, and inability to advance the strategic objectives of the U.S. Coast Guard,” a senior DHS official said in the release.

How Trump Saved the Abrams Tank

Merrick Carey

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Soon after his first inauguration in January 2017, President Trump saved the Abrams tank. What started as a Fox News interview on lowering the price of tanks quickly turned into a dedicated plan to rejuvenate Army tank production and rebuild the Midwest defense industrial base, too.

2017 was a critical moment for the new President to address the Abrams tank program. The Abrams was designed during the Cold War specifically to defeat the large tank forces of the Warsaw Pact in central Europe. During the Reagan Administration defense build-up, thousands of Abrams tanks were produced at the U.S. Army’s Lima, Ohio tank plant, managed by defense contractor General Dynamics. Manufacture of new tanks ceased after the fall of the Soviet Union, but regular modernization of the Abrams tank continued to incorporate digital upgrades and battlefield lessons learned.

Then, the Obama Administration withdrew U.S. tanks from Europe as it pushed its “reset” approach to Russia. At one point, the U.S. Army even proposed shuttering the Lima production facility when faced with budget reductions. America’s armored vehicle defense industrial base shrank dramatically as activity at the Lima tank plant in northwest Ohio, which had once produced 60 Abrams per month, worked on only 12 per year. Only additional funding from Congress kept a minimal Abrams workforce and supply chain in place.

President Trump’s expressed preference regarding tank purchases kickstarted planning by the White House, OMB, the Army, and General Dynamics, which resulted in budget increases that would modernize more than 100 Abrams tanks per year to the newest capability. The work added a billion dollars annually to previous plans during the first Trump administration. As a result, the tank industrial base in the Midwest was rejuvenated, and employment at the Lima plant quickly increased from 200 to nearly 2,000 jobs.

Jihadist Terrorism in the United States

Alexander Palmer, Skyeler Jackson, and Daniel Byman

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Introduction

In the early morning hours of New Year’s Day 2025, a U.S. citizen from Texas named Shamsud-Din Jabbar drove a truck into a crowd of people on Bourbon Street in New Orleans, killing 14 people.1 Jabbar was inspired by the Islamic State, making the incident the deadliest jihadist attack in the United States since the 2016 Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, Florida.2 To better understand attacks like Jabbar’s, CSIS compiled a dataset of 740 terrorist attacks and plots in the United States between January 1, 1994, and January 1, 2025, 140 of which were jihadist attacks and plots.3

Analysis of the jihadist attacks yields three main findings. First, the frequency of recorded jihadist attacks and plots against targets in the United States has been low since the territorial defeat of the Islamic State in 2019. Between the beginning of 2020 and New Year’s Day 2025, CSIS counted 8 jihadist attacks and 10 disrupted plots—an average of about 3 attacks or plots per year. Between 2013 and 2019, jihadists conducted 27 attacks, and 46 jihadist plots were disrupted—an average of about 10 attacks or plots per year.

Second, the lethality of jihadist terrorism in the United States has fallen since the territorial defeat of the Islamic State. This decline is likely the result of a decrease in the Islamic State’s ability to inspire violence rather than a loss of operational support from international terrorist organizations, as direct Islamic State support for attacks in the United States was lacking before 2019. U.S. terrorists have proved lethal even without support from international terrorists, with facilitated attacks accounting for only about 14 percent of deaths from jihadist violence in the last 20 years.

Israel must prepare for confrontation with Iran after Trump inauguration - opinion

JACOB NAGEL

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The renewed entry of President Trump into the White House signals a new era in Washington, and hopefully in US-Israel relations.

The first and most critical and significant issue on the agenda should be the joint and determined fight against Iran’s nuclear program, its regional behavior, and its support for terrorist organizations all over the region.

In recent days, Rafael Grossi, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), addressed the possibility of attacking nuclear facilities. He argued that Iran must reach understandings with the Trump administration regarding its nuclear activities to avoid another military confrontation in the Middle East.

This is a very mistaken and dangerous approach, especially considering Iran’s current fragile state: the collapse of its plan to create a “ring of fire” around Israel, the severe damage to its strategic air defense systems, its ballistic missile production capabilities, and the ongoing collapse of its economy.

Despite these challenges, Khamenei continues to advance his ambitious plan to destroy Israel using conventional means under a “nuclear umbrella” by 2040, as indicated by the countdown clock in Palestine Square in Tehran.

Gaza cease-fire: The view from Israel

Nimrod Goren

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After 15 months of devastating news from the Middle East, a silver lining has appeared in the form of the Israel-Hamas cease-fire.

The Israeli public has been waiting for this for months, with consecutive public opinion polls indicating that a large majority supported ending the war in Gaza in return for the release of all Israeli hostages held by Hamas.

As months went by, however, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing governing coalition worked to avoid such a deal — Hamas was doing the same. And the U.S. administration, although heavily invested in mediation efforts, simply didn’t apply effective pressure to make either party change course.

At the same time, the number of living Israeli hostages gradually decreased; casualties among Israeli soldiers increased; and the suffering of Gaza’s civilian population continued.

Today, Israelis are supportive of the cease-fire deal, but they also can’t help but ask why it wasn’t reached six, seven or eight months ago. The terms that were discussed and rejected at the time were nearly identical to the ones agreed upon now. Why was it necessary for additional hostages, soldiers and civilians to die before leaders finally took action?

No One Won the War in Gaza

Max Rodenbeck

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After 15 months of agony, the potential Gaza ceasefire comes as a colossal relief not just for Palestinians and Israelis, but for the wider Middle East. True, the deal is narrow in size and scope. It covers a physical space scarcely bigger than Martha’s Vineyard. The actual terms of the first phase of the ceasefire agreement extend no farther than a pause in fighting, an exchange of some hostages and a partial Israeli withdrawal. Given recent precedent, the fragility of Israel's ruling coalition and the yawning gap between the belligerents, this deal is just as likely to collapse, or simply to lapse, as to foster a longer-term peace. Still, even a temporary lowering of the regional heart rate allows for useful reflection.

The modern Middle East is prone to shifting alliances and balances of power, but each turn of the kaleidoscope tends to tumble only one piece of the multicolored pattern at a go. This time, the rearrangement looks far more radical than the puny size of Gaza might have suggested. Perhaps not since the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 has the regional puzzle been so swiftly and wholly transformed. In those six days Israel conquered East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, Syria's Golan Heights and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, upending a two-decade-long status quo, shattering Arab dreams, expanding America's role, and making the Jewish State an occupying power and turning millions of Palestinians into a subject people.

Europe as the Cold War order dies: stagnating, fading, failing, lost

Anthony J. Constantini

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Out of the many actions President Donald Trump took on his first day in office, two caught the eyes of Europeans: his announced withdrawal from both the Paris Climate Accord and the World Health Organization (WHO). While Trump had previously withdrawn America from the former, President Joe Biden quickly brought the country back in upon assuming office. Likewise, Trump had announced a planned withdrawal from the WHO, but left the presidency before the one-year withdrawal period was up. Now, with four years ahead, America’s leaving both of those organisations is assured – and if Trump is succeeded by someone like Vice President JD Vance, the United States may never return to either organisation.

This has put Brussels in something of a pickle. When Joe Biden got into office, European liberals were gleeful at the fact that Biden was going to restore the corroding post-Cold War international order. But he by and large failed to do so, leaving his successor with a stalemate in Ukraine – one which is slowly morphing into a Ukrainian loss – a still-rising China, and effectively no guidance for Europe.

The problem for Europe, however, is that they should not have waited for American guidance. Since his first term eight years ago Trump was signalling to Europe that they needed to do more to take control of their own affairs. He was happy to work with them, as evidenced by his annoyance over French President Emmanuel Macron’s suggestion of a European army, but he wished for Europe to get a handle on its own affairs so that America could focus on its interests, namely China and the southern border.

Trump’s “America First” Is Not Realism

Jonathan Kirshner

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Some observers have approvingly claimed that the second Trump administration heralds a realist revival in American foreign policy. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Robert O’Brien, who served as national security adviser in the first Trump administration, eagerly promised “the return of realism with a Jacksonian flavor.”

This view is gravely mistaken. Realists often disagree, sometimes sharply, about the best course of action, so it is not easy to say what a “realist foreign policy” is. But it is easy to say what is not—and Donald Trump’s brand of “America first” is not.

Realism starts with the assumption that in world politics, anarchy reigns: no ultimate authority can settle disputes or guarantee restraint. In that context, it is necessary to be alert to the capabilities of others and to the potential threats that they might present. Realists are also distinguished by a shared set of assumptions about power and conflict. They see disputes between states generally not as misunderstandings, or disagreements about which differences can easily be split, but as manifestations of opposing ambitions.

The World Is Getting Used to Trump

Hal Brands

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When Donald Trump first won the presidency, the world had a bit of a freak-out. The French ambassador to the US melted down on social media. Germany’s Angela Merkel fretted that Washington was abandoning the international system it had built. The global elites of Davos lauded China’s Xi Jinping when he promised, risibly, to be the defender of an open, cooperative world.

Now, Trump is back, and he certainly hasn’t mellowed. Yet this time, much of the world is more calmly, even optimistically, awaiting his second term. That moderated reaction speaks volumes about how the world’s expectations of America have changed over the past eight years — and how the world itself has gotten more Trumpy.

For insight, consult new polling by the European Council on Foreign Relations. Most European populations still dislike Trump. Still, Trump has encountered little of the overt hand-wringing or resistance diplomacy that characterized his first time around. Rather, European leaders — including French president Emmanuel Macron and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte — have rushed to engage with Trump even before his inauguration. And if most European elites seem resigned to Trump redux, other parts of the world are downright welcoming.

Publics in key states — including India, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia, Brazil, Turkey and Indonesia — think Trump will be more good than bad for their countries. On balance, the world expects he will help rather than hurt the chances for peace in Ukraine and the Middle East. Even Ukrainians themselves are more bullish than bearish. What exactly is going on?

‘Ceasefire not peace deal’: Future of Gaza in question after Israel-Hamas truce

Jennifer Bell

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As a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas takes effect in the besieged Gaza Strip, experts and officials warn that while the agreement provides immediate humanitarian relief, significant challenges lie ahead for Gaza’s reconstruction and lasting peace.

The initial 42-day truce, brokered by Qatar, the United States, and Egypt, includes a halt to hostilities, the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza, and the release of 33 out of 98 Israeli and foreign hostages. In exchange, hundreds of Palestinian prisoners detained in Israeli jails will be freed during the initial six-week phase.

Three Israeli hostages have been released in exchange for 90 Palestinian prisoners – with elation on the ceasefire deal felt on both sides of the border.

“In the past year and three months of the war, we have been feeling helpless about life continuing for us, and for our children, and women, and we lost, completely lost hope of ever surviving this war,” Palestinian resident Bilak Naeem told Al Arabiya English, via a translator. “We [had] put all our faith in God that there will be a ceasefire eventually, and thank god we received good news, and we were happy that our brothers in Qatar and Egypt, with their mediation, a deal was reached.”

Russia's Military After Ukraine

Michelle Grisé, Mark Cozad, Anna M. Dowd, Mark Hvizda, John Kennedy, Marta Kepe, Clara de Lataillade, Krystyna Marcinek & David Woodworth

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As of the writing of this report, the ultimate resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war is likely far off. Many questions remain, such as how the conflict will ultimately end, what the status of Russian and Ukrainian forces will be at the conclusion, and the lessons that Russia, Ukraine, and the West will learn from the years of fighting. What is clear, however, is that afterward, Russia will face the challenges of regenerating specific capabilities and systems and rethinking the role of its armed forces in countering perceived threats and achieving its strategic objectives.

In this report, the authors examine how reconstitution efforts might be shaped by (1) historical Russian defense reforms, (2) the Russian armed forces' performance in the Ukraine conflict, and (3) political, economic, demographic, technical, and foreign relations factors. They analyze Russian official statements and military scholarship on reconstitution and incorporate findings from discussions with experts on Russia and government advisers in Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Sweden.

From this analysis, the authors developed four potential reconstitution pathways: The Shoigu Plan, which reflects thinking on reconstitution that was proposed by Russia's former Minister of Defense; Revisiting Old Models, which would be a return to an emphasis on mass and a heavy reliance on conscription, mobilization, nuclear capabilities, and domestic production; A New, New Look, which would entail the rebuilding of a smaller, yet qualitatively superior, force; and A New Operational Model, which would involve major institutional reforms.

Q&A with Mart Noorma, the new director of NATO’s cyber brain trust

Colin Demarest

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It was around 6 a.m. EST when Mart Noorma popped into view on Microsoft Teams.

It was still dark and relatively quiet on the U.S. East Coast as he prepared for this interview. But in Estonia, at the NATO-accredited Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, the day was well underway.

Noorma in August became the latest director of the CCDCOE, a Tallinn-based hub focused on cyber research, training and exercises. He succeeded Brig. Gen. Jaak Tarien, who stepped into the position in 2018. Noorma will serve a three-year term.

His spot at the helm comes after decades of experience in the science, technology and defense worlds. He has worked as a director at a robotics company, a professor at the University of Tartu and a researcher for the National Institute of Standards and Technology. He has also served as a member of the NATO Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, the EEAS Space Advisory Board, the IEEE Autonomous Weapon Systems Expert Advisory Committee and the Estonian Defence League.

In an Oct. 13 conversation with C4ISRNET, Noorma discussed his goals for the cyber center — supported by the U.S., the U.K. and more than a dozen other contributors — while reflecting on lessons learned from the war in Ukraine. This interview was edited for length and clarity.

The Beginning of the End?

Lawrence Freedman

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For the first time since the spring of 2022 a serious effort is underway to find a negotiated solution to the Russo-Ukraine War. As a candidate Donald Trump promised that he could do a deal in a day. Since his election victory there has been intense speculation about how he intended to make good on this promise, even accepting that the timetable was a tad ambitious.

He no longer claims that the war will be solved in a day or even ‘very quickly.’ The latest promise is still of a solution but not a firm timeline. Notes of caution have appeared about the extent of the challenge. Nonetheless the process has been set in motion. The administration’s intention is soon to move to formal negotiations.

Left to themselves there is no reason to suppose that the belligerents would have agreed to talks other than on secondary topics such as prisoner exchanges or commercial shipping in the Black Sea. Their positions remain incompatible. The Trump administration can get them to engage because of the likely costs if they fail to do so. Ukrainians know that if they hold back then the US will withhold assistance; the Russians are nervous that if they snub Trump then US support to Ukraine will be sustained or even increased.

A New Playbook for Irregular Warfare: How the United States Can Win Without Fighting

Christian Trotti

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During the final stretch of the 2024 American presidential election, the Department of Justice seized 32 web domains linked to ‘Doppelganger,’ an aggressive Russian disinformation campaign to influence American voters. Meanwhile, China has continued to exploit the US sanctions regime to promote its own currency, the renminbi, as a viable alternative to the dollar. And while wildfires and winter storms ravage expansive regions of the country—not long after Hurricanes Helene and Milton had exposed glaring deficiencies in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) planning and budget—forecasters and politicians alike grapple with an increasingly grim future defined by extreme weather and climate change.

What do these challenges have in common? According to the siloed US national security enterprise, perhaps not much. But that assumption betrays a critical lack of vision. In reality, Americans are under siege every day, often by forces that they neither perceive nor understand. The United States is at war—not kinetically, but instead on the intangible battlefields of internet chat groups, currency exchanges, security cooperation agreements, and natural disaster responses. As the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) warns, the contemporary security environment is best described as an era of strategic competition and transnational crises. And the simultaneity of these challenges will be a defining feature of American foreign and domestic policy in the 21st century.

Putin Is Not Yet Desperate

Alexandra Prokopenko

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The newly inaugurated U.S. President Donald Trump has promised a swift end to the war in Ukraine. Faced with the unattractive alternative of continuing to fight without the assurance of further U.S. backing, Kyiv and its Western partners are now considering how to secure an acceptable deal with Moscow. In his Senate confirmation hearing to become U.S. secretary of state, Florida Senator Marco Rubio cited economic sanctions on Russia as a key source of leverage that could bring about a peaceful resolution. Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen, meanwhile, has stated that “time is not on Russia’s side,” especially if the West ramps up aid to Ukraine and intensifies the sanctions on Moscow. By applying enough pressure now, the thinking goes, Ukraine and its backers can enter talks from a favorable position, and Russian President Vladimir Putin will be forced to engage in good-faith negotiations that end in a satisfactory settlement.

It is true that Putin’s current strategy is unsustainable. He is trying to simultaneously wage war in Ukraine, maintain high social and infrastructure spending to create an illusion of normality for his domestic constituents, and preserve macroeconomic stability. It is impossible to do all three in perpetuity. Achieving the first and second goals requires large outlays of cash, which fuel inflation and thus prevent the achievement of the third goal. And the cracks in the Russian economy are becoming increasingly apparent.

Fielding 3D Printing to Enhance the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s Readiness

Tucker Chase

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The US Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade should field expeditionary three-dimensional (3D) printing capabilities to increase its combat readiness. As the Army’s contingency response force in Europe, the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s ability to innovate and rapidly deploy are crucial for supporting US military operations in Europe, Africa, and Central Command. The Army should equip the brigade with large-scale, deployable metal and plastic printers. Doing so will enable swift tactical solutions and serve as a model for the Army’s modernization efforts in preparation for future conflicts.

Leveraging Initial Success

Though nascent, the Army is prioritizing additive manufacturing in combat in preparation for large-scale conflicts. The Army recognized the benefits of 3D printing with the launch of the Advanced Manufacturing Center of Excellence (AM CoE) in 2019. In 2024, the AM CoE built the world’s largest hybrid additive and subtractive apparatus, the Jointless Hull, capable of printing an entire M1 Abrams tank. Additionally, Additive Manufacturing Research estimates the DoD will grow its 3D printing budget from $0.3 billion in 2023 to $1.8 billion by 2032. Lt. Gen. Christopher Mohan, AMC’s acting commander, emphasizes the “growth requirements coming primarily out of units in Europe.”

Don’t Listen to Putin: Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive Was a Success

Kris Osborn

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Kursk Offensive: Why Ukraine’s Tactics Shifted the War’s Momentum

These days, the narrative in most media outlets is that the war in Ukraine has now flipped to where Russia has most of the momentum and is slowly clawing back territory. And yet, just a few months ago, Ukraine’s Kursk ‘invasion’ was praised as a significant success.

However, even now, with North Korea entering the war to help Russia in this key sector, some say Ukraine made a mistake with this military undertaking.

If taking the long view, the Kursk offensive appears to have been largely successful in some key respects.

While “holding” ground continues to be a challenge for Ukrainian forces, and key factors are likely contributing to this, the Kursk offensive showed that classic mechanized maneuver operations with heavy armor were effective against Russian defenses.

Kursk: A Success for Ukraine? Yes.

While there are current Russian offenses that are taking ground slowly, and it may not be clear exactly how much “taken” ground Ukrainian troops will be able to hold, the Kursk offensive has proven highly effective in a number to a certain degree.

A Modest Proposal to Improve Joint Professional Military Education

Charles Richard & Robert Peters

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For upwardly mobile officers in America’s military, a year at a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) institution to acquire a Master’s degree is very often necessary for promotion. These schools, located at the Army War College in Carlisle, PA, National Defense University in Washington, D.C. the Naval War College in Newport, RI, and elsewhere, are meant to prepare officers for the jump from tactics (commanding a battalion or a single ship) to the larger, operational levels of war, where they may command a brigade or a squadron of ships as part of a larger combat engagement.

Far too often, however, the JPME teaches topics in the wrong order. Very often, JPME overemphasizes the strategic level of war at the expense of the operational level of war. In this sense, they are asked to consider and ultimately understand the movement of entire armies and fleets as part of a broader conflict between nation states, often times before such considerations are required for their rank. An example would be a Navy Lieutenant enrolled in JPME I being asked to write a paper on the use of strategic ambiguity in the Indo-Pacific theater. A worthy topic this is—but perhaps not one for a Lieutenant.

The consequence of such a jump is that they do not receive the education they need to understand the role their brigade or naval squadron plays at the operational level of war and how they can best achieve operational effect with the forces assigned to them or a members of an operational staff.

Army experimenting with what the ‘edge’ is for cloud computing capabilities

Mark Pomerleau

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The Army is conducting experiments to determine what its edge is at echelon and what tools those forces will require.

One such capability is edge computing and cloud. Once a prominent fixture for buzzword bingo, where government and industry types opined on deploying, the service is beginning to take a slightly different view on who will need these technologies and how feasible it will be to deliver them given the speed of war in the future.

“Somebody asked me the other day about ‘we need to scale this cloud thing all the way at the tactical edge.’ I was like, ‘to do what?’ … That’s not how the Army fights,” Leonel Garciga, Army chief information officer, said Friday at AFCEA’s Northern Virginia Chapter Army IT Day. “If we’re learning anything in Ukraine is these micro things that are happening, you’re not going to be doing that in the cloud, you’re not going to be scaling all these services. I think we really need to start focusing on building that [concept of operation] of how we’ve got to fight, so it can drive the right capabilities at echelon.”

Garciga added that the Defense Department needs to understand how it’s going to fight in the future and build capabilities that are needed at echelon and at the tactical edge. That also means determining what the edge is, which will vary across theaters, units, services and agencies.