22 January 2025

The New, and Low, Normal in U.S.-Pakistan Relations

Madiha Afzal

The four years of the Biden presidency have been a relative low point for U.S.-Pakistan relations, driven not by any real break in relations, but by a seeming lack of interest from the White House. Biden leaves office as the only U.S. president never to have called his Pakistani counterpart, although he did send Pakistan’s prime minister a short letter after the country’s fraught 2024 election. More than anything, this low-level equilibrium for bilateral relations reflects Pakistan’s reduced importance to the United States after the end of the war in Afghanistan. That will continue into the next administration.

The war in Afghanistan had formed the basis of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship since 2001, just as the previous war did in the 1980s. While Pakistan’s support for the Taliban ultimately led to growing distrust, especially during the Obama years, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan nevertheless necessitated a dependence on Pakistan, especially on its military, for counterterrorism needs and, later, for negotiations with the Taliban. That largely ended with the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021.

As vice president-elect in 2009, Biden told Afghanistan’s president Hamid Karzai, “Mr. President, Pakistan is fifty times more important than Afghanistan for the United States.” But Biden seemed eager to put both countries in the rearview mirror, and the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan seems to have amplified this desire.



Myanmar Military Regime Enters Year 5 In Terminal Decline – Analysis

Zachary Abuza

Myanmar’s military approaches the fourth anniversary of the coup d’etat that put them in power in terminal decline.

The economy continues to atrophy, with even more pronounced energy shortages, less foreign exchange, and an even larger share of the budget allocated to the military.

The battlefield losses are staggering, as the opposition has withstood Chinese pressure to stop their offensives, and continues to hand the over-stretched military defeat after defeat. Opposition forces now control two of the 14 military regional commands.

According to the National Unity Government (NUG) Ministry of Defense, the opposition is in full control of 95 of 330 townships, while the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta calls itself, had full control over 107 townships.

By the junta’s own admission, they are only able to conduct a census and safely organize elections in 161 of Myanmar’s 330 townships.

Losses on all battlefronts

Having taken 15 of 17 townships in Rakhine state, the Arakan Army is now in almost total control of the key western state. They’ve surrounded the Rakhine capital of Sittwe and come up to the border of Kyaukphyu where China’s special economic zone and port are located.


Geopolitical Implications Of China-Sri Lanka Joint Communique – Analysis

P. K. Balachandran

The joint communique issued at the end of Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s State Visit to China, will be read carefully in both New Delhi and Washington.

The four-day State Visit of Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to China from January 14 to 17 has resulted in a number of mutual commitments which could have significant geopolitical implications.

These commitments were stated clearly in the joint communique issued after talks between President Dissanayake on the one hand, and President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang and Zhao Leji, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, on the other.

Independent Foreign Policy

The Chinese side reiterated that it would continue to firmly support Sri Lanka in “safeguarding its national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and respect and support Sri Lanka in independently choosing a development path suited to its national conditions.”

On its part, Sri Lanka reiterated its commitment to follow “an independent non-aligned foreign policy.”

This is an important commitment on Sri Lanka’s part in the context of China’s persistent complaint that Sri Lanka tends to bow to pressure from regional power India to do this or avoid that vis-à-vis China.

Major leak exposes 1.5 billion Weibo, DiDi, Shanghai Communist Party, and others’ records

Vilius Petkauskas

While the mundanity of daily data leaks is hardly debatable, not all leaks are created equally. Take this, for example. An exposed database comprising a whopping 1.5 billion records covering numerous companies across different economic and social sectors. One uniting feature, however, is that victims are mostly Chinese citizens, making this discovery among the biggest of its kind.

The unprotected server with hundreds of millions of records, uncovered by the Cybernews research team, houses data from several major brands such as JD.com, a Chinese e-commerce company, Weibo, China’s top social media platform, DiDi, the country’s largest ride-hailing company, and many others.

Researchers believe the dataset is likely a mix of known and completely new data leaks collated on a single now-closed Elasticsearch server. While not all 1.5 billion records were exposed for the first time, some undoubtedly were, as we’ve found no indication of previous data leaks from companies included in the list.


China’s AI keeps getting better — and cheaper

Scott Rosenberg & Alison Snyder

Chinese AI makers have learned to build powerful AI models that perform just short of the U.S.'s most advanced competition while using far less money, chips and power.

Why it matters: American policies restricting the flow of top-end AI semiconductors and know-how to China may have helped maintain a short U.S. lead at the outer reaches of the AI performance curve — but they've also accelerated Chinese progress in building high-end AI more efficiently.

Catch up quick: In late December, Hangzhou-based DeepSeek released V3, an open-source large language model whose performance on various benchmark tests puts it in the same league as OpenAI's 4o and Anthropic's Claude 3.5 Sonnet.
  • Those are the most advanced AI models these companies currently offer to the broad public, though both OpenAI and Anthropic have next-generation models in their pipeline.
Stunning stat: Training V3 cost DeepSeek roughly $5.6 million, according to the company.
  • OpenAI, Google and Anthropic have reportedly spent hundreds of millions of dollars to build and train their current models, and expect to spend billions in the future.
  • AI pioneer Andrej Karpathy called DeepSeek's investment "a joke of a budget" and described the result as "a highly impressive display of research and engineering under resource constraints."


Welcome to Weimar 2.0

Robert D. Kaplan

Today, China, Russia, and the United States, to say nothing of the mid-level and smaller powers, are all running a strange simulation of the Weimar Republic: that weak and wobbly political organism that governed Germany for 15 years from the ashes of World War I to the ascension of Adolf Hitler.

America’s Weimar syndrome may be obvious with the reelection of the institution-destroyer Donald Trump as president. But the entire world is one big Weimar now, connected enough for one part to mortally influence the other parts, yet not connected enough to be politically coherent. Like the various parts of the Weimar Republic, we find ourselves globally in an exceedingly fragile phase of technological and political transition.


The Leninist Leash: How Beijing’s Answer to Global Demand for Choice Makes the World More Closed Off

Sense Hofstede

During his annual year-opening trip to Africa, People’s Republic of China (PRC) foreign minister Wang Yi (王毅) called for cooperation to reform global governance. In the view of the PRC, the rise of the Global South, developing countries’ right to modernization, and Africa’s suffering under “hegemonism” require changes to the international system (Xinhua, January 10). The PRC is prepared to help lead these changes by sharing its own solutions.

The demand exists. The varied global response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and reactions to Israel’s conduct in Gaza indicate a sense in the capitals of many so-called “Global South” countries that it is time to do away with what they regard as the double standards of rich countries. Western appeals to a “rules-based international order” are losing some of their attraction.

The PRC offers an alternative, but one that comes with a catch. This is the “Leninist leash.” As Beijing proceeds with its efforts to shape the world, it does so by following the operating logic of its own party-state. The unique nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) means that this entails the export of domestic control mechanisms abroad. Just as the rules-based international order has elements of the political structures and values of the countries that were instrumental in founding it—namely, the United States and its allies, the PRC’s proposal likewise reflects its own approach to governance.

Assessment of PLA Leaders at the End of 2024

Kenneth Allen

This article identifies all the key People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leaders at the end of 2024. It also discusses recent changes to the makeup of that leadership, including those that have resulted from corruption investigations as well as surveying changes that are likely to take place by the 21st Chinese Communist Paty (CCP) National Congress, set to take place in late 2027. Retirement age norms have varied throughout the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and there are always exceptions. Currently, it appears that the norm is that the central military commission (CMC) vice chairmen can remain on active duty until they are 70 years old but that all other senior leaders, including CMC members, service commanders, and theater command commanders must retire at age 65. However, there are always exceptions that allow them to remain in their billet after they have met their mandatory age requirement.

The senior leadership will look completely different than it is today by 2029 as a result. After 2027, only one of the two CMC vice chairmen will remain in position along with a new director of the CMC Political Work Department, while nine of the current leaders will retire at or before the 21st Party Congress and 11 other leaders, who will be 63 or 64 years old, will most likely retire within one or two years of the congress. Of note, each service and theater command have their own party congress, which normally takes place two years after the National Party Congress. However, leadership changes normally take place at the national congresses (CASI, April 12, 2021). The key billets that are addressed in this article include:
  • The two vice chairmen and three members of the CCP and state central military commissions (CMC), including the chief of the Joint Staff Department, the director of the Political Work Department, and the secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission.
  • The commanders and political commissars for the four services—the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force.
  • The commanders and political commissars of the five theater commands—Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central.

Military Implications of PLA Aircraft Incursions in Taiwan’s Airspace 2024

Cheng-kun Ma & K. Tristan Tang

Incursions by military aircraft from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) reached unprecedented levels in 2024. Beyond measuring the total number of sorties, the frequency of these incursions and the circumstances surrounding specific missions are also important for assessing the characteristics and implications of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft activities targeting Taiwan. This article utilizes publicly available data on PLA aircraft operations released by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense.

In 2024, the overall number of sorties and days on which incursions took place continued to rise. However, the percentage of sorties crossing the median line in the Taiwan Strait and the frequency of peak incursion periods were not markedly higher than those in 2023. This suggests two things. First, the operational capacity of the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command Air Force, which is mainly focused on Taiwan, may have reached its limits; and second, the intensified incursions against Taiwan were conducted not solely to target President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) but also to increase the intensity of trainings.

Incursions by Chinese Military Aircraft

We use three indicators to analyze the incursions: the frequency of crossings over the Taiwan Strait median line, the number of sorties crossing the median line as a percentage of the total, and the number of peak incursion periods.

When Israel and Turkey go to war

Michael Walsh

Over the next three months, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will have a policy window in which to try to go for broke in Syria.

The key question that he has to ask himself is whether his government should be content with the current state of affairs or whether it is worth the risk of pushing back against Turkish expansionism now rather than later.

From an analytical point of view, there is plenty of uncertainty surrounding the various foreign actors operating on the ground in Iraq and Syria. This includes the question of what role the Turkish Armed Forces may seek to play in their near abroad now that Bashar al-Assad has fallen.

That is an important question to ask. The Nagel Commission recently assessed that the risk of direct conflict between Israel and Turkey is real. This has led a number of prominent Israelis to call upon their own government to prepare for a war with Turkey.

In the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, also known as Rojava, Assad’s fall provided a similar policy window for Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to take the fight to American-backed Kurdish forces in Rojava.

How The Israel-Hamas War Reshaped The Middle East – Analysis

Ray Furlong and Abubakar Siddique

The 15-month conflict in the Middle East has caused a dramatic shift in the regional balance of power.

Iran and Russia have been severely weakened as Israel has pounded Tehran’s proxies in the region, leading also to the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Israel has emerged strengthened, but countries such as Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar have also gained influence.

Iran’s decline is perhaps the most striking. Its much-vaunted “axis of resistance” was based primarily on Hamas and Hezbollah, both listed as terrorist organizations by Israel, the United States, and other countries.
Dramatic Changes

The war began after Hamas launched its attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. In a dramatic escalation of decades of conflict, Hamas raids into Israel killed over 1,200 people, and the militant group seized over 200 hostages.

The Israeli bombing and ground campaign that followed has killed the top figures in the Hamas leadership and an estimated 18,000 Hamas fighters.

But it also reduced Gaza to rubble, killing some 46,000 people in total, according to Gaza health authorities.

Donald Trump 2.0 and The Next Era of Superpower Competition

Patrick M. Cronin

Donald Trump’s inauguration as the forty-seventh president of the United States marks the beginning of a new era of superpower competition.

Last week, Washington experienced a fleeting sense of normalcy with Senate confirmation hearings and President Joe Biden’s farewell address. Even the theatrics of Secretary of Defense nominee Pete Hegseth’s hearing and Biden’s warnings of a “tech-industrial complex” seemed restrained compared to the political storm that is expected to follow Trump’s inauguration at noon on Monday.

In his second inaugural address and through a series of executive orders, President Trump will unequivocally assert that U.S.A., Inc. is under new management.

Monday also signals the start of what Beijing once described as a “new type of great power relations.” Although this may be round two of the Trump-Xi matchup, there is no doubt that the two leaders’ ice-breaking phone call last Friday represented the opening jockeying for strategic advantage between the two most powerful men in the world.

The Trump-Biden-Trump Foreign Policy

Richard Fontaine

Today, U.S. President Donald Trump will sweep back into power promising a new American approach to the world. As he was in 2017, Trump has been harshly critical of his predecessor’s foreign policy and pledged major differences in priorities and style. His supporters cheer the return to an “America first” attitude, one that emphasizes toughness, seeks concrete benefits from any foreign engagements, and centers on hardheaded dealmaking. His detractors fear a cramped, short-term worldview combined with an erratic, transactional approach to a complicated international environment. Either way, much of the world now braces for significant policy departures and prepares for a major lurch in U.S. foreign policy.

To be sure, a second Trump era promises significant changes after four years of President Joe Biden’s administration. Biden firmly committed to supporting Ukraine, defending Taiwan militarily, fulfilling the United States’ climate change commitments, and centering democracy in U.S. foreign policy. He stressed the benefits of the United States’ alliances and the threats that China and other revisionist powers pose to the global order. Trump, on the other hand, questions the need to continue aiding Ukraine, declines to commit to Taiwan’s protection, downplays climate change, and deprioritizes the promotion of democracy and human rights. He often portrays U.S. allies as free riders enriching themselves under U.S. protection and emphasizes the unfairness of trade deficits with countries such as China more than any systemic risks these countries might pose. The new president will surely spend his first weeks in office issuing executive orders and other directives aimed at visibly reversing Biden’s policies.

Ceasefire Is No Victory for the Israelis—Or for Us

Rob Killick

As Western leaders celebrate the prospect of a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, we should listen instead to the response of Adam Ma’anit, cousin of Israeli hostage Tsachi Idan. Tsachi’s 18-year-old daughter Maayan was murdered by Hamas terrorists in front of him on October 7th.

The world community, the international community has allowed Hamas to play a game where they have a lot of the cards and we are forced into a discussion of a deal where they can exact concessions from us in order to secure the release of the hostages.

The entire world has failed us. If the world stood steadfast on October 7, October 8 against Hamas, demanding their full surrender, exerting every kind of pressure possible on states like Iran and Qatar and Egypt who have any kind of leverage over Hamas, insisting on the unconditional release of hostages rather than pursuing a so-called deal, we might have had them released a lot sooner—and the devastation that has been wrought on Gaza as a result of the Hamas atrocities may have been averted as well.

In my travels across Israel last year, from Sderot on the border with Gaza, in the army camp at Reim, in Jerusalem, in Tel Aviv, and on the border with Lebanon in the north, I met and talked to many Israelis about their views on the war.

Geopolitics of the GIUK Gap: Past, Present, and Future

Paulo Aguiar

The GIUK Gap—stretching between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom—has long been a critical maritime chokepoint. Throughout the 20th century, it shaped naval strategy, from protecting Allied supply lines in both World Wars to serving as a frontline in Cold War anti-submarine warfare. Control over this passage determined military advantage in the North Atlantic, influencing power projection and transatlantic defense. Though its significance waned following the Cold War, the GIUK Gap is taking on new relevance amid mounting Russian naval activity, Arctic expansion, and emerging hybrid threats, making it once again a maritime chokepoint of strategic note.

The GIUK Gap in the 20th Century

The GIUK Gap is a strategically significant maritime passage located between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. Serving as a central chokepoint in the North Atlantic Ocean, it connects the Arctic Ocean to the Atlantic and facilitates movement between North America and Europe, making it a constant focus for naval strategists.

This strategic importance was especially evident during the World Wars, when control of the GIUK Gap was essential for safeguarding transatlantic supply routes, the lifelines of the Allied war effort. In World War II, recognizing the Gap’s vulnerability, Allied forces occupied Iceland and Greenland to establish monitoring and defense positions. These bases played a pivotal role in countering German U-boats and surface ships that sought to disrupt vital shipping lanes. The high stakes of controlling the GIUK Gap was underscored by events like the Battle of the Denmark Strait, where the German battleship Bismarck exploited the passage to break out into the Atlantic.

Daily Memo: Russia Readies Reservists


Relying on reservists. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on Thursday ordering reservists to participate in military training in 2025. According to the decree, it’s aimed at maintaining combat readiness and increasing training for reserve forces. Details regarding the timing of the training, the number of reservists involved and their duties will be outlined in subsequent documents.

Russia and Iran. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is in Russia, where he is expected to sign with Russian President Vladimir Putin a new cooperation treaty. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement will include security and defense elements, though Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi previously said it will not amount to a defense alliance.

Russian spending. Russia spent 3.31 trillion rubles ($32 billion) on national development projects in 2024, new data from the Ministry of Finance shows. Spending for the projects, which include road construction, international cooperation and trade initiatives, and support for small and medium-sized enterprises and entrepreneurship, reached a record 99.6 percent of the target for the year.

Defining Trends From A Year Of Conflict In West Asia – Analysis

Dr. Muneer Ahmed

Since October 2023, violence in West Asia, particularly between Israel and factions in Gaza and Lebanon, has seen substantial escalation. This conflict has significantly reshaped the region, impacting not only military strategies but also diplomatic relationships, social media narratives, and evolving discourse around using force. This article highlights outstanding features of the ongoing conflict and examines their effects on the region’s strategic landscape.
Impact on the nature of warfare

Israel and non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah have adapted their combat strategies, influenced by technological advancements and changing battlefield conditions. The increased use of drones, particularly by Hamas and Hezbollah, is one of the most significant developments. Hamas has employed drones for reconnaissance and kamikaze attacks, demonstrating a substantial enhancement of their offensive capabilities. In response, Israeli forces have integrated AI for real-time threat assessment and facial recognition, allowing them to intercept many rocket and drone attacks successfully.

Additionally, the Iron Beam—an advanced laser-based air defence system—is reportedly nearing deployment. It will enhance Israel’s capability to target smaller, low-altitude threats like drones. Existing Israeli defence systems have not been able to intercept every projectile launched by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hamas, and Hezbollah.

Israel-Hamas Ceasefire Takes Hold With First Hostages Freed


A ceasefire between Israel and Hamas took hold Sunday, seemingly starting a six-week pause in 15 months of fighting in Gaza and setting the stage for the release of dozens of hostages held by the militants, including three young women freed in the first hours of the truce.

The truce started at 11:15 a.m. local time and hours later, a Red Cross convoy headed into Gaza, the narrow strip of land along the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, and secured the release of Romi Gonen, 24, Emily Damari, 28, and Doron Steinbrecher, 31.

Meanwhile, Israel began to move dozens of Palestinian prisoners toward Gaza. Israel had pledged to free them as part of the ceasefire deal agreed to last week after a year of futile negotiations.

U.S. President Joe Biden, who spurred negotiations leading to the truce, said on his last full day in office, “After so much pain, destruction, and loss of life, today the guns in Gaza have gone silent.”

Gonen had been abducted from a music festival on Oct. 7, 2023, during the shock Hamas attack on Israel that killed 1,200 people and led to the abduction of about 250 hostages, while the other two women handed over to Israeli authorities were kidnapped from Kibbutz Kfar Aza. Damari is an Israeli-British dual citizen.

The Pentagon, the Generals, and the Trump (47) Administration

Douglas Ollivant

There is clearly an assessment by the incoming Trump 47 administration, and a significant portion of its political base, that the military generally—and perhaps the Army in particular—has a leadership problem. This distrust is perhaps personified in Pete Hegseth, the nominee for Secretary of Defense, who wrote a book on the subject.

It’s perhaps easiest to say that there is a “vibe shift” regarding the generals.[i] As an observer, I can discern at least three different versions of this shift. The most overly political is the response to “Diversity, Equity, Inclusion” or “DEI” initiatives inside the services. Hegseth’s take is that the excesses of DEI have weakened the military by promoting the incompetent or unfit, and thereby discouraging traditional sources of recruits—rural white men—from joining.

The second version has to do with military performance during the long wars. The ambiguous ending of the Iraq war and the undeniable failure to achieve any war aims in Afghanistan—not to mention the debacle of the withdrawal—contribute to the judgment that the generals didn’t know how to properly fight such wars, and that they were frequently deceptive to both political leadership and the American people. Senior general after senior general assured us that the Taliban was unable to hold ground against the valor of the Afghan Security Forces. Either they were utterly delusional in their assessments, or they were lying to us. Neither is acceptable and points to a need for reform.

C.I.A.’s Chatbot Stands In for World Leaders

Julian E. Barnes

Understanding leaders around the world is one of the C.I.A.’s most important jobs. Teams of analysts comb through intelligence collected by spies and publicly available information to create profiles of leaders that can predict behaviors.

A chatbot powered by artificial intelligence now helps do that work.

Over the last two years, the Central Intelligence Agency has developed a tool that allows analysts to talk to virtual versions of foreign presidents and prime ministers, who answer back.

“It is a fantastic example of an app that we were able to rapidly deploy and get out to production in a cheaper, faster fashion,” said Nand Mulchandani, the C.I.A.’s chief technology officer.

The chatbot is part of the spy agency’s drive to improve the tools available to C.I.A. analysts and its officers in the field, and to better understand adversaries’ technical advances. Core to the effort is to make it easier for companies to work with the most secretive agency.

Who's who in Donald Trump's inner circle?

HANNAH SARISOHN

As Donald Trump is inaugurated as the 47th president of the United States on Monday, experts are steeped in uncertainty as to how Trump’s appointees to the top diplomatic roles will be vying for influence over long-term Middle East agenda items.

While the administration’s immediate priority will be on securing Israel’s ceasefire with Hamas and the release of the hostages, the focus will soon shift toward shoring up relations with Saudi Arabia and dealing with Tehran’s nuclear capabilities.

Trump’s cabinet and inner circle will be composed of both staunch isolationists and stalwart war hawks seeking to manage the president’s priorities in his relationship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

“The Middle East is probably at one of the most uncertain moments it’s ever been, especially in recent decades, and they’re about to be reintroduced to the most unpredictable leader the United States has ever had,” Brian Katulis, a senior fellow for US foreign policy at the Middle East Institute, who specializes in Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Jordan, told the Magazine.

Gaza Ceasefire Set To Begin, Implementing It Will Be Up To Trump

Patsy Widakuswara

Israel’s Cabinet approved a deal for a Gaza ceasefire and hostage release, with 24 ministers voting in favor and eight ministers rejecting the agreement. The deal is scheduled to be implemented beginning Sunday.

The deal to end the fighting between Israel and Hamas was achieved after more than a year of negotiations, with mediation from the United States, Qatar and Egypt. U.S. President Joe Biden first endorsed the deal in May. The warring parties agreed to it on Wednesday, and it was subsequently approved by the Israeli Cabinet early Saturday in Israel.

Starting midday on Monday when President-elect Donald Trump is inaugurated, it will be up to his administration to see that the deal is enforced.

The agreement has three phases, each of which will last six weeks. The terms of phases two and three are still being negotiated, but under phase one the cessation of hostilities is expected to continue if six weeks pass before the next phase is finalized.

Phase one includes withdrawal of Israeli forces from densely populated areas and more aid for Gaza, as well as the release of some Palestinians detained in Israeli prisons and some hostages held by Hamas, including Americans. The U.S. and other Western countries have designated Hamas as a terrorist group.

The Trump Administration Should Not Mess With the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework

Cameron Kerry & Shane Tews

When the first Trump administration took office in 2017, it kept in place the Privacy Shield framework, which enabled transfers of personal data from the EU to the U.S. At that time, the framework allowed continued transatlantic data flows without violating the EU’s data protection law, sustaining one of the world’s largest trading relationships.

The second Trump administration should exercise the same wisdom as to the successor of the Privacy Shield, the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework.

In both 2016 and 2024, the President-elect Trump campaigned on promises to roll back his predecessors’ executive orders. Fortunately, the Privacy Shield was not included in these rollbacks. In remarks on his first day as Trump’s secretary of commerce in 2017, Wilbur Ross affirmed the importance of protecting the framework and the Trump administration left undisturbed the foundation of the Privacy Shield—President Barack Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28). This executive order required intelligence agencies to extend to people outside the United States the privacy and civil liberties protections that intelligence laws and procedures accord to “U.S. persons,” i.e., U.S. citizens and noncitizens within the U.S. PPD-28 also designated a State Department undersecretary as an ombudsperson to review inquiries by individuals in the EU about surveillance that might affect them.

The economic calculus was simple: The cost of the Privacy Shield was low for the U.S., and undoing it would have handed the EU a trade barrier against U.S. businesses seeking to compete in European markets and reduced U.S. exports.

OODAcon 2024: A Compilation of Session Summaries

Daniel Pereira

Session Summaries


We kick off our annual series of expanded session summaries from OODAcon 2024 (find the full agenda here), where the conference day began – on Wednesday, November 6th – with the keynote presentation from Matt Devost, CEO and Co-founder of OODA on “Bootstrapping the Future”. Matt welcomed attendees and set the stage for the day and the conference’s theme – “Convergence” – to push the envelope of innovation and collaboration.


The following summarizes the vital takeaways from Dr. Amr Awadallah’s presentation at OODAcon 2024. An experienced innovator who co-founded Cloudera and is now the founder and CEO of Vectara, Amr delved into the current status of AI innovation, focusing on how generative AI can be applied to business data while addressing challenges such as accuracy, security, and explainability. With over 25 years of experience in big data and AI, Amr provided a forward-looking perspective on how scalable AI systems can transform industries while ensuring ethical and enterprise-ready deployment.

The TikTok Boomerang

Angela Huyue Zhang

Few predicted that TikTok users in the United States would flock to the Chinese app RedNote (Xiaohongshu) in defiance of a US government ban. And yet in the space of just two days this week, RedNote became the most downloaded app in the US, gaining 700,000 users – most of them American TikTok refugees.

Since US data security was the rationale for the TikTok ban, American users’ migration to other Chinese apps only amplifies those concerns. Unlike TikTok – a platform that does not operate in China and is not subject to Chinese law – RedNote is a domestic Chinese app bound by strict Chinese regulations. Moreover, while TikTok says that it stores US user data exclusively within the US, with oversight by a US-led security team, RedNote stores its data entirely in China.

In recent years, China has introduced a series of data protection laws ostensibly aimed at safeguarding user information. But these regulations primarily target businesses, imposing far fewer constraints on government access to personal data. Chinese public authorities thus have wide discretion in requesting and accessing user data.

Beyond the issue of data privacy, US authorities also worry that TikTok might be used to influence public opinion in the US. But TikTok’s algorithms are closely monitored by Oracle, as part of a deal to address security concerns. In contrast, RedNote’s algorithms operate under the close scrutiny of the Chinese government, and the app is subject to China’s stringent content-moderation requirements, which could further shape the opinions of the TikTok refugees now flocking to the platform.