20 January 2025

Bangladesh’s Revolutionary Women Have Disappeared

Muktadir Rashid and Maher Sattar

The turning point came at midnight, when women hit the streets.

By mid-July, Bangladeshi university students had been protesting for more than a month for the reform of government job quotas, which they said created a nepotistic patronage system that rewarded supporters of the ruling Awami League. But few predicted they would bring down Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who had ruled Bangladesh for 15 years with an iron fist.

Then, on July 14, Hasina called the protesters razakars—a term for an anti-independence paramilitary force that has become synonymous with “traitor.” Women students, who broadly supported the anti-quota movement, took the remark personally.

That midnight, thousands of residents of the women’s dorms in Dhaka University flooded out of their halls, defiantly shouting, “Who are you? Who am I? Razakar! Razakar!”

Residents of the men’s dorms joined them, and within 48 hours, the uprising had spread throughout the country. In less than a month, Hasina was on a helicopter, fleeing to India.

Joining BRICS, Indonesia sticks with multi-alignment strategy

Fitriani

Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS is no strategic pivot but a continuation of its multi-alignment foreign policy. However, Indonesia will need to navigate internal BRICS dynamics while maintaining ties with the West and its leadership role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Although framed domestically as a step forwards in strengthening economic growth through South-South cooperation, the move is leverage in its dealings with the West and preserves Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s approach of ‘friends to all, enemy to none’. Having long participated in BRICS summits as an observer, Indonesia’s formal admission in early 2025 aligns with its commitment to equilibrium through multi-alignment, shown through a parallel application to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

As the first Southeast Asian nation to join BRICS, Indonesia’s membership reinforces the group’s claim of representing the Global South. The move has been welcomed by both the current BRICS chair, Brazil, and China in statements promoting Indonesia’s potential contributions to reforming global governance and fostering South-South cooperation. Yet, the narrative of BRICS as a champion of South-South cooperation is debatable, as members such as China and Russia are hardly considered as Global South countries.

Navigating Myanmar’s Border Trade In The Post-Military Coup Era – Analysis

Windia Soe

Geopolitical Strategic Position

Myanmar spans 676,578 square kilometers with diverse landscapes, including the Arakan Mountains in the west and the Shan Plateau in the east. It borders Thailand and Laos to the southeast, China to the north and northeast, and India and Bangladesh to the west. Its location near the Andaman Sea, Bay of Bengal, and Indian Ocean shipping lanes makes it a vital regional link and trade hub into China from the Bay of Bengal.

The Historical Evolution of Border Trade Under Military Rule

Myanmar’s economy, rich in natural resources like oil, gas, and minerals, suffered under decades of military rule and economic mismanagement. During the socialist period, key trading partners included Japan, the UK, and the US, supported by official development assistance (ODA). After the 1988 military coup, Western sanctions redirected Myanmar’s trade towards neighbors such as China and Thailand.

The 1962 coup saw industries nationalized, eliminating competition and stifling economic growth. These policies pushed many businesses into the informal economy, spurring illegal border trade. A market-oriented economy reintroducedin 1988 attracted private investment, boosting imports and exports. Border trade agreements with China, Thailand, India, and Bangladesh in the 1990s further solidified cross-border commerce, establishing 17 official border trade stations.

​​Beijing’s Targeting of Taiwan’s Undersea Cables Previews Cross-Strait Tensions Under a Trump Presidency

Hans Horan

On January 10, a director of the company operating Shunxin-39 refuted the allegations, despite the ship’s movements reportedly sustaining the sabotage hypothesis.

This incident appears to be the latest example of Beijing-directed “gray-zone harassment.” In 2023, similar sabotage severed two submarine cables connecting Taiwan’s Matsu Islands, which temporarily disrupted their internet services. This most recent incident highlights the complex dynamics of China’s gray-zone tactics against Taiwan. Most notably, its timing – just weeks before Donald Trump’s inauguration for a second term as the United States’ president – raises the stakes, with China potentially testing the resilience of the Taiwan-U.S. partnership and Washington’s broader commitment to Indo-Pacific security.

Chinese Hybrid Warfare and Gray Zone Operations

The investigation into the Shunxin-39 incident remains inconclusive thus far, though the incident is far from isolated. It appears to align with Beijing’s broader use of hybrid warfare tactics to assert its claims over Taiwan, which it deems a “renegade province.” China’s gray-zone tactics – an established playbook – refers to a multitude of actions designed to deter, coerce, or subdue adversaries without escalating to full-scale war. In this context, China’s actions seem aimed at preventing Taiwanese independence, advancing unification with the mainland, and undermining or outright preventing foreign support for Taiwan, all while stopping short of an outright invasion and/or blockade.

Report reveals China’s PLA information warfare posture

Bill Gertz

China’s People’s Liberation Army is waging information warfare that is regarded as a key element of military power and crucial for battlefield combat, according to a report by an Air Force think tank.

“The PLA sees the ‘information domain’ as a domain of war unto itself, equal to the physical domains of air, land, sea, and space,” states the report by the China Aerospace Studies Institute made public this week.

Chinese hard power military operations are used to support information warfare operations.

“For the PLA, superiority in the information domain is necessary to seize and maintain battlefield initiative, and information dominance has become a prerequisite to being able to achieve decisive effects in any of the physical domains,” the report said.

By contrast, the U.S. military and those of other democratic states consider information “as the connective tissue that links and binds all of the other domains,” the report said.

West’s Dilemma Over China’s Silk Railroad

Emil Avdaliani

The official ceremony to mark the start of construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway was held on December 27. The event featured high-level officials from Beijing and Central Asian states and followed the signing of an investment agreement a week earlier.

The line, which is designed to carry 10-12 million tons of cargo a year, will stretch approximately 486km (302 miles), linking Kashgar in Western China to Andijan in Uzbekistan and passing through the mountains of Kyrgyzstan.

It will provide both countries with a direct link to China, bypassing their current reliance on routes through Kazakhstan, while also offering an opportunity to boost trade with Europe and the Middle East.

Beijing sees the railway as a way of bolstering exports to Europe and speeding up imports of Central Asian raw materials and agricultural goods.

Central Asian states will also have greater access to global markets as the railway will connect them with the Caspian Sea and the European Union via Georgia’s Black Sea shore, where China is building a deep seaport at Anaklia.

Advancing U.S.-China Coordination amid Strategic Competition: An Emerging Playbook

Ryan Hass, Ryan McElveen, and Lily McElwee

The Issue

Frictions between the United States and China are intensifying, yet even past geopolitical rivals found ways to collaborate on shared challenges where it squarely served national interests. In November 2022, the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies and the Brookings John L. Thornton China Center launched a project to explore safe and effective methods for collaboration among nonstate actors on key challenges facing both nations. The following brief distills takeaways from this work, which included historical case studies of collaboration during the Cold War, workshops with U.S. and PRC experts, and a track 2 dialogue on climate-smart agriculture designed to probe emerging findings.

Part I: Scoping the Challenge

The U.S.-China relationship dates to the nineteenth century, specifically to 1844, when the two countries signed their first diplomatic agreement, the Treaty of Wanghia, following the conclusion of the Opium Wars. In the nearly 200 years since, the bilateral relationship has oscillated between periods of intense engagement and estrangement. There have been times when both countries shared common adversaries and common pursuits, as well as other moments when the relationship was defined by enmity and even direct conflict, such as in the case of the Korean War.


What China’s New Fighter Jet Really Signals

Benjamin Jensen

On Dec. 26, 2024, Mao Zedong’s birthday, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) unveiled a new stealth aircraft. Reportedly designated J-36, the aircraft combines stealth capabilities with a large payload capacity, enabling both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions over extended ranges at supersonic speeds. These features make it a formidable challenge for modern air defense systems.

China’s sixth-generation fighter jet has sparked renewed concerns about Beijing’s advances in the ongoing arms race. It comes at a time when the United States has scaled back investments in next-generation air dominance under its latest defense budget. For U.S. military planners, this development significantly complicates operational scenarios, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, where China’s enhanced offensive counterair and interdiction capabilities would necessitate a rapid deployment of additional intelligence and defensive assets. Such a capability shift underscores the need for the United States to reassess its air strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

The jet’s unveiling marks a significant milestone in the evolving great-power contest between Washington and Beijing. This new Cold War is increasingly defined by technology competition. The CCP isn’t just seeking to dominate core commercial technologies like electric vehicles and artificial intelligence. It wants a deeper military-civil fusion that supports Beijing’s ability to replicate a Cold War-era offset strategy, in which technological advantages tip the military balance.

Lebanon’s Success Depends on Sidelining Hezbollah

Bilal Y. Saab

For the first time since 1958, there is reason for hope in Lebanon. That hope lies today in the rise of two Lebanese public figures who served their country ably over many years: Gen. Joseph Aoun, a former Lebanese army commander who will now serve as president, and Nawaf Salam, Lebanon’s former United Nations ambassador who will assume the role of prime minister.

This reformist and philosophically aligned duo, rare in Lebanon’s modern history, could usher a new political era in the country—one that could start to rehabilitate a paralyzed system, a broken economy, and a deeply wounded nation that has incredible potential.

Will Trump Wage ‘No New Wars’?

Brian Finucane

The U.S. president has significant latitude to use military force even in the absence of congressional authorization and even when such action would violate international law. Through its military interventions in the Middle East since Oct. 7, 2023, the Biden administration has both further eroded the existing guardrails constraining presidential war powers and possibly bequeathed a new conflict with the Houthis to his successor.

Despite President-elect Donald Trump’s oft-deployed slogan of “no new wars” and claims that United States was at peace during his first administration, Washington both engaged in new conflicts and expanded and intensified existing ones without fresh congressional authorization under this leadership between 2017 and 2021.

OSS 2.0: Emphasizing the Importance of Human Intelligence in Irregular Warfare for Great Power Competition

Chris Cruden

As the global landscape shifts into an era of Great Power Competition, characterized by unconventional threats and complex geopolitical dynamics, the need for a reimagined Office of Strategic Services (OSS) framework has never been more pressing. The revival of an OSS 2.0 would empower the Department of Defense (DoD) with enhanced Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities that are critical for navigating the intricacies of Irregular Warfare (IW). Leveraging an updated OSS concept, the DoD could build deeper, longer-lasting relationships with foreign partners and local populations, laying the foundation for invaluable intelligence collection and clandestine or covert operations.

The Role of HUMINT in IW

In the so-called “new” era of Great Power Competition, AKA Cold War 2.0, where the DoD prioritizes Irregular Warfare, the timeless adage “everything old is new again” rings especially true. HUMINT, a discipline often dismissed as a Cold War relic, is indispensable to IW, as it offers unparalleled insights into enemy tactics, operational plans, and overall capabilities. It is the bedrock of operations that requires an intimate understanding of the local population, its culture, and the situational dynamics on the ground. Through HUMINT, military leaders gain vital information to neutralize key enemy leaders, unravel supply chains, and disrupt operational plans.

How hard is it to run the Pentagon?


“SO VAST IS the [Department of Defence] and so multifarious are its missions,” wrote Ash Carter, America’s 25th secretary of defence, “that it dwarfs most institutions on Earth.” The Pentagon owns or maintains almost 30m acres of property, he noted, an area larger than Pennsylvania. Its carbon emissions are about 1% of the country’s total. Its annual budget, a little over $800bn, exceeds the GDP of Taiwan, Belgium or Argentina.

One reason the U.S. government is so spooked by TikTok: AI

MARK SULLIVAN

THE REAL REASON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WANTS TO BAN A BYTEDANCE-OWNED TIKTOK

TikTok could shut down in the U.S. as soon as January 19 if the Supreme Court doesn’t step in. The high court is now considering the constitutionality of a law passed by Congress in April mandating that TikTok find a new owner or face a ban. The government believes TikTok’s parent company, Beijing-based ByteDance, might share user data with the Chinese government. But Congress has failed to explain how such a data transfer could be so dangerous to the 170 million Americans who use TikTok.

The data threat has a lot to do with AI. Congress is trying to play the “long game” with TikTok, one Washington insider tells me. China has a history of vacuuming up any data it can get its hands on, from user data to supply chain analytics to intellectual property. Per this insider, lawmakers worry that a decade from now Chinese AI may be able to access and weaponize TikTok user data to move U.S. public opinion one way or the other on key issues like tariffs.

TikTok’s algorithm is already eerily good at putting videos in front of users that match their tastes, values, and sensibilities. That capability will only improve as AI models grow more sophisticated. Because AI makes generating content cheaper, the Chinese government might be able to leverage what it knows about each TikTok user, and generate content for them that’s specially tailored to persuade them.

America Is Winning the Race for Global AI Primacy—for Now

Colin H. Kahl

Since the release of ChatGPT in November 2022, the breakneck pace of progress in artificial intelligence has made it nearly impossible for policymakers to keep up. But the AI revolution has only just begun. Today’s most powerful AI models, often referred to as “frontier AI,” can handle and generate images, audio, video, and computer code, in addition to natural language. Their remarkable performance has prompted ambitions among leading AI labs to achieve what is called “artificial general intelligence.” According to a growing number of experts, AGI systems equaling or surpassing humans across a wide range of cognitive tasks—the equivalent

The US Strategy To Constrain China In The AI Sector Will Further Intensify – Analysis

Zhou Chao

Since the Trump administration, the U.S. has gradually increased its restrictions and blockades on China in the field of high-tech industries, with the aim to curb the development speed of China’s advanced technologies and maintain its own advantage over China. This approach has continued into the Biden administration without change. The same is true in the rapidly growing field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in recent years. However, within the AI sector, the U.S. seemed to show a certain degree of willingness for cooperation with China at one point.

From 2023 to the first half of 2024, in exchanges at various levels between the two countries’ governments, the U.S. side consistently expressed a willingness to cooperate with China on the global AI regulatory framework. The most obvious example of this was the official invitation extended to the Chinese delegation to attend and speak at the first Global AI Summit held in November 2023 in the United Kingdom. Considering the close relationship between the U.S. and the UK, it would have been difficult to imagine the Chinese delegation’s attendance without U.S. permission. Subsequently, high-level government dialogues on AI were held between the U.S. and Chinese governments in Switzerland. For a moment, it seemed that China had returned to the global stage in the AI field. However, based on a comprehensive analysis of various factors, researchers at ANBOUND believe that the “tech Cold War” between the two will persist and intensify, with no substantial shift in sight, particularly in the AI field.

Reinforcing the Nation’s Cybersecurity Defenses

Chris Simpson

As cyber threats increasingly challenge global security, the demand for cybersecurity professionals has never been more urgent. Alarmingly, the United States faces a significant shortage of workers in this critical field, with more than half a million cybersecurity jobs going unfilled. Gartner, a leading technology consulting firm, predicts that by 2025, half of all cybersecurity incidents will stem from this lack of skilled talent and human mistakes.

Recent findings from the 2024 ISC2 Global Workforce Study paint an alarming picture: nearly 60% of organizations report that skills gaps have significantly impacted their security posture, with 58% stating these gaps put their organizations at substantial risk. Despite this urgent need, economic pressures have led to staff and budget reductions, further compromising organizational security.

The solution to this crisis lies in reconsidering traditional hiring pools and pathways into cybersecurity. The ISC2 study reveals that successful cybersecurity professionals increasingly come from diverse professional backgrounds beyond IT, with these varied pathways proving equally valuable to career success. The military community—both veterans and military spouses—represents an especially promising talent pool. Veterans bring a disciplined approach and mission-driven mindset, while military spouses offer exceptional adaptability and proven success in remote work environments. However, transitioning to civilian cybersecurity careers remains challenging for both groups, often due to outdated educational models and hiring practices that create artificial barriers to entry.

Trump 2.0: Unilateralism and the Future of Arms Control

Syed Ali Abbas

As the world prepares for Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the implications for global arms control loom large. New START, the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, is set to expire in February 2026. Russian president Vladimir Putin suspended participation in the treaty a year ago due to tensions resulting from the Ukraine war, which leaves the agreement or any like it in question.

This important agreement, which places limits on strategic nuclear arsenals and provides verification mechanisms, may face an uncertain future under Trump’s leadership. During his first term, President Trump demonstrated a dislike of arms control, a trend that could seriously undermine multilateral efforts in maintaining global strategic stability.

Trump’s Arms Control Record

During Trump’s first term, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a landmark agreement with Russia that had eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. While the US cited Russian violations of the treaty as the reason for American withdrawal, the move is concerning for European security and removes a crucial safeguard against nuclear escalation.

How Trump Can Rebuild America

Oren Cass

Across the American economic dashboard, warning indicators are flashing red. The globalization and financialization of the past several decades have slowed investment, innovation, and growth. Industrial output and productivity have declined, and the United States has lost its leadership position in vital technologies—including in aerospace, energy, and semiconductors. Yes, U.S. corporate profits, stock prices, and consumption have all surged. But crises—including the opioid addiction in the American heartland, the war in Europe, and a worldwide pandemic—have each in their own way exposed the decaying foundations of American security and prosperity.

Trump’s Threat to U.S. Intelligence

Peter Schroeder

On January 21, 2017, the day after his inauguration, U.S. President Donald Trump visited Central Intelligence Agency Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. It was one of his first official actions as president and an opportunity to reset relations with the intelligence community. Just ten days prior, he had accused intelligence agencies of helping to leak a report that claimed that Russian operatives had his personal and financial information.

But Trump quickly went off the rails, setting the tone for his relationship with the intelligence community for the rest of his first term. Standing in front of the CIA Memorial Wall—the agency’

This Gaza ceasefire deal is tainted by Trump, Netanyahu and their disregard for peace

Simon Tisdall

At last! The yearned for Israel-Hamas ceasefire-for-hostages deal is finally happening. It is welcome. Like thin ice covering deep waters, it is scarily fragile, prone to crack under the slightest pressure. And it is desperately, lethally overdue. Tens of thousands of Palestinians, and many Israelis, have died since last May, when the US president, Joe Biden, first set out the parameters of this agreement. Civilians are still being killed in Israeli airstrikes that have actually intensified since the two sides grudgingly initialled the deal in Qatar.

Palestinians in Gaza and elsewhere are naturally relieved that these merciless Israeli bombardments will soon stop. But celebrations are tempered by fears about the future, and by deep grief and anger over the still terrifying present and immediate past. According to Gaza health ministry figures, more than 46,000 people have died there since the 7 October 2023 Hamas terrorist attacks killed over 1,200 people. The true Palestinian death toll may be even higher.

Most of Gaza’s 2.1 million population is displaced. Most of their homes and neighbourhoods are in ruins. Most are short of food and water. Hunger, bordering on famine, is a daily menace. Hospitals and the healthcare system have been smashed. Tent cities have sprung up where real cities once stood. Gangs roam and steal. Children are perhaps the biggest victims. Those who survive are traumatised. The world’s abject failure to halt this slaughter of innocents will not be forgiven or forgotten.

The strategic logic of Ukraine’s further push into Russia’s Kursk region

David Kirichenko

Ukraine is launching a fresh offensive in Russia’s Kursk region, aiming to reclaim the initiative, expose Russia’s persistent vulnerabilities and strengthen its position ahead of potential peace talks. At the same time, Russia continues to press further in Donetsk Oblast, taking as much Ukrainian land as possible before President-elect Trump takes office. While many pundits questioned Ukraine’s initial incursion into Kursk in August 2024, outgoing Secretary of State Antony Blinken has acknowledged that Ukraine’s positions there could play an important role in potential negotiations with Russia.

Following the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the frontlines began to stabilize and the fight gradually turned into a war of attrition. Ukraine’s former top general, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, admitted in an interview in 2023 that he misjudged Russia, believing he could stop the Russians by bleeding them out: “That was my mistake. Russia has lost at least 150,000 dead. In any other country such casualties would have stopped the war.”

But for Russia, human life means little; Vladimir Putin measures the losses in comparison to the Great Patriotic War (what Russians call World War II). So we can assume that Putin is willing to expend hundreds of thousands more, or even millions, of soldiers to conquer Ukraine. Independent Russian polling in 2024 also confirms that the majority of Russians support the ongoing war against Ukraine.

Panama: From Zoned Out to Strategic Opportunity

Andrew Sanders and Ryan C. Berg

Introduction

Since his election in November 2024, President Donald Trump has staked out strong positions on the importance of the Western Hemisphere to the United States’ national security interests. A secure, prosperous, and free Western Hemisphere underpins U.S. geopolitical and economic success. Panama is the most strategically significant geography in the Western Hemisphere. With 40 percent of U.S. container traffic passing through the Panama Canal, it rightfully drew President Trump’s attention. Trump has highlighted concerns about the status quo regarding the disposition of the canal, its operation, and People’s Republic of China (PRC)–owned ports dominating the approaches. This commentary will not relitigate the merits of the 1977 Carter-Torrijos treaty, sovereignty, or transit rates but rather highlight the strategic importance of Panama, legitimate concerns over Beijing-owned ports, and the need for sustained diplomatic engagement and U.S. private sector investment.

Since 1903, Panama has been one of the United States’ closest allies in the hemisphere. The Trump administration should build on this partnership. President Josรฉ Raรบl Mulino’s administration offers an opportunity for the United States to reinvigorate this critical strategic relationship. Mulino’s declared alignment with U.S. priorities, such as migration and anti-corruption, bodes well for the bilateral relationship and U.S. leadership in the Americas. This alignment on security issues should be accompanied by policies that build joint economic prosperity for the United States and Panama.

Faster into the Cloud

James Andrew Lewis

The CSIS Commission on Federal Cloud Policy examined federal cloud computing. It produced a report which highlights the critical need for U.S. government agencies to adopt private sector best practices and accelerate the adoption of cloud technologies. Despite the widespread use of cloud services in the private sector, federal agencies remain significantly behind in the modernization of their information technology (IT) infrastructure, which has created problems for citizen service delivery and cybersecurity.

The next administration should prioritize cloud adoption as essential to enabling new AI software tools and improving government services, national security, and technological competitiveness. The benefits of greater federal cloud use are significant, including potentially lower spending, improved cybersecurity, and more efficient government services. A hesitant and incomplete acceleration of cloud computing in the public sector leaves the United States vulnerable and citizens inadequately served. To help lay the groundwork for progress in government cloud use, this report makes a number of recommendations on how to move to a more secure and efficient government cloud environment.

With Its Latest Rule, the U.S. Tries to Govern AI’s Global Spread

Sam Winter-Levy

On Monday, President Joe Biden’s administration released one of its most ambitious acts of economic and technological policymaking. In an “interim final rule” whose wonky title—a “Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion”—belies its importance, the Biden administration has sought to reshape the international AI landscape. The rule seeks to set the export and security terms for the AI market that will produce the world’s most powerful technological systems in the coming years.

The rule tightens control over sales of AI chips and turns them into a diplomatic tool. It seeks to enshrine and formalize the use of U.S. AI exports as leverage to extract geopolitical and technological concessions. And it is the Biden administration’s latest attempt to limit Chinese access to the high-end chips that are critical to training advanced AI models.

With a new administration taking office in a week, the rule’s ultimate impact is uncertain. President-elect Donald Trump and his staff will no doubt take a fresh look at how—or whether—to regulate the export of advanced U.S. AI technology. But as they do so, they too will have to reckon with the underlying national security pressures and economic incentives that drove the Biden administration’s development of this policy.

Strategic Centaurs: Harnessing Hybrid Intelligence for the Speed of AI-Enabled War

William J. Barry, Chase Metcalf and Blair Wilcox

Modern warfare generates mountains of data from satellites, drones, and other sensors. The sheer volume of data makes identifying meaningful patterns extremely difficult. This significant problem requires a deliberate conceptual solution to address it. Enter the strategic centaur.

Consistent with the third offset strategy, this concept aims, at the strategic level of war, to reconcile human intuition and cognitive computing within modern conflicts’ dynamic and unpredictable nature. Western approaches to warfare currently lack a sufficient concept for AI integration at the strategic level of war. Without a guiding framework for strategic integration, AI adoption risks operational and tactical missteps that will only increase the rate of human carnage. Adapting military organizational processes, planning culture, and senior education to harness the cognitive power of AI is essential. The result? Faster, more accurate strategic decisions and, ultimately, a strengthening of warfighter lethality.

This discussion is not a philosophical exercise. It is a call to action based on observed hybrid performance, real-world experience in both warfighting and strategic planning from the corps through the combatant command level, and over a decade of research with AI as an emerging technology.