A proposed dam on the Tibetan plateau shouldn’t unleash panic in India

Anushka Saxena

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China’s recently approved a proposal to build a 60-giga-watt dam at the ‘Great Bend’ of the Yarlung Tsangpo River in Tibet has sent shockwaves in India. The highly reactive and securitised nature of Indian policy discourse on China has contributed to the threat perception that the dam shall disrupt India’s access to Brahmaputra waters as a lower riparian vis-à-vis China, or even divert the flow of the river away from the lower reaches of Tibet, to the Chinese province of Xinjiang. However, it may just be the case that this is not so much a national security threat, as it is a potential opportunity for India to build its own hydropower capabilities without worrying about China’s capabilities as an upper riparian.

A dam still on paper

Approved by the Chinese government on December 25, 2024, but only announced to the world in an article appearing in the state-run news media platform Xinhua, the new Great Bend dam is proposed to be the largest in the world. It has the potential to produce three times the energy generation capacity of the second largest dam in the world, the Three Gorges, which is also built in China.

Despite the promise of a massive investment of 1 trillion yuan (~US$ 137 billion), the founding brick for the dam is yet to be laid. And not only has such a dam been under deliberation in China for at least a decade, but the first official confirmation that a hydro-project was in the works at the Great Bend only came with the approval of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan in 2021. Even in the Plan, the proposal makes no mention of a dam on the Great Bend, but a need to create investment opportunities in “hydropower development in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo River.”

Bangladesh: Testing India’s South Asia Doctrine

Armaan Mathur

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Bangladesh’s latest demand for Sheikh Hasina’s extradition has illustrated how the country’s political crisis has cemented itself as one of the most pressing quandaries in the complex tapestry of India’s neighbourhood policy. While the external affairs ministry (MEA) has chosen not to comment at the moment, they have confirmed that a “note verbale” has been received from Dhaka requesting the former Bangladeshi PM’s extradition. This newspaper has reported that India is unlikely to accede to the request due to “incomplete formalities” and “political nature of the request”.

Under the India-Bangladesh extradition treaty, Article 8 lists multiple grounds for refusal, including cases in which an accusation has not been “made in good faith in the interests of justice” or military offences which are not “an offence under the general criminal law”. While an exemption on “political grounds” alone might be tough – some of the offences under which Hasina has been booked are excluded from the definition of political crimes in the treaty – it is conceivable for India to decline the request on the grounds outlined.

Biotech Battlefield : Weaponizing Innovation in the Age of Genomics

Craig Singleton

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Introduction

In a sign of his unwavering commitment to technological self-reliance (自力更生), Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Xi Jinping has declared technological innovation to be the “main battlefield of the international strategic game.”5 Central to Xi’s vision is biotechnology, which he has identified as a critical sector in China’s bid to become a global science superpower.6

Xi’s broader ambitions are anchored in China’s military-civil fusion (军民 融合) strategy, which aims to break down barriers between military and civilian institutions to mobilize the latter in service of the former. Specifically, military-civil fusion facilitates the direct transfer of data and cutting-edge technologies to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), ensuring that China’s military capabilities keep pace with rapid civilian technological progress. Biotechnology, with its vast potential to revolutionize fields such as genomics, synthetic biology, and bioengineering, is integral to military-civil fusion.

The PLA has long recognized the strategic importance of biotechnology, engaging in extensive collaborations with Chinese biotechnology behemoths like BGI Group (華大集團, or BGI) and its former subsidiary MGI Tech (深圳华大智造科技股份有限公司). These and other partnerships have yielded research with potential military applications, including efforts to enhance Chinese soldiers’ physical and cognitive abilities. The PLA’s involvement in biotechnology research extends to its collaborations with select Chinese civilian universities, which, along with entities like BGI Group and MGI Tech, play a pivotal role in advancing China’s military-civil fusion strategy.

China plans to blow Starlink out of the sky in a Taiwan war

Gabriel Honrada

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China’s bold moves to counter Starlink’s military applications with cutting-edge satellite disruption methods spotlight the pivotal role space would play in a Taiwan Strait conflict.

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Chinese scientists have developed a method to target SpaceX’s Starlink satellite constellation. SCMP says the method simulates a space operation that could approach nearly 1,400 Starlink satellites within 12 hours using 99 Chinese satellites.

The research, led by Wu Yunhua, director of the aerospace control department at Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, was published in the Chinese academic journal Systems Engineering and Electronics and highlights Starlink’s military applications as witnessed in the Ukraine war.

The Chinese team’s computer simulation suggests that China could effectively track and monitor the operational status of Starlink satellites, which are equipped with lasers, microwaves and other devices for reconnaissance and tracking. The SCMP report notes that the method uses a new binary AI algorithm to mimic the hunting strategy of whales.

Wu’s team claims to have developed an unprecedented technology that enables computers at the ground control center to generate a comprehensive and reliable action plan in less than two minutes.

Why ‘Beating China’ in AI Brings Its Own Risks

Will Knight

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The Biden administration this week introduced new export restrictions designed to control AI’s progress globally and ultimately prevent the most advanced AI from falling into China’s hands. The rule is just the latest in a string of measures put in place by Donald Trump and Joe Biden to keep Chinese AI in check.

With prominent AI figures including OpenAI’s Sam Altman and Anthropic’s Dario Amodei warning of the need to “beat China” in AI, the Trump administration may well escalate things further.

Paul Triolo is a partner at DGA Group, a global consulting firm, a member of the council of foreign relations, and a senior adviser to the University of Pennsylvania’s Penn Project on the Future of US-China Relations. Alvin Graylin is an entrepreneur who previously ran China operations for the Taiwanese electronics firm HPC. Together they have been tracking China’s AI industry and the impact of US sanctions. In an email exchange, Triolo and Graylin discussed the latest sanctions, Silicon Valley rhetoric, and the dangers of seeing global AI as a zero sum game.

Doing the Wrong Thing Well: Flawed Security Policy for Ukraine

Dr. Charlie Black

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Among many national security challenges, the newly elected U.S. President will be confronted with making, communicating and implementing clear policy choices related to the Ukraine-Russian conflict. There is increasing international and increasingly heated domestic debate about U.S. support to Ukraine in over two years of war with Russia. The continuation of a policy that largely depends upon incremental war material support to aid Ukraine’s self-defense has proven ineffective in achieving military victory by Ukraine or political unity in Europe. According to the State Department, U.S. policy “is centered on realizing and strengthening a democratic, prosperous, and secure Ukraine more closely integrated into Europe and Euro-Atlantic structures.” This is a broadly ambiguous statement with much room for interpretation by allies and enemies alike. War in Europe continues as does the chance for escalation in scope and scale. The U.S. pursuit of ill-defined ends is akin to solving the wrong problem well. We no longer live in the bifurcated world where one is clearly on one side of an issue. Today the U.S., each of the NATO allies, Ukraine and Russia are entangled economically in ways that were not present in the Cold War. More than ever the U.S., European states, and the alliance itself experience tension due to competing self-interests and the interests of the alliance. The current Ukraine conflict represents a unique security challenge that requires reconsideration.

Can Ukraine Survive Without U.S. Military Weapons?

Reuben Johnson

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The Ukraine War: From Bad to Worse if Trump Dumps Kyiv?

For months leading up to the 2024 presidential election, the issue of whether Ukraine could survive and continue to fight back against Russia’s military without United States military aid. This line of questioning stems from the unspoken assumption that a second Donald Trump Administration might reduce that aid—or even curtail it altogether.

Since the fall, and more so since Trump’s election victory in November 2024, the prospect of the withdrawal of US military aid seems less likely. However, if assistance to Ukraine was not canceled but just significantly scaled back, the consequences could be severe.

The most crucial point to remember, says a Ukrainian official in Kyiv who spoke to 19FortyFive, is the “constant, static usage of military items on the front lines. Vehicles are destroyed and have to be replaced. Soldiers are either killed – or if wounded have to be withdraw from combat. Reduced manpower causes a loss in firepower and too many vehicles out of action means a loss of mobility.”

Drone War in Ukraine: Bombers, Kamikaze Strikes and Dogfights in the Sky

David Hambling

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Air War 2.0: How Small Drones Fight

A new type of air war is unfolding in Ukraine, one with curious echoes of WW1 and the early days of air combat. It is a battle of drone versus drone, with tactics and technology for attack and defense evolving fast. It is happening in a parallel universe to traditional air warfare, a space where existing weapons have been unable to reach.

Victory in this sphere will have insurmountable significance – greater perhaps than winning air superiority in previous wars.

Air War Beneath the Jets

In 2017, the Allies completely dominated the sky over Mosul during the operation to retake the city from ISIS militants. The United States Air Force A-10 Warthogs, Navy F/A-18s, and Marine Corps Harriers provided close air support while B-52 Stratofortresses delivered bombs from high altitude, collectively hitting up to 500 targets a week in the most intense phase of an air campaign against ISIS.

Simultaneously, allied forces on the ground were coming under an air attack.

ISIS was among the first groups to weaponize small consumer quadcopters, turning them into bombers dropping grenades and other small munitions. These were not used effectively and lacked anti-armor capability, but they caused casualties and delays among the attacking forces. At times, there were as many as a dozen ISIS drones in operation, and according to one BBC correspondent, bombs “fell like rain.”

Beyond Buzzwords: A Model for Strengthening Interoperability and Interior Lines

Nathan D. Levy

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Across the US joint force’s global footprint, terms like “interoperability” and “build interior lines” are commonly heard. In Army service component commands and geographic combatant commands, these terms burst forth as clarion calls, concise expressions of what US forces must achieve in their areas of responsibility. After a tactical-level unit completes a task, commanders often state that they’ve built interior lines and developed interoperability with partnered nation X. Yet, in many cases, there is no metric by which to measure progress or success. Interoperability is not an end-state, but rather a means to an end. Operations that aim to improve interoperability should not do so with that as their final objective; they must also assist us in understanding posture requirements and, subsequently, help set priorities for infrastructure investments.

Too often, the US military—across all services—participate in combined (nation-to-nation) exercises with our partners, yet fail to extract the maximum value. The cycle is familiar: we conduct the exercise, exchange high-fives, swap patches, and depart. We do not maintain enduring relationships. The communication network built for each event is temporary, often leaving the partner nation without access to key information afterward. This often makes US presence a requirement for success in the exercise. We aren’t meeting our partners where they are, asking what they need, or working collaboratively to build lasting interoperability or interior lines. An annual exercise simply doesn’t achieve lasting impact. In many countries, there must be more continuous investment between exercises that helps inform our posture initiatives and prioritize infrastructure development.

Anti-Tank Weapon Analysis: How Ukraine Destroyed 3,197 Russian Tanks

Kris Osborn

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Heavy armored formations and mechanized units engineered for dispersed, yet “linear” attacks to penetrate and hold enemy territory are not likely disappearing anytime soon as a critical element of modern Combined Army Maneuver, yet there is little question that the warfare in Ukraine is re-defining certain key ground-war tactics in favor of lightweight, de-centralized, agile and ground-fired anti-tank weapons used by dispersed, dismounted forces and fast, light tactical vehicles. When combined with precise overhead surveillance, unmanned systems and some measure of effective networking, Ukrainians armed with shoulder-fired anti-armor weapons continue to exact a devastating toll upon Russian assault platforms.

A significant Army Intelligence Report called the “The Operational Environment 2024-2034 Large-Scale Combat Operations.” (US Army Training and Doctrine Command, G2) says that Russia’s entire active duty tank force has been destroyed in its war with Ukraine.

“Ukrainian Armed Forces have used vast quantities of man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), antitank guided missiles, and FPV UAS—combined with fires—to great effect. As of July 2024, Russia has lost 3,197 main battle tanks—more than its entire active-duty inventory at the outset of conflict—and 6,160 armored fighting vehicles, forcing them to pull increasingly obsolescent systems from storage,” the text of the report from 2024 states.

Dominion: Trump’s new grand strategy?

Gabriel Elefteriu

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With Donald Trump only days away from being sworn into what will likely be the most “imperial” of US presidencies since Franklin D. Roosevelt’s, the geopolitical environment is rich with positive opportunities waiting to be realised – as well as risks. As it is becoming almost a habit, he comes into office on the heels of yet another Democratic administration whose foreign policy has been a train wreck from one end to the other, and that he must fix.

Before Trump’s first term of office, Obama had presided over the Libya war (including Benghazi), the Arab Spring (including the onset of Syria’s civil war), Putin’s Crimea grab, the rise of ISIS, the rise of China, and the catastrophic Iran Deal (i.e. the JCPOA).

Then Trump defeated ISIS, strengthened NATO, started to arm Ukraine, turned the screws back on Iran, put Israel and the Arabs on track to peace (the Abraham Accords), and reoriented US power – as well as allies – towards confronting China seriously, for the first time.

After that, on Biden’s watch, things went badly wrong again. America got humiliated in Afghanistan, Ukraine was invaded by Russia, Israel was attacked by Hamas and Iran, the Houthi rebels brazenly blocked most shipping in the Red Sea, Sub-Saharan Africa was lost to the Russians and the Chinese, an Al-Qaeda graduate warlord took over Syria with Turkish help, and China grew stronger and more aggressive around Taiwan and beyond.

Illiberal Hegemony: The Tenets of a Trump Foreign Policy - Opinion

Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco

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Perhaps the greatest change of direction in the world Zeitgeist derived from the second coming of Trump —and probably the most consequential legacy of his administration— is a prospective reformulation of US foreign policy. Together, the popular legitimacy of Trump’s second mandate, the lack of circumstantial political constraints associated with the quest for re-election, and intense geopolitical convulsion open a window of opportunity to make this happen. Such a course of action would be a departure from the inertial bipartisan trajectory followed by the US for decades after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Many mainstream media commentators disqualify this hypothetical possibility, often with contradictory criticisms. Trump is portrayed as a trigger-happy incendiary cowboy as a result of his supposed megalomania but, at the same time, he is also depicted as an irresponsible and cowardly isolationist eager to follow the metaphorical ‘ostrich policy’ or as the reincarnation of Chamberlain because of his alleged proclivity for appeasement. These misrepresentations respond to the lack of an appropriate interpretative referential logic. Therefore, it is pertinent —for diagnostic, predictive and prescriptive purposes— to overcome the narrow-minded and Manichean vision of liberal internationalism with the explanatory capabilities of theoretical models, such as political realism, geoeconomics, and classical geopolitics. The purpose of this analysis is to cover this gap in understanding by offering a higher degree of clarity as an ingredient of a better judgment through a dispassionate assessment. The following contents intend to dissect the cornerstones of Trump foreign policy.

Israel-Hamas ceasefire won’t end war or bring peace - Opinion

Marika Sosnowski

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After 467 days of violence, a ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel has been reached and will come into effect on Sunday, pending Israeli government approval.

This agreement will not end the war or bring about peace. Ceasefires are not a panacea for the war, trauma, displacement, hunger and death Israelis and Palestinians have borne before and since October 7, and will no doubt continue to bear, long after.

While this is not the end of the story, this ceasefire does mark the start of a new chapter for Palestinians, particularly those in Gaza, and Israelis.

The terms of this ceasefire, at least for the first phase, are detailed, setting the stage for its effective implementation.

In structure and content, this ceasefire closely resembles numerous others that have been proposed over the past year, including the 7+2 day truce agreed in November 2023. Unlike that truce, however, this agreement is envisaged to last longer, having three distinct phases, each lasting 42 days (6 weeks).

As US President Joe Biden said, this agreement “is the exact framework of the deal I proposed in May.”

United States nuclear weapons, 2025

Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns & Mackenzie Knight

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As of January 2025, we estimate that the US Department of Defense maintained an estimated stockpile of approximately 3,700 nuclear warheads for delivery by ballistic missiles and aircraft. Most of the warheads in the stockpile are not deployed but rather stored for potential upload onto missiles and aircraft as necessary. We estimate that approximately 1,770 warheads are currently deployed, of which roughly 1,370 strategic warheads are deployed on ballistic missiles and another 300 at strategic bomber bases in the United States. An additional 100 tactical bombs are deployed at air bases in Europe. The remaining warheads—approximately 1,930—are in storage as a so-called “hedge” against technical or geopolitical surprises. Several hundred of those warheads are scheduled to be retired before 2030.

While the majority of the United States’ warheads comprise the Department of Defense’s military stockpile, retired warheads under the custody of the Department of Energy awaiting dismantlement constitute a “significant fraction” of the United States’ total warhead inventory (US Department of Energy 2024b, F-6). Dismantlement operations include the disassembly of retired weapons into component parts that are then assigned for reuse, storage, surveillance, or for additional disassembly and subsequent disposition (US Department of Energy 2023b, 2–11).

Small and advanced nuclear reactors: Closing the fuel cycle?

Claire Corkhill, Malcolm Joyce, Derek Lacey & Nigel Thrift

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Undeniably, ambitions for a nuclear renaissance are thriving. The UK is building its first nuclear power station in 30 years, France plans a new fleet of 14 reactors and, in total worldwide, 100 new reactors are proposed. And it is not only energy firms who are leading the way—Big Tech companies, who require reliable low-carbon dioxide baseload electricity to provide for their energy-thirsty AI technologies and data storage, are supporting nuclear energy too. Microsoft’s Constellation Energy has suggested reopening the Three Mile Island power plant (Reuters 2024) in Pennsylvania, and Amazon recently purchased a nuclear-powered data center (Gardner 2024a).

But unlike Microsoft and Amazon, Google has agreed to buy power generated from a fleet of small modular nuclear reactors that are yet to leave the drawing board, by backing the start-up company Kairos Power and their conceptual molten salt reactor (Gardner 2024b). The primary driver for building small modular reactors like these is to avoid the cost over-runs and extended timescales that have plagued large conventional reactor construction, like the Flamanville light water reactor built and operated by Électricité de France, which was 12 years overdue and more than 10 billion euros (about $10.9 billion in US dollars) over budget. Moreover, the advent of Gen IV reactor designs, often termed “advanced modular reactors,” promises not only electricity generation but also hydrogen and heat, as well as medical isotope production.

Why defence industry needs an urgent rehaul - Opinion

Arun Prakash

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The commissioning of three frontline naval platforms on January 15 — the first Project-17A frigate, Nilgiri; the last of four Project-15B destroyers, Surat; and the sixth and last Scorpene-class submarine Vagsheer — is of considerable consequence for the Navy and the nation. While these long-awaited accretions will bolster India’s maritime warfare capabilities, they are also, a reassuring demonstration of the diverse competencies acquired by our warship building industry in the 53 years since the first Indian-built warship (also named Nilgiri) was delivered in 1972.

Amidst the euphoria, it is important to take note of a recent reality check, provided by China. On December 27, 2024, Shanghai’s Hudong Shipyard launched a 40,000-tonne warship of radical design, described as China’s first “super-sized amphibious assault ship”. Built in just four years, this vessel features an electromagnetic catapult as well as arresting gear to enable fixed-wing aircraft operations and carries a complement of unmanned combat air vehicles. A day earlier, China displayed two new aircraft acclaimed by aviation experts as the world’s first and second “sixth generation” fighters, designated the Chengdu J-36 and Shenyang J-50. Both are powered by Chinese-designed and manufactured WS-15 jet engines.

Comparisons may seem odious, but many in India are not aware, that in 1949, when the People’s Republic of China came into being, India was industrially ahead of it. The World War II had spawned of a vast defence-industrial complex to supply to the Allied war effort. Apart from numerous government ordnance factories, it included the privately-owned Hindustan Aircraft Ltd and Scindia Shipyard. China, however, launched a national campaign to undertake reverse engineering of Soviet weapon systems in the mid-1960s. Six decades later, this resolute quest for technology acquisition has made it a leading arms producing nation.