14 January 2025

Why Greenland Matters

Mathew Burrows 

The media outrage over a president-elect who campaigned against war not ruling out the use of military force to obtain Greenland (and the Panama Canal) is right and understandable but misses the Arctic’s growing strategic dimension and Russia and China’s progress in staking out their claims. Greenland is rich in mineral deposits, and its geographic position makes control over Greenland and the Arctic crucial for power projection, rival monitoring, and securing shipping routes.

Many viewers of the second season of the “Trump Show” see the president-elect’s warmongering as just another aspect of his blustering personality and not something to be taken seriously. This misses the significant implications of Trump’s ambitions. Climate change, which Trump has decried as a hoax, is melting Arctic icecaps, potentially revealing previously inaccessible raw material deposits. Greenland’s strategic position and rich raw material reserves, including oil, gas, zinc, copper, platinum, and rare earths, make it crucial in the Arctic region. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the region has an estimated 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of undiscovered natural gas. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Greenland has 1.5 million tons of rare-earth element reserves, close to the 1.8 million tons in the United States. However, China leads with 44 million tons of deposits and could use them as leverage in a trade war. Given Trump’s tariff threats to China, Greenland’s rare-earth deposits are becoming increasingly significant.

Greenland’s proximity to the Arctic shipping routes means it could play a key role in managing, securing, and controlling these new trade pathways. The Northeast Passage, also known as the Northern Sea Route, is a shipping route along the Arctic coast of Russia that connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This route is growing more significant due to the melting ice in the Arctic, creating permanently usable routes that can reduce transport times and costs between Europe and Asia.

The geopolitical dynamics involving Greenland, Russia, China, and the United States will influence the future of global trade and international relations not just in the High North but in the larger play for global advantage among the three great powers.

China Suddenly Building Fleet Of Special Barges Suitable For Taiwan Landings

H I Sutton 

Anyone wondering what an invasion of Taiwan might look like now has a fresh visual clue. Defence analysts watching Chinese shipyards have noticed an increase in a particular type of vessel.

A number of special and unusual barges, at least 3 but likely 5 or more, have been observed in Guangzhou Shipyard in southern China. These have unusually long road bridges extending from their bows. This configuration makes them particularly relevant to any future landing of PRC (People’s Republic of China) forces on Taiwanese islands.

Naval News has seen multiple sources confirming their construction, and has shared information with naval experts to validate our preliminary analysis. The consensus is that these are most likely for amphibious landings.

Unusual Barges Similar To D-Day Mulberry Harbours

Each barge has a very long road span which is extended out from the front. At over 120 meters (393 ft) this can be used to reach a coastal road or hard surface beyond a beach. At the aft end is an open platform which allows other ships to dock and unload. Some of the barges have ‘jack up’ pillars which can be lowered to provide a stable platform even in poor weather. In operation the barge would act as a pier to allow the unloading of trucks and tanks from cargo ships.

The Guangzhou Shipyard International (GSI) on Longxue Island has been a key part in China’s naval expansion. It is particularly associated with construction of unusual vessels including a very large uncrewed surface vessel and a light aircraft carrier.

The barges are reminiscent of the Mulberry Harbours built for the allied invasion of Normandy during World War Two. Like those, these have been built extremely quickly and to novel designs. Although there appears to have been a smaller prototype as early as 2022, the batch of these barges have appeared only recently.

Taiwan hypersonics aim for deep strikes on the mainland

Gabriel Honrada

Taiwan’s latest hypersonic missiles allow for precise long-range strikes on China’s vital infrastructure and military installations, a significant advancement in the self-governing island’s defense strategy amid rising tensions with Beijing.

Last month, multiple media sources reported that Taiwan is developing hypersonic missiles capable of striking targets deep into northern China, with ranges extending beyond 2,000 kilometers.

The National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) has already mass-produced the Ching Tien supersonic cruise missile, with a 1,200–2,000 kilometer range, and is working to upgrade it into the Ching Tien hypersonic cruise missile.

Taiwan reportedly began producing the Ching Tien hypersonic cruise missile in late 2024 and delivered small quantities to the Taiwanese Air Force and Missile Command. In the future, Taiwan aims to deploy 10 sets of mobile systems with 20 missiles at Pingtung County, south of the island, according to reports.

The Ching Tien hypersonic cruise missile will reportedly transition from bunker-style launch systems to mobile platforms, enhancing survivability and strike capability. The Taiwanese military considers 12×12 chassis trucks from Czech manufacturer Tatra as primary launch vehicles, while US-made Oshkosh M983 trucks are an alternative.

The Ching Tien missile series, first deployed last year, represents Taiwan’s inaugural strategic weapon capable of reaching targets as far as Hohhot, Inner Mongolia. The project, reportedly part of an NT$13.5 billion (US$411 million) budget under the codename “Feiji No 2,” underscores Taiwan’s push to bolster deep-strike capabilities amid escalating regional tensions.

Efforts also involve developing advanced materials and rocket engines to refine the missiles further, with the NCSIST leveraging domestic expertise to achieve hypersonic speeds. This initiative aligns with Taiwan’s strategic pivot toward more mobile and survivable defense systems.

A Trump diplomacy for Europe


Europe anxiously awaits Donald Trump’s inauguration. Its greatest fear is that the United States withdraws its commitments and resources from Ukraine, and perhaps the continent. But it can craft a diplomatic strategy to avert this. Europe must make the case that America has a compelling and enduring interest in European security, including Ukraine. What would this look like?

Trump wants a secure and prosperous America. These are the core interests of any country. In this, Trump is no different from any previous US president, or indeed any current European leader. What is different is the way he will pursue these interests. Trump cares little for values. His policy instincts favour retrenchment to overseas commitment, and protectionism to free trade. In diplomatic method, he prefers transactions and ‘deals’ over making rules and working through international organisations.

This means that Europe can no longer rely on the glue of values, institutions and law that have reinforced transatlantic relations for 80 years. Now more than at any time since the 1930s these relations will depend on the strength of shared interests alone. Europe’s challenge is therefore to renew America’s self-interested case for an enduring commitment to the continent. It must persuade America that Europe’s security and prosperity are preconditions of its own. It can do so in four ways.

Firstly, Europe must explain that its security is a compelling US economic interest. Europe is America’s biggest trade partner. It is also by far the leading destination for American investment. And together with Japan, Europe dominates inward investment into America, which creates jobs for American workers. While Trump may pressure Europe to reduce its trade surplus, this should not obscure how much America benefits from a vibrant economic relationship. A Europe imperilled by Russia or in turmoil after a Ukrainian defeat would severely undermine this. America cannot hope to export more to Europe while also abandoning it to its adversaries.

Can Trump Save America From Itself? – OpEd

Alastair Crooke

Russian FM Lavrov last week dismissed Team Trump’s floated peace proposals for Ukraine as unsatisfactory. Essentially, the Russian view is that the calls for a frozen conflict precisely miss the point: From the Russian perspective, such ideas – frozen conflicts, ceasefires and peacekeepers – do not begin to qualify as the type of treaty-based, ‘Big Picture’ deal the Russians have been advocating since 2021.

Without a sustainable, permanent end to conflict, the Russians will prefer to rely on a battlefield outcome –even at the high risk of their refusal bringing continuing escalatory – even nuclear – U.S. brinkmanship.

The question rather is: Sustained peace between the U.S. and Russia – Is it even possible?

The death of former President Jimmy Carter recalls to us that the turbulent 1970s policy ‘revolution’ which became encapsulated in the writings of Zbig Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Adviser – a revolution that bedevils U.S.-Russia relations from then, until today.

The Carter era saw a major inflection point with Brzezinski’s invention of weaponised identitarian conflict, and his espousal of the same identitarian tools – as applied more widely – in order to bring western societies under the control of a technocratic élite “[practicing] continuous surveillance over every citizen … [together with élite] manipulation of the behaviour and intellectual functioning of all people …”.

Brzezinski’s seminal books, in short, advocated a managed cosmopolitan identitarian sphere, that would swap out communal culture – i.e. national values. It is in the hostile reaction to this technocratic ‘control’ vision that we can root today’s trouble breaking out everywhere, on all global fronts.

Put plainly, current events are in many ways a replay of the turbulent 1970s. Today’s march toward anti-democratic norms began with the Trilateral Commission’s seminal The Crisis of Democracy (1975) – the fore-runner to WEF(‘Davos’) and Bilderberg – with, (in Brzezinski’s words), international banks and multinational corporations being crowned as the principal creative force in the place of the “the nation-state as the fundamental unit of man’s organised life”.

Since The 2011 Fukushima Accident, Japan Has Restarted 14 Nuclear Reactors – Analysis

EIA

Japanese utilities restarted two additional nuclear reactors in 2024 that had been suspended from operations in response to the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident, taking the total number of restarted reactors to 14 since the accident. In November, Tohoku Electric Power Co. restarted its 796-megawatt (MW) Onagawa Unit 2 reactor, and in December Chugoku Electric Power Co. restarted its Shimane Unit 2 (789 MW). Onagawa is the nuclear power plant located closest to the epicenter of the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami.

Most of the restarted reactors have been pressurized water reactors (PWR) located in western Japan. Onagawa Unit 2 and Shimane Unit 2, by contrast, are the first boiling water reactors (BWR) to be restarted. Onagawa Unit 2 is also the first reactor in the eastern part of the country to be restarted. Japan’s nuclear regulator prioritized the restart of PWRs due to public safety concerns regarding BWR technology, which is the design of the Fukushima Daiichi units.

Japan suspended its nuclear fleet from 2013 to 2015 for mandatory safety checks and upgrades following the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident. Before the accident, 54 commercial nuclear reactors were operating in Japan, and nuclear power accounted for approximately 30% of the country’s electricity generation. Nuclear restarts have proceeded slowly since the first two units (Sendai Units 1 and 2) were restarted in 2015. Restarts have been slow due to a significantly more stringent safety inspection and authorization process established after the accident and local court injunctions emerging from ongoing public safety concerns in some regions. Public support for restarts has been growing in Japan recently, however.

Under the current restart process, once regulatory approvals have been granted, the local municipality and prefectural governments are consulted prior to restart. In addition to the 14 reactors already restarted, three more units (namely, the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 6 and Unit 7 and the Tokai Daini unit) have received regulatory approval to restart but have yet to do so. Tohoku Electric Power announced in 2018 that Onagawa Unit 1 would be decommissioned rather than upgraded, but the utility plans to seek approval to restart Onagawa Unit 3. Restarting another 10 units is under regulatory review.

How NATO Can Strengthen Its Ties With The Indo–Pacific – Analysis

Stephen Nagy

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the increased connectivity of war in modern times. Conflict in one part of the world cannot be separated from other regions. In June 2024, North Korea provided at least five million munitions to Russia. And more recently, North Korea sent an estimated 12,000–15,000 troops to fight Ukraine. China has also supported Russia’s illegal war through third countries and by propping up its economy through the purchase of energy.

Former Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida voiced similar concerns at the 2022 Shangri-la Dialogue. In his keynote address to the annual security summit, he warned that ‘today’s Ukraine could be tomorrow’s East Asia’.

For NATO and its Indo–Pacific Four (IP4) allies — Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea — Russia’s invasion serves as a cautionary tale about the potential for aggression from revisionist powers. It has prompted a re-evaluation of military readiness and collective defence strategies. Countries in the region, such as Japan and South Korea, have become acutely aware of the need to strengthen deterrence capabilities.

The situation has also galvanised NATO discussions about the importance of a cohesive response to aggression, emphasising the necessity of solidarity not only in Europe but across the globe. This is based on a convergence in understanding in NATO that ‘unilateral transgressions of the rules-based international order and other unexpected events will have dramatic domino effects all over the world’, requiring a coordinated response.

Escalation Dominance Does Matter

Joe Buff

In a reply to a recent article in Global Security Review, which advocated for American escalation dominance, Katerina Canyon, Executive Director of the Peace Economy Project, challenged the importance of escalation dominance, instead advocating for a reduction in nuclear weapons and an increase in domestic spending. Canyon is wrong on three points: the history of the Cuban Missile Crisis, who started the nuclear arms race, and the need for nuclear cost cutting.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

Canyon begins her article by employing the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of where diplomacy rather than military force carried the day. Her explanation is simple disinformation and misunderstands how nuclear deterrence works.

Early in the crisis, President John F. Kennedy moved nuclear-armed bombers to Air Force bases in Florida, lining them up wing tip to wing tip, as a visible display of the nuclear hell both Cuba and the Soviet Union would face if Nikita Khruschev did not remove nuclear weapons from Cuba. That signal was seen by the Soviets.

President Kennedy also called the then-recent deployment of Minuteman I intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) his “ace in the hole.” He credited his ICBMs with forcing the Soviets to back down. Minuteman I was very much American escalation dominance that the Soviets could not match.

He also implemented a blockade around Cuba. When the Soviet submarine B-59 attempted to run the blockade, the USS Beale depth charged the submarine. Rather than launching its nuclear torpedoes against the Beale, B-59 retreated.

Contrary to Canyon’s assertion that diplomacy carried the day, it was military strength and nuclear superiority that carried the day. General Secretary Khruschev knew that the United States had a superior nuclear arsenal and backed down.


An open letter to Prof Muhammad Yunus

Shekhar Gupta

Respected and dear Prof Yunus,

At the very outset, I am conflicted on whether I should congratulate you or commiserate with you. Usually, one wouldn’t need to qualify such a brilliant ascent to power with a caution. But the challenge of leading a large, populous and still largely poor nation in the Subcontinent cannot be taken lightly.


Nevertheless, congratulations first. When I had the privilege of spending a couple of days with you, at a large philanthropy conference in Hubballi-Dharwad in early 2016, I was awed by your sincerity, gentle manner and yet a firm belief in your ability to master the odds.

In the Walk The Talk episode we recorded, you had told me the story of how Sheikh Hasina had taken away your bank, and you responded by taking your bank overseas.

You refused to take the bait of probably a too-clever-by-half response by me that her government took away your bank, and you took revenge by building one overseas. You said we’re not seeking revenge, but just doing the right thing. I could see then that you were angry, hurting and holding back.

The opportunity came last August in an incredibly dramatic meltdown of the Hasina government. You were brought back from overseas to head the new administration, though you still haven’t given yourself an executive or political title. You’ve stayed with ‘Chief Adviser’, and probably will go with that to Davos later this month.


Russia Is Stepping Up Its Covert War Beyond Ukraine

Bart Schuurman

A masked Russian soldier takes part in a counterterrorism exercise at an Interior Ministry base near Moscow on Sept. 4, 2007.A masked Russian soldier takes part in a counterterrorism exercise at an Interior Ministry base near Moscow on Sept. 4, 2007. 

Just this week, Duma member Alexander Kazakov claimed Russian sabotage in the Baltic Sea was part of a military operation aimed at provoking NATO and enlarging Russia’s control over the area. While events such as the cutting of undersea cables have garnered substantial media attention, no systematic effort has been made to assess the full scope and nature of Russia’s actions against Europe. Analysis from Leiden University exposes how far Russia is willing to go to weaken its European adversaries and isolate Ukraine from vital support. It paints a chilling picture of the potential for Russian escalation below the nuclear threshold—and underlines the need for a concerted and assertive European response, which has been lacking so far.

Can the World Do Anything About Conflict in 2025?

Ravi Agrawal

The new year has begun with a grim sense that there are too many global conflicts and crises happening simultaneously, with many of the old tools of aid, diplomacy, and multilateralism blunted. Every January, Foreign Policy runs “10 Conflicts to Watch,” an essay compiled by the International Crisis Group, an independent body that speaks to all sides and tries to offer advice on preventing and resolving war.

I sat down with the group’s president and CEO, Comfort Ero, to discuss some of the conflicts that get less attention—Sudan, Haiti, and Myanmar, as examples—and to try and understand why it seems the world is less able to deter leaders from escalating crises into war. Subscribers can watch the full discussion on the video box atop this page or listen to the FP Live podcast. What follows here is a lightly edited and condensed transcript.

EU Economy Shows Modest Improvement

Geopolitical Futures

The EU economy is recovering modestly but still faces significant structural adjustments and external pressures. In the third quarter of 2024, gross domestic product grew 0.4 percent compared with the previous three-month period in both the eurozone and the broader EU, fueled by steady domestic consumption and a rebound in international tourism. However, stubborn inflation and tighter European Central Bank policies have eroded consumer purchasing power and curbed borrowing. Ireland and Poland have outpaced other economies, leveraging tech-driven exports and EU-funded infrastructure projects. Meanwhile, Germany and Italy lag due to high energy costs and structural barriers.

The EU’s economic outlook remains clouded by several challenges. Rising energy costs, worsened by the cutoff of Russian gas, are straining industrial economies, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Southern Europe is grappling with high youth unemployment and growing sectoral inequalities, further straining social stability. Global trade uncertainties, including weaker Chinese demand and potential U.S.-EU frictions, are undermining export growth. Efforts like the European Green Deal and the Recovery and Resilience Facility aim to drive sustainable growth, but balanced progress will require tackling inefficiencies and fostering competitiveness across all member states.

US top court leans towards TikTok ban over security concerns

Lily Jamali, North America Technology correspondent , Natalie Sherman, business reporter, & Liv McMahon

The Supreme Court appears poised to uphold a law that bans TikTok in the US over national security concerns unless its China-based parent company sells the platform ahead of a 19 January deadline.

The Court's nine justices heard from lawyers representing TikTok, and content creators that the ban would be a violation of free speech protections for the platform's more than 170 million users in the US.

The US government argued that without a sale, TikTok could be used by China as a tool for spying and political manipulation.

A decision by the top court has to be made within days. President-elect Donald Trump - who returns to the White House in just over a week - now argues against the ban.


The law requires TikTok's parent company ByteDance to sell it in the US or cease operations on 19 January. The company has said it will not sell the short-form video platform.

Congress passed the law with support from both the Democratic and Republican parties - a moment that marked the culmination of years of concern about the widely popular platform, which is known for its viral videos and traction among young people.

The legislation does not forbid use of the app, but would require tech giants such as Apple and Google to stop offering it and inhibit updates, which analysts suggest would kill it over time.

TikTok has repeatedly denied any potential influence by the Chinese Communist Party and has said the law violates the First Amendment free speech rights of its users.

The Coming Fight for Syri

Rob Geist Pinfold

Before sunrise on 8 December 2024, Bashar al-Assad boarded a plane and left the country he had ruled with an iron fist for so long. Curiously, he opted for the longer flight to Moscow rather than the much shorter hop to neighbour and long-term ally Iran.

For many, Assad’s destination was inconsequential. What mattered was that the hated autocrat, who had killed at least 600,000 of his own people, was gone. But concerned pundits tempered the enthusiasm, invoking recent instances where an Arab dictator had fallen to illustrate that Syria’s future was far from bright: looting, instability and violence could be expected to follow. Optimists claimed that this time was different. Syria is not Iraq, nor is it Libya. Syria is Syria. And in Syria, it was not a foreign occupier that made regime change possible. Quite the opposite: this was the product of the Syrian people’s own blood, sweat and tears. They had finally not just removed a home-grown dictator but also freed themselves from Russian and Iranian domination.

Both the optimists and the pessimists are right. This was the Syrian people’s triumph. Likewise, Syria has seen some looting, but nothing like the widespread anarchy after the fall of Saddam Hussein. But pessimists are right to focus on ‘the day after’. Once the celebrations end, Syrians will have to decide what kind of country they want and who should lead it. Yet Syria is not a coherent, unified state. It is made up of multiple armed groups with different goals and foreign backers. Thus, the country’s future – and which external powers will control a significant stake in a post-Assad Syria – will not be a decision that the Syrian people will make alone.
The Former Status Quo

Syria under Assad was neither free nor sovereign. Assad’s rule was brutal, yet his regime did not enjoy the monopoly over power within Syria’s borders that is a necessary component of statehood. Before Assad’s fall, the country was de facto partitioned: the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) held eastern Syria, the Islamist Hayut Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ruled the northern Idlib province, and the Syrian National Army (SNA) was sandwiched between SDF and HTS-controlled territory. Even in areas Assad nominally controlled, such as the southern Daraa province, in practice it was local militias from the Southern Front (SF), whose loyalty flipped between the rebels and the regime, who really called the shots.

The Wars That Could Define The Donald Trump Presidency

Michael Rubin

Almost every president since the end of the Cold War had his foreign policy legacy defined by a war no one could have foreseen. For George H.W. Bush, it was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Bill Clinton sought to deflect Bush’s 90 percent popularity after the successful 100-hour ground war by focusing on bread-and-butter issues. In 1992, Clinton campaign consultant James Carville summarized the strategy with the famous quip, “It’s the economy, stupid.” Clinton genuinely hoped to focus on the economy. He extricated U.S. forces from Somalia following the “Black Hawk Down” incident but found himself drawn first into Bosnia and then more reluctantly into Kosovo. George W. Bush, too, sought to be a domestic president but, after the 9/11 attacks, ordered U.S. forces into Afghanistan and, more controversially, into Iraq. Barack Obama pledged to end “dumb war[s],” but not only remained in Afghanistan and returned to Iraq but then involved the United States in Syria and Libya.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dominated the Biden administration’s foreign policy. Joe Biden did not send U.S. forces into the theater, but he did provide Ukraine with weaponry and other forms of support for their war effort. For all his talk about his genuine interest in Africa, Biden has paid little attention to the world’s deadliest conflict, the civil war in Sudan. He staked out the middle ground in the Israel-Hamas conflict, meddling diplomatically and virtue signaling with humanitarian schemes while otherwise standing largely aloof. Biden also claimed to be “the first president in this century to report to the American people that the United States is not at war anywhere in the world.” However, he omitted U.S. involvement off the coast of Yemen.

While the COVID-19 Pandemic overshadowed Donald Trump’s first term (thanks to a Chinese lab leak), he is correct in saying that he did not involve the United States in new wars. His second term will likely not be so placid.

Several wars loom, all of which could impact Trump’s legacy, whether he chooses to involve himself or not.

Turkey And Syria Vs. The Kurds

After Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Turkish-sponsored Sunni Islamist group that previously aligned with Al Qaeda rampaged through Syria and ended Bashar al-Assad’s dynasty after nearly a quarter-century. Trump celebrated. “I think Turkey is very smart...Turkey did an unfriendly takeover, without a lot of lives being lost,” he said.

The US Army needs less good, cheaper drones to compete


IN UKRAINE BOTH sides are deploying millions of low-cost drones, which play a role in combat as both scouts and weapons. The US Army, long considered a leader in this field, has been following events in Ukraine closely. But the Pentagon is acquiring only small numbers of drones at high cost. Why are American drones so expensive, and can prices be brought down?

A typical FPV (“first-person view”) attack drone costs Ukraine’s army less than $500. Based on racing quadcopters, these are typically made by small suppliers. Some are assembled at kitchen tables through a government initiative which shows people how to make drones at home. Though rough and ready, they can knock out a Russian tank, artillery piece or bunker from several miles away.

The nearest American equivalent is the Marine Corps’ new Bolt-M made by Anduril. This is a slicker, more polished quadcopter with more on-board intelligence and requiring less operator skill, but it performs the same basic task of hitting a target with a 1.5kg warhead. The cost though is “low tens of thousands” of dollars. The similar Rogue-1 comes in at an eye-watering $94,000 apiece. In Ukraine, FPVs are so numerous that two or more may pursue each Russian footsoldier. The US cannot issue drones quite so lavishly when each costs as much as a sports car.

Trump vs. the Military

Ronald R. Krebs 

During his successful 2024 reelection campaign, incoming U.S. President Donald Trump promised to purge the military of “woke” generals. Soon after his November victory, The Wall Street Journal reported that his transition team had drafted an executive order to establish a so-called warrior board of retired senior military officers tasked with identifying serving generals and admirals who ought to be dismissed. In the meantime, according to other media reports, Trump’s team has been drawing up its own list of generals to remove from their posts and perhaps even court-martial.

The great paradox: strategic thinking in an unstrategic world

Harlan Ullman

Jan. 8 (UPI) -- Much of my 2025 will be devoted to co-authoring a book with my great English friend, David Richards. The title is The Great Paradox: Strategic Thinking in an Unstrategic World. Richards' more formal title is General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux, a peerage conferred for his long and distinguished service culminating as chief of the U.K. Defense Staff, equivalent to the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

David and I first met more than 20 years ago in Kabul, where he was commanding NATO's International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan. His views on dealing with the Taliban based on reconciliation at the tribal level conflicted somewhat with NATO and U.S. doctrine. Sadly, David would be proven correct.

One of the reasons for this book was the dramatic failings and failures of government, both democratic and autocratic. Whether one loved or hated presidents Joe Biden and Donald Trump, some 80% of Americans believed the United State was headed in the wrong direction. A similarly large proportion had lost trust and confidence in government and most institutions, even in the private sector. And America's $36 trillion debt is nearly 1 1/2 times GDP -- an economically unsustainable level.

The U.K. had gone through a string of Tory prime ministers. Despite the victory of Labor in the last election, it has not fared much better in governing. Germany and France are in political disarray. And South Korea is running out of presidents to impeach.

Behind the Curtain: The information gods

Jim VandeHei, Mike Allen

Three massive, concurrent tectonic shifts are reordering in dramatic ways how America and the world will get, and consume, information in the years ahead:Trust in traditional media is vanishing.

Where people are getting information instead has shattered into dozens of ecosystems.
The world's most powerful social platforms — X, Facebook, Instagram — no longer police speech or information.

Why it matters: In this new information world order, the people with the largest platforms and followings hold more power than ever in shaping reality. That's a seismic shift in how realities are formed in real time.

Meta's decision to dial back fact-checking, announced Tuesday, captures the sea change.A few short years ago, Twitter (before it was X), Facebook and Instagram had robust teams monitoring news and information — and pulling down posts that were hateful or deemed fake or misinformation. On top of that, news organizations had more credibility than today — allowing them both to expose misinformation, and also help correct it for the public.
Now, the platforms' fact-checking teams have been dismantled, and traditional media is more delegitimized with a lot of consumers.

While that was happening, the common window through which most Americans learned about the country and the world — TV, newspapers, radio — was shattered into dozens of shards of glass, based on consumer's personal preferences.So as President-elect Trump — a huge beneficiary of this new reality — takes office, the way we get informed has been upended in ways most have not fully reckoned with.

1,200,000 Drones: Ukraine’s Unmanned Weapons are Transforming Warfare

David Hambling

Key Points and Summary: Ukraine’s drone warfare has reached unprecedented heights, with 1.2 million drones produced in 2024 alone. Key components include FPV kamikaze drones, reconnaissance quadcopters, and long-range strike UAVs like the Lyutyy, which boasts a 600-mile range.

-FPVs dominate Ukraine’s arsenal, making up over 90% of production and proving critical in anti-armor roles. Heavy bombers, hybrid drones, and fixed-wing UAVs offer flexibility for reconnaissance, precision strikes, and deep-target missions.

-Ukraine’s innovative drone strategies, driven by evolving technology and battlefield demand, are reshaping modern warfare and providing a blueprint for nations like the U.S. to update their drone forces.

Ukraine Reveals Drone Order of Battle

Large numbers of small drones have become a key component in Ukraine’s ground war. This development was formalized last year with the establishment of the Unmanned Systems Forces as a separate branch of the armed services, a move later copied by Moscow.

But the exact makeup of this force is a mystery. We know the composition of an armored battalion in terms of tanks, IFVs, artillery, and other hardware, but no information has been released on the uncrewed equivalent – until now.

Figures released last month by Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense give the total production of drones for 2024, providing insight into the proportions of different drones deployed. The total for the year is a staggering 1.2 million drones, the vast majority being small FPV kamikazes.

This is not a complete account of Ukraine’s drones. At the start of the war, before the military appreciated the value of these types, volunteers and fundraising groups supplied drones direct to army units, bypassing the military procurement process. This activity continues on an impressive scale. Fundraiser Serhii Sternenko has organized drives supplying more than 133,000 FPVs over the course of the war – that’s more drones than any NATO army possesses.

A No-Brainer for Global Growth and US Jobs

JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ and MARK WEISBROT

In August 2021, the International Monetary Fund issued $209 billion to developing countries in the form of special drawing rights (the IMF’s reserve asset). SDRs are much like cash, because recipient governments can convert them to hard currency. As such, they are a highly effective tool, and the IMF can and should make greater use of them.

While the 2021 issuance helped billions of people around the world, hundreds of thousands of Americans also benefited – and would do so again. Exports of US goods and services to developing countries total around $1 trillion, and if these countries get an infusion of reserves, they will import even more.

This effect can be quite significant. An SDR distribution the size of the 2021 issuance would be expected to create about as many jobs in the United States in one year as the $740 billion Inflation Reduction Act did in its first year. We are talking, conservatively, about 111,000-191,000 new jobs, most of which would be in export-related areas such as manufacturing, transportation, and warehousing.


HOW TO TRANSFORM THE ARMY FOR DRONE WARFARE

Neil Hollenbeck 

That the U.S. Army needs to adapt to drone warfare is obvious. The best institutional mechanism to do that is not.

Since 2022, Ukraine has led the world in the integration of aerial drones into large-scale ground combat operations. Unfortunately, Russia has been a fast follower. Both armies are using drones within traditional infantry, tank, and artillery formations, while also creating new drone warfare organizations. That the U.S. Army needs to adapt to drone warfare is obvious. The best institutional mechanism to do that is not. But there are some in Congress who are ready to make the decision for the Army now.

U.S. House Resolution 8070, passed in June 2024, included a provision establishing a Drone Corps as a basic branch of the U.S. Army. Chief of Staff of the Army General Randy George expressed opposition, arguing drones should be integrated into existing formations, not consolidated in a separate branch. The provision was not included in the final version of the bill.

How to organize the Army for adaptation to drone warfare could be the most important decision Army senior leaders make in the next few years. There are two ways to get it wrong. One would be to treat drones as an entirely new arm, to be developed and employed independently. The other would be to treat drones as tools to help other arms do what they already do better. With the airplane and the tank—the most disruptive weapons that were maturing during this same decade in the last century—the Army got it wrong in both ways.

The U.S. Army purchased the world’s first military aircraft in 1909. By the 1920s, the Army had established aviation as a separate arm, which, with strong congressional support, grew increasingly independent. As a result, air capabilities developed quickly, according to entirely new warfighting concepts. But airpower became unmoored from land power, if not from reality. Army aviators came to view airplanes as war-winners in their own right. That vision was never realized, and poor air-ground integration plagued the Army throughout World War II.

The Race to Lead the Quantum Future

Charina Chou, James Manyika, and Hartmut Neven

Over the last several years, as rapid advances in artificial intelligence have gained enormous public attention and critical scrutiny, another crucial technology has been evolving largely out of public view. Once confined to the province of abstract theory, quantum computing seeks to use operations based on quantum mechanics to crack computational problems that were previously considered unsolvable. Although the technology is still in its infancy, it is already clear that quantum computing could have profound implications for national security and the global economy in the decades to come.

Since the late 2010s, the United States and many other advanced countries have become increasingly involved in the race for leadership in quantum information science and technology, a field that encompasses quantum computing, quantum communications, and quantum sensing. Over the last decade, governments in 20 countries have announced investments in quantum development totaling more than $40 billion worldwide; China alone has committed to spend $15.3 billion over five years. In 2016, Beijing designated the development of quantum technologies as a national priority, and it has created advanced hubs for production. For its part, the United States, in 2018, enacted the National Quantum Initiative, legislation aimed at maintaining the country’s technological and scientific lead in quantum information and its applications. The U.S. government has announced $3.7 billion in unclassified funding, plus more funding for defense research and development. In addition to government-led initiatives, multiple research and development efforts are underway in the private sector and academia.

Although these investments are still dwarfed by U.S. and international funding for AI, the rise of quantum technology has already begun to shape international policy. In 2019, the United States announced a bilateral “statement on quantum cooperation” with Japan, which the U.S. government strengthened in 2023. And in 2024, Washington established a multilateral initiative called the Quantum Development Group to coordinate strategies for advancing and managing the new technology. The United States has also discussed quantum issues within various economic and security forums, including AUKUS, the trilateral defense pact among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; the Quad, or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States; and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council. Underscoring the growing concerns about the technology in Washington, one analyst for the Center for a New American Security argued in November, following the U.S. presidential election, that the incoming administration must “act quickly during the first 100 days to reinvigorate America’s quantum competitiveness.”

Gambling with Strategy: How Poker Theory Can Help Transform the Irregular Warfare Decision-Making Landscape

Micah Smith 

In the realms of irregular warfare, financial markets, and high-stakes poker, decision-makers navigate environments defined by ambiguity and contested advantage. Whether a military commander operates in the gray zone, a trader positions through market uncertainties, or a poker professional exploits subtle edges, success depends on optimal decision-making with incomplete information while facing adaptive opponents. Modern irregular warfare extends beyond traditional operations into competition and deterrence, where actions and intentions remain deliberately ambiguous—much like the strategic concealment and revelation of information in both poker and financial markets.

It isn't just a game; it's a battlefield of wits, strategy, and calculated risks. From smoky saloons in the Old West to online tournaments with players spanning the globe, poker has transformed from a game of chance into a science where the best players leverage mathematics and psychology to outwit their opponents. Similarly, irregular warfare has evolved beyond traditional conflict into a complex spectrum of competition and deterrence, while financial markets have progressed from simple exchange floors to sophisticated algorithmic trading environments. Mastering strategic decision-making in these uncertain domains requires understanding how theories of optimal play, risk management, and adaptation apply across all competitive spaces. The evolution of strategic theory, particularly through game theory and mathematical optimization, illuminates parallel developments across military and market strategy - three domains where practitioners must master the art of decision-making in environments where nothing is certain and everything is contested.

The Origins of Poker as Strategic Competition

Poker comes in many variations, from 4-card Omaha to PLO 8 or better, 7-card stud, razz, and no-limit hold'em. While the rules differ, the fundamental principle remains constant: exploiting opponents' mistakes for advantage. This mirrors the varied domains of irregular warfare – which has all the complexities of traditional warfare but with an asymmetry of at least one irregular actor; these span from information operations to full proxy conflicts - and the diverse instruments of financial markets, from derivatives to currencies to commodities. All three domains operate on the principle of strategic competition, where success depends on exploiting adversary weaknesses while protecting against exploitation of one's own.

Soldiers are turning to social media when the chain of command falls short. The Army sees it as a nuisance.

Patty Nieberg

When trash bins overflowed at Fort Liberty and continued to pile up for weeks last winter, soldiers at the North Carolina Army base sent photos to a soldier-run Instagram account to highlight the unsightly issue. Comments flooded in, many of them jokes at the Army’s expense. Within days of that initial social media post, which prompted news coverage, base officials responded and the garbage was removed.

The de facto smoke pit of the digital era, social media in the military has long been a gathering place for service members and veterans. But it’s also a tool of last resort for rank-and-file troops who feel that the only way to fix a problem they’re facing is to post about it publicly and break with a longstanding cultural norm in the military to keep issues in-house.

The Army, as an institution, has seen social media as a crucial recruiting tool in recent years, but when it comes to how the branch uses these platforms to engage with its own members, some current and former soldiers say the strategy is unclear at best and adversarial at worst. Recently, Army leaders have been reluctant to embrace newer forms of media as a way to receive feedback from soldiers. Instead, the preference, and oft-repeated talking point, has been that soldiers should run their problems through their chain of command.

Where Army leaders are missing the mark, critics say, is in not asking why some soldiers today feel they need to raise these concerns in online forums like Reddit, or community pages on Facebook and Instagram, and on other platforms and apps.

Communities like U.S Army W.T.F! Moments, whose Facebook page boasts a digital audience of 1.6 million followers and more than 2 million daily viewers, and the Army and Military Reddit forums, with audiences of 315,000 and 488,000 members, respectively, “would not be needed if the official channels worked,” said Ken Ramos, a retired psychological operations sergeant major and admin for U.S Army W.T.F! Moments.