Indian Strategic Studies: 01/09/25

9 January 2025

What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding?

Mariel Ferragamo

Introduction

The countries that comprise BRICS—which stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, and now five new members—are an informal grouping of emerging economies hoping to increase their sway in the global order. Established in 2009, BRICS was founded on the premise that international institutions were overly dominated by Western powers and had ceased to serve developing countries. The bloc has sought to coordinate its members’ economic and diplomatic policies, found new financial institutions, and reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar.

However, BRICS has struggled with internal divisions on a range of issues, including relations with the United States and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, its growing membership is both expanding its clout and introducing new tensions. Although some analysts warn that the bloc could undermine the Western-led international order, skeptics say its ambitions to create its own currency and develop a workable alternative to existing institutions face potentially insurmountable challenges.

Why does BRICS matter?

The coalition is not a formal organization, but rather a loose bloc of non-Western economies that coordinate economic and diplomatic efforts around a shared goal. BRICS countries seek to build an alternative to what they see as the dominance of the Western viewpoint in major multilateral groupings, such as the World Bank, the Group of Seven (G7), and the UN Security Council.

England’s Pakistani Rape Gangs Will Evade National Inquiry

Graham Barnfield

Keir Starmer’s Labour government is under fire for its refusal to set up a national inquiry into the phenomenon of so-called grooming gangs—organised rapists operating across multiple British towns.

Tesla and X CEO Elon Musk has amplified the row, claiming Jess Phillips MP “deserves to be in prison” over the “disgraceful” decision. Correspondence shows Phillips, the Home Office’s parliamentary under-secretary of state for safeguarding—who is responsible for addressing violence against women and girls—rejected calls for a government investigation into ‘historic’ sex abuse in Oldham, Greater Manchester, that would have the power to compel witnesses to testify.

Instead, Phillips has stated that the decision to conduct such an inquiry should remain the sole responsibility of the municipal authority requesting it. In effect, by trying to keep it local, Labour is blocking a public reckoning with Starmer’s role as the head of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) during its investigation of the Oldham child grooming scandal.

To an already angry electorate, this is no mere administrative technicality. At least as far back as 2012, when Starmer was the director of public prosecutions (DPP) running the CPS, whistleblowers claimed they were told that no action should be taken because of the ethnic origin of the alleged perpetrators, in the name of ‘maintaining good community relations.’ This echoes similar events in other towns, including Rochdale, Rotherham and Telford.

The ISIS Threat Never Left

Matthew Continetti

New Year's terror in New Orleans: 14 people dead and dozens wounded after a 42-year-old man drove a rented pickup into a celebratory crowd on Bourbon Street. Police killed the terrorist in a shootout before he could wreak further havoc. The truck bore an ISIS flag, the banner of the global jihad. In a cruel irony, revelers had gathered to welcome a new beginning. The attack was a horrible reminder of ancient evils and enduring threats.

At such moments our attention turns inward. The media provide updates, profile victims, and explore how the assailant, U.S. citizen and Army veteran Shamsud-Din Jabbar of Houston, Texas, became a radical Islamist. It's tempting to fixate on Jabbar's crooked path to mass murder while neglecting the broader movement to which he belonged. Such temptations should be avoided. What happened in New Orleans was larger than one man's pathology. It was the latest atrocity committed in the name of a sick ideology.

Terrorist alliance formation: the case of Islamic State and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in Balochistan (Pakistan)

Khurram Shahzad Siddiqui

Introduction

The modern terrorist landscape is defined by terrorist groups, especially Al Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS) affiliates, like Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which are at the core of alliance networks. These terrorist organizations can accumulate and share the benefits of such alliances with their allies, enhancing their ‘lethality, longevity, and resilience’. This makes alliances with a core group at the center of the network more significant than others.Footnote1 It is particularly true about ISIS affiliates. After the loss of its territory, which began in 2015 owing to military operations in Iraq and Syria, the ISIS core primarily relied upon lethal attacks by its affiliates abroad targeting civilians and aimed to exploit ethnic/sectarian conflicts and social or political divisions.Footnote2 James A. Piazza & Michael J. Soules concluded, ‘as ISIS lost its caliphate, it internationalized its profile’.Footnote3 One of the lethal affiliates of ISIS, namely ISKP, exists in the Af-Pak (Afghanistan-Pakistan) region. Colin P. Clarke asserts that as the core of ISIS weakened, the affiliate organizations [like ISKP] could operate more independently and with greater lethality.Footnote4 A contemporary lethal alliance hub of ISKPFootnote5 exists in Balochistan province, which can be safely termed as a focal point in the South Asian terrorist landscape because it directly targets and has severe consequences for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), worth around $62 billion, the flagship project of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).Footnote6

The 2023 Strategic Posture Commission Report From a Japanese Perspective

Masashi Murano

Introduction

U.S. allies are interested in America’s strategic posture because it has a direct bearing on the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees. The 2023 Strategic Posture Commission report comprehensively addresses the qualitative and quantitative efforts needed by the United States to address China and Russia, i.e., the two-nuclear-peer problem. Its recommendations support strengthening the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region—a conclusion that would have been positively received had it been emphasized in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).

While generally supportive of many of the Commission’s recommendations, this paper provides a complementary argument for improving the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region from a Japanese perspective and an alternative option that differs slightly from the Commission’s recommendations.

'America First' meets Greenland, Taiwan, and the Panama Canal

Joanna Rozpedowski

As the incoming Trump administration prepares to take office on January 20, 2025, a recalibration of U.S. foreign policy priorities and broader national strategy goals is already underway. Advocates of realism and restraint welcome Trump’s emphasis on a foreign policy that prioritizes pragmatism and “peace through strength” over ideological moralism, even while liberal internationalists fear the effects of “America First” policy on multilateral alliances.

Both sides recognize, however, a need for a prudent shift from crippling foreign policy misadventures and ideational stagnation to a bold U.S. foreign policy vision in all theaters of potential competition.

Among the constellation of apparent global security hotspots, three seemingly disparate locations — Taiwan, Greenland, and the Panama Canal — have emerged as serious contenders in the geopolitical realignment of interstate competition over resources, trade and shipping routes, and political-military dominance, becoming the recent focus of President-elect Trump’s typically boisterous social media posts over the holidays.

China-Vietnam dialogue won’t change a thing in South China Sea - Opinion

Rahul Mishra and Harshit Prajapati

In early December, China and Vietnam convened their first-ever “3+3 strategic dialogue“—a mechanism unprecedented in both nations’ diplomacy.

Built on the three pillars of defense, diplomacy and public security, the dialogue was held at the vice-ministerial level just before the 16th meeting of the China-Vietnam Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation.

This new dialogue underscores the respective anxieties of the two neighbors, which are deeply entangled in territorial and resource disputes in the contested Spratly and Paracel Island chains in an increasingly fluid global geostrategic landscape.

Vietnam is known to be concerned that Trump’s tariff war might shift focus from China to itself amid speculation it often serves as a transshipment site for what are really Chinese-made goods. At the same time, Hanoi is wary of China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea.

For its part, China is seeking to prevent South China Sea disputes from spiraling out of its control and is aiming to preemptively neutralize potential US exploitation of the situation.

Contrary to perceptions that the new 3+3 dialogue signifies Vietnam’s alignment with China, seasoned observers see the mechanism as a pragmatic response to overlapping interests rather than a hierarchical shift in Vietnam’s foreign policy.

‘The Taiwan Story: How a Small Island Will Dictate the Global Future’

John West

Among the most complex foreign policy challenges facing President Donald Trump following his inauguration on 20 January will be relations with China and the U.S.’s position relative to Taiwan.

Perhaps no better book informs political debate and public opinion than Kerry Brown’s The Taiwan Story: How a small island will dictate the global future (Viking, 2024). Brown is a prolific author of books on Chinese politics, currently based at King’s College, London, following a stint at the University of Sydney.

The Taiwan Story begins with the Chinese Civil War (1945–49), in which Mao Zedong’s communists ousted Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists from the mainland and establish the People’s Republic of China. Chiang’s forces retreated to the island of Taiwan as the Republic of China. The U.S. government sided with the Republic of China, with which it maintained diplomatic relations, not recognising Beijing.

The story evolves when the U.S. switches recognition from Taipei to Beijing, following the 1972 visit to China by U.S. President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger. Thus began the U.S. ‘acknowledgement’ of the one-China policy. According to the Shanghai Communique of 1972, ‘the United States acknowledges that Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.’

Under the Microscope : China’s Evolving Biotechnology Ecosystem

Nadège Rolland

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This essay highlights China’s strategic goals and long-term investments, addresses how these support the foundational work and infrastructure that will drive future discoveries, and examines research in multiple areas that have made tremendous gains—including genomics, bioinformatics, and brain research.

MAIN ARGUMENT

Academia, research, and commerce are becoming the new “geopolitical battlespace” in the U.S.-China technology rivalry, and fields such as biotechnology are the new front in this competition. It will be essential for the U.S., its allies, and other like-minded countries to design a strategy that reflects the values of open democratic societies.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The U.S. needs to invest strategically in the bioeconomy. The early stages of development will be most important for government support and policies. These “first mover” advantages are critical to making new discoveries, and the failure to support nascent industries may produce “chokepoint” ingredients or data for technology development that fast followers cannot recover from.
The U.S. and like-minded countries need to drive policies that govern the use and storage of genomic data, genomic editing, and animal models that reflect the values of open democratic societies. These policies should include a re-examining of the “biological rules of the road” that includes the sharing of clinical and environmental samples, genomic data, and testing results.

The Houthis Are Undeterred

Beth Sanner and Jennifer Kavanagh

The U.S. mission to deter and degrade the Houthis is not working. In the last week of 2024, the militant group launched a new wave of missile and drone attacks on Israel and shipping lanes in the Red Sea which led to strikes by the United States on military targets on the coast of Yemen. All told, in December alone, the Houthis fired on several U.S. Navy and merchant ships, and conducted ten drone and missile attacks on Israel. Israel and the United States retaliated five times in total, knocking out port and energy infrastructure and Houthi military positions, but the Houthis continue to fire back. In the process, friendly fire brought down a U.S. FA-18 fighter jet, thankfully sparing its crew. This cost-benefit ratio is not sustainable. Houthi operations and ambitions have not been seriously eroded, but U.S. military readiness and reputation have. Washington needs a new strategy, one that is focused on the sources of the Houthis’ growing power and not simply on its symptoms on display in the Red Sea.

Just over a year ago, in December 2023, Washington established a multinational operation to defend merchant ships and restore freedom of navigation in the wake of Houthi attacks that threatened some 12 percent of global shipping transiting through a chokepoint known as the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The Houthis maintain that their aim is forcing Israel to end its war in Gaza, but they have indiscriminately targeted international shipping. After a United Nations Security Council resolution—adopted last January, though China and Russia abstained—failed to stop the Houthi campaign, Washington and London added an offensive dimension, Operation Poseidon Archer, to erode Houthi military capabilities. These U.S.-led operations, however, received little support from partners inside and outside the region—not even from those hurt the most. All the while, Russian and Chinese flagged ships, the illicit traders serving these nations, and Iran sail largely unbothered after paying or negotiating for safe passage.

Ian Bremmer’s Top Risks for 2025

Willis Sparks

Every January, Eurasia Group, our parent company, produces a report with its forecast for the Top 10 Risks for the world in the year ahead. Its authors are EG President Ian Bremmer and EG Chairman Cliff Kupchan.

Here are brief summaries of the most important risks that will preoccupy world leaders, business decision-makers, and the rest of us in 2025, according to Bremmer and Kupchan. You can read the full report here.

1. The G-Zero wins

A G-Zero world is an era when no one power or group of powers is both willing and able to drive a global agenda and maintain international order. We’ve been living with this lack of international leadership for nearly a decade now. But in 2025, the problem will get a lot worse.

Bremmer and Kupchan argue that we should expect new and expanding power vacuums, emboldened rogue actors, and a heightened risk of dangerous accidents, miscalculations, and conflict. The risk of a geopolitical crisis, they warn, “is higher than at any point in our lifetimes.”

Bracing For Hurricane Trump In 2025 – Analysis

Yves Tiberghien

Over the past five years, the Indo-Pacific has witnessed intensifying great power competition and a series of social and political disruptions, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the ripple effects of conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. The coming of an unconstrained and revolutionary Donald Trump 2.0 administration is likely to trigger even more disruption.

Ultimately, it will be the choices made by China in response to the opening salvos of the Trump 2.0 administration, as well as the constraining and balancing choices made by large middle powers in the region that will define the outcomes in 2025.

Events are driven by the confluence of three trends — the shift from a unipolar world to a hybrid bipolar and multipolar world; the exhaustion of the liberal globalisation experiment; and the disruptive pressures stemming from the shocks of climate change, green tech and the AI revolution.

These trends have turned the United States — the superpower at the heart of the current global order — into an insurgent against the system it created. After seven decades building a tight economic and security order that delivered prosperity and freedom for an ever-growing majority, the United States is now bent on destroying key pillars of that order.

Red Sea Attacks Are Testing Combat Information Centers Aboard U.S. Navy Warships Like Never Before

Geoff Ziezulewicz

The Combat Information Center (CIC) is the nerve center and tactical brain of a U.S. Navy surface combatant. These high-tech floating command centers and their watchstanders have been put to the test over the last year, unlike any other time in history, as missile and drone barrages from Houthi rebels in Yemen have plagued the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. With this in mind, TWZ spoke with multiple surface warfare officers (SWOs) about the realities sailors face when fighting their ship from within the CIC, including what factors come into play, what mistakes can arise during tense, time sensitive engagements, and the effects of being on patrol in a free-fire zone for months on end.

Cocooned within the ship, amongst the dimly lit CIC packed with glowing screens, are between 10 and 20 sailors on watch at any given time. Led by a tactical action officer (TAO), they track all threats and movements in the region around the ship. A CIC’s air warfare watchstanders might flag an inbound Houthi missile and approve firing orders to other ship combat systems, while others are scanning the rest of the sky, correlating electronic warfare signals, tracking other surface vessels and watching out for submarines. CICs also keep in constant communication with other Navy vessels and aircraft in the area via various datalink systems, sharing sensor data and coordinating actions. The CIC works closely with the bridge to best move the ship to its most survivable or advantageous position at any given time as well.

Ukraine’s renewed Kursk push flops as talk of negotiation swirls

Stephen Bryen

A so-called Ramstein format meeting – that’s an informal name of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, comprised of Kyiv and allies – will take place in Germany on January 9th. The meeting format addresses Ukraine’s defense needs. Ukrainian President Zelensky will attend and the US side will be headed by outgoing Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

In two weeks Donald Trump will be the US president. It isn’t clear if the meeting is designed to undermine Trump and his administration, but it’s a good bet that Austin and Zelensky hope to put in place decisions that will be hard for Trump to reverse.

This is not surprising as the outgoing Biden administration is running a sabotage operation across the board, trying to hobble Trump before he gets into the White House. Thus the administration has dumped new billions into Ukraine, both funding for weapons and cash for the government, and it is likely even more risky decisions may emerge from the meeting.

There are no reports that any representatives of the Trump camp were invited to audit the Ramstein meeting, and it is unlikely they would want to attend.

Vulgarity, crime, rapes, coarsening of public life, liberal England is gone

Kevin Myers

This year sees the ninetieth anniversary of the publication of a book called The Strange Death of Liberal England by the Anglo-American historian George Dangerfield. Though the title was referring to the British Liberal Party before the outbreak of the First World War, in a broader sense it implied the correlated values of a more general political philosophy, including the germs of the recently-born welfare state. So, far from dying, this new liberalism would over the coming decades infiltrate and colonise almost all British political parties. Even as the British Empire continued to expand after the war, these values remained a powerful vector for those that governed Britain: of the power of reason, of negotiation, of law, of accepting people – even opponents – at face value. More than anything else, it spoke of a gentlemanly optimism that could always detect a glimmer of light at the end of the longest tunnel. It was this spirit that enabled the British people to survive the bloodshed and impoverishment of two world wars, the second of which destroyed the remains of the Empire and saddled unborn generations with a self-replicating debt mountain which, in coded debentures, probably remains concealed in British current accounts to this day. The main point was that the British spirit, with its English core, rather resembled a buoyantly liberal plastic duck, for it always righted itself.

There was a moral continuum that co-existed with some of the worst of the late-imperial atrocities in Palestine, Cyprus and Kenya. Throughout there was always a voice of decency that spoke of a good England that stood for honour, and uprightness, and duty. The men and women who embodied these values were never numerous, but they were there, and they were audible, if only barely, the voice of conscience that spoke to others, an echoing morality that ensured that all was not quite lost.

America Cannot Surrender Its AI Dominance

Robert C. O’Brien

The twenty-first century will be defined by the great power competition between the United States and China. The winner of that competition will likely be the nation that dominates the tech sector. During his first term, President Donald Trump defeated Communist China’s effort to control the global 5G market by installing Huawei as essentially the world’s sole telecommunications provider.

Huawei did not take its loss lying down. The company took advantage of four years of Biden administration weakness to reconstitute as an Artificial Intelligence (AI) enterprise. Now, like it attempted to do with 5G, China seeks to make the rest of the world reliant on Huawei’s AI technology. As the great Yogi Berra once said, “It’s Déjà Vu all over again.”

President-elect Trump is about to take office again with a plan for an unprecedented era of American economic prosperity. But on its way out the door, the Biden administration is trying to hamstring Trump while giving Communist China a gift in the form of the Interim Final Rule on “Export Control Framework for AI Diffusion.” This proposed rule would create a global export control regime on AI and related hardware that has been on the market for years. This regime would restrict free commerce by preventing U.S. companies from freely selling mainstream AI hardware and software to American partners and allies abroad.

Canada Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to Step Down as Leader of Liberal Party. What to Know

Chad de Guzman and Nik Popli

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is stepping down as the leader of the ruling Liberal Party, following months of pressure from partymates to resign amid increasingly poor public approval ratings.

"I intend to resign as party leader as prime minister, after the party selects its next leader through a robust, nationwide competitive process," Trudeau said at a press conference Monday morning outside of his home in Ottawa. “This country deserves a real choice in the next election and it has become clear to me that if I’m having to fight internal battles I cannot be the best option in that election.”

The Globe and Mail first reported on Sunday that Trudeau would leave his party leadership post this week ahead of a key party caucus on Wednesday, citing three unnamed sources. (Reuters also reported Trudeau’s impending resignation, citing an unnamed source.)

Trudeau on Monday confirmed that he would remain in office as both Liberal Party leader and Prime Minister until a replacement is selected, meaning he will lead Canada during the early months of Donald Trump’s presidency, including navigating tense trade negotiations and potential tariff threats from the United States. Trudeau announced that Canada’s Parliament would be suspended until March 24 to give his Liberal Party time to choose a new leader.

The Strange Triumph of a Broken America

Michael Beckley

By all appearances, the United States is a mess. Two-thirds of Americans believe the country is on the wrong track, and nearly 70 percent rate the economy as “not good” or “poor.” Public trust in government has fallen by half, from 40 percent in 2000 to just 20 percent today. Love of country is fading, too, with only 38 percent of Americans now saying patriotism is “very important” to them, down from 70 percent in 2000. Congressional polarization has reached its highest point since Reconstruction, and threats of violence against politicians have surged. Former U.S. President Donald Trump faced two assassination attempts en route to reclaiming the White House, winning the popular vote even though many Americans believe he’s a fascist. Some scholars draw parallels between the United States and Weimar Germany. Others liken the United States to the Soviet Union in its final years—a brittle gerontocracy rotting from within. Still others argue that the country is on the brink of civil war.

Yet such undeniable American dysfunction has had remarkably little effect on American power, which remains resilient and, in some respects, has even grown. The country’s share of global wealth is about as large as it was in the 1990s, and its grip on global arteries—energy, finance, markets, and technology—has strengthened. Internationally, the United States is gaining allies, whereas its main adversaries, China and Russia, are increasingly embattled. Inflation, massive debt, and sluggish productivity remain serious concerns, but they pale in comparison to the economic and demographic headwinds facing other great powers.

Russia's Coming Economic Crisis May Help Trump End the Ukraine War | Opinion

Ariel Cohen

The incoming Trump administration doubtless wants a strong hand to begin negotiating with Russia on peace with Ukraine. Moscow is providing an opening with its precarious economic situation. Despite Putin's chipper tone in his annual marathon press conference on Dec. 19, in which he challenged the West to a "high-tech duel" over Kyiv, critics raised questions about his grip on reality. His multi-billion-dollar spending on his war on Ukraine is unsustainable, and Russia's economic situation is getting worse. Ursula van der Leyen, EU Commission president, has suggested to President-elect Donald Trump to replace Russian LNG with imports from the U.S. The Kremlin would lose $ 12 billion as a result.

Russia's soaring inflation, capital flight, and exodus of oligarchs—may cause a painful recession in 2025. The Trump administration should not rush to negotiate with the Kremlin. Instead, it should let Russia's pending economic crisis play out. Strategic patience will likely soften Moscow's position and ensure better outcomes.

Since the war began in 2022, Russia has defied ominous predictions of collapse. Despite Western economic sanctions, the nation's economy—boosted by massive currency reserves—has proved stronger than expected during the three years of war. After an initial 2.1 percent decline in GDP in 2022, the number rose to 3 percent to 4 percent in 2023. This year, the government forecasts a 3.9 percent expansion.

Narrative Intelligence in Internet-Based Military Information Support Operations: A Cyberpsychology Perspective Under the Irregular Warfare Construct

Troy Troublefield, DBA, PhD

Introduction

The rapid proliferation of the internet and social media has transformed the landscape of information warfare, presenting new challenges and opportunities for MISO. In this digital age, misinformation has emerged as a significant threat, undermining the integrity of information and eroding trust in institutions. As irregular warfare (IW) increasingly moves into the cyber domain, the need for effective strategies to counter misinformation has become paramount. Therefore, the conceptualization of narrative intelligence as a critical tool in internet-based MISO will be explored by drawing upon the principles of cyberpsychology to inform narrative strategies (1). Information warfare, broadly defined, is the use and management of information to gain a competitive advantage over an adversary. It differs from traditional warfare, which primarily involves physical confrontation, by focusing on the cognitive and psychological aspects of conflict (2). Unlike hybrid warfare, which blends conventional and unconventional methods, information warfare in the context of IW emphasizes the manipulation of information flows and perceptions to achieve strategic objectives (3). This approach is particularly relevant in the digital age, where the battlespace extends beyond physical territories into the realm of social media, online communities, and digital platforms. In this context, narrative intelligence emerges as a crucial capability for navigating the complex information environment and effectively countering adversarial narratives (4).

Countering Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Securing the Homeland Against Evolving Threats

Claire Dozier , Katherine Kelleher , Maha Malik & Michael Tierney

The Case for Action

The rise of recreational and commercial uses of UAS with increasingly advanced capabilities creates numerous economic opportunities for various domestic industries, including aerial photography, delivery services, and the agricultural sector. While UAS technology benefits commercial industries, UAS’s relative low cost, growing presence in the airspace, and ease of use also make them an attractive tool for carrying out nonattributional, nefarious activities. UAS capabilities may be exploited to conduct hostile surveillance and smuggling activities, as well as to disrupt government missions and aviation operations. They may also be weaponized to carry out lethal attacks on mass gatherings. Due to the variety of potentially malicious applications of UAS, they are one of the most significant emerging threat vectors in the Homeland.

Preventing and confronting UAS threats demands extensive coordination and collaboration across multiple federal departments and agencies. Currently, four U.S. government departments—the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), Defense, and Energy—have the authority to conduct C-UAS activities under 6 U.S.C. § 124n, 10 U.S.C. § 130i, and 50 U.S.C. § 2661, respectively. The proposed Safeguarding the Homeland from Threats Posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems Act of 2023 seeks to expand the C-UAS authorities granted to DHS and DOJ. For example, if passed, the Act would finally grant statutory authorization to DHS and DOJ for the protection of airports. It would also establish a pilot program to evaluate the potential benefits of state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement (LE) entities having the ability to detect and mitigate credible UAS threats. Presidential support for the passage of appropriate legislative expansions of C-UAS authority, such as those included in the Act, is critical to address and close the policy and legal gaps that currently impede departments, agencies, and other stakeholders from being able to effectively carry out their C-UAS missions.

Army Cyber Institute (ACI)Cyber Defense Review, Fall 2024, v. 9, no. 3

The Need for a Cyber Smoke Screen: A Tactical Action that Instantly Becomes Strategic in an All-Domain Operation

The Path to China’s Intelligentized Warfare: Converging on the Metaverse Battlefield

Blind Allegations of U.S. Cyber Hegemony Complements China’s Influence Campaign to Weaken Global Confidence in the United States

GenAI in the 2024 Taiwan Presidential Election: Lessons for Democracies

Embracing Memory Safe APIs for C2 Systems

Forward Persistence in Great Power Cyber Competition: Military Assets in a Relative Power Erosion Framework

Can Technology Save a World Hurtling Toward Disorder?

Michael Hirsh

A little over a year ago, during a war game conducted to test artificial intelligence against human reasoning in an imagined conflict between the United States and China, a funny thing happened. The team guided by AI–powered by OpenAI’s GPT-4—proved to be more prudent, even wise, in its advice about how to handle the crisis than the human team did.

“It identified responses the humans didn’t see, and it didn’t go crazy,” Jamil Jaffer, director of the project at George Mason University’s National Security Institute, told me. Or, as Jaffer’s report concluded: “Humans consistently sought to raise the stakes and signal a willingness to confront China directly while AI played defensively and sought to limit the scope [and] nature of potential confrontation.”

Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Necropolitical Frontier

Adam Reilly & Matthew P. Arsenault

As conflict progresses into the 21st century the introduction of autonomous weapon systems marks a significant turning point for the application of force. With the ability to operate with little to no human intervention autonomous weapons technologies are a tight encapsulation of what Achille Mbembe calls Necropolitics- the leveraging of death as the ultimate tool of sovereignty and control over the world. With the delegation of the act of killing to these autonomous systems the practical mechanics of warfare are being redefined to such as extent as to change the relationships between conflict and culture. This redefinition is compounded by the large scale investment in, and implementation of, these systems as a backbone of future conflict. Serving to legitimize and normalize the application of death as a tool of, not only power, but governance. The looming dawn of a new autonomous or semi-autonomous battlefield demands the critical analysis and reflection of these emergent dynamics in a world where their use is no longer seen as a possibility but instead an eventuality.

Historical Context: The Evolution of Necropolitics in Warfare

While the phrase necropolitics is relatively new the concept of violence and death as a tool of power is an enduring part of human civilization dating back to prehistory. Evolving with each emergent technology to both respond to and shape the ever changing nature of conflict. From the earliest clubs to modern precision weapons the objective remains the same: create and wield power and influence by controlling who lives and who dies.

A Problem of Character: How the Army’s Myopic Focus on Technology Has Clouded Its Thinking

Major Robert Rose, USA

Introduction

You may have heard this story before: Fifty years ago, the Yom Kippur War displayed the lethality of new weapons and seemed to reveal a change to the character of war. The commander of the then-new U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General William DePuy, sent the commandant of the U.S. Army’s Armor School, Major General Donn Starry, to study that war. His goal was to extract lessons for countering and, if necessary, fighting the countries that were aligned through the Warsaw Pact in Europe.[1] From the detailed analysis of the effectiveness of new technologies in that war, TRADOC published the doctrine of Active Defense in 1976.[2]

You may not have heard the end of this story. After leading the study of Yom Kippur, Starry took command of V Corps in Germany and began testing concepts in Active Defense against an attack by the Warsaw Pact forces arrayed in front of him. Once put into practice, he discovered that the doctrine which he himself had helped to craft was, in fact, lacking.[3] And he was not the only critic of Active Defense.

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