Indian Strategic Studies: 01/06/25

6 January 2025

Taliban-Pakistan war threatens India’s security—New Delhi must reimagine defence capabilities

Swasti Rao

The year 2024 ended with heightened tensions in India’s neighbourhood. On Christmas, Pakistani airstrikes targeted seven locations in Afghanistan, killing 46 people including women and children. This was in retaliation to a 21 December attack by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in South Waziristan, which killed 16 Pakistani security personnel. In retaliation, the Taliban struck several points in Pakistan. The cycle escalated further on 29 December, when an explosion at the Taliban’s Ministry of Interiorn killed 10 personnel. It was claimed by the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, which aligns with Pakistan.

Meanwhile, Baloch insurgents, siding with the Taliban in their fight for self-determination, added another layer to the chaos. Earlier in March, militants bombed and attacked Pakistani forces at a border post, prompting airstrikes that, according to the Taliban, killed civilians.

This relentless cycle of violence reflects a complex web of conflicting allegiances and power struggles. At its core lies the fractured identity of South Asia, shaped by British-drawn borders that divided the subcontinent into modern states—India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and China. These artificial divisions have bred ongoing territorial disputes, further complicated by ideological and geopolitical factors over time.

In the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, these tensions are exacerbated by jihadi doctrines rooted in Sharia, often exploited by state actors to destabilise rivals. Pakistan’s use of such groups against India has boomeranged, with the country now facing the destructive forces it once fostered. This volatile dynamic underscores the enduring instability in South Asia, where historical wounds continue to fester.

Starlink under govt scrutiny after company refuses to reveal details on who used its satcom devices in India

Starlink, the satellite internet service owned by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, is facing growing regulatory challenges in India after its communication devices were found in the possession of insurgents and smugglers.

The discovery has raised concerns within India’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Department of Telecommunications (DoT), particularly regarding the potential use of these devices for illegal activities.

The situation escalated when authorities uncovered Starlink satellite communication devices during a significant drug bust in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, where smugglers were found to be using the satellite internet services for navigation.

Why has Starlink refused information to the govt?Despite requests from the Indian government for information about the original purchasers of these devices, Starlink has refused to comply, citing data privacy laws. A source within the government confirmed that the MHA has now directed the DoT to take "appropriate steps" to address the matter.

"After the recovery of these devices in the hands of drug smugglers in the Andamans, the government asked Starlink about the ownership details, but the company declined, citing data privacy laws," the source revealed.

The investigation into the recent drug bust, which involved the seizure of 6,000kg of methamphetamine, highlighted that smugglers from Myanmar were using Starlink's satellite services to set up Wi-Fi hotspots, further complicating the situation. The DGP of Andamans, Hargobinder Singh Dhaliwal, confirmed that the smugglers had operated satellite phones to create these hotspots.

In addition to the drug smuggling case, Starlink devices have also been found in the hands of insurgents in the northeastern state of Manipur.

The Tibetan Government-in-Exile Has a New Strategy

Robert Barnett

An unexpected development has taken place in the seven-decades-long dispute between the Tibetan exile leadership and China’s government. In early July, for the first time since 2010, Chinese authorities reportedly held direct talks with the exile Tibetan political leadership, based in Dharamsala, India. The meeting in July followed a year or more of back-channel contacts of some kind.

These talks are at only a very preliminary stage and may not last. Beijing has not confirmed that it has had contact with the exiles, and the exile leaders have downplayed any prospect of substantive outcomes, professing interest only in long-term developments. But behind these reports are signs of a larger and more intriguing shift. This is indicated, according to the exile leadership, by the fact that it was China that initiated the resumption of talks. They “are reaching out to us, it’s not us reaching out to them,” as the exiles’ Sikyong, or political leader, Penpa Tsering, has put it. Beijing, the exiles argue, now finds itself under pressure to reach a deal with the exiled Tibetan religious leader, the 89-year-old Dalai Lama, before his health declines further. If so, this would be a 180-degree reversal from the previous dynamics of the dispute, when it was the exiles who were urgently, even desperately, seeking a settlement before time runs out.

The exiles’ new assessment of China’s diplomatic calculus seems ambitious, given that it implies a significant weakening in China’s bargaining power on Tibet. But there is some evidence to support this view. It follows from a fundamental shift in the exiles’ strategy from a focus on human rights violations to a focus on flaws within China’s claim to sovereignty over Tibet.

Can China’s Scholarships and Cultural Diplomacy Efforts Succeed in Pakistan?

Akbar Notezai

In Washington, D.C., China has a bad reputation for the way it treats its Muslim minorities. But views differ greatly in many majority-Muslim countries in Asia. Educational programs and exchanges are a key part of this. Pakistan is an exemplar: Estimates suggest that more than 28,000 students studied in China in 2019, making it the top destination for outward-bound students.

Pakistan’s ambassador to China, Khalil Hashmi, said in Beijing that Pakistan is one of the top three countries in terms of sending students China. In 2018, the most recent year that China’s Ministry of Education released statistics on the numbers of students from different countries, the top sender countries were South Korea (50,600 students), Thailand (28,608), Pakistan (28,032), India (23,198), and the U.S. (20,996).

China’s government offers scholarships that can be generous, but several families I spoke to told me they had financed their own or their children’s studies in China, especially for medical degrees. Based on interviews with 25 Pakistani students or parents of students, other popular programs that Chinese universities offer to Pakistani students include Chinese language, engineering, and computer science programs. Educational consulting companies act as brokers between potential students and Chinese universities. One such firm currently advertises an academic year of tuition fees for a medical degree and lodging for $3,000.

The Role of Bangladesh’s Military in the July Revolution and Its Historical Legacy

Shafi Md Mostofa

The military has been a central force in Bangladesh’s history, particularly in its tumultuous political landscape from independence in 1971 until the 1990s. This period was marked by coups, counter-coups, assassinations, and direct military rule. However, since the 1990s, the military’s overt role in politics has diminished, largely due to two factors: its participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions and its economic engagement through civilian and institutional roles. These dynamics have played a critical role in transforming the military’s function in state affairs, as evidenced by its restrained role during the July Revolution of 2024.

In the early years of Bangladesh, the military emerged as a powerful actor amid political instability. The assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in August 1975 was a watershed moment, marking the first successful military coup in the country. The coup was followed by a counter-coup led by Major General Khaled Musharraf in November 1975, which briefly attempted to restore discipline within the military. However, Musharraf’s reign lasted only four days, as he was overthrown and killed in a subsequent counter-coup led by soldiers loyal to Major General Ziaur Rahman, who was under house arrest during this time.

Zia’s rise to power as the country’s military ruler set the stage for a period of military dominance. However, his presidency ended in 1981 when he was assassinated in a failed coup orchestrated by Major General Abul Manzoor. This assassination exposed the deep factionalism within the military, as officers vied for control amid competing loyalties and visions for the country’s future. The era of Lieutenant General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, who seized power in 1982, further entrenched military rule.

Ershad’s regime, lasting until 1990, represented the peak of military dominance in Bangladeshi politics. However, growing popular resistance and international pressure eventually forced his resignation, ushering in a return to parliamentary democracy.

5 Predictions for China in 2025

James Palmer

This was a relatively quiet if depressing year for China. But 2025 could be a lot stormier, especially when it comes to clashes with the United States. As the COVID-19 pandemic showed when it began nearly five years ago, there are many potential unknowns in a country of 1.4 billion people. The return of the mercurial Donald Trump to the White House adds to the uncertainty.

China’s central bank plans policy overhaul as pressure mounts on economy

Cheng Leng and Robin Harding

The People’s Bank of China plans to cut interest rates this year as it makes a historic shift to a more orthodox monetary policy to bring it closer into line with the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank.

In comments to the Financial Times, the Chinese central bank said it was likely it would cut interest rates from the current level of 1.5 per cent “at an appropriate time” in 2025.

It added that it would prioritise “the role of interest rate adjustments” and move away from “quantitative objectives” for loan growth in what would amount to a transformation of Chinese monetary policy.

Most central banks, such as the Fed, have only one policy variable, the benchmark interest rate, which they use to influence demand for credit and activity in the economy.

US Treasury hacked: Are China and the US stepping up their cyberwar?

Sarah Shamim

The United States Department of the Treasury on Monday blamed China for breaching its network and gaining access to information that includes unclassified documents.

Beijing has denied the allegation, calling it “groundless”.

The alleged hacking comes weeks after Beijing accused Washington of carrying out two cyberattacks on Chinese technology firms.

With Washington and Beijing trading blame, we assess the history of cyberwarfare between the world’s two largest economies and whether it has intensified.

Who hacked the US Treasury Department?

The US Treasury Department accused Chinese state-sponsored hackers of breaking into its system this month and accessing employee workstations and unclassified documents.

The department said the hackers gained access by overriding a security key used by third-party cybersecurity provider BeyondTrust, which provides technical support remotely to Treasury employees.

What to know about string of US hacks blamed on China

Mike Wendling

US officials say hackers linked to the Chinese government are responsible for breaching security at major telecommunications companies and US agencies.

The latest hack, announced on Monday, targeted the US Department of the Treasury, which called the infiltration a "major incident".

Officials said the hackers were able to access employee workstations and some unclassified documents. China denies involvement.

It's the latest in a string of cyber-attacks that have emerged in recent months against US and other Western targets.

What's been hacked?

The treasury department hack followed news in late October that the two major US presidential campaigns were targeted.

The FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (Cisa) said the hack targeting the White House campaigns was carried out "by actors affiliated with the People's Republic of China".

China’s economy is far from buried

John Rapley

China’s economy has become something of a Rorschach test. The 5% growth target for 2024 that Xi Jinping yesterday said the country had met? One set of economists looks at it and says the economy is collapsing, the figures are probably fudged, and that a recession is likely to begin this year anyhow. The other side says the government is probably right, and that while Beijing’s economy is slowing, these problems may be overcome in 2025. They can’t both be right, even if they both have a point. But the camp to which you belong to appears to be determined by where you sit.

Western analysts, using aggregate data and a liberal interpretative lens, tend to see China’s economy as beset with insurmountable structural obstacles embedded in Communist Party rule. Because the leadership is reluctant to give more political power to the people as their incomes rise, the CCP persists with an industrial development model based on repressing wages to boost investment in export-manufacturing industries. Unable as a result to break out of the middle-income trap, which would require shifting towards an economy based on domestic consumption, the regime has consequently left itself vulnerable to the coming wave of Donald Trump’s tariffs. Then, the thinking goes, the economy may enter a real crisis.

Four years of tectonic shifts that redrew the Middle East

Paul Salem, Brian Katulis, Charles Lister, Nadwa Al-Dawsari, Alex Vatanka, Khaled Elgindy, Nimrod Goren, Fadi Nicholas Nassar, Mirette F. Mabrouk, Gönül Tol, Gerald M. Feierstein, Robert S. Ford, Intissar Fakir, Iulia-Sabina Joja, Marvin G. Weinbaum

Contents:

2 Trumpreturns to a profoundly different Middle East

4 Whatadifference four years make in US politics and policy on the Middle East

6 Post-Assad Syria presents a more complex, nuanced, and urgent challenge to a second Trump administration

7 TheRedSeacrisis demands a forward-thinking approach to solve the Yemen problem 9 Iran must choose a path as Trump reenters the picture

11 OnIsrael-Palestine dire conditions, formidable challenges as Trump returns to office

13 Four years of political, diplomatic, and security transitions in Israel, but Oct. 7 overshadows it all

15 Under Donald Trump, Washington can decisively defeat Hezbollah

17 The perils of neglecting a more unstable Red Sea region and Horn of Africa

18 Turkey on a better foreign policy footing as Trump returns to office

20 Geostrategic shifts have deepened divisions between Arab Gulf states and Israel, challenging assumptions for Trump II

21 The incoming administration will encounter a stronger, more independent partner in Iraq

22 North African and Sahel countries increasingly seek partnerships far beyond the US and Europe

24 Black Sea region in disarray as Trump returns to the scene

The Shadow War

Behnam Ben Taleblu

“We must possess Syria. If the thread from Lebanon to here is cut, bad events will happen,” warned former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in 2012. Fast forward 12 years, and the Islamic Republic no longer possesses Syria, a point made clear when images of Tehran’s ransacked embassy in Damascus surfaced online recently.

The empire created by Iran’s chief terrorist, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force chief Qassem Soleimani, killed in Iraq in 2020 by a U.S. drone strike utilizing Israeli intelligence, is fast crumbling. The Assad regime in Syria, the Islamic Republic’s sole state ally in the Middle East, has fallen to Sunni Salafist jihadists. Lebanese Hezbollah, the brightest star in Tehran’s constellation of regional terror proxies, has seemingly been neutered by Israel, and its influential leader, Hassan Nasrallah, is no more. The land bridge, the terror highway connecting Tehran to Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, now has a gaping hole in it.

None of this was foreseeable on Oct. 7, 2023, when Hamas, an Iran-backed Palestinian terror group, burst forth from the Gaza Strip and killed 1,200 Israelis in addition to taking more than 200 hostages. Nor was the breadth of the response from other Iran-backed proxies to broaden the war and support their fellow Axis of Resistance member foreseeable: Hezbollah from Lebanon on Oct. 8, Shiite militias from Iraq on Oct. 17, and Houthi rebels from Yemen on Oct. 19. But one year later, Israel has withstood Iran’s “ring of fire,” Hamas has been decimated in Gaza, and many of its leaders, such as Ismail Haniyeh, Yahya Sinwar, and Saleh Arouri, have been killed.

The Five Central Asian Countries Remain Shaped By The ‘Soviet Structure’ – Analysis

Zhou Chao

Independence is not only about the formal sovereignty of a nation but also about economic structural constraints. In Central Asia, this economic structure is what ANBOUND’s founder Mr. Kung Chan refers to as the “Soviet structure”. Mr. Chan points out that, even today, and perhaps into the future, this “Soviet structure” continues to deeply influence the long-term stability and security of the Central Asian region.

A significant feature of the Soviet-era economic system was its strong planned nature. In the Central Asian region, Kyrgyzstan is an agricultural country, with agriculture being the backbone of its economy, accounting for 36% of its GDP. Uzbekistan is the world’s sixth-largest cotton producer and the second-largest cotton exporter. According to past data, 28% of Uzbekistan’s workforce was in agriculture, which contributed 24% to its GDP. Tajikistan is the poorest country in Central Asia, with a low GDP; in 2006, its GDP was only 80% of what it had been in 1990. The country’s economy is also heavily reliant on agriculture and livestock. Thus, several key countries in the Central Asian region, influenced by the “Soviet structure”, have their economies and productive forces focused on water-intensive agricultural sectors, and this situation has not fundamentally changed.

However, since the Soviet era, water scarcity has always been a significant challenge. The five Central Asian countries are located deep in the heart of the Eurasian continent, making it difficult for oceanic moisture to reach the region. As a result, the average annual precipitation in Central Asia is generally below 300 millimeters. In areas near the Aral Sea and the deserts of Turkmenistan, the annual rainfall is even as low as 75-100 millimeters. Only in the mountains and the southern slopes of the Fergana Valley does precipitation increase slightly, reaching 1,000-2,000 millimeters. Along with the low rainfall, evaporation is exceptionally high. For example, the annual evaporation rate from the Amu Darya Delta can reach 1,798 millimeters, which is 21 times the local precipitation.

The fall of Assad: four and a half implications

Gabriel Elefteriu

History is not merely on the move again – as we have become used to saying in response to the great succession of extraordinary political and military events since about 2014-16, that are shattering the old rules and geopolitical status quo – but it is racing forward at a gallop. Over the past couple of weeks it has been events in Syria that have provided the latest shock to the global system, with the swift and sudden implosion of Assad’s regime at the hands of rebels left over from a civil war that the Syrian president had, by all accounts, won four years ago.

It is perhaps too early to identify all the elements involved in this coup de main, and exactly how it was accomplished. One difficulty is that the Syrian rebels are split into a multitude of groups with overlapping loyalties, shifting affiliations and opaque interests; discerning who’s who at any one point, and what their game is, is hard even for the intelligence agencies. Nowhere than in Syria could the expression, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”, apply with more reason and effect.

Another problem is tracking the involvement of foreign state actors within this maze of war and deceit. For over a decade Syria has been an arena of confrontation and occasionally (sometimes simultaneously) cooperation between different combinations of Turkish, Iranian, Russian, Israeli, Gulf Arab and American interests – to name but the most prominent players. Turkey and Israel are by far the biggest beneficiaries of the recent turn of events; any direct role they might have had in covertly enabling aspects of the rebel offensive remains, for now, a mystery.

After Assad, Are the Houthis Next?

Ari Heistein Nathaniel Rabkin

With the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon defeated and increasingly isolated, attention turns to the Houthis in Yemen. Perhaps the strongest remaining Iranian proxy force in the region, the Houthis are certainly the most active in terms of their attacks on Israel and also on international shipping in the Red Sea.

With confrontation between the Houthis and Israel, and perhaps America too, seems set to escalate, this will likely raise questions of whether the regime in Sanaa will prove as frail as its former partner in Damascus.

Like Assad’s regime, the Houthis are a corrupt organization representing a narrow segment of the population, leaving the majority mired in poverty. This poverty stems less from war or sanctions and more from systemic corruption, nepotism, and deliberate isolation. These regimes facilitate depredation of the populace via a common tool kit: bribes demanded by underpaid officials, monopolized industries that benefit insiders, and rigged systems for the import of goods, as exports play little role in the ravaged economies of Iran’s satellite states.

Reform of state institutions is implausible, as their dysfunction is a deliberate choice to ensure that the regime’s core supporters enjoy economic and social preeminence.

The high levels of corruption and exploitation made both the Assad and Houthi regimes deeply unpopular, forcing them to depend on brutal security apparatuses to maintain power. Indoctrination through media and education, framing these governments as anti-colonial defenders of national independence, grows less convincing as public suffering at the hands of the regime worsens and as dependence on foreign sponsors, especially Iran, increases.

Despite these parallels, key differences between the Assad and Houthi regimes suggest their trajectories may diverge. The Houthi leadership is younger and more energetic than Assad’s aging cadre. For example, Houthi intelligence chief Abulhakim al-Khaiwani is under forty, while his Syrian counterpart, Hossam Louka, was nearing sixty-five before Assad’s fall.

New Orleans attacker used very rare explosive in bombs, officials say

Freddie Clayton and Tom Winter

The driver who killed 14 people in an ISIS-inspired vehicular attack in Ne w Orleans used a very rare explosive compound in two homemade bombs that did not detonate, two senior law enforcement officials briefed on the matter told NBC News.

The explosive has never been used in a U.S. terrorist attack or incident, nor in a European one, the officials said. A key question for investigators now is how Shamsud-Din Jabbar, the attacker, learned about the explosive and how he managed to produce it.

Neither of the homemade devices exploded and it remains unclear whether the failure was due to a malfunction, lack of activation or another issue. Jabbar planned to use a transmitter to detonate the two bombs, which were placed in coolers, authorities have said

The FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives said in a joint statement Friday that the two explosive devicess were placed on Bourbon Street, which Jabbar later turned into a scene of devastation.

Trump’s Most Essential History Lesson

Stephen Sestanovich

If, as he promises, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump can settle Russia’s war against Ukraine, he will surely boast that he accomplished something no one else has been able to do in over 100 years—end a major war on the European continent by negotiation. And he’ll be right—well, almost right. The U.S. diplomats who settled the Balkan wars of the 1990s will be his only rivals. Even so, Trump needs to understand their success, for it was achieved by overcoming instincts and preferences very much like his own. He ought to know that policymakers in President Bill Clinton’s administration were tempted to be Trump—and succeeded only because they weren’t.

If Trump can get an eager assistant to sketch the Balkan wars for him in a few quick strokes, he will instantly see the parallels to today’s war in Ukraine. The fighting in the 1990s erupted after the slow collapse of Yugoslav communism, which had long suppressed desires for independence among the many ethnic groups it ruled. The dictator who led the largest state after the breakup—Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia—had made resentful nationalism the basis of his rule, and adjacent states like Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, both with large Serb minorities, felt the pressure immediately. Though the resulting bloodshed took on genocidal proportions, Western governments for years proved unable to stop it. When the warring parties finally agreed to attend a peace conference in Dayton, Ohio, in late 1995, many senior U.S. officials—even Richard Holbrooke, who led the U.S. team—expected the effort to fail.

Rethinking Defense: The Role of Private Capital

Michael Sion, John Wenzel & Blaine Pellicore

Private capital is poised to play a critical role in the modernization of the US defense industry. As battlefield demands shift, the government is seeking to accelerate investment in advanced technologies and encourage disruption. Private capital will help the US close the investment gap, innovate faster, and improve the affordability of defense platforms and systems.

Venture capital and private equity firms can add value in two key areas. Disruptive start-ups need growth-oriented investments to develop new capabilities and achieve step-change improvements in cost and time to market. In particular, private capital can play a key role in reducing the cost of delivering battlefield outcomes (sometimes called “cost per effect”). More mature companies will require investment to increase manufacturing scale and production capacity, improve on-time delivery, and bring unit costs down.

Many investors have been wary of the defense sector, given its high barriers to entry, low unit volumes, high customer concentration, and atypical go-to-market costs. Defense companies also must grapple with government budget uncertainty and political shifts. These factors make self-funded corporate investment in long-term research and development more difficult. However, firms that can navigate these challenges will have the opportunity to get a stake in fast-growing companies at a critical juncture for the industry.

2025: The year we get better at being wrong

Mark Leonard & Jeremy Shapiro

Most of our predictions for 2024—from the situation in the Middle East and Ukraine to the Chinese economy and the United Kingdom elections—were right. We ended with an impressive 7 out of 10 score. But one of our most important predictions—that Joe Biden would retain the United States presidency—turned out to be more than just wrong, as Biden did not even run for re-election.

Fortunately, there are no negative scores in our state-of-the-art prediction scoring algorithm. For 2025, we are determined to get better at being wrong, which is why we have focused on predictions with clear binary outcomes. Here are our ten key foreign policy trends for 2025, along with two bonus technology-focused forecasts.

1. It’s Trump’s world; we only live in it. Most governments outside of Europe (and a few within) spend the year either welcoming or pretending to welcome Donald Trump’s return to power. They find comfort in an American president who prioritises domestic interests over positioning the US as a global moral arbiter or a hegemonic power. By the end of 2025, the G7 evolves from a centre-left to a right-leaning group, showing little interest in “woke” issues like climate change or food insecurity. Even among Europeans, the predominant response to Trump’s re-election is one of pre-emptive surrender, tempered by discreet bargaining.

2. The German grand coalition strikes back. The February election results in a yet another version of the grand coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD coming to power in Germany. To the disappointment of many Europeans, this recycled coalition does not introduce any major changes in Germany’s foreign, security, or economic policy—whether on Chinese electric vehicles, military support for Ukraine, or defence spending. But they provide a comforting, if false, sense of stability to a German public that yearns for little else.

The Islamic State Is a Franchise Now - Analysis

Clara Broekaert and Colin P. Clarke

In the early morning hours of New Year’s Day, a 42-year-old U.S. Army veteran named Shamsud-Din Jabbar drove through a crowd of revelers in the French Quarter of New Orleans, killing at least 14 and injuring dozens more. Jabbar had an Islamic State flag on the rented vehicle and reportedly recorded a video pledging his allegiance to the jihadi group.

The FBI is likely conducting an assessment of Jabbar’s electronics to see what the digital forensics reveal: what kind of Islamic State propaganda was he imbibing; how frequently was he reading Islamic State posts; did he download guides to make improvised explosive devices, or IEDs; which social media platforms did he visit; and was he in touch with any actual Islamic State operatives who may have served as a cyber-coach or virtual entrepreneur in the attack.

The three forces that will shape 2025

Zanny Minton Beddoes

What happens when the world’s biggest economy takes a sharp protectionist turn? When the global superpower decides that a transactional foreign policy beats alliances? And when the reset takes place as wars rage, menacing adversaries join forces and artificial intelligence (AI) is changing everything from health care to warfare? The world is about to find out.

Rare Earth In Myanmar: Economic Opportunity Or Environmental Costs? – Analysis

Naw Seng

Myanmar’s rare earth mining industry sits at the intersection of short-term opportunity, environmental degradation, and geopolitical conflict, shaping the future of local communities and global rare earth supply chains.

Key takeawaysSome local communities stand to gain economically from rare earth mining, which generates jobs and raises wages for workers, who make roughly twice the national average. Risks associated with these opportunities include potential health risks from dangerous conditions at work, lack of regulatory oversight, and exploitation by foreign corporations.

Local communities, the Myanmar military (SAC), and foreign companies, particularly from China, significantly impact the country’s rare earth mining sector. Increased conflict and instability could result from the struggle to control these valuable resources, especially between the military and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).

Deforestation, destruction of soil, and water pollution are the major environmental problems brought on by rare earth mining’s uncontrolled nature. These effects put communities’ long-term health and nearby ecosystems at risk. Sustainable practices and efficient governance are essential to balance economic development and mitigate these issues.

1. Overview of Rare Earth Elements

The rare earth elements are divided into two groups, which are Light Rare Earth Elements (LREE-La, Ce, Pr, Nd, Sm) and Heavy Rare Earth Elements (HREE-Eu, Gd, Tb, Dy, Ho, Er, Tm, Yb, Lu, Y). The 17 chemical elements known as rare earth elements (REEs) are essential for many high-tech devices, such as smartphones, electric cars (EVs), and renewable energy sources. Rare earth elements are necessary to produce many goods, especially in the energy and technology industries. As the world moves toward clean energy and cutting-edge technologies, the demand for rare earth elements (REEs) is predicted to circle, possibly increasing three to seven times by 2040. With more than 58% of the world’s supply, China controls most of the rare earth market, although Myanmar is making a growing contribution.

The Next Steps In Missile Defense

Richard Weitz

Shortly after assuming office, the new Trump administration will undertake a comprehensive review of the missile threats confronting the United States. Geopolitical and technical developments are undermining the longstanding foundations of U.S. missile defense policy. Potential adversaries such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are deploying an expanding portfolio of ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles—supplemented by large fleets of reconnaissance and strike drones. These countries are pooling their resources in the missile domain. Both Iran and North Korea give Moscow missiles and drones to use against Ukraine, while Russia is assisting these partners’ aerospace programs. Meanwhile, technology is transcending delineations between regional and homeland missile systems.

Some beneficial changes have already occurred. The Pentagon is deploying a Next-Generation Interceptor before the end of this decade. The new interceptor will make the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system protecting North America from intercontinental ballistic missiles more effective. The Missile Defense Agency has launched a new Transformation Task Force to evaluate options for realigning missions and responsibilities, integrating cross-domain capabilities, modernizing digital technologies, improving internal agency processes, and enhancing cooperation with operational forces and other partners.

Advances in U.S. missile defense capabilities have been evident in the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. The United States can leverage these technologies to build a more comprehensive missile shield. However, budget constraints and competing priorities could degrade capabilities and increase risks.

In particular, U.S. defenses against hypersonic missiles are lagging. The Chinese and Russian militaries are constructing several types of hypersonic conventional and nuclear delivery systems capable of traveling at many times the speed of sound. The Defense Department’s latest China military power report assesses that “The PRC has the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal.” Russia has employed several hypersonic missiles against Ukraine, including its new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile in December.

The Decline of the United States Defense Industrial Base and the Need to Restore Industrial Deterrence

William C. Greenwalt

Chairman Moolenaar, Ranking Member Krishnamoorthi, and other distinguished members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning on the need to strengthen America’s defense industrial base and workforce.

Restoring the “Arsenal of Democracy” is one of the most important tasks Congress and our nation can embark on in the coming years. This will not be easy as reforms of the last 30 years to address the defense industrial base have proven to be only marginally successful.

We have now reached an inflection point as our industrial deterrence is no longer credible. This is a far cry from the defense industrial base that facilitated our victory in the WWII. The Arsenal of Democracy industrial model, still active in the early Cold War period, may have been the most significant driver of innovation ever created. However, beginning in the early 1960s, the incentives and structure underpinning this approach were systematically destroyed.

How does one go bankrupt? Hemmingway succinctly wrote in “Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.” Processes and ideas put in place in the 1960s and 1970s gradually and incrementally, like barnacles on a wooden ship, undermined our defense industrial base and innovation system over the course of multiple decades. These processes first dissolved the links to the underlying commercial industrial base, then shattered the importance of time constraints to innovation.

Once delinked, the commercial industrial base left the defense industrial base far behind. This was done through massive expenditures in R&D and appropriating the Pentagon’s discarded time-based innovation model.[1] DOD then lost the visibility and the ability to impact incremental commercial supply chain decisions, most notably those made when parts of the commercial market unwisely outsourced its production capabilities to China. The result of civil-military disintegration has undermined both national and economic security. As we survey our current situation, it is becoming clearer that we have squandered our longstanding defense and, in many cases, our commercial technological and industrial lead over the rest of world. We are suddenly facing the prospect of industrial bankruptcy.

By the numbers: The global economy in 2024

GeoEconomics Center experts

In May, US President Joe Biden announced a 100 percent tariff on all electric vehicles (EVs) imported from China. The administration had two main objectives: 1) Protect and stimulate US clean energy industries and supply chains, and 2) counter a flood of Chinese goods as Beijing turns to exports to compensate for its weak internal demand. For the United States, these tariffs are largely preventative and symbolic, as Chinese EVs make up only around 2 percent of total EV imports. For other Group of Seven (G7) countries, it’s too late for prevention, as Chinese EVs already dominate.

The Biden administration coordinated with concerned allies and, in August, Canada also announced it would levy a 100 percent tariff on EV imports from China. The European Union (EU) later imposed up to 45.3 percent tariffs on Chinese EVs. Economic stress due to Chinese dumping increasingly reaches beyond the United States––and even beyond the G7. Since 2023, Argentina, Brazil, India, and Vietnam have all begun anti-dumping or anti-subsidy investigations into Beijing’s practices.

The incoming Trump administration will now have a choice. It can revert to President-elect Donald Trump’s previous preference for bilateral negotiations, or it can continue to restrict China’s access in step with allies and partners, possibly by creating a “buyers club” to regulate standards and open markets to a select few.

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