5 January 2025

Four Stories to Follow in South Asia in 2025

Michael Kugelman

There will be many questions about South Asia and the world this year: how the region adjusts to a second Trump administration in Washington, how it is affected by conflict in the Middle East and Ukraine, and how it navigates unrelenting great-power competition.


How to Succeed in Deterring an Invasion of Taiwan Without Really Trying (Hard)

Scott Savitz

The threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan represents one of the largest challenges for the Department of State and the Department of Defense (DoD). A successful Chinese conquest of Taiwan would not only entail the ruthless repression of Taiwan's population, but it would menace other East Asian nations while facilitating further Chinese power projection.

China would also acquire control of a sophisticated economy with the world's most important facilities for making computer chips. The seizure of Taiwan would mark a major milestone in China's efforts to become the dominant power across the globe.

U.S capabilities to deter or prevent this outcome are hampered by a number of factors, a couple of which stand out.

First, at the policy level, the indefinite continuation of half-century-old policies intended to garner Chinese cooperation against the Soviet Union impedes the United States. Specifically, the United States is explicitly ambiguous about whether it will help defend Taiwan, whose government it does not recognize, and it precludes itself from stationing forces on the island.

China’s Economy Could Soon Face A Massive Debt Crisis

Gordon Chang

“China’s economy has rebounded and is on an upward trajectory, with its GDP for the year expected to pass the 130 trillion yuan mark,” Xi Jinping said in his 2025 New Year message.

On December 26, China revised upward its gross domestic product figure for 2023 by 3.4 trillion yuan, a 2.7% adjustment. That puts the size of the Chinese economy that year at 129.4 trillion yuan or $17.73 trillion. Xi’s target for the size of the economy, therefore, is easy to reach.

There is, as usual, great optimism displayed by Beijing leaders about the size of the Chinese economy. Few of the official numbers make sense, however, as reported figures are hard to reconcile with, among other things, large cash outflows from the country.

For instance, China experienced the largest outflow from its financial markets in November, as Chinese banks wired $45.7 billion offshore. The amount, announced by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, includes repatriation of foreign investment in China and Chinese residents’ purchases of offshore securities.

Why the large withdrawals? “The rising tide of outflows signals souring sentiment toward the Asian nation as U.S. President-Elect Donald Trump’s vow to impose 60% tariffs on Chinese goods threatens to decimate trade between the two nations,” reports Bloomberg.

The problem appears to be more fundamental than that, however. Outbound flows started well before the Trump tariff threats were made: The Wall Street Journal in late October reported that, based on its calculations, “as much as $254 billion might have left China illicitly in the four quarters through the end of June.”

Bracing for the US-China trade war to come

Nigel Green

China is gearing up for Trump's promised tariffs with punitive measures of its own. Image: Asia Times Files / iStock

China’s announcement of export controls on 28 US companies, including defense giants Lockheed Martin and Boeing Defense, signals an ominous start to 2025.

This latest trade war salvo in the US-China rivalry comes just as Donald Trump prepares to resume the presidency, reigniting speculation that tit-for-tat trade policies will define the global economic landscape this year and possibly beyond.

The punitive move, ostensibly made to “safeguard national security and interests,” underscores Beijing’s growing willingness to retaliate against perceived US provocations, including the ramped-up restrictions imposed on China’s access to US and its allies’ chips and high-tech.

The timing suggests it’s not a coincidence. Trump’s campaign rhetoric repeatedly promised a tougher stance on China, including blanket 60% tariffs on China-made goods, greater scrutiny of Chinese investments and a doubling down on sanctions.

For China, the preemptive export controls send a message it is ready to fight US trade fire with fire. If Trump’s previous presidency taught us anything, it’s that his administration views trade policy as a zero-sum game.

The tariffs and trade barriers imposed during his first term sent shockwaves through global supply chains, but they also prompted China to escalate its countermeasures. By 2019, both nations were locked in a tit-for-tat trade war that left industries reeling and investors uncertain.

A China-Taiwan War Would Start an Economic Crisis. America Isn’t Ready.

Eyck Freymann and Hugo Bromley

Eyck Freymann is a Hoover fellow at Stanford University. Hugo Bromley is a research fellow at the Center for Geopolitics at the University of Cambridge.

China’s military exercises in the waters around Taiwan this month — the largest in almost three decades — highlight the growing risk of a total breakdown in United States-China relations. A full-scale invasion of Taiwan is one eventuality; last year, the C.I.A. director, William Burns, noted that China’s president, Xi Jinping, has instructed his armed forces to be ready for an invasion by 2027.

That isn’t Mr. Xi’s only option. He could use his far larger coast guard and military to impose a “quarantine,” allowing merchant shippers and commercial airlines to travel in and out of Taiwan only on China’s terms. This strategy would mirror Beijing’s moves in the South China Sea, where its coast guard is trying to assert control over waters and atolls that are part of the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally.

If China forces a confrontation over Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its own territory, the United States will need to respond decisively: The implications are enormous, potentially including a global economic crisis far worse than the shock caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Right now, America isn’t ready.

As a report from a House panel concluded last year: “The United States lacks a contingency plan for the economic and financial impacts of conflict” with China.

Addressing this lack of preparation must be a bipartisan priority. The incoming administration must work with Congress and allied governments to develop a coherent plan that clearly outlines a vision for the global economy during and after a crisis that is anchored in American economic leadership.

Why mainland China’s Taiwan integration experiment in Fujian is starting to fizzle

Amber Wang

Fujian province has become a test bed for mainland China’s push for economic, social and political integration with Taiwan. In this story – the first in a four-part on-the-ground series – Amber Wang details the 15-year integration drive in Fujian’s Pingtan county, which appears to be losing steam as the mainland economy falters, military tensions grow and Beijing struggles to turn cross-strait business ties into political loyalty.

For Allen Xue, a Taiwanese woman, the allure of moving just across the Taiwan Strait to the coastal county of Pingtan on the mainland was hard to resist.

Earlier this year, she settled into a compound specifically tailored for Taiwanese and bought it at a price far below market value.

Many decades ago, Pingtan, located just 110km (68 miles) from Taiwan in Fujian province, was a collection of underdeveloped fishing towns that served as a base for mainland Chinese attempting to illegally enter Taiwan.

Much has changed since then. Around 15 years ago, the county became a test site for economic, social and political integration with Taiwan. Business and infrastructure boomed as Beijing invested billions into building links across the strait.

However, the integration drive seems to be losing steam after its initial progress as the mainland’s economy stumbles and cross-strait tensions grow, according to Taiwanese residents of Fujian and Beijing policy advisers interviewed by the South China Morning Post.

While some Taiwanese businesses have taken advantage of the scheme, the plan has not succeeded in fostering deep cross-strait economic ties or political loyalty towards Beijing.

The Man Who Almost Changed China

Chen Jian

One of the most consequential events of the twentieth century was China’s historic turn, in the years after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, toward a sweeping program of reform. By relaxing the state’s grip on the economy and its control over society in this period, Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader from 1978 to 1989, helped put in motion the forces that would in mere decades pull hundreds of millions of people out of absolute poverty, transform China into the workshop of the world, and set it up as a great power in the twenty-first century—the only plausible rival to the United States. Although Deng led this process, he was aided at the time by the advice and work of a less heralded leader, Hu Yaobang.

Hu does not enjoy the broad name recognition of Mao, Deng, and the leading Mao-era statesman Zhou Enlai. Even in China, many people who came of age after 1989 know little about him. But as the international relations scholar Robert Suettinger shows in The Conscience of the Party: Hu Yaobang, China’s Communist Reformer, Hu was an essential figure in the grand process of “reform and opening.” Leading up to and during his tenure as chairman (and then general secretary) of the Chinese Communist Party from 1981 to 1987, he worked to shatter the ideological hold that Maoism had over Chinese politics, restoring the rights of millions of people purged during the Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1976, and striving to ensure that the imperatives of reform prevailed in Chinese policymaking. Hu’s commitment to political reform, however, led to his downfall, after a rift with Deng forced him out as CCP general secretary in January 1987. But he was still regarded by ordinary Chinese—as well as intellectuals and young students—as the champion of China’s political democratization.

Is the US testing China's 'red lines' on Taiwan?

Joel Mathis

President Joe Biden is trying to strengthen Taiwan's defenses before he leaves the White House. The United States, said China's leaders (who consider now-independent Taiwan to be China's territory), is undermining "peace and stability" in East Asia as a result.

American leaders, Beijing said, are "playing with fire" with the latest round of military assistance to Taiwan, Politico said. The warning came after Biden authorized up to $571 million in defense-related "material and services" to the democratic island. (The Pentagon at the same time announced it had approved $295 million in military equipment sales.) China's foreign ministry said that Taiwan is a "red line that must not be crossed" by the U.S., Reuters said, and added that it would take "all necessary measures" to protect its claim.

"Beijing regularly protests announcements of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan," said The Wall Street Journal. Its latest pushback comes at a moment of transition, with Donald Trump about to take office. Trump's approach to the China-Taiwan tension "generally remains unclear." Trump has warned Taiwan — like NATO — that it should "significantly increase its military spending and not rely entirely on U.S. military support," said the Journal.

The Most Effective Antidote to ISIS Attacks

Graeme Wood

The man who murdered at least 15 people with his truck on Bourbon Street, in New Orleans, last night was flying the black banner of the Islamic State from his truck, according to the FBI. Police shot 42-year-old Shamsud-Din Bahar Jabbar dead at the scene. So far little else is known about the suspect, but given that ISIS flags are not a standard option on a Ford F-150, it is reasonable to presume that the driver—a U.S. Army veteran—committed mass murder as an homage to the Islamic State.

President-Elect Donald Trump famously lamented that Mexico was “not sending their best” to the United States. After contempt for the New Orleans killer, and sadness for the dead and 35 wounded, my reaction to this attack is relief that for the past decade the Islamic State has been sending its best, and its best remain verminous incompetents whose most ingenious plots involve driving trucks into crowds. Jabbar is said to have brought along explosives, and to have set his Airbnb on fire, but either his bombs didn’t work or he did not live long enough to set them off. In 2014, the Islamic State regarded its string of early victories as a sign that God favored it. Now I wonder whether it has noticed that God has seemingly capped the IQs of its operatives, and taken the hint about what that might say about its continued divine favor.

In 2014, the group’s spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, kicked off its campaign of terror in Europe by urging followers to improvise weapons. “If you are not able to find an IED or a bullet,” he said, “smash the American or European’s head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car.” Some horrific attacks ensued, including a truck-ramming in 2016 that killed 86. But consider the number of Islamic State supporters of European origin—probably in the tens of thousands—and the easy availability of rocks, knives, and cars. Few have taken Adnani up on his offer, and those who have tend to be (if the jihadists will pardon the expression) ham-handed.

A Last Chance for Iran

Richard Nephew

For two decades, hawkish voices in Washington have called for the United States to attack Iran’s nuclear program. And for two decades their calls have been rejected. That is because for most of that time, the argument against military action was compelling and straightforward. Iran’s nuclear capabilities were immature. The international community was united on the need for Tehran to prove that its nuclear intentions were entirely peaceful and thus was reasonably united in sanctioning the country when it became clear that they weren’t. These sanctions imposed high costs that pushed the Islamic Republic into negotiations.

There are still many good reasons to not bomb Iran. Striking the country would inject more chaos and instability into the Middle East. It would consume substantial American resources at a time when Washington wants to focus on other regions. It could undermine U.S. credibility if the attacks don’t succeed. And the odds of failure are high: even the most accurate strikes might only delay Iranian nuclearization. The best, most durable solution to the issue remains a diplomatic agreement.

Islamism Ruined Britain. Don’t Let It Ruin America.

Connor Tomlinson

The New Year began in America with news that a Ford F-150 Lightning pick-up truck had been driven into crowds on Bourbon Street, in New Orleans’ French Quarter, killing 15 and injuring 35 more. The suspect then exited the vehicle and opened fire, wounding two police officers, before being shot dead. The assailant has been identified as 42-year-old Shamsud-Din Jabbar, a US army veteran born in Texas. While this had all the hallmarks of an Islamist attack, the FBI were quick to have a barely-literate confirm “it is not a terrorist event”. This was then recanted, when it was revealed that Jabbar was flying an ISIS flag from the trailer hitch of the truck, and that two improvised explosive devices were found near the scene. Now, the FBI suspects Jabbar did not work alone.

It is possible that Jabbar is linked to the explosion of a Tesla cyber-truck outside the Trump Hotel in Las Vegas, five hours after the attack in New Orleans. The driver was killed and seven people were injured when gas and fuel canisters, and over a dozen firework mortars, ignited in the truck bed. Given Elon Musk’s friendship with incumbent President Trump, the explosion had the makings of a political statement. More suspicions were aroused when it was found that both of the New Orleans and Las Vegas attack trucks were rented through peer-to-peer app Turo. The authorities have yet to establish any further link between the attacks.
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However, the FBI’s eagerness to rule out any link to Islamic terror, only to be proven wrong hours later, demonstrates a ruinous culture of political correctness within the institutions tasked with keeping Americans safe. Any appeasement of Islamism, under the rubric of anti-racist ideology, simply gives quarter to the terrorists who would do us harm. This same fear of being called racist and Islamophobic led to authorities ignoring the Manchester Arena bombing perpetrator in 2017. It also caused politicians to be willfully blind to the Muslim grooming gangs, abusing girls in fifty towns and cities across England and Wales. As discourse on X, concurrent to the New Orleans attack, made Americans aware: that cover-up still continues today.

The US will have a Happy New Year if Trump takes 4 pieces of advice

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos

President-elect Donald Trump spent the holidays mocking Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, suggesting that the U.S. could annex and make Canada the 51st state. He then went on to propose that the U.S. retake the Panama Canal, and buy Greenland.

Trump’s remarks brought the usual outcries and exhortations, but, in all seriousness, Trump will have more immediate foreign policy challenges on Day One, beginning with the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as Washington’s overall relationship with China.

Experts at the Quincy Institute have assembled several key priorities, keeping in mind Trump’s stated desires to pursue foreign policy in the national interest and reduce Washington’s foreign entanglements and new wars abroad. Can he keep to his own goals, considering the hot wars in Israel and Ukraine and Washington’s continued involvement in them — and growing tensions with Beijing?

2025 will be the test.

According to QI’s Eurasia and Grand Strategy fellows, Trump should maintain his commitment to putting U.S. interests first. This would mean pursuing a European balance of power strategy that avoids unnecessarily provoking Russia; rather, bringing all parties to the table and ending the war through negotiations.

This path to peace would focus on a new European security relationship that takes into account Russia’s longstanding aversion to NATO expansion, emphasizing instead expediting Ukrainian admission to the European Union and providing strong guarantees for Kyiv to deter future Russian aggression.

Furthermore, says QI experts, the U.S. should play “the China card” by taking into account Beijing’s interest in seeing the war in Ukraine end, including some of the ancillary dynamics — like North Korea’s military support of Moscow. Including China in coming to a negotiated peace would help bind the parties and could help improve the rocky relations between Washington and Beijing, and lay the foundations for future diplomatic cooperation

Russia’s Imperial Mindset: Understanding the Roots of the Ukraine War

Andrew A. Michta

As the second Trump administration prepares to take charge of US foreign and security policy, there is intense debate in Washington about what the end state in Ukraine should be, what kind of a peace deal can be negotiated with Putin, and what long-term prospects there might be for reaching a modus vivendi with Russia.

Much of the discussion is tied up in American domestic politics, as it trails the last presidential election. Indeed, this war should have never happened, and whatever “Russia explainers” might say going forward, there should be no doubt that the horrendous cost in Ukrainian and Russian lives is squarely on Vladimir Putin and his enablers in the Kremlin.
What Putin Wants in Ukraine

But taking a principled stance will not move the needle toward a durable armistice. In fact, by all indications, Moscow is not interested in anything short of an all-out surrender by Kyiv, including the foreclosure of any prospects for Ukraine’s membership in NATO, the de facto disbandment of the Ukrainian armed forces, and consigning Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence. Putin has no real incentive to negotiate in good faith because he believes that at this stage, he is winning, and unfortunately, he is right.

For three years, the US and Europe prioritized escalation management that left Ukraine with no clear path forward to an equitable negotiation for a lasting peace, or at the very least, an enduring armistice with Russia.

Today, Putin continues to signal that there is no deal he would accept that would not be tantamount to a victory for Russia because he believes he can defeat Ukraine at an acceptable cost, and thus deliver a devastating blow to US interests across the globe, undermining the system the United States and its democratic allies put in place post-Cold War. For three years of this war the West has offered no strategy for victory, while the horrendous attrition on the battlefield, combined with the mass flight of civilians from the front, has left Ukraine with roughly one-fourth of the population of the Russian Federation.

A Ukrainian drone pilot has a novel plan to smash Russia's formidable defenses

Michael Peck 

A Ukrainian drone pilot argues a massive drone swarm could clear a path through enemy lines.
The pilot, Illya Sekirin, is calling for 40,000 drones to barrage a 6-mile-wide sector.
His vision calls for using drones similar to the way tanks were employed a century ago.

Behind the minefields and obstacles, the enemy waits in their entrenchments, poised to strike at tanks and infantry trying to advance through the treacherous ground. Instead, tens of thousands of drones descend on their positions, blowing up vehicles, artillery, and bunkers and clearing a path for friendly ground troops.

This is the vision of a Ukrainian combat drone pilot who believes that armies need to create a separate branch for uncrewed aircraft systems and electromagnetic warfare — and go on the attack.

"Breakthroughs with large mechanized formations are becoming a thing of the past and static warfare, like the positional stalemate in Ukraine, appears to be the new norm," Illya Sekirin wrote in an article for the British Army Review. "As a result, the role of the UAS and electromagnetic warfare branch would be particularly useful in breaching enemy fortified positions through the use of massed offensive actions."

Drones — along with artillery — have become the dominant weapons in the Ukraine war. In particular, while tanks are still a major weapon on the battlefield, they no longer enjoy the supremacy they once had. Hordes of small first-person-view drones have made life hazardous for hulking, expensive weapons such as armored vehicles and artillery pieces, which now operate cautiously and under the protection of air defenses and electronic-warfare systems.

"FPV drones (also known as loitering munitions) have become so effective that they, at a cost of around $350 to $450 per asset, can now be described as the Ukrainian army's principal anti-tank weapon," wrote Sekirin, who has combat experience operating the DJI Mavic 3, a piloted drone popular with hobbyists as well as Ukrainian soldiers.

There are so many drones in Ukraine that operators are stumbling onto enemy drone feeds and picking up intel

Sinรฉad Baker 

There are so many drones in Ukraine that operators sometimes accidentally pick up other feeds.
Those moments can provide intelligence and warnings of coming attacks.
It is an emerging element within the constantly evolving drone war.

There are so many drones in the skies above Ukraine that drone operators occasionally stumble onto enemy drone feeds and pick up unexpected intel. Neither side can be sure, though, when it will luck into this — or when the other side will.

Drones, including cheap first-person-view ones, are being used more in Russia's war against Ukraine than in any other conflict in history. They are being used to attack troops and vehicles, complicating battlefield maneuvers, and they're so prolific that ground troops often struggle to sort out which ones are theirs.

Ukrainian drone operators told Business Insider that extensive drone warfare had resulted in unintentional feed switching.

When this occurs, operators on one side of the battlefield can see the feed of the other side's drone — typically airborne devices that can target soldiers directly or identify enemy positions that will then be targeted. A drone operator in Ukraine said being able to see Russian drone feeds was "useful because you see where the enemy drone that wants to destroy you is flying."

That gives the unit a chance to take defensive action.

The G.O.P.’s Elon Musk Problem

Benjamin Wallace-Wells

For almost a decade, conservatives have insisted that we should take Donald Trump seriously, not literally. But how seriously should we take Elon Musk?

Musk, who funnelled more than two hundred and seventy million dollars into Trump’s Presidential campaign, has become somewhat ubiquitous in the weeks since the election: co-chairing a budget-cutting advisory commission called DOGE, touring Congress, and vociferously supporting the far-right Alternative fรผr Deutschland (AfD) party, in Germany. Questioned about that last one—about his support for a party whose manifesto reads, in part, “Islam does not belong in Germany”—Musk replied, “The AfD policies are identical to those of the US Democratic Party when Obama took office!” Was that literal? Serious or deliberately trolling? 

This week, it has been the turn of conservatives to try to gauge Musk’s meaning and intent. On Tuesday, House Speaker Mike Johnson had just about finalized a short-term agreement on government spending with the Democrats, who, until Inauguration Day, still run the White House. The idea was to pass a continuing resolution to avoid a government shutdown and to insure that all the bills were paid through March, when Republicans would be back in charge. And, for the sake of political tranquility, Johnson made some minor concessions to the Democrats and attached a couple of bills with bipartisan support. But, on Wednesday, Musk unleashed a torrent of more than a hundred and fifty posts on X, the social-media platform he owns, denouncing the agreement, which had the effect of making it the main subject of the world. “Outrageous!” Musk wrote, retweeting a self-styled “Former Jan 6th Political Prisoner” who said the bill would allow Congress to block an investigation into the January 6th House select committee. “Unconscionable,” he wrote, about a claim that the stopgap spending bill would raise congressional pay by forty per cent. (The real figure was 3.8 per cent.) Many of the tweets took this form—a word of outrage, a furious emoji, regarding claims about the bill’s overreach or sheer length. But with

America Needs a Maximum Pressure Strategy in Ukraine

Alina Polyakova

In June 2024, Keith Kellogg, a retired lieutenant general and national security adviser to former President Donald Trump, presented a plan he co-authored with the former CIA analyst Fred Fleitz that proposed halting the delivery of U.S. weapons to Ukraine if Kyiv didn’t enter into peace talks with Moscow—but also warning Moscow that if it refused to negotiate with Kyiv, Washington would increase its support for Ukraine. About five months later, President-elect Trump named Kellogg as his special envoy for Ukraine and Russia. “The makeup of the war has expanded,” Kellogg said in an interview, “and it’s time to put it back in a box.”

In response to Kellogg’s nomination, Konstantin Malofeyev, a Russian oligarch with ties to the Kremlin, told a reporter for the Financial Times what he thought the likely Russian response would be. “Kellogg comes to Moscow with his plan, we take it and then tell him to screw himself, because we don’t like any of it,” Malofeyev said. “That’d be the whole negotiation.”


The MAGA Honeymoon Is Over

Ali Breland

Elon Musk spent Christmas Day online, in the thick of a particularly venomous culture war, one that would lead him to later make the un-Christmas-like demand of his critics to “take a big step back and FUCK YOURSELF in the face.”

Donald Trump had ignited this war by appointing the venture capitalist Sriram Krishnan to be his senior AI-policy adviser. Encouraged by the MAGA acolyte and expert troll Laura Loomer, parts of the far-right internet melted down, arguing that Krishnan’s appointment symbolized a betrayal of the principles of the “America First” movement.

Krishnan is an Indian immigrant and a U.S. citizen who, by virtue of his heritage, became a totem for the MAGA right to argue about H-1B visas, which allow certain skilled immigrants to work in the United States. (Many tech companies rely on this labor.) In response to Krishnan’s appointment, some right-wing posters used racist memes to smear Indians, who have made up nearly-three quarters of H-1B recipients in recent years. Loomer called such workers “third world invaders” and invoked the “Great Replacement” theory, which claims that America’s white population is being purposefully replaced by nonwhite people from other countries.


Why South Korea Should Go Nuclear

Robert E. Kelly and Min-hyung Kim

South Korea has long relied on the United States to keep the North Korean nuclear threat at bay. Pyongyang began taking fitful steps toward a nuclear weapon during the Cold War, tested its first bomb in 2006, and today regularly issues nuclear threats against its southern neighbor. Seoul, meanwhile, shelters under the American nuclear umbrella that came with the defense alliance it signed with Washington in 1953, just after an armistice effectively ended the Korean War. For decades, this arrangement provided South Korea sufficient security assurance. But today, that assurance appears increasingly fragile.

South Korea’s problem is twofold. First, North Korea’s capabilities are growing. Pyongyang has developed an intercontinental ballistic missile, which raises doubts about whether the United States would honor its alliance commitment and fight for South Korea, because North Korea can now strike American cities with a nuclear weapon. Second, Donald Trump, who has harshly criticized the U.S.–South Korean alliance in the past, is set to begin his second term as U.S. president. Under Trump, the likelihood that Washington would intervene in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula will drop further still.

The False Promise of High-Skilled Immigration

Helen Andrews

The Silicon Valley tech titans who joined the Trump coalition during the 2024 presidential race have just had their first major quarrel with the MAGA movement’s more stalwart factions. The issue was high-skilled immigration. It started when Donald Trump announced the appointment of Indian-born venture capitalist Sriram Krishnan as senior policy adviser on artificial intelligence. Krishnan had recently tweeted in favor of eliminating country caps for green cards and “unlock[ing] skilled immigration.” When he was attacked, tech bigwigs including Elon Musk and David Sacks jumped in to defend Krishnan and the H-1B program associated with high-skilled immigrants.

“There is a dire shortage of extremely talented and motivated engineers in America,” Musk tweeted. “If you want your TEAM to win the championship, you need to recruit top talent wherever they may be.” Contrary to the “‘fixed pie’ fallacy,” he argued, high-skilled immigration has “essentially infinite potential for job and company creation.”

The tech bros are wrong. High-skilled immigration threatens to do to the middle class what low-skilled immigration and free trade did to the working class in America. The process is not as far advanced and could still be reversed with the right policies, but if we continue on the current path, the white-collar middle class will see the same result as their blue-collar neighbors.

10 Conflicts to Watch in 2025

Comfort Ero and Richard Atwood

In these unsettled times, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s return to the White House looks set to shake things up further. But how does a disrupter deal with an already disrupted world?

In the Middle East, a chain reaction set off by Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel has propelled a year of staggering change. Israel has buried Gaza under rubble; degraded Iran’s regionwide network of nonstate proxies; demolished Tehran’s own defenses; and, inadvertently, set the stage for Islamist rebels to topple the Assad family’s half-century-old dictatorship in Syria.

Year Ahead – The Coming Year’s Evolution in the Law of Cyber Operations

Jeffrey Biller 

As digital technologies continue to develop at breakneck speed, the law often appears to fall ever further behind. Unfortunately, that gap is unlikely to close as the application of international law in cyberspace is not poised for significant evolution in 2025. Despite some advancements, particularly at the regional level, State practice will continue to demonstrate a lack of consensus regarding international law and State cyber operations.

Formal Discussion of Norms and Rules for State Behavior in Cyberspace

In 2025, the UN’s Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) will continue to make incremental progress in establishing voluntary norms, such as refraining from targeting critical infrastructure and law enforcement cooperation in responding to significant cyberattacks. However, the development of international law in this domain will be challenged by entrenched positions on key issues of disagreement, including the question of creating new binding instruments specific to cyberspace. Nonetheless, significant development will continue to occur within regional bodies such as the African Union and the European Union.

IHL Applicability in Cyberspace Operations During Armed Conflicts

The specific question of international humanitarian law (IHL) applicability in cyberspace will be a key area of contention at the UN OEWG and regional bodies. While State agreement that IHL rules apply to cyberspace operations will continue to expand, the extent to which IHL is viewed as protecting civilian data during armed conflicts will be approached slowly and cautiously. There will be little resolution to the primary questions of defining cyber-attacks and the status of data as an object. One area of advancement will be the increased inclusion of scenario-based explorations of IHL questions by international working groups. Initially, the effect of their inclusion will be limited to defining the primary areas of disagreement with more specificity.

Irregular Warfare in 2024: Lessons Learned, Paths Forward

Guido L Torres

The global security environment in 2024 proved as unpredictable as ever—yet, beneath the headlines, several clear themes and patterns emerged. A review of our articles published throughout the year reveals deeper insights into how irregular warfare is evolving across multiple fronts, from the Indo-Pacific to the Sahel, and from space to the bottom of the sea. This was not a year of singular, decisive battles but of incremental advances and strategic maneuvering in unconventional ways.

In 2024 technology continued to be a transformative force, redefining the operational limits of both small insurgent groups and global superpowers. Actors wielded narratives and perceptions as critical tools in modern warfare. Partnerships and resilience played pivotal roles in shaping alliances, bolstering societal defenses, and destabilizing adversaries. Meanwhile, strategic competition in the gray zone blurred the lines between war and peace, making indirect warfare the centerpiece of great power rivalries. Below is a synthesis of major trends, lessons learned, and interesting data points that can help contextualize and forecast what might come next.
Disruptive Technologies

In 2024, technology cemented itself not merely as a tool but as a revolutionary force in irregular warfare, reshaping the contours of conflict and enabling actors to achieve strategic objectives. This shift showcased a range of capabilities—drones, cyber tools, space-based systems, and artificial intelligence (AI)—that altered the operations of both state and non-state actors while exposing vulnerabilities that require urgent attention.

The modern battlefield exemplified this transformation, where Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) evolved from basic surveillance tools into strategic force multipliers. These drones now execute precision strikes, deliver logistical support, and perform in new ways every day. Adversaries like insurgents and narco-criminals have demonstrated remarkable ingenuity, adapting commercially available drones for offensive purposes, as explored in Harnessing Insurgent and Narco-Criminal Drone Tactics for Special Operations. Conversely, the inability of conventional forces to fully address this threat underscores the urgent need for improved counter-drone capabilities, as highlighted in How the US Army Can Close its Dangerous and Growing Small Drone Gap.

What Matthew Livelsberger's Social Media Reveals About Cybertruck Suspect

Marni Rose McFall

Anumber of posts on social media accounts purportedly linked to Tesla Cybertruck explosion suspect Matthew Livelsberger reveal details about his life.

Livelsberger has been named in reports as the suspect found dead inside an explosives-filled Tesla Cybertruck that blew up outside President-elect Donald Trump's Las Vegas hotel on Wednesday, New Year's Day 2025.

Colorado Springs station KOAA and the New York Post have reported that Livelsberger, a 37-year-old former Army veteran, is the suspect, citing unnamed law enforcement sources.

Newsweek has reached out to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department via email for comment.

One person died and seven more were injured after the explosion cause fire to erupt in the valet area outside the Trump International Hotel at Las Vegas Boulevard at around 8:40 a.m. local time, according to authorities. The dead person was said to have been behind the wheel of the vehicle that exploded.

Police have yet to determine what caused the incident and are investigating whether it was an act of terrorism.

There are three social media accounts in question: a LinkedIn account linked to Matt Livelsberger, a Facebook account linked to a Matt Berg, and a Facebook account linked to what appears to be a wife or girlfriend of Livelsberger, named Sara Livelsberger.

Newsweek has not been able to independently verify the veracity of these accounts.

Here is the military service record for the New Orleans attack suspect

Jeff Schogol

Shamsud-Din Jabbar, whom the FBI has identified as the suspect who allegedly killed at least 15 people in New Orleans on Wednesday, served in the Army from March 2007 to July 2020 after briefly enlisting in the Navy’s delayed entry program, defense officials told Task & Purpose.

“Shamsud-Din Bahar Jabbar was in the regular Army as a Human Resource Specialist (42A) and Information Technology (IT) Specialist (25B) from March 2007 until January 2015 and then in the Army Reserve as an IT Specialist (25B) from January 2015 until July 2020,” a defense official said. “He deployed to Afghanistan from February 2009 to January 2010. He held the rank of Staff Sergeant at the end of service.”

His awards include three Army Commendation Medals, four Army Achievement Medals, two Army Good Conduct Medal, the Army Reserve Components Achievement Medal, National Defense Service Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Medal with campaign star, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, two Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Ribbons, the Army Service Ribbon, Overseas Service Ribbon, Army Reserve Component Overseas Training Ribbon, NATO Medal, two Meritorious Unit Commendations, the Parachutist Badge, and the Driver and Mechanic Badge.