1 January 2025

HAPPY NEW YEAR 2025

HAPPY NEW YEAR 2025

 

The Man Who Relaunched India

KAUSHIK BASU

The passing of Manmohan Singh, India’s prime minister from 2004 to 2014, has led to an unexpected eruption of nostalgia and appreciation. Singh’s modesty and low-key style made it easy for many to overlook his achievements in boosting India’s economic growth and elevating its global standing. His death, at 92, has thrown a spotlight on an impressive record.

Singh will be remembered as one of the world’s most important – and most unlikely – political leaders. I first met him in the late 1980s in the East Delhi housing complex where my family lived at the time. Singh had finished his term as governor of the Reserve Bank of India and was looking to buy a simple apartment in our locality. A friend of mine called to ask if he could bring Singh to see ours.

Singh came and met us and chatted with my mother. But he never moved to the area, because soon thereafter he was appointed secretary-general of the South Commission in Geneva; and, after that, in 1991, he became India’s finance minister. In 2004, my mother called me, excitedly informing me that the soft-spoken, unassuming Singh had just become India’s Prime Minister.

Inside China’s plan to conquer the Pacific

Roland Oliphant

Rugby League is a fast-moving, sometimes physically brutal game born in the working-class communities of northern England.

Now it is at the centre of an even higher-stakes geopolitical competition on the other side of the world.

Anthony Albanese and James Marape, the prime ministers of Australia and Papua New Guinea, this month announced Australia would spend A$600 million (£298 million) over 10 years to set up a Papua New Guinea team to play in the Australian league.

But it comes hand in hand with another pact that makes clear Australia will remain Papua New Guinea’s main security partner. In other words, China will not be.

The “rugby diplomacy” deal is, after all, about far more than just sport. For Australia and its Western allies, it is part of an ongoing scrum over China’s plans to conquer the Pacific.

China Rapidly Builds Up Weapons And Psychological Warfare Operations

Chuck DeVore

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is undertaking an unprecedented military buildup aimed at challenging America and its allies, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. And, like Nazi Germany’s buildup in the 1930s, the militarization program ordered by the Chinese Communist Party isn’t simply a great power buildup — it’s a weapon in service of a deadly ideology.

The 2024 Department of Defense China Military Power Report and recent analysis by Bill Gertz in the Washington Times reveal this buildup as part of a broader strategy by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to position itself as a global superpower. Meanwhile, the U.S., having spent $5.4 trillion on the global war on terror and attendant, futile nation-building, has left itself strategically vulnerable by diverting critical resources while underestimating the threat from China.

Missile Expansion and Strategic Modernization

China has rapidly expanded the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) arsenal, adding, that we know of, some:
  • 50 new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of striking the continental U.S., for a cumulative total of 400.
  • 300 medium-range ballistic missiles and 100 long-range cruise missiles.
  • More than 600 operational nuclear warheads, projected to surpass 1,000 by 2030.
  • Hypersonic missiles like the DF-27, capable of evading U.S. missile defenses and targeting Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska​.
  • China’s navy, already the largest in the world with 370 ships and submarines, is expected to grow to 435 by 2030.

China firing preemptive trade war shots at Trump

Yong Jian

China has heightened trade war tensions with the United States by extending existing tariffs imposed on a crucial chemical solvent, sanctioning seven American firms on security grounds and threatening to stop buying US semiconductors within a single day.

China’s Ministry of Commerce (MoC) announced on December 27 that it will continue to impose anti-dumping duties on n-butanol imports from the US, Taiwan and Malaysia for another five years, effective from December 29, 2024.

The MoC said removing the anti-dumping duties would likely lead to a resumption or continuation of dumping practices and subsequent harm to China’s domestic n-butanol industry.

N-butanol is a key organic chemical used in the production of various products including paints, adhesives and plasticizers.

On December 29, 2018, China imposed 52.2-139.3% tariffs on n-butanol imports from the US and 12.7-26.7% tariffs on those from Malaysia. A 56.1% duty was imposed on all Taiwanese firms, except Formosa Plastics Corp, which only paid 6%.

In 2022, China imported 105,400 tons (66% of total) of n-butanol from Taiwan and 37,300 tons (23.4% of total) from Saudi Arabia, according to a report published by the Beijing-based Huajing Industry Research Institute. The remaining came from Russia, South Africa and Malaysia.

Outgoing Raimondo admits China chip war a ‘fool’s errand’

Scott Foster

US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, the Biden administration’s leading light behind efforts to limit China’s access to advanced chips and related technologies, now says that export controls are merely “speed bumps” and that “trying to hold China back is a fool’s errand.”

In Raimondo’s view, the CHIPS and Science Act – a US$52.7 billion industrial policy aimed at reviving US semiconductor production and high-tech R&D and signed into law by President Joe Biden in 2022 – is more important than sanctions against China.

“The only way to beat China is to stay ahead of them,” Raimondo told The Wall Street Journal in an article published on December 22. “We have to run faster, out innovate them. That’s the way to win,” she said.

How Will Trump’s National Security Team Shape His China Policy?

Gabriel Corsetti

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s views on China are often considered to be erratic and unpredictable. His first presidency led to a negative shift in China-U.S. relations. On the eve of his second presidency, Trump’s attitude remains hard to gauge. His current focus is still on the trade deficit, and he plans to impose high tariffs on Chinese goods if elected. On the other hand, he has refused to confirm that he would use U.S. military force to protect Taiwan in the event of a conflict, and in fact he has recently accused Taiwan of stealing U.S. jobs in the semiconductor industry.

With conflicting signals from Trump himself, do his picks for key national security positions offer more clarity?

Trump’s National Security Picks Are Mostly China Hawks

During Trump’s second term in office, much about his approach to China will depend on his foreign policy advisers. Trump announced the picks for his national security team in mid-November. Precedent suggests that his nominees will most likely be confirmed by the Senate.

While in 2016 Trump picked individuals with a long experience in government or business, this time he has made several unconventional choices that have unsettled policy circles in Washington. His most “traditional” picks are probably Mike Waltz as national security adviser and Marco Rubio as secretary of state. Both are professional politicians and hardline conservatives with hawkish views on China.

As resurgent ISIS exploits Syria’s void, will Trump cede fight to Turkey?

Colin P. Clarke

“The single biggest concern I have is the resurgence of ISIS,” US national security adviser Jake Sullivan said over the weekend on CNN.

The lightning rebel advance led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham that toppled the regime of longtime Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has left ungoverned spaces throughout the country. Over the past decade, the Islamic State has repeatedly proven adept at exploiting these power vacuums, using the opportunities to recruit, recuperate and rearm.

Since the fall of the Assad regime, the US military has conducted several bombing raids against ISIS positions in Syria. In the first wave in early December, B-52 bombers, F-15 fighters and A-10 Warthogs attacked 75 targets consisting of ISIS leaders, operatives and training camps. A week later US airstrikes killed another dozen ISIS fighters, targeting more operatives and training camps. Late last week, US Central Command announced that the United States had successfully eliminated ISIS leader Abu Yusif in Deir ez-Zor province in the latest round of precision strikes against the Islamic State’s leadership echelon.

Turkey’s resurgence has left the West flat-footed

Philip Pilkington

Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria earlier this month, there was a brief period of excitement in Western foreign policy circles. Now, as new battle lines are drawn and Turkey reasserts its influence in the region, such hopes are fading quickly.

This week, Turkish President Recep Tayyip ErdoฤŸan stated that if Kurdish militias in Syria did not lay down their arms they would be “buried”. The position of the new Syrian government under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) on the Kurdish question is unclear, but it is becoming increasingly evident that the Turks wield enormous influence over the group.

Shortly after ErdoฤŸan’s statement, his son announced a rally in Istanbul on 1 January, adding: “Yesterday Hagia Sophia, today the Umayyad Mosque, tomorrow Al-Aqsa.” The Umayyad Mosque is in Damascus, and so we can only infer from this that the Turks consider themselves the new major power in Syria. Al-Asqa Mosque is located in Jerusalem, and so its mention raised eyebrows in Israel about this resurgence in Turkish regional power.

Syria will never be unified Western busybodies should be wary

Edward Luttwak

The foreign busybodies in the State Department, Foreign Office and the French foreign ministry, who are already now pressing for the reconstruction of a unitary Syrian state, should reflect on the country’s history. Syria was never meant to function as a unitary state. Nor under Sunni Arab majority rule, as it is likely to now.

The distinct national identities of its Alawite, Arab Christian-Orthodox, Druze, Kurdish, Armenian, Ismaili and Arab Shia populations were all recognised under Ottoman rule. And when France obtained the territory in 1919, it strove to accommodate plural identities by creating two separate states: an Alawite one in north-west Syria and a Druze one in the south-east.

But when the French gave up their attempt to control Syria in 1946, a Sunni Arab, Shukri al-Quwatli, became the country’s president. He did not discriminate against the minorities, but he did send troops with Transjordan and Egypt to invade Israel in 1948 in the name of Sunni Arab solidarity. He had high hopes of conquering the Galilee, because the Syrians had tanks and artillery left behind by the French, while the Jews only had rifles, some machine-guns, and a couple of antique 1906 howitzers.

Part II: Neo-Imperialism is making a comeback, time to choose your hegemon

Ralph Schoellhammer

What is a “pole“? I believe in the ongoing debate about uni- and multipolarity we have to establish what the characteristics of a pole are, independently of their number. When we talk about a pole in geopolitics, it describes a geographical region that is dominated by a single state that has the ability to influence or dominate the behaviour of other states in that region. In other words, multipolarity is just a euphemism for a world divided into different regions that are controlled by a local hegemon that tries to establish a sphere of interest.

The popular claim that the end of the unipolar order and the so-called rules-based liberal international order will be replaced by both a new era of sovereignty as well as multipolarity has a massive internal contradiction: There will be no new universal sovereignty, only the sovereignty of regional hegemons who most likely will be more aggressive than the US has been as the sole, unipolar hegemon. Criticizing the US has been fashionable for both the intelligentsia on the Left and the Right, but in hindsight Washington was enacting mostly a hands-off approach during its unipolar moment.

Trump settles MAGA movement feud on tech visas

David P Goldman

A week before Donald Trump fired him in August 2017, then-presidential strategist Steve Bannon blew up at this writer for suggesting that American industry needed to bring in Chinese engineers.

“They’re all Chinese spies!” Bannon shouted. We were sitting in Bannon’s disheveled cubicle in the West Wing, talking about reviving US manufacturing. America graduates barely 34,000 mechanical engineers and about 17,000 chemical engineers a year, I observed. As much as we want to train American talent, I argued, we can’t do that fast enough to keep pace with China.

Math education in the US is a disaster, and the Bannon wing of the MAGA movement is a case in point: Opponents of legal immigration for skilled workers can’t understand the numbers that show how badly they are needed. More on that below.

Bannon waded into the debate again last week, lambasting Tesla and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk for backing the H-1B visa program that allows US companies to hire foreign engineers. The H-1B program “t’s about taking American jobs and bringing over essentially what have become indentured servants at lower wages…the thing’s a SCAM by the Oligarchs in Silicon Valley,” Bannon tweeted.

Washington’s Crossing Exemplified the Importance of Adaptability in Warfare

Susan Brynne Long

The morning of December 26, 1776, did not start according to plan. The night before, George Washington had led 2,400 Continental Army soldiers across the Delaware River, thinking that two additional troop columns were doing the same at other designated crossing points. The Patriots were tasked with neutralizing a garrison of Hessian auxiliaries at Trenton, New Jersey, before pivoting to nearby British outposts.

Instead, only one column succeeded in crossing the Delaware, and hours behind schedule. Yet in this confluence of challenge, error, and bad breaks, Washington exhibited an enduring priority of the American military: adaptability. He pressed the attack, and his victory saved the Patriot cause.

Washington’s crossing of the Delaware River was a desperate act. As 1776 drew to a close, the commander-in-chief feared that the defeat of the American rebellion was at hand. British General William Howe had captured New York City in mid-November, ending months of fighting for control of the American capital city. Running low on supplies and morale, Washington removed the Continental Army to Pennsylvania to rest and reset.

An Open Letter to Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia, General Keith Kellogg: The Strategic Realities of the War in Ukraine

Keith D. Dickson and Yurij Holowinsky

After 1,000 days of war, there seems to be no end in sight. Ukrainian forces have pushed into the Kursk Oblast, occupying the Sudzhansky Rayon and have a tentative grip on the territory, creating a bulge that must be defended, while serving as an occupying force. Russian forces batter relentlessly against entrenched Ukrainian defenders from Kupyarsk to Pokrovsk in the eastern Donbas. Although both sides put their hopes in fielding a new weapons system or missile will change the course of the war, it is a false hope: this is a war of attrition. Despite Russia’s often admired sophisticated concepts of war at the operational level, the Russian armed forces are incapable of applying them. Their leadership has neither the imagination, nor do their combat units have the training, to conduct sophisticated joint operations or combined arms maneuver. Russian forces have naturally, almost unconsciously, reverted to the model of war their grandfathers and great-great grandfathers understood: simple, straightforward, uncomplicated, unsophisticated infantry assaults backed by mass artillery strikes with the belief that enough men and steel thrown against the enemy will eventually break them. It has been the approach from the Masurian Lakes to Grozny. The Russians accept casualties at a rate that has astounded their enemies for over 100 years; the Russian soldier is capable of enduring atrocious conditions that would destroy the morale of any other army. New wrinkles have been introduced, with mostly indiscriminate rocket and missile attacks and the arrival of thousands of mercenaries from around the globe along with North Korean combat troops. Yet, the model of simple attrition is unchanged. The enemy inevitably wears down before the Russian steamroller wears down.

Bring Back the War Department

Elliot Ackerman

Donald Trump’s selection of Pete Hegseth to lead the Defense Department signals the incoming administration’s intention to enact significant changes at the Pentagon. Some of what the administration aims to pursue seems ill-advised; waging a culture war inside the U.S. military is a specious enterprise, whether prosecuted by the left or the right. However, the Trump administration could swiftly enact one cultural change at the Pentagon that would be for the good, and send a powerful signal aligned with the administration’s priorities: Trump could ask Congress to redesignate the Defense Department as the War Department.

The secretary of defense position came into being after the Second World War, as part of the sweeping 1947 National Security Act. Before then, the nation had a War Department, which oversaw the Army, and a separate Navy Department. With the Cold War on the horizon, the 1947 act greatly expanded the scope of the national-security state to confront the Soviet threat; for example, the U.S. Air Force and CIA are both creations of the act. A 1949 amendment formally brought the armed forces under a single civilian leader, and renamed the new entity the Department of Defense. By changing the department’s name, Congress also endorsed an expansionist view of the new department’s mission. For the U.S. military, the 77 years that followed the act’s passage ushered in an era of unprecedented nation-building and humanitarian missions all over the world.

Studies in Intelligence 68, No. 5 (Special Edition, IRTPA 20 Years


Studies in pleased to present this special edition marking the 20th anniversary of the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), which created the position of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to oversee the US Intelligence Community.

The edition includes a rich mix of perspectives and reminiscences from people who were instrumental in crafting and implementing IRTPA, particularly during the formative years of ODNI. Their insights and perspectives are valuable additions to the historical literature and should stimulate discussion of the future direction of the IC.


Trump’s Key Foreign Policy Challenges – OpEd

Kerry Boyd Anderson

As ever, a new year comes with new challenges and opportunities. For US foreign policy, the new Trump administration, which will take office on Jan. 20, will shape the country’s approach to the world. As with all presidents, Donald Trump will have significant power to determine foreign policy but will also have to determine how to respond to events that are unexpected or outside of US control.

When Trump once again becomes president, he and his senior advisers will face two major wars — in Ukraine and Gaza — that have bedeviled the outgoing administration. Trump has repeatedly said that he could very quickly end the war between Russia and Ukraine and now he will have an opportunity to attempt to do so. Trump and some of his top advisers have expressed skepticism about or opposition to America’s provision of weapons and aid to Ukraine. It is very likely that Ukraine will face a major reduction in US assistance once Trump returns to the White House.

Trump recently appointed Keith Kellogg as his special envoy to address the war. Kellogg has proposed using the threat of cutting off future aid as leverage to force Ukraine to negotiate, while offering incentives such as putting off NATO membership for Ukraine and alleviating sanctions to persuade Moscow to negotiate. Regardless of the policy specifics, Ukraine will find itself in a weaker position vis-a-vis Russia, which indeed might lead to negotiations to end the war, but probably on terms that are more disappointing to Kyiv than to Moscow.

Here’s why Trump’s foreign policy is hard to pin down - Opinion

Jasen Castillo, John Schuessler and Miranda Priebe

It is common to hear President-elect Donald Trump described as an isolationist. According to critics, Trump deserves this moniker because he would abandon the long-standing American strategy of deep engagement, which calls for promoting and protecting the liberal global order with U.S. economic and military power.

But this isolationist characterization is off the mark. It overstates the likely influence of those who call for a more restrained U.S. approach to the world within a second Trump administration. Sure, there will be groups calling for a less militarized approach to Europe and the Middle East — including from within the Republican Party — but they face an uphill battle in convincing the administration to adopt such proposals.

In his first term, Trump was far from an isolationist. While he certainly abandoned some multilateral and liberal elements of previous administrations’ strategies, he did not significantly reduce the U.S. role in security affairs around the world. He embraced competition with China, both in the economic and military spheres. He also pursued a policy of maximum pressure on Iran, abandoning the carefully crafted agreement that had been in place to limit Tehran’s nuclear program. And he increased spending and military activities in Europe through the European Reassurance Initiative to calm nervous allies.

Accusations That Trump Is ‘Transactional’ in Foreign Relations Miss the Point of Diplomacy - Opinio

GRANT NEWSHAM

The terms “transactional,” “dealmaker,” “businessman” and the like are routinely lobbed at President Trump. They accuse him of not understanding the nuances of foreign relations and diplomacy — and even suggest he’s got a certain amorality to him.

Yet what relationship with a foreign country or any agreement or “deal” between nations isn’t “transactional”? They all are. It’s the essence of the thing. Both sides believe and expect they are getting something useful out of it.

We Looked at 78 Election Deepfakes. Political Misinformation Is Not an AI Problem.

Sayash Kapoor & Arvind Narayanan

AI-generated misinformation was one of the top concerns during the 2024 U.S. presidential election. In January 2024, the World Economic Forum claimed that “misinformation and disinformation is the most severe short-term risk the world faces” and that “AI is amplifying manipulated and distorted information that could destabilize societies.”

In contrast, in our past writing, we predicted that AI would not lead to a misinformation apocalypse. When Meta released its open-weight large language model (called LLaMA), we argued that it would not lead to a tidal wave of misinformation. And in a follow-up essay, we pointed out that the distributionof misinformation is the key bottleneck for influence operations, and while generative AI reduces the cost of creating misinformation, it does not reduce the cost of distributing it. A few other researchers have made similar arguments.

Which of these two perspectives better fits the facts?

Fortunately, we have the evidence of AI use in elections that took place around the globe in 2024 to help answer this question. Many news outlets and research projects have compiled known instances of AI-generated text and media and their impact. Instead of speculating about AI’s potential, we can look at its real-world impact to date.

Race for Arctic resources in a climate change era

Tatiana Kanunnikova

In November, a student-led project made a disturbing discovery: Mesyatsev Island, a floating slab of ice previously observed in the Arctic, had almost disappeared. It took around a decade and a half for the 11.8-million-square-foot island to shrink by 99.7% and vanish from the Arctic’s map.

Indeed, the Arctic is changing fast, impacting ecosystems and economies all over the world. Over the last 50 years, the polar region has been warming up four times faster than other parts of the globe, a phenomenon known as Arctic amplification. Temperatures have risen considerably; in 2023, the region experienced its warmest summer.

“A melting Arctic presents new challenges and exacerbates existing ones for Arctic states and communities,” said Samuel Jardine, head of research at London Politica. “Degrading permafrost has already seen infrastructure damage as foundations collapse and pipelines deform.”

“It is estimated that 34% of the population in the Arctic’s permafrost regions will be at risk by the end of 2100, with it costing between US$205-$572 billion depending on who you ask to just maintain the operation of engineering and service infrastructure in the 2080s,” Jardine said.

Claims of ‘Ghost Ships’ and ‘External Interference’ in Plane Crash Suggest Russian Involvement in Global Incidents

Micah Hanks

Welcome to this week’s yuletide edition of The Intelligence Brief… over the Christmas holiday, a pair of concerning incidents occurred that have sparked new worries over Russian involvement among international officials. In our analysis, we’ll be looking at 1) the unusual circumstances involving a plane crash in Kazakhstan that has caused some experts to point the finger at Moscow, 2) the seizure of a vessel by Finnish officials amid investigations into a damaged power cable in the Baltic Sea, and 3) why many experts point to the potential operation of alleged “ghost ships” by Russia as part of a new modern effort involving “hybrid warfare.”

New Concerns Arise Over Holiday Incidents Potentially Linked to Moscow

A concerning pair of incidents that occurred over the Christmas holiday have raised fresh concerns about potential Russian involvement in destabilizing global infrastructure and security.

The alarming events, including a passenger plane crash crashed near Aktau International Airport, Kazakhstan, and the severing of a critical undersea cable in the Baltic Sea, both occurred on Christmas Day.

Each of the incidents potentially point to shadowy tactics used by Moscow, which some experts attribute to “hybrid warfare” amid allegations of sabotage and covert operations that highlight the growing unease about Russia’s potential role in these disruptions, while international bodies like NATO call for accountability and readiness.

A Better Chance Without France?

Kamran Bokhari

Over the past few months, the Levant sub-region in the Middle East has experienced geopolitical changes of historic proportions. The shockwaves from these changes, which are still very much in play as various powers and factions holding pieces of territory in Syria try to tilt the gameboard and pull the area’s future in their direction, will be felt throughout the entire Middle East and, through it, the world.

The situation is fraught with both danger—and opportunity. President-elect Donald Trump clearly indicated in his recent interview with Time Magazine that when it comes to the Middle East, “…I support whatever, whatever is necessary to get not just peace, a lasting peace. It can’t go on where every five years you end up in tragedy. There are other alternatives.” In seeking to make these aspirations a reality, the incoming president has his work cut out for him. Unfortunately, one place where he is unlikely to get any practical help is France.

One could argue that the recent upheaval in Lebanon, which, along with Syria, used to be a French protectorate, began when Hezbollah began firing into northern Israel a day after Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023. By September 2024, Israel began hitting back hard—first blowing up the pagers, cell phones, and laptops used by Hezbollah field commanders and then eliminating its leadership, including its central leader, Hassan Nasrallah. During most of this period, Lebanon’s and Syria’s former colonial ruler, France, was largely missing in action, except for occasional, often contradictory, and occasionally grandiose comments from French President Emmanuel Macron.

The Most Important Breakthroughs of 2024

Derek Thompson

This is my third time honoring what I see as the year’s most important scientific and technological advances.

In 2022, my theme was the principle of “twin ideas,” when similar inventions emerge around the same time. Just as Alexander Graham Bell and Elisha Gray both arguably conceived of the modern telephone in 1876 (and, by some accounts, on the same day!), the U.S. saw a cluster of achievements in generative AI, cancer treatment, and vaccinology.

In 2023, my theme was the long road of progress. My top breakthrough was Casgevy, a gene-editing therapy for patients with sickle-cell anemia. The therapy built on decades of research on CRISPR, an immune defense system borrowed from the world of bacteria.

This year, my theme is the subtler power of incremental improvement, which has also been a motif of technological progress. Although nothing invented in 2024 rivals the gosh-wow debut of ChatGPT or the discovery of GLP-1 drugs, such as Ozempic, this year witnessed several advancements across medicine, space technology, and AI that extend our knowledge in consequential ways.

2025: Our top five emerging tech predictions

Nick Sinnott, Rob Wythe, Henry Tse, Hannah Green & Jessica Regan

Vigilance required to tackle rising AI-generated threats

In 2024, AI became even more embedded in society, having a significant impact on everyday life and on private and public sectors alike. As the technology evolves rapidly, we can only expect this trend to continue in 2025. The same is true for conversations surrounding it, particularly around the responsible use of AI.

Neuromorphic and quantum tech to bring real-world benefits

Neuromorphic vs. quantum computing

When it’s mature enough to be applied to real-world problems, quantum computing will be a game changer. But this reality is years away. In the shorter term, there is another form of high-performance computing we should be looking at: neuromorphic computing.

Advanced situational awareness to drive unified multi-domain and cross-domain integration

As the trend towards multi-domain and cross-domain operations grows, connecting data from different domains – from subsea through to space – will be crucial for equipping those in critical sectors, including defence, security and law enforcement, with the 360° vision and situational awareness needed to make informed and rapid decisions.

Compass Points - CRS Report on the LSM


Ronald O'Rourke, a CRS Specialist in Naval Affairs, has produced many quality reports for the Congressional Research Service, his latest covers the Medium Landing Ship (LSM). The report is packed with information on the Marine Corps and the LSM. The author, however, could not have predicted that just as his report was published, a late breaking development has changed the entire issue of funding the LSM.

Before getting to the latest LSM funding development, it is worth looking at the inception of the LSM. No one should be allowed to pick up a wrench to start building the LSM, without first examining more fundamental questions. The first question is 'why?' Is there any good reason to build any LSMs? The LSMs have been proposed as a crucial part of the Marine Corps' controversial plan to place Marine missile units on islands in the Pacific. Before any answer can be given about constructing the LSM, questions need to be asked about Force Design itself and about its related operational concept, EABO - Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations.

In his LSM report, Ronald O'Rourke lists 9 issues for Congress related to the LSM, Force Design, and EABO. In addition, O'Rourke provides a substantial index of published articles that explore the LSM, Force Design, and EABO. The answers to the issues he raises are contained in the articles O'Rourke lists and others.