Mick Ryan
Over the past three years, both sides in the Ukraine war have learned and adapted. Both sides have learned to learn more quickly and to proliferate lessons into their military and industrial systems. In the past six months the adaptation battle has intensified. It has technical dimensions, but also organisational and doctrinal aspects as well. Ukraine’s adaptive stance is driven by an existential threat that is not apparent to western nations not currently at war. Russia too is now learning and adapting quickly. Where they aren’t innovative, they are fast followers.
Adaptation, in technology and tactics, is now moving at a speed that is probably incomprehensible to western politicians and defence bureaucrats.
Ukraine’s learning system, which is not always fully joined up from the tactical to strategic levels, offers lessons on how western militaries might improve and speed up their learning and adaptation processes and cultures. On the other hand, Russia has learned to learn better and faster as the war has progressed. This makes it a more dangerous adversary for Ukraine, as well as a much more capable and dangerous military to threaten Europe.
Perhaps the most important feature of the interactive adaptation struggle is that it can no longer be described purely as an adaptation battle. While there are important issues to research and analyse from the battlefield and at the strategic levels of war, there is now an important international dimension. Ukraine is sharing lessons with its partners and Russia has fostered the development of an active learning community with Iran, North Korea and China.
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