Trym Eiterjord
China’s presence is being felt in the Arctic. Despite a retreat from the region in recent years, following political pushback and a series of abortive infrastructure and extractive projects, Beijing’s maritime activities – or perceived activities – in the region continue to stoke fears among Western Arctic governments and provide grist for pundits warning about an Arctic in peril. U.S. President Donald Trump illustrated as much during a January news conference where he explained his rationale for wanting to buy, or otherwise acquire, the Arctic island nation of Greenland: “You look outside, you have China ships all over the place.”
The reality, however, is different. Rather than an Arctic Ocean teeming with Chinese-flagged vessels, Beijing’s maritime presence in the region remains modest and, for now, does not pose the security risks many have warned about.
China, to be sure, sees itself as a “near-Arctic” state with scientific, economic, and strategic interests in the region, as spelled out in its 2018 Arctic policy. Beijing has identified Arctic waterways as important for diversifying its access to various strategic resources. It has included the Arctic Ocean as a maritime space within its globe-spanning Belt and Road Initiative and proposed to build a “Polar Silk Road” connecting economies throughout the region. Although making up only a tiny fraction of global seaborne commerce, cargo traffic across the Arctic is today dominated by the Russia-China energy trade. Last October, Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered the Arctic Ocean for the first time.
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