Benjamin Jensen and Erica Lonergan
Within hours of the announcement of a ceasefire in Ukraine that limited conventional attacks on critical infrastructure and military operations in the Black Sea, something interesting happened: a dueling series of cyberattacks. Ukrainian railways were hit by a large-scale cyberattack designed to limit both military and economic transportation (though the attack did not actually disrupt any railway traffic). In Russia, cyberattacks hit a mix of banking apps, mobile payment systems, internet providers, and the oil giant Lukoil.
These tit-for-tat cyber operations highlight a new pattern: how states are increasingly using non-kinetic attacks against critical infrastructure as a coercive strategy to gain a competitive advantage and manage escalation, even during a war. Covert or anonymous strikes in cyberspace—and even in space—are becoming an important form of bargaining in modern statecraft. Precisely because these actions are non-kinetic and do not cause physical damage, they offer a broader range of options for states to signal to and engage in bargaining with adversaries. As a result, countries supporting Ukraine will need to address the risk of Moscow seeking to gain negotiation leverage through indirect methods in both the space and cyber domains. This will require steps to improve Ukraine’s resilience in both space and cyberspace as part of a broader deterrence strategy.
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