Alexander Cooley
After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, many Western analysts and scholars who study post-Soviet countries expected those countries’ governments and publics to express solidarity with Ukraine and denounce Russian attempts to reclaim territory and deny Ukraine’s sovereignty. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the post-Soviet states have sought to consolidate their independence, forging links with the West and other regional players while remaining mindful of the need to manage their relations with Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, has since 1999 made reestablishing influence over Russia’s “near abroad” a strategic priority in his bid to justify his great-power aspirations.
Putin began his tenure by waging an aggressive military campaign to bring Chechnya back under Moscow’s control. And over the course of the next decade, he intensified his attempts to curb Western influence across the post-Soviet space, opposing the continued presence of U.S. military bases in Central Asia and the so-called color revolutions that brought more Western-friendly governments into power in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine. The Kremlin justified its 2008 war with Georgia as an effort to protect Russia’s “privileged” sphere of influence in the “near abroad.” Moscow’s strategic priority to blunt Western influence in its region has now culminated in its “special military operation” in Ukraine and a three-year standoff with the West over Ukraine’s future.
No comments:
Post a Comment