Pavel K. Baev
Russia’s war against Ukraine is stuck in a rigid deadlock. The prospect of agreeing on a ceasefire, which had appeared within reach a couple of weeks ago, has, however, become distant and blurred. Russian President Vladimir Putin is not procrastinating or bargaining, he deliberately persists with unfeasible conditions while accepting concessions as a matter of routine (Re: Russia, March 27). This uncompromising position led to little progress gained from the tri-lateral U.S.-Russia-Ukraine talks in Saudi Arabia on reducing hostilities in the Black Sea (Carnegie Politika, March 27). An agreement should have been possible because Ukraine consistently refrains from attacking tankers of the Russian “shadow fleet” with its naval drones, but Moscow demands more concessions while refusing to cease missile strikes on Odesa (see EDM; Novaya gazeta Europe, March 28). At the end of the week, Putin expeditiously shifted the focus of political maneuvering from the Black Sea to the Arctic.
The annual forum “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue” in Murmansk, held on March 27, used to be a meeting place for international stakeholders, but it has been reduced to a podium for Putin’s rhetoric (see Panorama, March 21; Izvestiya, March 28). Russia is excluded from all formats of international cooperation, and its partnership with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) yields few benefits. Consequently, Putin made a rare admission that the model for developing the Northern Sea Route was unworkable (Kommersant, March 27). He did not mention that the production of natural gas was fast contracting and Gazprom’s market value was sinking (Lenta.ru; RBC, March 28). In Putin’s mind, these economic setbacks are of scant significance compared to the main source of Russia’s strength in the Arctic—the Northern Fleet.
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