Jackson Smith & Cristina Garafola
In March, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) announced the successful launch of a fifth batch of satellites to comprise its broadband G60 megaconstellation, also referred to as the Qianfan (千帆; “Thousand Sails”) Constellation. This latest batch was launched on the Long March 8, a new generation rocket designed specifically for placing assets in low earth orbit (LEO) (MIIT, March 12). The PRC’s increased efforts to capitalize on dwindling space in LEO have been driven in part by developments in U.S. space capabilities.
Over the past several years, U.S. activities in LEO have attracted great interest within the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Analysis of professional military education textbooks and journal articles written by PLA scholars and Chinese industry experts indicates that the PLA associates the development of LEO as a warfighting domain with the fielding and expansion of the commercial Starlink constellation, operated by the American firm SpaceX. [1] By linking Starlink with U.S. military activities in LEO, PLA researchers attach specific security implications to Starlink, which in turn has led to a range of countermeasures being proposed, as well as the development of indigenous Chinese LEO systems (China Brief, September 6, 2024).
Perceptions of Starlink Inform PLA Views of pLEO and LEO as a Warfighting Domain
A survey of research from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the United States’ use of space as a military domain since the 1990s reveals that the PLA’s shift in focus toward LEO is closely tied to the PLA’s assessments of the operational significance of Starlink. Taking a closer look at the evolution of PLA space research, therefore offers a more holistic perspective on the origins of its emphasis on LEO, proliferated LEO (pLEO), and Starlink, as well as PLA analyses’ tendency to equate the three. [2]
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