The Principles of Deterrence Still Hold, It’s Just More Complex
At its core, the foundational intellectual and practical tenets of deterrence still hold in this era of renewed strategic competition and evolving technological complexity. Deterrence remains the use of policies and threats of action to induce an actor to stop or prevent an action from taking place (as opposed to compellence, which is the use of policies or threats of action to force an actor to do something). Deterrence is part of grand strategy and statecraft, designed to ensure that two parties or more of considerable power can co-exist. Its success is based on something not happening as opposed to an action occurring. It is, therefore, often difficult to define what action or series of actions caused the effect.
Successful deterrence remains predicated on shaping adversary perceptions—it is inherently part of a broader dialogue between states. If the threats or responses do not exceed the level of target aggression or willingness to incur pain—if, in effect, the potential costs do not outweigh the perceived benefits of acting—deterrence is ineffective. As described below, this necessitates considerable understanding of one’s adversary and oneself. Deterrence is also based upon clarity of policy and intention. If the policy or intentions are unclear or vague, or they create alternative courses of action (such as pre-emptive action), deterrence will be ineffective. Equally, the responses themselves require clarity—it is no use leaving the response unclear as it creates space for adversary interpretation. Finally, the deterring state’s threats must be credible—the aggressor or adversary must believe that the deterring state will carry out its threats.
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