Mark S. Bell and Fabian R. Hoffmann
Over the first months of Donald Trump’s presidency, it has become increasingly clear to European leaders that remaining reliant on the United States to underwrite the continent’s security would be a dangerous gamble. Trump’s overtures to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Vice President JD Vance’s public attacks on the domestic policies of European countries, the administration’s imposition of tariffs, and threats to the Danish territory of Greenland have pushed European leaders to begin to think seriously about a future in which the United States—and its nuclear weapons—are no longer the ultimate guarantor of European security.
Skepticism about the United States’ willingness to fight a nuclear war on Europe’s behalf long predates Trump. During the Cold War, French President Charles de Gaulle famously questioned whether the United States would “trade New York for Paris.” But the Trump administration’s hostility has given new urgency to Europe’s efforts to provide for its own defense.
Nonetheless, for Europe to assume responsibility for its own security is not simply a matter of generating more political will, higher defense budgets, or better coordinated procurement processes. Europe must navigate a strategic trilemma regarding its nuclear options. European leaders have three goals they would like to achieve: credible and effective deterrence against Russia; strategic stability, understood as lower incentives for any state to be the first to use a nuclear weapon; and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to new states. Unfortunately, Europe cannot achieve them all. In fact, choosing any two makes the third impossible. If Europe chooses strategic stability and nonproliferation, it may not be able to deter Russia. But to fortify its nuclear posture enough for credible deterrence, Europe must either allow new states to acquire the weapons or sacrifice a degree of strategic stability. None of the available choices are ideal. But in the absence of protection from across the Atlantic, Europe would be best served by choosing nonproliferation and credible deterrence. Accepting a level of strategic instability in European-Russian relations requires assuming genuine nuclear risks. The alternatives, however, would be even more dangerous.
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