Howard Wang, Jackson Smith & Cristina L. Garafola
Introduction
Space is a critical domain for the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) vision of future power and military competition with the United States. Chinese space industry officials view China as being on track to surpass the United States as the world’s foremost space power by 2045.2 China’s space program has the second-most satellites in orbit behind the United States, including sophisticated capabilities, such as an all-weather 24-hour remote sensing system and the GPS-like Beidou navigation system.3 It is also developing a number of counterspace capabilities, including direct ascent antisatellite (ASAT) weapons; co-orbital ASAT weapons, such as the Shijian (SJ) series satellites;4 electronic warfare capabilities, such as ground-based jammers targeting satellite communications (SATCOM) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR); and offensive cyber capabilities intended for strategic deterrence to counter U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific region.5
Central to the space domain’s importance in CCP thinking is the potential for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to leverage space assets for conducting informatized joint operations. PLA analysts frequently refer to space as the “ultimate high ground” enabling modern informatized operations through space-based command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.6 Accordingly, the PLA has been adjusting its warfighting doctrine and forces around the goal of obtaining space superiority so that it is better positioned to achieve information superiority, or the ability to freely use information and deny the adversary’s use of information. In 2015, China’s defense white paper designated space a critical military domain, and the PLA established the now-reorganized Strategic Support Force (SSF),
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