The Gorge Between China and India on Hydropolitics

Ruth Gamble and Hongzhang Xu

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On Christmas Eve 2024, the Chinese government announced that it had approved the world’s largest – and, at $137 billion, most expensive – hydropower project on the Yarlung Tsangpo River in the Eastern Himalaya, near its disputed border with India. The project would generate around 60 gigawatts annually, nearly three times the capacity of the Three Gorges Dam, and help China meet its energy transition goals.

The government did not provide any additional information.

Most international media misinterpreted the announcement, assumed that all hydropower projects were dams, and reported that China was building “the world’s largest dam” (BBC, South China Morning Post, New York Times, Economist) near the disputed border. The Indian media were the most alarmed, using AI-generated images to depict China’s “mega-dam” looming over India.

The threat of the dam has reverberated through the Indian public sphere since. Pema Khandu, the chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, a border state with territory claimed by China, called the “mega-dam” a “water bomb” and asked for India’s largest dam, which is planned for the same river 90 kilometers below the border, to be fast-tracked on national security grounds.

Pakistan Is the Real Nuclear Weapons Threat We Need to Worry About

Steve Balestrieri

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Pakistan’s Nukes, An Even Bigger Threat Than Iran?: The United States, Israel, and much of Western Europe have long worked together to ensure Iran doesn’t get its hands on a nuclear weapon. But there is another country just as dangerous as Iran that already has 175 nuclear warheads, and could have as many as 250 by the end of the decade: Pakistan.

Pakistan is one of the shakiest regimes in Western Asia. Ruled by a coalition of politicians and military leaders, the government never seems to have a firm hold on the country and has been dealing with domestic terrorism for a long time.

The United States’ biggest fear is that jihadis flush from success in next-door Afghanistan might try to take over Pakistan with its nuclear stockpile.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Obama’s Words Were Spot On In 2010

At a summit in April 2010, just a year before he sent Navy SEALs and Army Special Operations aviators into Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden, then-U.S. President Barack Obama spoke at a summit in Washington and chose his words very carefully.

Although he was officially speaking to then-South African President Jacob Zuma, his words were directed to others in the room as well.

The Pentagon’s Endangered Brain Trust

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

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In the 1990s, following the Soviet Union’s collapse, few in Washington were thinking about China as a potential future threat. During this “unipolar moment,” the conventional wisdom held that China would become a responsible stakeholder of the global community once it had become a fully integrated member. Inside the Pentagon, however, a group of analysts charged with assessing the strategic environment saw things differently. Focusing increasing attention on the Chinese leadership, they concluded that China was intent on creating the capabilities needed to overturn the U.S.-led international order. Their findings proved prescient, anticipating by several decades the return of active great-power competition and China’s growing military challenge to the United States.

These insights came from the Office of Net Assessment, a small arm of the Department of Defense that has, through its independent analyses, for decades played a vital role in informing senior Pentagon leaders’ strategic planning and policy priorities. Although it comprises only a dozen or so staff and commands a research budget of roughly $20 million—“budget dust” in Pentagon-speak—ONA has again and again provided crucial and often contrarian analysis that has reshaped U.S. strategic thinking.

Why China needs ‘as many friends as possible’ to prevail in US rivalry

Orange Wang

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China should cultivate more friends in global politics, as partnerships with other countries could be the trump card in Beijing’s rivalry with the US, according to a leading Chinese international relations expert.

Li Wei, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, said on Saturday that whichever of the two powers could win support from the most third parties would “emerge victorious in the competition”.

He made the remarks during a virtual seminar hosted by the China Macroeconomy Forum think tank. The comments came amid growing debate over how Beijing should cope with US President Donald Trump’s blows to bilateral ties and the world order.

Li called for Beijing to “make as many friends as possible and as few enemies as possible” in its competition with Washington, evoking a slogan from former Chinese leader Mao Zedong.

Trade tensions are poised to worsen this week as US President Donald Trump is set to unveil “reciprocal tariffs” against countries with their own duties on American goods or other policies the White House views as unfair trade barriers. The measure is expected to unleash chaos for global businesses and escalate frictions between the US and dozens of countries, friends and foes alike.

The Nexus of Power | Water | Data: The Foundations of American Prosperity & National Security

Shawn P. Creamer

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More than two thousand years ago, the Qin Chinese developed a concept to emphasize the relationship of national prosperity to state power and a strong armed forces through the idiom Fuguo Qiangbing, which roughly translates into English as Rich Nation, Strong Army. Meiji Japan adopted this slogan in the 19th Century as its model to guide the transformation of Japanese society and to increase the power of the armed forces and the Empire. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has again adopted this model to build its national power. Instrumental to the Chinese model has been significant investments in infrastructure and a mercantilist approach to supporting their economy. As an example, the Chinese state is planning to add 150 nuclear reactors and up to 300 coal power plants to power its growing economy and are investing more than $169 billion annually in its water infrastructure to support current and future industrial, agricultural and residential needs. The Chinese leadership is laying the foundation for Made in China 2025 and primacy during the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Industry 4.0).

As China has aggressively industrialized, during the last several decades the United States has transitioned to a service-based economy, with decreased support to American manufacturing industries, such as critical mineral mining and refinement, and the production of everything from medical supplies to plastics, to metals and chemicals, to machinery and electronics, etc. As American manufacturing was hollowed out through outsourcing, the nation significantly under-invested in its infrastructure ecosystem: Water (storage, treatment, distribution, and regeneration); Power (generation, storage, transmission and distribution); Transportation (roads, bridges, rail, and ports / waterways); and Communication (operational technology to support advances in information technology, data storage and processing, cyber defense, etc).

A glimpse into the black box of China’s policymaking process

Alexander Davey

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Introduction

In recent years, China’s policymaking has become more opaque for outside observers. Tensions between China and the west have not only disrupted trade but also restricted the free flow of information, making it harder to trace Beijing’s domestic policy priorities. However, by carefully analyzing the structured rhythm of the CCP’s policymaking process, key signals still emerge, and these patterns reveal intent. This is essential to understanding China’s external behavior and formulating well-informed policy decisions in response.

Every year, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) draws thousands of legislators from across the country to Beijing, where they deliberate and vote on legislation. This year, Premier Li Qiang delivered the Government Work Report – looking back at 2024 and setting the policy direction and major tasks for 2025. The meeting provides a rare glimpse into a process often described as a “black box” – how China's top leadership signals its policy priorities to the bureaucrats who must carry them out.

Tracking key themes from the Third Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Committee in July 2024 to the NPC in March 2025 sheds light on how Beijing’s broad ambitions turn into concrete action – or where priorities fade. The plenum sets long-term strategic direction, while the NPC reveals nearer-term priorities. This eight-month window offers critical insight into policymaking processes, resource allocation, and the political trajectory shaping China’s next decade.

China is Trying to Win the Tech War, We Should Be Too

Alex Rubin

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I spent ten years at the CIA covering China’s efforts to wage an all-out technology war. Chinese leader Xi Jinping is pouring billions into research, reshaping global supply chains, and using state power to ensure Chinese dominance in semiconductors, AI, and biotech. This isn’t just economic competition—it’s a strategy to make China the world’s technological superpower. Xi’s vision is total: self-sufficiency in food, AI-driven surveillance, and military primacy.

In short—to quote Matt Damon’s character in The Martian—Xi plans to “science the shit” out of China. And if the U.S. doesn’t take more decisive action, it will lose.

To achieve his vision, Xi has ratcheted up state support to the highest possible level. His government is providing direct cash infusions, cheap land and utilities, and other incentives to help them dominate these key markets. Xi is ensuring that China has the people and research capabilities it needs to support his vision—increasing its funding for basic research by more than 10% last year. Meanwhile, he is hurting U.S. companies’ ability to compete and undermining their ability to make revenue and invest in the technologies of the future.

If China is devoting so much time, energy, effort, and money toward achieving this vision of a techno-centric economy, military, and society with an eye toward global power, then the U.S. should be too. The U.S. needs to increase investment across-the-board in critical technologies, from advanced batteries to robots, from autonomous vehicles and LiDAR to novel biotechnology.

American Airstrikes are Decimating ISIS in Syria

Stavros Atlamazoglou

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The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has dramatically expanded the scope of its counterterrorism operations since mid-February. In a few short weeks, the combatant command responsible for U.S. military operations in the Middle East and North Africa has taken several high-ranking terrorists out of the picture.

CENTCOM Is Striking ISIS—Directly and Through Allies

In around 40 days, U.S. forces have killed or enabled the capture of four high-ranking terrorists in Syria and Iraq. The target deck has included a senior leadership facilitator of a group affiliated with al-Qaeda, the senior military leader of the same terrorism organization, an Islamic State (ISIS) cell leader, and the second-in-command of ISIS.

On February 21, CENTCOM forces conducted a precision airstrike in Northwest Syria, killing Wasim Tahsin Bayraqdar. He was a senior leadership facilitator in Hurras al-Din (HaD), a terrorist organization and al-Qaeda affiliate.

“We will relentlessly pursue and destroy terrorist threats, no matter their location, in order to protect our homeland and our allies and partners,” U.S. Army Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla, the commander of CENTCOM, said in a press release.

Three big unknowns ahead of Trump's 'Liberation Day' tariffs

Natalie Sherman

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Donald Trump says tariffs are coming. That message from the US president has been consistent.

But what tariffs and when? Import taxes have come so thick and fast since he took office that it can be hard to keep track.

Trump has already raised duties on Chinese imports, as well as steel, aluminium and some goods from Canada and Mexico. Higher levies on cars are due to go into effect this week.

We're now waiting for Trump to unveil the details of his plan for a wider set of tariffs, which his team has spent the last few weeks developing.

The White House is calling it "Liberation Day". So what might we learn on Wednesday?

How big are the tariffs?

The White House has not said how high the tariffs could go, although various possible rates have been floated by analysts.

Golden Dome: Learning From the Past To Gild the Future

Peter Mitchell

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Two months ago, President Trump directed the development of a national missile defense system initially dubbed “Iron Dome” and rebranded in February as “Golden Dome". Its stated purpose is to establish a layered and integrated defense shield to protect the United States against ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, advanced cruise missiles, and other emerging aerial threats.

The executive order acknowledges that similar ambitions are not new. It references President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, noting that while it “resulted in many technological advances,” the program was ultimately “canceled before its goal could be realized.”

However, the current order justifies renewed urgency, asserting that “over the past 40 years, rather than lessening, the threat from next-generation strategic weapons has become more intense and complex.” It specifically cites adversaries’ development of “next-generation delivery systems and their own homeland integrated air and missile defense capabilities.”

Success in realizing this monumental undertaking will depend on avoiding past pitfalls while leveraging existing technologies and institutional expertise.

Understanding Hybrid Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Husen Muhammad

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The History and Definition of Hybrid Warfare

The concept of hybrid warfare is not a new phenomenon in the history of global conflicts. Although the term gained popularity in the 21st century, warfare strategies combining conventional and unconventional tactics have been employed since ancient times. Throughout history, many empires and states have utilized a combination of direct military engagements with methods such as sabotage, propaganda, infiltration, and the use of proxy groups to defeat adversaries without engaging in open battlefield confrontations.

One of the earliest examples of hybrid warfare tactics can be found in the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) between Athens and Sparta. In this war, both sides relied not only on military strength but also on economic blockades, political manipulation, and strategic alliances to weaken their opponents. Similarly, during the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), French forces faced guerrilla warfare tactics from Spanish insurgents supported by Britain an early form of hybrid warfare that combined conventional battles with non-military resistance.

In the 20th century, hybrid warfare evolved significantly, particularly in conflicts involving non-state actors. The Vietnam War (1955–1975) serves as a crucial example, where the Viet Cong employed a combination of guerrilla warfare, propaganda, and political infiltration to combat the conventionally superior U.S. military forces. Additionally, during the Cold War (1947–1991), the United States and the Soviet Union avoided direct confrontation but engaged in various hybrid warfare methods such as proxy wars, covert operations, information warfare, and economic interventions to expand their spheres of influence.

Russia says it cannot accept US peace plan for Ukraine ‘in its current form’

Pjotr Sauer

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Moscow has described the latest US peace proposals as unacceptable to the Kremlin, highlighting the limited progress Donald Trump has made on his promise to end the war in Ukraine since taking office in January.

Sergei Ryabkov, a foreign policy adviser to Vladimir Putin, said some of Russia’s key demands were not being addressed by the US proposals to end the war, in comments that marked a rare acknowledgment from the Russian side that talks with the US over Ukraine had stalled in recent weeks.

“We take the models and solutions proposed by the Americans very seriously, but we can’t accept it all in its current form,” Ryabkov was quoted by state media as telling the Russian magazine International Affairs. It came after Trump on Sunday revealed his frustration with Putin, saying he was “pissed off” and threatening to impose tariffs on Russian oil exports.

“All we have today is an attempt to find some kind of framework that would first allow for a ceasefire – at least as envisioned by the Americans,” Ryabkov said.

“As far as we can see, there is no place in them today for our main demand, namely to solve the problems related to the root causes of this conflict.”

Putin has repeatedly referred to what he claimed were the “root causes” of the conflict to justify his hardline position on any prospective deal to end the war in Ukraine.

Are Beijing’s hypersonic anti-ship missiles in Taiwan Strait a warning for US?

Liu ZhenandEnoch Wong

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The People’s Liberation Army appears to have deployed its new hypersonic anti-ship missiles during drills around Taiwan on Tuesday, in what analysts said was a signal to the US against any potential interference amid the rising tensions.

Two YJ-21 missiles – also known as Eagle Strike-21 – were visible on board an H-6K strategic bomber seen taking off from an unidentified airfield in a video posted on Tuesday to the PLA Eastern Theatre Command’s official social media account.

The video was released soon after the start of yet another large-scale surprise joint exercise in the waters and airspace to the north, south and east of Taiwan, which a command spokesman described as “a serious warning and powerful deterrent”.

The YJ-21 hypersonic missile – which has a conical warhead similar to the Russian Kh-47 Kinzhal – has an estimated range of 1,000km to 1,500km (621-932 miles) with an average speed of Mach 6 and a terminal velocity of Mach 10.

No existing anti-missile system is capable of intercepting the YJ-21, which was first deployed as a ship-launched version in 2022 when the PLA released a video of it being fired from a Type 055, its largest and most advanced destroyer.

Trump’s pick for Joint Chiefs chairman vows to be apolitical and addresses Signal chat

TARA COPP AND LOLITA C. BALDOR

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President Donald Trump’s nominee to become the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Dan “Razin” Caine, told senators Tuesday that he understands he is an unknown and unconventional nominee — but that the U.S. is facing unconventional and unprecedented threats and he is ready to serve in its defense.

At his confirmation hearing to become the top U.S. military officer, he said he would be candid in his advice to Trump and vowed to be apolitical. While Caine stopped short of criticizing top leaders for using a Signal chat to discuss plans for an attack against Yemen’s Houthi rebels, he told senators during questioning that he always communicates in proper channels.

Caine, who was not part of the Signal chat and deferred on many questions about the controversy, said that if he found himself in situations where classified information was being posted inappropriately, he “would weigh in and stop it.”

Caine was nominated after Trump fired Gen. CQ Brown Jr., seen by the administration as endorsing diversity, equity and inclusion contrary to the president’s agenda. He had been the second Black general to serve as chairman. The firing raised concerns among Democrats that Trump was politicizing the military, and many of the questions Caine faced before the Senate Armed Services Committee centered on that topic.

How Donald Trump is Undermining the Intelligence Community

Paul R. Pillar

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Amid repeated caving to Donald Trump’s wishes by elements both inside and outside government, one might expect, or hope, that the U.S. intelligence community would remain relatively independent. Although the intelligence agencies are part of the executive branch, a measure of independence is part of the reason those agencies exist. Moreover, independence is critical to accomplishing their mission of providing the most accurate picture possible of the world outside U.S. borders, even if that picture is not what policymakers would like to see. Otherwise, those agencies become little more than bloated speechwriting staffs.

However, the unclassified version of the community’s most recent annual threat assessment shows that it, too, has caved to the interests of the administration.

It is not unusual for the annual assessment, which is a congressionally mandated document, to partly reflect policy concerns of the White House. Indeed, it is an appropriate and necessary part of the intelligence agencies’ mission to take those concerns into account when allocating resources for collecting and analyzing information and deciding what subjects are to be addressed in written products. But such responsiveness to policymaker interests is quite different from shaping publicly released intelligence products to echo preferred administration messages.

U.S.-ROK Tech Cooperation: Batteries, Biotech, and Quantum Technologies

Jungmi Cha and Doug Strub

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Introduction: Building a U.S.-ROK Quadruple Partnership—Aligning Innovation, Industry, Supply Chains, and Policy

Studies on the cycles of great-power ascendance and decline have emphasized technological innovation as a central factor in the rise and fall of great powers.1 Nations that pioneer and adopt these leading sectors of technological innovation secure global leadership. In the context of a shifting geopolitical landscape, great powers are increasingly recognizing that today’s global order may be undergoing a transitional phase, in which societies that most effectively capitalize on technological advances will emerge on top.

In the United States, the Biden administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy argued that “the world is changing” and is “at a significant inflection point in world history.”2 It emphasized that technology is central to today’s geopolitical competition and to the future of national security, the economy, and democracy.3 Similarly, the Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy clearly noted that “losing our innovation and technological edge would have far-reaching negative implications for American prosperity and power.”4 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has also framed the current era as a stage of this ongoing cycle of global leadership change. One of Xi Jinping’s signature phrases, “great changes unseen in a century,” emphasizes the concurrent transformation of global power dynamics and the role of technological innovations in driving these shifts. The 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–25) highlights that these changes are partly driven by a “new scientific and technological revolution” and aims for China to become a world-class innovative nation by 2035. The Republic of Korea (ROK) has also emphasized the importance of technology and prioritized policies to advance the country’s technological leadership. The Ministry of Science and ICT highlights that global technological competition centers on critical emerging technologies and that securing “science and technology sovereignty” through advanced technologies is key to driving national growth.5

The Next Steps in Homeland Missile Defense, No. 620, March 17, 2025

David J. Trachtenberg

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Introduction

Among the more consequential decisions the second Trump Administration must confront is whether to allow America’s continued vulnerability to coercive nuclear threats from China and Russia to remain unchallenged or to take steps to mitigate and alleviate the threats to the U.S. homeland posed by both countries’ growing nuclear arsenals.

Both China and Russia are seeking to overturn the established international order and displace the United States from the position of global dominance it has held since the end of World War II. And the growing entente between Beijing and Moscow, augmented by increasing cooperation and collaboration with the likes of North Korea and Iran, suggest that the United States has entered a period of unprecedented vulnerability to the whims of malignant actors. In this dangerous environment, President Trump must seriously rethink whether it makes sense to continue to leave the American people vulnerable to Chinese and Russian nuclear threats or whether it is time to move forward—deliberately and with all due urgency—to build and deploy defenses that can not only help deter potential aggression against the U.S. homeland but can also help protect Americans from nuclear Armageddon should deterrence fail.

It will take determined leadership and a solid commitment to overturn obsolete Cold War orthodoxy—accompanied by adequate funding to translate policies into programmatic reality—to implement the necessary adjustments to U.S. missile defense posture, and to do so with the urgency required. President Trump has already taken the first step in this direction by issuing an Executive Order on January 27, 2025, calling for an “Iron Dome for America” and the deployment of a “next-generation missile defense shield” to defend the United States against all types of missile attacks from both rogue states and peer and near-peer adversaries.[1] This now must be followed by the allocation of sufficient budgetary resources to implement the president’s direction and to do so with alacrity.

Why the Marines Can’t Fix the Houthi Problem

Gary Anderson

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After the imbroglio over the leaked conversation about airstrikes on Houthis in Yemen dies down, there will be one issue unresolved. The United States will have found that the Houthis are still firing missiles into the Bab al Mandeb against international shipping at the southern approach to the Suez canal. Airstrikes alone against a determined foe using mobile missile launchers and hiding key facilities among civilians have never worked. That is why the Israelis were forced to invade Gaza.

Once he becomes frustrated with the fact that Houthi missiles and drones are still flying. President Trump will likely ask why. Eventually, someone will have to tell him that it will likely take a ground incursion to eliminate them. They will also probably tell him that it will take a ground incursion to root out the launchers and command and control installations. Given the geography of the region, this will mean a massive amphibious raid from the sea. When the president says “make it happen,” someone will have to tell him that the United States no longer has the capability to do that. I would not like to be in the room when the President asks, “Why the hell not?”

How To Deal With “Signalgate”—a Guide to the Perplexed

Lani Kass

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Last week, The Atlantic published an explosive report claiming that its editor-in-chief, Jeffrey Goldberg, was invited to a “Principals Committee (PC) Small Group” discussion on Signal, where Cabinet officials discussed plans to strike the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Sensitive details—including the iconic who, what, where, when, and how of military operations—were publicly disclosed.

Although the Administration denied that classified information was shared, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss. and Ranking Member, Rhode Island Sen. Jack Reed, called for the Defense Department Inspector General (IG) to investigate the incident.

The story quickly gained “legs” beyond the Washington Beltway. According to the first poll out on the national security breach, 3 out of 4 Americans— including 60% of Republicans—believe the use of a Signal group chat to discuss military strikes is a serious problem.

Thus far, the Administration’s efforts to downplay the explosive report have failed to quell the controversy, even as White House officials initially said they believed it would die down.

NACD Director's Handbook on Cyber-Risk Oversigh

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Introduction

Since the release of the third edition of this handbook in early 2020, companies have been embattled by the challenges of working from home to protect workforces from COVID-19, systemic cyberattacks such as the SolarWinds incident, and the economic ramifications of Colonial Pipeline’s struggle with a ransomware actor, to name only a few headwinds. Despite these significant events in the cyber-threat landscape and challenges facing organizations, some board-level oversight practices stand the test of time. Boards of directors, with their attending fiduciary duties, continue to be responsible for overseeing management’s strategy and their approach to enterprise-wide risk, and cybersecurity matters inherently span the enterprise.

As cybersecurity challenges grow, the board’s duties may also expand, as regulators and rule makers in state and federal governments scrutinize the role of the board in oversight of information security risks—and boards are rising to the challenge to provide sound oversight in this realm. According to the 2022 NACD Public Company Board Practices and Oversight Survey, 83 percent of boards have significantly improved their understanding of cyber risk compared with two years ago.

AI IN CYBERSECURITY

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Introduction: AI Friend and Foe

Artificial intelligence (AI) has already significantly impacted business, with greater impacts for efficiency and productivity predicted as AI quickly becomes more widely integrated. In truth, with business adoption of AI reaching 72 percent in 2024, it already has.1&2 Overall, it’s estimated that AI will contribute a 21 percent net increase to the United States GDP by 2030.3 As more companies and consumers adopt AI in their operations and daily lives, there will be an accompanying increase in the risks and benefits, both known and unknown, that this technology will bring to companies and their cybersecurity. Businesses’ rapid adoption of AI introduces new risks alongside its benefits to innovation and productivity, suggesting that AI, like any other enterprise risk, needs to be overseen and governed at the board level.

When applied to a company’s cybersecurity program, AI can enhance capabilities in areas like automatic cyber threat detection, alert generation, malware identification, and data protection.4&5 AI’s enhanced data analysis capabilities can significantly reduce the signal-to-noise ratio among log data coming into the security operations center—reducing false positives and quickly directing the security team’s attention toward the most important and critical threats. AI also has the potential to help predict weaknesses and assist security teams in making changes to prevent the breach in the first place. This capability allows companies to “get left of theft,” thereby making it much harder for the attackers to succeed. Overall, AI, when applied correctly, can be a force multiplier to corporate cybersecurity teams, strengthening a business’s defense systems while increasing efficiency, productivity, and profit in business operations.

Superintelligence Strategy

Dan Hendrycks, Eric Schmidt & Alexandr Wang

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Introduction

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming multiple facets of society, with advances arriving at a pace and scale that few anticipated. These developments compel policymakers, technologists, and strategists to address a widening spectrum of issues, from economic shifts driven by automation to strategic concerns about global competition. As with any transformative technology, AI presents both significant opportunities and formidable risks.

Among these challenges, the dual-use nature of AI—its capacity for both civilian and military applications—emerges as a critical factor. Unlike specialized technological tools, AI spans virtually every sector, including finance, healthcare, and defense. This broad applicability, coupled with its rapid evolution, creates a risk landscape that is expansive and difficult to predict. Strategic actors must contend with potential misuse, risks of geopolitical escalation, and the need for frameworks to govern systems whose capabilities may surpass human oversight.

To navigate these complexities, many have turned to analogies. AI has been compared to electricity for its general-purpose nature, to traditional software for its economic importance, or to the printing press for its cultural impact. While these comparisons provide useful entry points, they fail to emphasize the grave national security implications of AI. A more productive analogy lies between AI and catastrophic dual-use nuclear, chemical, and biological technologies. Like them, AI will be integral to a nation’s power while posing the potential for mass destruction. A brief examination of the historical parallels between AI and the nuclear age can highlight the gravity of our current situation.

How to Protect Government Data with Privacy-Enhancing Technology

Sydney Saubestre

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Introduction to Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs)

Privacy Matters

Governments should and do rely on data to allocate resources, assess policy impact, and improve public services. From tracking public health trends to optimizing educational attainment, data-driven decision-making enables more efficient and informed governance. However, the growing scale of data collection and sharing also heightens privacy risks—particularly as more personal information is aggregated and stored across public and private systems.1 Consumer data, including financial records, location history, and online activity, is increasingly intertwined with government-held information, creating broader exposure to breaches, misuse, and re-identification.2

Without proper safeguards, sensitive personal data can be exploited, leading to real-world harm. For example, the 2015 U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) breach compromised the records of millions of federal employees, exposing Social Security numbers, personnel records, and even extensive information about employees’ friends and relatives provided as part of applications for security clearance.3 Similar risks exist in the private sector, where high-profile breaches have exposed data from credit card details to genetic information.4 Such incidents erode public trust and illustrate the dangers of concentrating vast amounts of sensitive information in centralized, highly accessible systems.5

When Good Intentions Kill: Why the World Must Abandon Bans on Landmines and Cluster Munitions

Dan Rice

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When nations across the globe signed conventions banning landmines and cluster munitions, they acted with noble intentions but limited perspective. Most were far from geopolitical hotspots and never imagined their signatures could one day embolden aggression and cost innocent lives in distant lands.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—Europe’s deadliest war since World War II—has tragically revealed the unintended consequences of these agreements. While distant nations showed symbolic solidarity—lighting buildings blue and yellow, waving flags—many also upheld treaty commitments that delayed Ukraine’s access to essential defensive weapons.

Cluster munitions and landmines, while controversial, have proven decisive in Ukraine’s defense. Over half of Russia’s nearly 900,000 casualties are reportedly due to cluster munitions, underlining their brutal effectiveness against massed infantry. At the same time, Russia’s extensive use of landmines has stalled Ukraine’s counteroffensives, revealing their strategic utility in defensive warfare.

Army to deploy integrated data layer for NGC2 at division level before next Project Convergence

Carley Welch

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The Army plans to have its Next Generation Command and Control’s (NGC2) integrated data layer fully operational at the division level before next year’s Project Convergence Capstone (PCC) event, Army senior leaders said today.

The integrated data layer is a user interface where sensors from multiple domains can work together to supply information on enemy targets and other data the warfighter needs to make important calls. It’s a key part of the technology stack that makes up NGC2, and it creates a framework where, for example, artillery, operational, aviation and other systems can talk to each other so the warfighters operating these systems don’t have to digest the various data separately.

“We, on this side, kind of owe the Army an integrated data layer that then we can build applications just like the ones that are on your phone, where warfighting systems can reach you and use that same data, and we’re not building separate pieces of transport, complicated spaghetti charts that connect the boxes and flow data. Now all the data is in one place and anyone can interact with it,” Director of the Army’s Network Cross Functional Team Gen. Patrick Ellis told reporters at the Pentagon today.

India-Bangladesh-Pakistan: South Asia’s Fateful Triangle

Swasti Sachdeva

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54 years after Operation Searchlight and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s historic declaration of the independence of Bangladesh, the country stands at a critical juncture yet again. As in 1971, decisions in Dhaka could alter regional dynamics, especially vis-à-vis India and Pakistan, with whom Bangladesh’s destiny has been closely intertwined.

There is growing bonhomie between Bangladesh’s Muhammad Yunus-led interim government and Pakistan — a development that has not gone unnoticed in New Delhi, whose relationship with Dhaka faces uncertainties. A much anticipated meeting between Yunus and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the upcoming BIMSTEC Summit in Thailand is unlikely to happen. Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan as well as China are deepening.

Evolving Foreign Policy: Liberation to the July Uprising

While Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan have warmed since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government on August 5 last year, ties between the two countries were by and large fraught for decades. Dhaka’s foreign policy stemmed from a troubled and contested history, a lack of ideological consensus, and a sharply divided polity, among other geoeconomic and regional considerations.

The Perils of Ignoring the Taliban Regime’s Support for Terror Groups

Abdul Basit

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According to the Global Terrorism Index 2025, Pakistan was the second-worst country affected by terrorism in the preceding year. This isn’t surprising; three of the world’s ten deadliest terrorist groups — Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) — operate in Pakistan. These groups have grown deadlier since the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan.

Despite obligations under the 2020 Doha Agreement to not allow terrorist groups to use Afghan soil for terrorism in other countries, the Taliban regime has allowed the TTP to use hideouts in Afghanistan to plot attacks in Pakistan.

The Taliban’s ideological patronage of and logistical support to the TTP has emboldened the latter and enabled it to expand its organizational framework and boost its operational strength. Ahead of the U.S. exit from Afghanistan, TTP renewed its oath of allegiance to the Taliban’s Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada in order to continue living in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan energized the TTP and provided it with a template to emulate for its militant campaign in Pakistan.

Terrorism Assessment For Afghanistan – Analysis

Luke Coffey

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According to the US government’s annual threat assessment, released by its intelligence community this week, Daesh remains the most significant terrorism challenge facing America and its partners.

The assessment is part of a broader report that addresses all threats to the US including, but not limited to, terrorism. Notably, this year’s report includes an alarming section about the role of Daesh in Afghanistan.

It states that Daesh’s Afghan branch, the so-called ISIS-K, “remains the most capable of carrying out external terrorist attacks and maintains the intent to conduct attacks in South and Central Asia, and globally, although its capabilities vary.” The report also warns that the group is “expanding capability beyond South Asia and ability to inspire individuals to conduct attacks abroad.”

The US is not alone in this assessment. A recent report by the UN Security Council similarly highlighted the growing threat from Daesh in Afghanistan. It stated that the group maintains a presence throughout South and Central Asia, even though its operational hub remains in Afghanistan.

Taiwan is under a triple security threat

Shanna Khayat

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Taiwan’s national security is increasingly jeopardized—externally, from two different directions, and also from within.

The largest and most direct threat, of course, is the People’s Republic of China. Beijing’s long-standing position is that Taiwan must not formally politically separate itself from China. The red line for military action by the PRC has never been crystal clear. Taiwan presidents from Chen Shiu-bian (2000—2008) to current president Lai Ching-te have publicly said “Taiwan is an independent, sovereign country.” Until recently it was reasonable to believe Beijing might be content to kick the can down the road indefinitely as long as the governments in Taipei did not attempt a gesture that would seem to codify juridical separation from China, such as altering the Republic of China constitution.

That has become doubtful, however, under paramount leader Xi Jinping. Xi has expressed impatience with the lack of progress toward unification, saying Taiwan’s de facto independence “should not be passed down generation after generation.” Beijing implicitly announced in early 2024 the Chinese military would hold a large military exercise later in the year after President Lai’s inauguration speech expected in May. The comments in Lai’s speech about China were rather mild, but the People’s Liberation Army went ahead with its war games anyway. The situation is much more dangerous if cautious behavior by Taipei no longer restrains potential aggression by China.

PRC Malign influence at Home and Abroad—Peter Mattis's Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Peter Mattis

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I. OVERVIEW

Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you.

Countering the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) efforts to build political influence, recruit and mobilize civil society outside the borders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and shape the world in coercive, corrupting, and covert ways is fundamental to U.S. success in this rivalry. Any sustainable, long-term strategy for addressing China’s challenge requires the integrity of U.S. political and policymaking processes—and those of our allies and partners. This requires grappling with the challenges posed by the Party’s efforts to shape the United States and others by interfering in our politics and domestic affairs.

The United States, its political and business elite, its thinkers, and its Chinese communities have long been targets for the CCP. The Party employs tools that go well beyond traditional public diplomacy efforts. Often these tools lead to activities that are, in the words of former Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull, corrupt, covert, and/or coercive. Nevertheless, many activities are not covered by Turnbull’s three “Cs” but are still concerning and undermine the ability of the United States, its allies, and its partners to comprehend and address Beijing’s challenge.

Obscurity by Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

Tanner Greer

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Introduction

Few notes of concord survive contact with Donald Trump. Trump’s election in 2016 upended settled assumptions; one by one he knocked down the pillars of consensus and convention that held up decades of American diplomacy. The strongest and most consequential of these pillars concerned China. For more than forty years, American diplomats and statesmen worked to integrate China into an American-led economic order. By doing so, they hoped to align Beijing’s behavior (and, if lucky, the entire Chinese political regime) with liberal norms. Their hopes proved in vain. China did not moderate or liberalize. The new president, rejecting both the means and ends of engagement, pushed for a less cataleptic strategy.

That was five years ago. Those who see Trump as a champion of the new hawkish “bipartisan consensus on China” have been nonplussed by the first moves of his second administration. Trump invited Xi Jinping—but no other foreign leader—to attend his swearing-in. One of his first acts as president was an executive stay of the TikTok ban. Trump publicly browbeat a dozen countries with threats and blandishments in the week that followed—but not the People’s Republic of China. Contrary to expectation, Trump’s inaugural address barely glanced at China. It does not outline, or even hint at, what Trump’s approach to America’s greatest challenger might be.

Autonomous Battlefield: PLA Lessons from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Sunny Cheung & Joe McReynolds

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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has vividly demonstrated the pivotal role autonomous and drone-based systems play in modern warfare. Chinese military experts have gained invaluable insights as the conflict has evolved over the last three years, reshaping their understanding of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of autonomous systems that likely will play an important role in a potential conflict over Taiwan.

In late March, state media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) reported the rapid evolution of anti-drone technologies, with aerospace expert Wang Ya’nan (王亚男) emphasizing the urgent need for more cost-effective and efficient countermeasures (CNR, March 23). Traditional methods, he noted, are prohibitively expensive—often hundreds of times the cost of the drones that they are meant to defeat—and still fall short in detection accuracy and coverage. Meanwhile, reports have surfaced of some PRC factories openly displaying Ukrainian flags, signaling acknowledgement for and partnerships with Ukraine’s drone manufacturers instead of Russia’s (X/@wartranslated, March 16). This speaks to the complex ways in which policymakers and key observers within the PRC perceive and are interpreting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Turkey’s cautionary tale: The fall of the courts is the fall of freedom

Dan Perry

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When Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu — widely seen as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s most formidable political rival — was arrested at his home on flimsy corruption charges, Turkey entered a new and dangerous phase in its long democratic unravelling. His detention, followed by mass protests, violent crackdowns, and the arrest of demonstrators and journalists, is the natural outcome of years of democratic backsliding — which began with the dismantling of judicial independence.

Turkey’s descent is not just Turkey’s problem, and it’s not just inconvenient because Turkey is large and important, but is a fundamental warning about political systems. The architecture of liberal democracy — checks and balances, independent courts, protected rights — doesn’t dismantle itself overnight. It is chipped away, often in full view of the public, under the pretense of “majority rule.” It happens gradually, even legally, until suddenly a country that holds elections no longer holds power to account.

The signs of democratic backsliding, always with the freedom of the courts politicized or threatened, are visible in many countries once thought immune — most prominently at present in Israel, Hungary … and the United States.

A Grim Message for Iranians - Opinion

Ilan Berman

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On March 20, Iranians in Iran and in the diaspora commemorated Nowruz, the Persian New Year. Typically, U.S. administrations have used the occasion to practice some soft power diplomacy. In the past, America's Nowruz greetings have taken pains to highlight Iran's proud pre-Islamic heritage, underscore its immense civilizational potential, and draw a distinction between the country's historic greatness and its current repressive clerical regime.

Not this year, however. The congratulatory message from the new Trump White House on March 19 was decidedly pro forma. At a paltry 109 words, the missive didn't include any of the strategic messaging employed by previous administrations, contenting itself with wishes for a "joyous holiday."

That minimalist approach is an alarming signal of what might be to come, as the Trump administration pivots toward engagement with Iran's ayatollahs.

Signs of such a shift are everywhere. True, President Donald Trump has now reinstated his first term policy of "maximum pressure" against the Islamic Republic. But he has also coupled it with an offer of renewed negotiations with Iran's clerical regime. And while that outreach in principle comes with an expiration date, the goalposts of America's approach to Iran appear to be shifting significantly.

The Limits of Trump’s Hardball Diplomacy

Matias Spektor

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No great power sustained as dominant a position over its neighboring region as the United States did during most of the twentieth century. But in recent decades, Washington has largely disregarded its neighbors. Since a free trade agreement with Canada and Mexico and a military initiative to help Colombia combat drug cartels were negotiated more than 25 years ago, United States policy in the Americas has consisted mostly of failed measures to stem flows of migrants and drugs across U.S. borders. This neglect has opened the door for China and Russia to exert increasing influence across the Western Hemisphere.

Since the beginning of his political career, U.S. President Donald Trump has signaled his intention to reassert U.S. dominance in the region. He hopes to resist China and Russia’s growing diplomatic, economic, and military engagement with countries that have traditionally been within the United States’ sphere of influence, and doing so while delivering on issues important to his base, including securing favorable trade terms and stopping flows of both migrants and fentanyl. During Trump’s first administration, these goals were largely aspirational. He and his officials frequently invoked the Monroe Doctrine, the 1823 declaration asserting exclusive U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere, when they opposed Russian military cooperation with Latin American countries, say, or framed Chinese economic expansion in the region as a security threat. Rex Tillerson, Trump’s first secretary of state, called the doctrine “as relevant today as when it was written.” Ultimately, these appeals amounted mostly to rhetorical posturing and, because of policy inconsistencies and incompetence, effected little concrete change. In his second term, however, Trump is accompanying radical rhetoric about regional hegemony with real action.

Trump is redefining, not abandoning, American soft power - Opinion

Kurt Davis Jr

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For decades, the United States projected global influence through what foreign policy experts call “soft power” – the ability to shape world affairs through cultural appeal, diplomatic engagement and ideological attraction rather than military force.

Under President Donald Trump’s administration, this traditional approach to international relations is undergoing a fundamental transformation.

Critics decry the shift as abandonment of American leadership. They’re missing the point. What we’re witnessing isn’t a reckless dismantling of American influence but rather a necessary recalibration for a world where the old rules no longer apply.

The traditional soft power model lacked clear metrics in today’s competitive global landscape. While previous administrations invested heavily in abstract notions of goodwill and long-term influence, Trump recognized that in a world where China and Russia wield economic leverage to expand their spheres of influence, America needed a strategy prioritizing tangible returns over ideological appeal.

This approach has manifested in several high-profile decisions: withdrawing from agreements like the Paris Climate Accord and the Iran nuclear deal, questioning the value proposition of NATO (in today’s form), and reconsidering America’s role in international organizations.

If negotiations among Russia, Ukraine, US collapse, what’s next?

Stephen Bryen

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It may be that the US-Russia and US-Ukraine negotiations are going off the rails.

Meanwhile the US is anxious for Europe to take over responsibility for supporting Ukraine as Washington turns to the Middle East and Pacific regions. The Europeans then will need to decide if they are ready, willing and able to make up the difference.

One strategy for them is to try to secure western Ukraine, figuring the Russians will be successful east of the Dnieper, But that idea is not a cake walk and could trigger a wider conflict. Washington will have to make up its mind on what is next regarding Ukraine.

President Trump is complaining that the Russians are dragging out negotiations on a comprehensive ceasefire, and he is threatening Russia with new energy sanctions. The main feature of the threat from Trump is that countries that buy Russian oil will be cut off from trade with the US. This includes India and China.

US total goods trade with China was an estimated $582.4 billion in 2024. US goods exports to China in 2024 were $143.5 billion.

In 2023-24, the US was the largest trading partner of India with $119.71 billion bilateral trade in goods ($77.51 billion worth of exports, $42.19 billion of imports, with $35.31 billion trade surplus).

Putin’s Warpath Goes Through Arctic

Pavel K. Baev

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Russia’s war against Ukraine is stuck in a rigid deadlock. The prospect of agreeing on a ceasefire, which had appeared within reach a couple of weeks ago, has, however, become distant and blurred. Russian President Vladimir Putin is not procrastinating or bargaining, he deliberately persists with unfeasible conditions while accepting concessions as a matter of routine (Re: Russia, March 27). This uncompromising position led to little progress gained from the tri-lateral U.S.-Russia-Ukraine talks in Saudi Arabia on reducing hostilities in the Black Sea (Carnegie Politika, March 27). An agreement should have been possible because Ukraine consistently refrains from attacking tankers of the Russian “shadow fleet” with its naval drones, but Moscow demands more concessions while refusing to cease missile strikes on Odesa (see EDM; Novaya gazeta Europe, March 28). At the end of the week, Putin expeditiously shifted the focus of political maneuvering from the Black Sea to the Arctic.

The annual forum “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue” in Murmansk, held on March 27, used to be a meeting place for international stakeholders, but it has been reduced to a podium for Putin’s rhetoric (see Panorama, March 21; Izvestiya, March 28). Russia is excluded from all formats of international cooperation, and its partnership with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) yields few benefits. Consequently, Putin made a rare admission that the model for developing the Northern Sea Route was unworkable (Kommersant, March 27). He did not mention that the production of natural gas was fast contracting and Gazprom’s market value was sinking (Lenta.ru; RBC, March 28). In Putin’s mind, these economic setbacks are of scant significance compared to the main source of Russia’s strength in the Arctic—the Northern Fleet.