2 April 2025

What to expect from Modi-Putin tete-e-tete

Andrew Korybko

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed that preparations are underway for Putin’s reciprocal trip to Delhi after Modi visited Moscow last summer as the first foreign trip of his third term.

Readers can review the outcome of their most recent summit here, while the present piece will forecast what they might discuss during their next one, the date of which has yet to be determined.

Given their shared enduring interests as well as the latest international developments, they’re expected to discuss:

1. Arms

Russian-Indian Defense Ties Are Evolving With The Times”, having moved beyond their prior transactional relationship to the sharing of Russian technologies to help develop India’s domestic military-industrial complex.

The generalities of this will likely be discussed in the context of their newly updated military pact, as will the specifics as they relate to India’s planned procurement of jointly produced 800-kilometer-range BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and its interest in Russia’s Su-57 jets.


A different kind of heart: Tibetans’ genetic uniqueness and enduring cultural sway

Razib Khan

Fourteen years ago, a UC Berkeley team studying altitude adaptation in Tibetans developed a method to scan the genome of various modern populations, looking for outlier gene frequencies compared to related populations. First, they compared Tibetans, Han Chinese and Northern Europeans, looking for genomic regions where Tibetans were the exception, the outlier. This approach identified EPAS1, a gene implicated in high-altitude adaptation, as a likely target of positive selection in Tibetans years before it was discovered that this gene introgressed from Denisovans.

This sort of technique obviously requires a good grasp of the genome’s broader phylogenetic patterns. You need some sense of the history of the populations to infer the peregrinations of specific genes. Next, calculating the timescale of divergences between Tibetans and Han Chinese, the authors estimated the two populations split 2,750 years ago. The problem with this estimate is that it places the proto-Tibetan stream’s separation from the proto-Han one at 750 BC, at least a millennium after we know the Han already existed as a people, and centuries into their long written history. Of course, this estimate, as estimates generally do, has multiple simplifying assumptions baked in that might be incorrect. For example, Han Chinese and Tibetans were both modeled as homogeneous groups at the tips of a bifurcating tree, rather than mixed populations. If Tibetans were a mix of two populations, each with distinct historic relatedness to the Han Chinese, then the average divergence estimate may have been misleading.

Pakistan Welcomes Starlink. But Can It Deliver on Its Promise?

Zohaib Alta and Nimrah Javed

On March 21, 2025, Pakistan granted a temporary No Objection Certificate (NOC) to Starlink, the satellite internet service developed by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, allowing it to begin operations in the country. The decision, issued after consensus among regulatory and security bodies, marks a milestone in Pakistan’s ongoing effort to modernize its digital infrastructure and deliver internet access to underserved regions. Starlink’s approval sets the stage for a potential leap forward in connectivity, particularly for rural, remote, and conflict-prone areas that remain beyond the reach of fiber optics and reliable mobile data coverage.

In Pakistan, the digital divide is not merely a technological issue; it is an economic and social barrier. While the country has over 142 million broadband subscriptions, nearly 99 percent are mobile-based, and fixed broadband penetration remains under 1 percent. Still, the economic potential is hard to ignore. Pakistan’s digital economy is steadily expanding – IT exports hit $3.2 billion in fiscal year 2024 – and more than 1.5 million freelancers are already contributing to global platforms from across the country. But most of that growth is happening in big cities.

Fergana Valley: Stability, Development, and Strategic Interests


Executive Summary

The Fergana Valley, a strategically significant region in Central Asia, has long been a focal point of geopolitical tensions and economic development challenges. Spanning Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, unresolved border disputes, ethnic tensions, terrorism, and economic fragility have shaped the valley.

Recent agreements on border demarcation between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan provide an opportunity for enhanced regional stability, economic integration, and industrial growth. The possible success of infrastructural projects such as CASA-1000 and the expansion of industrial clusters will play a critical role in determining the valley’s future.

External actors, including China, Russia, and the United States, also have vested interests in the valley’s stability, given its strategic importance in trade and security. Addressing existing challenges will require strong regional cooperation, transparent governance, and sustained economic investment.

Beijing will not attack Taiwan if it thinks trade will suffer, US senators hear

Bochen Han

Beijing would not invade Taiwan if it believed that US allies and partners would respond by severing trade ties, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard on Wednesday, as expert witnesses urged lawmakers to acknowledge that allies’ strategic contributions go beyond defence spending.

Noting that China is “an export-driven economy”, Oriana Skylar Mastro, a fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, said that “if they believed trade with US allies and partners would stop if they attacked Taiwan, they would never do it”.

Beijing regards Taiwan as a renegade province, to be eventually united with the mainland, by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-governed island militarily.

Mastro and other witnesses at the committee hearing stressed that US allies and partners could provide Washington much more than just financial aid to help deter China militarily.

The Party’s One-Way Approach to People-to-People Exchanges

Cheryl Yu

In a recent interview with the People’s Daily, the flagship newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Mayor of Steilacoom in Washington State, Dick Muri, said students from the town benefited from the “inviting 50,000 American youth to China for exchange and study over the next five years” initiative (‘未来5年邀请5万名美国青少年来华交流学习’倡议). He said that the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) should maintain cooperation and friendly relations because “we can have candid exchanges and discussions and learn from each other, and this will make us better and better” (我们可以进行坦诚的交流与讨论,相互学习,这会让我们变得越来越好) (People’s Daily, January 11). His comments reflect the PRC’s effective use of people-to-people exchanges to advance its agenda.

The PRC uses people-to-people exchanges to influence American perceptions to its benefit. The CCP manages all such exchanges via the united front system in ways that intentionally create asymmetries of understanding between the two countries. This does little to promote the interests of the United States or the Chinese people, but allows the Party to control how it is perceived overseas and, ultimately, to enhance its power globally.

Germany decides to leave history in the past and prepare for war

Sarah Rainsford

A missile launcher sends a cloud of brown dust into the air as it hurtles across a field towards the firing line. Moments later comes a soldier's countdown, from five to 'Fire!', before a rocket roars into the sky.

The blasts and booms from such military training exercises are so constant that locals in the nearby small town of Munster barely notice anymore.

But life here is set to get even louder.

Germany's military, the Bundeswehr, recently got the all-clear for a massive increase in investment after parliament voted to exempt defence spending from strict rules on debt.

The country's top general has told the BBC the cash boost is urgently needed because he believes Russian aggression won't stop at Ukraine.

"We are threatened by Russia. We are threatened by Putin. We have to do whatever is needed to deter that," Gen Carsten Breuer says. He warns that Nato should be braced for a possible attack in as little as four years.

"It's not about how much time I need, it's much more about how much time Putin gives us to be prepared," the defence chief says bluntly. "And the sooner we are prepared the better."

Europe’s Nuclear Trilemma

Mark S. Bell and Fabian R. Hoffmann

Over the first months of Donald Trump’s presidency, it has become increasingly clear to European leaders that remaining reliant on the United States to underwrite the continent’s security would be a dangerous gamble. Trump’s overtures to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Vice President JD Vance’s public attacks on the domestic policies of European countries, the administration’s imposition of tariffs, and threats to the Danish territory of Greenland have pushed European leaders to begin to think seriously about a future in which the United States—and its nuclear weapons—are no longer the ultimate guarantor of European security.

Skepticism about the United States’ willingness to fight a nuclear war on Europe’s behalf long predates Trump. During the Cold War, French President Charles de Gaulle famously questioned whether the United States would “trade New York for Paris.” But the Trump administration’s hostility has given new urgency to Europe’s efforts to provide for its own defense.

Nonetheless, for Europe to assume responsibility for its own security is not simply a matter of generating more political will, higher defense budgets, or better coordinated procurement processes. Europe must navigate a strategic trilemma regarding its nuclear options. European leaders have three goals they would like to achieve: credible and effective deterrence against Russia; strategic stability, understood as lower incentives for any state to be the first to use a nuclear weapon; and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to new states. Unfortunately, Europe cannot achieve them all. In fact, choosing any two makes the third impossible. If Europe chooses strategic stability and nonproliferation, it may not be able to deter Russia. But to fortify its nuclear posture enough for credible deterrence, Europe must either allow new states to acquire the weapons or sacrifice a degree of strategic stability. None of the available choices are ideal. But in the absence of protection from across the Atlantic, Europe would be best served by choosing nonproliferation and credible deterrence. Accepting a level of strategic instability in European-Russian relations requires assuming genuine nuclear risks. The alternatives, however, would be even more dangerous.

A Third Way To End The War In Ukraine – OpEd

M.K. Bhadrakumar

In an unguarded moment, perhaps, ex-UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson blurted out recently in an interview that the ultranationalist elements who rule the roost in Kiev are a formidable obstacle to ending the war in Ukraine. For Johnson, this might be a blame game to absolve himself of responsibility, given his own dubious role as then PM (in cahoots with President Joe Biden) in undermining the Istanbul agreement in April 2022 to rev up the simmering conflict and turn it to a full-fledged US-led proxy war against Russia.

What Johnson will not admit, though, is that the ascendance of the MI6, Britain’s intelligence agency, in the power structure in Kiev goes back by several years. MI6 was responsible for the personal security of President Zelensky. MI6 took advantage by positioning itself to choreograph the future trajectory of the war and subsequently in the planning and execution of major covert operations directed against the Russian forces — and ultimately to carry the war into Russian soil itself.

According to reports, the UK intends to establish a base in the Odessa region on the Black Sea coastline. See my article The Hundred Years War Donald Trump should know about, Deccan Herald, January 29, 2025.

Soft power from the rooftop of the world

Razib Khan

In 1915, nine lamas arrived in St. Petersburg, Russia, to inaugurate the Datsan Gunzechoinei Buddhist temple there. Russia’s last Tsar, Nicholas II, had approved its construction in the empire’s then capital. Erecting a temple on Europe’s northeastern fringe as the 20th century dawned may sound odd, but Buddhism had actually been one of the Russian Empire’s official religions since 1741. Hundreds of thousands of the Tsar’s subjects were devotees of the Vajrayana tradition; from Kalmyk Mongols tending their herds on the Volga to Tuvan Turks ascending Siberian peaks every summer to reach upland pastures.

Vajrayana derives from the Sanskrit vajra, a diamond-strong thunderbolt the storm god Indra yields, thus its alternate labels: the “Diamond Vehicle” or “Thunderbolt Vehicle.” Vajrayana is Buddhism’s third and youngest tradition, after Theravada or the “Way of Elders,” which is both the most ancient and traditional variant dominant in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, and the Mahayana tradition of China and Japan, which translates as the “Great Vehicle.” Theravada puts the onus on individual action to attain salvation, while Mahayana sects count on the power of supernatural intercessory beings, or bodhisattvas, to aid believers in attaining enlightenment. Vajrayana, meanwhile, though originally an extension of the Mahayana tradition, contends that enlightenment can be accelerated into a single lifetime through initiatory rites supervised by a teacher of confirmed spiritual lineage, often himself a reincarnated bodhisattva in the flesh (rather than an unseen spirit). These teachers are called lamas, the Tibetan word for guru, and Vajrayana is often termed “Lamaist” for their essential role. Turkic and Mongolian Vajrayana adherents also use the term lama for their religious leaders, illustrating Tibetans’ influence after incubating and nourishing this form of Buddhism for over a millennium.

North Korea’s Establishment of Research Centre 227: Cyber Warfare Enhancement


Executive Summary

North Korea has established a new cyber warfare unit, Research Centre 227, under the General Staff Reconnaissance Bureau. The centre develops offensive hacking technology that employs artificial intelligence (AI) for cyber espionage, financial plundering, and network disruption. Starting with a staff of 90 specialists, the unit will aim at automating intelligence gathering and bolstering the cyber capabilities of North Korea.

This step is a strategic enhancement of the regime’s cyber warfare capabilities, which poses a grave security threat to financial institutions, critical infrastructure, and government agencies all over the world.

This report, based on publicly available information and previous SpecialEurasia’s investigations on Pyongyang’s domestic and foreign politics, aims to assess the establishment of North Korea’s Research Centre 227, its implications for cyber warfare, and the associated security risks.

The Robotics Landscape in Europe: Current Trends and Future Prospects


Executive Summary

The European robotics sector has experienced significant growth, with industrial robot installations reaching approximately 72,000 units in 2022, marking a 6% increase from the previous year.

Germany, Italy, and France lead in adoption, collectively accounting for approximately 70% of these installations. The European Commission is set to release an EU-wide robotics strategy in 2025, aiming to harmonise and bolster the continent’s AI-powered robotics initiatives.

While Europe’s position is strong, the continent faces increasing pressure from global competitors, highlighting the need for strategic investment and innovation.

Russia’s Information Security Industry Expands International Footprint

Luke Rodeheffer

Russia’s annual Information Security Forum took place in early February 2025. Participants included representatives from Russian security services, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and leading Russian information security contractors, including Positive Technologies (Infoforum 2025, accessed March 26). The forum highlighted the growing ties between the Russian state and the country’s information security industry, as well as increased international cooperation in this sector. The forum underscored the Kremlin’s continued desire for a sovereign internet that would be as independent as possible from Western technologies as well as the interest of other authoritarian states in the Kremlin’s digital sovereignty project.

The United States sanctioned Positive Technologies in April 2021 in connection with its alleged collaboration with Russian intelligence services in malicious attacks against the United States (U.S. Treasury Department, April 15, 2021). The sanctions appear to have had little effect, however, as the company’s operations have continued to expand. The company is listed on the Moscow Stock Exchange, and it has recently acquired technologies previously owned by the Russian cybersecurity company “Group IB,” whose founder and former CEO, Ilya Sachkov, was arrested and charged with treason in July 2023 (ServerNews, February 17). The company aims to capture a 20 percent market share in Russia’s information security market, which is projected to reach a value of 700 billion rubles ($8.2 billion) by 2028 (PTSecurity, February 20).

Is Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy washed up? - Opinion

Lakhvinder Singh

In the unfolding drama of 21st-century geopolitics, Northeast Asia is emerging as an increasingly pivotal arena. The US-led Indo-Pacific strategy – once hailed as the cornerstone of regional security and economic architecture – is now facing fresh turbulence amid shifting global dynamics.

As new alignments begin to take shape, critical questions arise: Is the United States losing its grip on the region? And, more provocatively, is China succeeding in drawing traditional US allies such as South Korea and Japan into its orbit?

Recent developments, including the Korea-China-Japan Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Tokyo and the Expert Dialogue held at South Korea’s National Assembly, suggest that tectonic shifts are shifting – albeit slowly and cautiously. The language of these diplomatic engagements reveals a subtle but significant recalibration of strategic postures in the region, raising both opportunities and alarms for global stakeholders.

Winds of change: the trilateral meeting in Tokyo

On the 22nd of this month, in Tokyo, the foreign ministers of South Korea, China, and Japan convened for their first trilateral meeting in over 16 months. The meeting was significant not merely because it happened after a long hiatus but because of the changing geopolitical environment that necessitated it.

US to give $73 million to aid Rohingya refugees, State Dept. says


The Trump administration said on Thursday it will provide $73 million in new financial aid to Rohingya refugees through the U.N. World Food Programme, amid concerns that aid cuts could deepen the crisis for the world's largest stateless population.

"This food and nutrition support through @WFP will provide critically needed food and nutrition assistance for more than one million people," U.S. State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce said in a post on X. "It is important that our international partners engage with sharing the burden with life-saving assistance such as this."

The infusion comes as U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration have made sweeping cuts to foreign assistance as part of his "America First" agenda and wider efforts to drastically cut federal spending and dismantle parts of the U.S. government.

Two United Nations agencies had warned that a funding deficit would curb rations for the Rohingya in Bangladesh who have fled violence in neighboring Myanmar for the past eight years. Refugees have worried that cuts would worsen hunger, curtail critical healthcare and fuel crime.

US is pushing more expansive minerals deal with Ukraine, sources say

Erin Banco, Andrea Shalal and Gram Slattery

The Trump administration has proposed a new, more expansive minerals deal with Ukraine, according to three people familiar with the ongoing negotiations and a summary of a draft proposal obtained by Reuters.

The U.S. has revised its original proposal, said the sources, and it gives Ukraine no future security guarantees but requires it to contribute to a joint investment fund all income from the use of natural resources managed by state and private enterprises across Ukrainian territory.

The terms put forward by Washington go well beyond the deal discussed in the days leading up to the contentious Oval Office meeting last month between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has been leading negotiations for the United States, said one of the sources.

Bessent did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The proposal makes no mention of the U.S. taking ownership of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, according to the summary - something Trump had talked about.

US Military Needs ‘Software Literate’ Workforce, Not Just Coders

Shaun Waterman

To make the best use of the technological advantage offered by America’s economy, the U.S. military doesn’t need squadrons of coders writing programs—it needs a “software literate” workforce that knows the right questions to ask of technology contractors, according to a new report from a blue ribbon commission of current and former government officials and technology executives.

The final report of the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare also recommends that the Department of Defense’s Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) establish an “enterprise data repository” to collate all the data collected by the different military services and agencies and assemble it into sets “readily usable for analysis and refinement for AI training, functional, and operational pipelines.”

Reform of the DOD’s test and evaluation procedures was also among the report’s nine recommendations, commission members said during a launch event March 27.

There was a palpable sense of excitement among commission members at the window of opportunity offered by the new administration, along with an urgency to meet the threat of a rising China.

“Defense tech is the new crypto,” said commission member Tyler Sweatt, CEO of defense tech start-up Second Front. “Everyone wants to get in.”

America's academic brain drain has begun

Rafi Schwartz

The United States hosts many of the best educational and academic institutions on Earth, and this has been instrumental in securing the country's status as a 21st century global superpower. These schools draw students, teachers and researchers from around the world to help perpetuate the very academic superiority that appealed to them in the first place.

Now, as the White House places various universities and research institutions in its ideological crosshairs, the nation's reputation for academic excellence is in jeopardy. Prospective students and job-seekers must contend with limited funds, the risk of deportation or worse. Suddenly, the United States' global educational appeal seems conspicuously less appealing. Meanwhile, other nations are noting the change, with some making plans to capitalize on America's waning collegiate pull.

'Fire sale on American academics'

"We are witnessing a new brain drain," said Aix Marseille University President Eric Berton in early March, after announcing a new "safe space for science" initiative to help American researchers continue their work at his school in France. So far the project has attracted more than 50 American researchers who have applied to bring their expertise overseas, a university spokesperson said. Universities worldwide have "reported seeing an uptick in applications from U.S.-based researchers" wary of the "increasingly uncertain climate" of the Trump administration, Science.org said. Many institutions see an opportunity to "attract new talent and reverse the steady migration of scientists to the U.S. in recent decades."

What Washington Keeps Getting Wrong in War Planning - Analysis

Andrew L. Stigler and James Guimond

As the world observed Russia preparing to invade Ukraine in early 2022, the most common prediction across the U.S. national security community was that the Russian military would overwhelm the Ukrainian defenders in short order. Russia’s 900,000 active-duty personnel, 2 million reserve forces, and $45 billion defense budget dwarfed that of Ukraine, which had an estimated 196,000 active-duty troops, 900,000 reservists, and defense spending one-10th that of Russia at the time of the invasion. By one account, Gen. Mark Milley, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, privately predicted to members of Congress that Ukraine would “fall in 72 hours.” It appeared likely that the world would witness the first conquest of a European nation since the end of World War II over 75 years ago.

Moscow’s mis-assessment has cost Russia billions of dollars, resulted in hundreds of thousands of Russian causalities, and cratered parts of the Russian economy. Putin might not have attacked if he had accurately anticipated the significant struggle that would ensue. But the West’s miscalculation almost certainly delayed critical military assistance and reduced the potential for NATO member states to do more to strengthen Ukraine’s defense at the outset.


Consolidating Europe’s Eastern Frontiers: the Options for Ukraine and the Continent

Andriy Zagorodnyuk, Alina Frolova and Oleksandr Khara

Almost two months into President Trump’s tenure in the White House, his promised and highly publicised quick resolution of Russia’s war in Ukraine remains as unclear and confusing as ever. Following a controversial Oval Office meeting with President Zelensky, Ukraine took steps to mend relations with the US administration, first proposing a staged ceasefire, later accepting a US proposal for a 30-day ceasefire and most recently a ceasefire on energy infrastructure.

Moscow’s position – that it seeks a comprehensive agreement rather than interim measures – is a familiar tactic. Russia wants to signal that it is in no hurry, while continuing to use violence as leverage against Ukraine and, more importantly, against a US administration eager for a quick resolution. It remains highly uncertain whether any ceasefire will actually take hold and be upheld – and, crucially, whether the US will press for more concessions from Russia or from Ukraine.

For Ukraine, the prospect of a sustainable end to the war is undoubtedly a commendable goal. There is no doubt that the country is suffering gravely from the violence, and peace remains its greatest aspiration. However, the credibility and reliability of any peace arrangements are absolutely critical to ensure – peace will only be as robust as the means by which it is protected.

How the Signal Chat Leak Makes the NSA’s Job Harder - Analysis

Bruce Schneier

U.S. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, who started the now-infamous group chat coordinating a U.S. attack against the Yemen-based Houthis on March 15, is seemingly now suggesting that the secure messaging service Signal has security vulnerabilities.

“I didn’t see this loser in the group,” Waltz told Fox News about Atlantic editor in chief Jeffrey Goldberg, whom Waltz invited to the chat. “Whether he did it deliberately or it happened in some other technical mean, is something we’re trying to figure out.”

Seizing Russian Assets Isn’t as Easy as It Sounds

Charles Lichfield

The United States’ shocking turn against Ukraine has finally brought Europe’s previously academic debate on immobilized Russian sovereign assets to the fore. Since Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s humiliation in the Oval Office in late February and U.S. President Donald Trump’s temporary pause on all weapons deliveries to Ukraine, an implicit European taboo on seizing the assets and transferring them to Kyiv has been broken.

Days after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Group of Seven agreed to block the Russian Central Bank’s access to the $300 billion monetary reserves that it still held in the West—mainly in Europe and Japan. Russia’s National Welfare Fund’s holdings were also affected. Russia had predominantly been parking its cash in safe sovereign debt, which it was purchasing through the Belgium-based central securities depository Euroclear. The sum of 183 billion euros ($197.6 billion) that has accumulated there is made of more than 10 currencies, including U.S. dollars.


Silicon Persia: Iran’s AI Aspirations and the Global Tech Order


Executive Summary

This report examines Iran’s strategic advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), as President Pezeshkian has reaffirmed his administration’s commitment to advancing this sector. The Iranian government has committed $115 million to AI research and aims to position itself as a regional leader in this field.

At the Iran Corridor 2025 conference in the UAE on 3 February 2025, Iran proposed AI partnerships with Persian Gulf states, leveraging its expertise alongside regional investment and infrastructure. On 15 March 2025, Iran unveiled a prototype of its national AI platform, with a stable version expected within a year.

WriteWise Review – Write Entire Drafts with AI

Sophia Sipos

Starting a research paper is often the hardest part. Many researchers struggle with writer’s block and structuring ideas – the main cause of procrastination. WriteWise is an AI tool that aims to solve this by generating a structured first draft quickly, allowing users to spend time focusing on refining arguments and integrating references. So, does it make writing easier? In this review, we explore WriteWise’s features, effectiveness, and whether it can transform the writing process.

What makes WriteWise different?

WriteWise specializes in generating first-draft manuscripts from scratch. Most academic AI writing tools are designed for editing and refining existing papers, however, WriteWise is designed to tackle the hardest part of writing – starting. Once a draft is generated, it also offers tools to help refine and polish the manuscript.

Unlike generic AI tools, WriteWise incorporates established linguistic theories, including those of John Swales, whose research on academic discourse has shaped how scholarly writing is structured. Swales’ work defined WriteWise’s drafting approach, ensuring that outputs align with academic conventions.

Another key feature is the guided questions, meaning users don’t need advanced AI prompting skills to generate comprehensive papers. Users are guided through targeted follow-up questions to ensure sufficient information. A proprietary “mega prompt” system is then used to generate a draft of 4,000+ words.

When Technology Transforms War: Legal and Ethical Considerations

Aleksaundra Handrinos

Rapidly developing new technologies such as drones, lethal autonomous weapon systems, and artificial intelligence are creating a modern revolution in military affairs that poses legal and ethical questions about warfare.

So said William Renn Gade, deputy general counsel for intelligence and security with the Department of Defense, when he recently explored the impact of technological advancements on the law of warfare as part of the “Lawfully Speaking: A Forum on Law & Ethics” series hosted by the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology (CMIST).

Warfare today has moved beyond the steel, gunpowder, rifled muskets, and traditional battlefields of the past into a world of artificial intelligence (AI) and space. For this reason, Gade offers legal guidance to senior leaders on intelligence, cyber, space, sensitive activities, security, AI, and advanced technology. A former Army officer, he also has served as general counsel for the Defense Intelligence Agency and as senior legal counsel at the National Counterterrorism Center and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.

1 April 2025

Conflict in India’s Manipur Takes a New Turn With Intra-Community Clashes

Rajeev Bhattacharyya

The Indian government’s efforts to normalize the situation in conflict-ridden Manipur has met with limited success, revealing the deep and multi-layered faultlines in the border state that has been burning for almost two years.

Supreme Court Justice B R. Gavai, who had led a delegation of five Supreme Court judges as part of the National Legal Services Authority’s initiative to monitor efforts for supporting communities impacted by violence in Manipur, has described the situation in the state as a “difficult phase.”

Ethnic clashes erupted in Manipur on May 3, 2023. In the 22 months since, the violence has claimed around 250 lives and displaced nearly 60,000 people. Many of those displaced from their homes are lodged in relief camps. The government’s inability to check the violence has provoked sharp criticism from different quarters, including global organizations.

On February 13, Manipur’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government was suspended and President’s Rule (Federal Rule) was imposed.

Since then, the government has unleashed efforts aimed at making the state free from violence and restoring communication through roads that different communities engaged in the conflict blocked for several months.

How India Is Responding to Trump: Five Takeaways from a Trip to New Delhi

David Sacks and Paul B. Stares

We recently returned from one week of meetings in New Delhi with a range of think tank experts, academics, and government officials. Our visit occurred following the Oval Office confrontation between Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and President Donald Trump and coincided with negotiations between the United States and Ukraine in Saudi Arabia. The prospect of a U.S.-Russia rapprochement and a U.S.-China deal dominated our conversations. Below are five principal takeaways of what we heard about U.S.-India relations, how India sees its role in the Indo-Pacific, and how it plans to navigate a second Trump administration.

India views Trump’s pivot toward Russia as a vindication of its stance on the war in Ukraine.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, India refrained from signing on to multilateral sanctions and instead took advantage of the low price of Russian oil. Whereas Russian crude oil accounted for only one percent of India’s oil imports on the eve of the war, this has now surged to 40 percent, and Russia is currently India’s top supplier of crude oil. Russia and India also have a long-standing security relationship, with Russian equipment accounting for over 60 percent of India’s military hardware. Indian elites describe Russia as a trusted, reliable partner, with one scholar even describing Moscow to us as a “beacon of light.”


Indians spent 1.1 lakh crore hours staring at smartphones to make many richer

Gourab Das

What's your usual view when you get on a metro, bus, or even see family members at a dining table in a restaurant? You’ll likely find most of them with their heads down, engrossed in their smartphones. While critics blame the government for recent economic slowdowns, and India's growth is set to hit a four-year low due to weaker consumer spending, smartphone users show no signs of slowing down, helping social media influencers and businesses make more money.

In a country witnessing rapid Internet adoption, with smartphones available on offers almost every day and e-commerce companies rolling out new sale seasons every month, new data shows that Indians have spent over a trillion hours glued to their smartphones—while social media and OTT platforms cash in. India is a goldmine for driving Internet data sales, as citizens of the world's most populous country stay hooked to their screens, from watching viral videos and Oscar winners to booking international trips.
Indians spend 1.1 lakh crores staring at smartphonesIndians collectively spent 1.1 lakh crore hours staring at their smartphones in 2024, according to management consultant EY, as cheap internet makes platforms from Instagram to Netflix more accessible to the world’s most populous nation.

On average, they spent five hours daily on the mobile screen, nearly 70% of it devoted to social media platforms, gaming, and videos, EY said in its annual entertainment report published Thursday.

Experts warn Pentagon to embrace software-defined warfare to counter China’s military advantage

Carley Welch

If the US wants to win a war against its adversaries, namely China, the Pentagon must get serious about implementing software-defined warfare, experts from the Atlantic Council said Wednesday.

The Atlantic Council’s new report “Commission on Software-defined Warfare” outlines recommendations for developing a military that pivots from the sole use of legacy hardware and processes to software-defined warfare — a software-centric, hardware-enabled approach that focuses on the continuous integration of cutting-edge, interoperable tech.

When asked what would happen if the Pentagon did not implement software-defined warfare sooner rather than later, Commission Director of the report Stephen Rodriguez told reporters at a Defense Writers Group event, “we lose to China.” Therefore, he said, the recommendations focus on the “near term” before 2027, when several defense leaders theorize that ​​China will invade Taiwan.

“China’s outproducing us in ships, munitions and other systems,” Peter Modigliani, one of the authors of the report and a senior advisor at Govini, added. “So that’s where software is going to be the differentiator. Harnessing America’s commercial advantage in a military standpoint, to then have that so we can rapidly upgrade legacy systems, design new weapon systems, and then have the rapid decision support from C2 [command and control] to logistics, and have that rapid iterative cycle. That’s going to be an advantage.”

Crouching Panda, Hidden Dragon: Contesting Chinese Subversion in the Middle East and Central Asia

Steve Ferenzi & David Harden

Pandas, Dragons, and Irregular Deterrence—oh my!

With their charming appearance, gentle demeanor, and playful behavior, pandas are adored worldwide. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) deceptively uses this disarming motif to present itself as a gentle giant while obfuscating its global predatory, neocolonial behavior. But hiding inside the PRC’s cheap panda suit is a red dragon seeking to prey on the Middle East and Central Asia. Unfortunately, the singular U.S. focus on Taiwan creates blinders enabling the PRC to “securitize its greater periphery” by capturing strategic geography and human terrain globally beyond the Indo-Pacific. To comprehensively shape PRC decision calculus over Taiwan and other areas of U.S. national interest, the United States must exploit outsized gray zone deterrence opportunities via irregular warfare in the Central Region. Otherwise, bureaucratic and cognitive stovepipes will impede application of a true trans-regional approach to “integrating” deterrence as U.S. national defense and security strategies call for.

Forgotten in America’s shift away from counterterrorism, the Central Region remains a core political and economic axis for the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to connect Asia to Europe. Beijing exploits access and influence opportunities along the BRI through economic statecraft with military implications—opened by perceptions of declining U.S. engagement and loss of credibility. Whether through “strategic fulcrums” like the United Arab Emirates or via states under massive debt distress like Tajikistan, the PRC can wield significant ideological, economic, and political power on the global stage. Today, we see the PRC increasing its role in regional peace, security, and diplomacy, while trade with the region has more than tripled over the past 20 years. As the world’s largest crude oil importer, the People’s Republic sources 46% of its oil from the Middle East. To wit—the PRC is truly beginning to “win the Middle East” at the expense of U.S. national security.

China, Russia, and the United States in Low Earth Orbit

Camille Reeves & Cortney Weinbaum

RAND researchers compiled publicly available information on space systems in low earth orbit (LEO) that are operated by a government, military, or commercial entity in China, Russia, or the United States. The tool shown below and the downloadable dataset contain the results of that research, along with descriptions of systems that could harm or hinder LEO operations (e.g., ground-based lasers) and of launch vehicles available for each country to reach LEO.

Users can view information about LEO systems and capabilities to explore trends across such attributes as country of origin and systems’ primary functions. We include terrestrial weapons designed specifically for LEO, such as ground-based lasers, but not terrestrial weapons designed for other purposes, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles. This tool is designed to display LEO constellations by system rather than by individual asset count. Full constellation counts, along with other asset-level details, are available in the dataset. The definition for each term and function is provided in the “Definitions” section below each tool and in the download file, and a citation for more information about each system is in the dataset for download.

We created this tool as a resource for researchers and analysts seeking data on China’s, Russia’s, and the United States’ LEO assets. This tool is based on publicly available information, and these data were current as of September 30, 2024.



Limits of Economic Deterrence in the US-China Tech Competition

Rogier Creemers and Louise Marie Hurel

A week before reaching a deal, US President Donald Trump said he wanted $500 billion worth of Ukraine’s critical minerals as compensation for having supported the country following the full-scale invasion by Russia in February 2022. The offer, then rejected by Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky, was followed by threats to cut the country’s access to Starlink’s satellite communications system if it did not reach a deal. At the core of the US government’s pressure lays, among other things, its desire to diminish US dependency on the country that holds almost half of the world’s critical minerals reserves essential for tech development: China.

Only 12 days following the inauguration of Trump’s second presidency, the administration announced a fresh set of 10% tariffs on imports from China—shortly thereafter increased by an extra 10%. China followed with a retaliatory set of measures including antitrust probes into US tech companies, 10-15% tariffs on farm products, coal, crude oil and farm equipment, and expansion of export controls on critical minerals that are essential in producing everything from smartphones to F-35s and solar panels.

Trump’s latest rush to secure critical minerals in Ukraine, a country that currently does not produce them (despite having them) and cannot ensure easy access to them during an ongoing war, raises the question of how ready they are to deal with pressures from their trade war with China – particularly in realms of high technology. How quickly and effectively can they respond to, and anticipate changes to critical supply chains feeding key sectors such as defence and technology? How effective have US economic deterrence measures been to stop Chinese tech?

China’s legacy chip buildout A new EU strategic dependency that needs de-risking?

Tim Rühlig

Introduction

Legacy chips have taken centre stage in the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China. The European Union is concerned that it might soon be overly reliant on legacy chips from China. Legacy chips are of strategic importance as they are irreplaceable in a wide range of applications, from the automotive sector to medical appliances or the defence and aerospace sector. The challenge is real but, contrary to a popular belief, it does not stem from overcapacity. This has concrete policy consequences. Instead of “protect” measures, the EU should focus on “promote” and “partner” tools. The EU should strive to maintain a significant global market share for European chip makers by securing access to the domestic Chinese market. Furthermore, it should promote the diversification and expansion of the global supply of legacy chips, not least by expanding European investment in third countries. Finally, it should adopt strategies to maintain European technological strengths where they exist.

Artificial Intelligence, China, and America’s Next Industrial Revolution

Dewey Murdick and William Hannas

The United States has faced defining moments before, such as two world wars, a cold war, economic stagnation in the 1970s, the rise of Japan in the 1980s, and the aftermath of 9/11. But today’s competition with China is something different. The People’s Republic is a rival that matches our economic scale, technological strength, global influence, and geopolitical aspirations. Yet, U.S. policymakers lack a coherent strategy to manage this unprecedented challenge. Instead, the country finds itself in a dangerous cycle of reactive decision-making that plays directly into Beijing’s hands.

American statecraft increasingly defaults to outward-facing tools that include coercion through economic sanctions and the threat of military action. While somewhat effective in the past, this approach is insufficient for the China challenge. In essence, the United States is reacting to China’s moves instead of pursuing its own positive agenda. Breaking free from this pattern means that U.S. policymakers must reimagine what success looks like beyond maintaining the current global order.

The United States needs new strategies, supported by research and continuous monitoring, to evaluate China’s competitive moves, track its technological progress, assess economic risks, and discern patterns in its dealings with other countries. Better measures and understanding of China’s own challenges can inform a proactive vision for securing long-term success amid geopolitical competition. Our current approach—a reactive patchwork of feel-good solutions that treats symptoms while ignoring the underlying causes—is a formula for defeat.

US foreign assistance freeze: significance for the Middle East

Laith Alajlouni, Hasan Alhasan & Asna Wajid

The Trump administration's drastic reduction of US foreign assistance to the Middle East, including a freeze on all foreign aid and the elimination of 83% of USAID programmes, marks a significant shift in US foreign policy. This decision, driven by the ‘America First’ approach and a desire to streamline operations, has had far-reaching consequences, particularly for key regional allies like Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, although military aid for these countries has remained largely unaffected. The freeze has exacerbated humanitarian crises in conflict zones such as Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, where vital services and development programmes have been disrupted. The cuts also risk diminishing US influence in the region, creating space for China, Russia, and other powers to expand their geopolitical influence. While the reductions align with domestic conservative views on foreign aid, they have sparked concerns about the long-term stability of the region, the effectiveness of the United States' approach to humanitarian needs, and the potential for fostering resentment and radicalisation. This policy shift reflects broader trends towards nationalistic, transactional foreign policy, prioritising short-term security and diplomatic objectives over long-term development and humanitarian goals.

Russia may be ‘dragging feet’ on achieving peace in Ukraine, Trump says

Angus Watson, Jessie Yeung, Ivana Kottasová and Anna Chernova

US President Donald Trump said he believes Russia wants to end its war with Ukraine, but suggested Moscow could be “dragging their feet” after the Kremlin disputed accounts of agreements made with the US.

“I think that Russia wants to see an end to it, but it could be they’re dragging their feet. I’ve done it over the years,” the president told the right-wing cable channel Newsmax in an interview that aired Tuesday night.

“I think Russia would like to see it end and I think (Ukraine’s President Volodymyr) Zelensky would like to see it end, at this point,” Trump said.

His comments came only hours after Russia said it would only implement a US-brokered deal to stop using force in the Black Sea once some of the sanctions imposed on its banks and exports over its invasion of Ukraine are lifted.

Following days of separate negotiations with Ukrainian and Russian officials in Saudi Arabia, the White House said on Tuesday that the two sides had agreed “to ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea.”

Drones, Mines and Snipers: Ukraine’s Front Line Is a World Away from Peace Talks

Marc Santora and Liubov Sholudko

Hunted by drones, stalked by snipers and surrounded by minefields, soldiers fighting in Ukraine can’t risk even a small lapse in concentration.

That is why Col. Dmytro Palisa, commander of Ukraine’s 33rd Mechanized Brigade, instructs his soldiers to ignore speculation about a possible cease-fire.

“They start relaxing, they start overthinking, putting on rose-colored glasses, thinking that tomorrow will be easier. No,” he said in an interview at a command post on the eastern front. “We shoot until we are given the order to stop.”

As diplomats and European leaders thousands of miles away talk about a possible truce and how to safeguard it, Russia and Ukraine are engaged in bloody battles as intense as any of the war. The furious fighting, tearing across the Ukrainian front, is, in part, a late play for land and leverage in the talks, which the Trump administration says are making progress.


ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY


INTRODUCTION

This annual report of worldwide threats to the national security of the United States responds to Section 617 of the FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act (Pub. L. No. 116-260). This report reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community (IC), which is committed to providing the nuanced, independent, and unvarnished intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and America’s interests anywhere in the world.

This assessment focuses on the most direct, serious threats to the United States primarily during the next year. All these threats require a robust intelligence response, including those where a near-term focus may help head off greater threats in the future.

Information available as of 18 March was used in the preparation of this assessment.

Airborne Electromagnetic Warfare in NATO: A Critical European Capability Gap

Professor Justin Bronk

Airborne electromagnetic warfare (EW) capabilities are critical to Western airpower, but they are also one of the areas in which NATO countries have the greatest dependence on the US military. The scale of this dependence represents a potential risk for the Alliance if Russian aggression occurs when American reinforcements and support capacity are either tied up with a concurrent crisis in another theatre or are otherwise unavailable at scale.
  • No single European country has either the existing foundations or sufficient suitably qualified and experienced personnel to rapidly be able to add meaningful capabilities across all aspects of EW. Therefore, creating end-to-end capability within Europe will require genuine multinational partnerships and cooperative specialisation.
  • The UK has maintained world-class signals analysis and mission dataprogramming expertise, especially through the Joint Electronic Warfare Operational Support Centre and the tactical data-focused Typhoon Mission Support Centre. However, maintaining these vital and scarce capabilities in electromagnetic support measures (ESM) and electromagnetic countermeasures (ECM) in an era of rapidly evolving digital threat systems will require increased investment and rapid adoption of AI- and machine learning-enabled toolsets.
  • The key to rapidly increasing European NATO’s ability to collect electromagnetic intelligence data is to ensure that all the electronic support measures suites being carried by non-traditional ISR platforms – such as modern fighter aircraft and UAVs for other mission sets – are used to their full collection potential.
  • A pooled multinational electromagnetic attack squadron procured and run by NATO could allow air forces that are too small to economically field dedicated EW capabilities to meaningfully contribute funding and personnel. There is precedence for this approach in other areas, such as the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System Force (AWACS), the Multinational Multirole Tanker Transport Capability fleet, and the Strategic Airlift Capability fleet.

Ukrainian Formations Have Largely Withdrawn From Russian Region Of Kursk – Analysis

Can Kasapoğlu

1. North Korea and Russia Launch a Large-Scale Offensive in Kursk

Tactical engagements sprang up across multiple flashpoints last week. Eastern Ukraine continued to see fierce fighting as Ukrainian efforts to stabilize the front faced mounting Russian offensives. Each belligerent made incremental gains in various axes across the line of contact, including in Pokrovsk and Toretsk.

Russian offensives in Kupiansk and Lyman also generated heavy combat. On the front near Chasiv Yar, the Ukrainian military fought to forestall further Russian territorial gains. Meanwhile, resupplied Russian forces mounted a push in southern Ukraine.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has heightened the frequency of aerial glide bomb and drone strikes. The VKS also continued to increase its use of Shahed loitering munitions. These drone salvos targeted wide swaths of Ukraine, including Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa.

International Geopolitical Finance Through The Lens Of Euro And US Dollar – Analysis

Xia Ri

In the era of globalization, the U.S. dollar has been the most important financial dominant force globally since World War II. The euro, on the other hand, is a later development. The euro was established in the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992 by the European Union to create an Economic and Monetary Union of Europe (EMU). It officially began on January 1, 1999, as the currency for 20 EU countries, with a population of 300 million people using it. Europeans pride themselves on the fact that the euro is the most significant result of European monetary reform since the Roman Empire. During the peak of globalization, for many years after the euro’s introduction, Europe openly declared that the euro was the primary force to counterbalance and share the global market with the U.S. They spared no effort in promoting and enhancing the euro’s status as the world’s main reserve currency. This narrative was only denied by Europeans after the Trump administration took office, in an attempt to downplay the longstanding financial rivalry that had existed for decades.

After Trump took office, as the U.S.’s stance toward Europe became clearer, the trend of ideological divergence between the U.S. and Europe grew more apparent. Consequently, the confrontation between the U.S. and Europe is shifting from politics and ideology to economics, industries, and finance. This has led to the question: Could Europe potentially short the U.S. dollar to achieve certain political objectives? This question not only involves the operations of financial markets but also touches on geopolitical maneuvering and competition in the international monetary system.

To End the Ukraine War, Trump Should Think Like Ike

Graham Allison

As President Donald Trump struggles to fulfill his campaign promise to bring an immediate end to the war in Ukraine, he and his team should review what another American president did facing a similar challenge seven decades ago. In his 1952 campaign for the White House, Dwight David Eisenhower pledged to end a bloody war that had claimed more than 3 million lives on the Korean Peninsula. Over the next six months, he actually did it. After winning the election but before he was inaugurated, he went to South Korea, overruled its leader, Syngman Rhee, who was determined to fight on to victory, and energized a process that concluded with the signing of the armistice on his 189th day in office. If Trump hopes to match Ike’s record, he has just 121 days left.

When Eisenhower became president in January 1953, the Korean War had been stuck in a stalemate for a year and a half. To remind readers of the history: the war had begun in June 1950, when Kim Il-Sung’s North Korean forces launched a surprise invasion of South Korea, advanced rapidly, and were on the cusp of taking control of the entire peninsula. President Harry Truman ordered General Douglas MacArthur and U.S. troops stationed in Japan to come to the rescue. The Americans rapidly stopped North Korea’s advance, beat it into retreat, and liberated Seoul. Without much thought about the likely consequences, MacArthur’s forces continued their march across the 38th parallel into North Korea, seized the capital Pyongyang, and were advancing toward the Chinese border. For China’s leader Mao Zedong, this posed an unacceptable threat. On November 1, MacArthur was shocked to find a 300,000-strong vanguard of the Chinese army assaulting American and allied forces. In the weeks that followed, what MacArthur and his fellow commanders had dismissed as a “peasant army” not only halted the allied advance but forced them back past the 38th parallel. Despite a U.S.-led counteroffensive, the war soon bogged down in a stalemate, though thousands of combatants continued dying each month.